Ivory poaching and trading in central and eastern Africa has recently received a lot of attention. On the one hand, there have been a number of analyses highlighted how ‘tusks fund terror’ for the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). On the other hand, there have been a wide range of news reports on the confiscation of large consignments of ivory, in Entebbe airport, but particularly in Mombasa, all of which highlighting the intensified trade in ivory and the important (transit) role of Uganda. This analysis wants to better document both of these points, by linking them together: it wants to explain the poaching dynamics in Garamba National Park (GNP) in the DRC, where the LRA is active. It particularly wants to show how the LRA is a relatively minor actor in poaching – it can by far not explain the strong intensification of elephant poaching in the park: whereas from 2007 to 2012, 7 to 8 elephants were killed in the park, in the first 10 months of 2012 alone, a staggering 50 elephants were killed. Related with this, the analysis wants to show how much of the ivory passing through Uganda, or confiscated in Mombasa, comes from GNP. Therefore, while calls from the UN Security Council to investigate the role of the LRA in ivory poaching are useful in bringing attention to the poaching problem, the strict attention to the LRA is not particularly helpful, and will only have a limited impact.
Le 9 et 10 octobre 2013, le Conseil des Ministres burundais a adopté un projet de loi portant modification de certaines dispositions de la Constitution du Burundi. Moins de deux ans avant les élections générales de 2015, cette démarche suscite de nombreuses interrogations. La présente analyse se limite à développer trois éléments d’analyse très précis. S’agit-il une d’une révision de la Constitution du 18 mars 2005 actuellement en vigueur ou de son remplacement par une nouvelle Constitution? Si, en effet, il est question d’une nouvelle Constitution qui remplacera l’actuelle, quelles seront les conséquences en ce qui concerne l’éligibilité de l’actuel Président de la République Pierre Nkurunziza? Enfin, comment peut-on évaluer cette initiative au regard de la Charte africaine de la démocratie, des élections et de la gouvernance? Avant d’aborder ces trois questions, un bref aperçu historique nous paraît utile.
On 9 and 10 October 2013, the Council of Ministers of Burundi adopted a bill amending certain provisions of the Constitution of Burundi. Less than two years before the general elections of 2015, this approach raises many questions. This analysis is limited to three very specific elements of analysis. Is it a revision of the Constitution of 18 March 2005 or is it a replacement by a new Constitution? If, indeed, a new constitution is to replace the current one, what are the implications regarding the eligibility of the current President Pierre Nkurunziza of the Republic? Finally, how can we evaluate this initiative under the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance? Before addressing these three questions, a brief history seems useful. (text only available in French)
Over the past years, there has been an increasing attention for the use of tradition-based or home-grown justice and reconciliation mechanisms in the aftermath of violent conflict. The Rwandan gacaca court system is often evoked in this global trend. The gacaca courts operated nationwide between 2005 and 2012. This policy briefing summarizes major findings and policy recommendations based on extensive field research conducted during these years.
We study whether conflict had an impact on economic performance across Rwandan administrative sectors six years after end of massive violence. Economic performance is measured using household expenditure data from a nationwide survey. Conflict intensity is measured using an index of excess mortality called WEMI (wartime excess mortality index). The findings show that economic performance was significantly lower in conflict-affected sectors, even after controlling for production factors (land, labor, education).
Sub-Saharan African governments have made significant progress in developing domestic local currency bond markets over the last decade. While this bodes well for their countries’ economic resilience and facilitates necessary investments, many challenges remain.