Feeling for the Intangible
A Framework for Donor’s Monitoring and Evaluation of Capacity Development Interventions

Glaister Leslie
Nathalie Holvoet
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Instituut voor Ontwikkelingsbeleid en -Beheer
Institute of Development Policy and Management
Institut de Politique et de Gestion du Développement
Instituto de Política y Gestión del Desarrollo

Postal address: Visiting address:
Prinsstraat 13 Lange Sint-Annastraat 7
B-2000 Antwerpen B-2000 Antwerpen
Belgium Belgium

Tel: +32 (0)3 265 57 70
Fax: +32 (0)3 265 57 71
e-mail: iob@ua.ac.be

http://www.ua.ac.be/iob
Feeling for the Intangible: A Framework for Donor’s Monitoring and Evaluation of Capacity Development Interventions

Glaister Leslie*
Nathalie Holvoet**

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* Glaister is an alumnus from the IOB who was awarded the 2012 Province of Antwerp Prize for Development Cooperation for his dissertation. He is currently working as a Monitoring and Evaluation & Surveillance Specialist at the international NGO, Malaria Consortium, in Bangkok, Thailand. He is from Westmoreland, Jamaica, in the Caribbean.

** Nathalie Holvoet is a senior lecturer at the Institute of Development Policy and Management (IOB), University of Antwerp.
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ABSTRACT

Despite the acknowledged importance of capacity development to developing countries achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and one quarter of global aid going to this purpose, there is little evidence of progress in this area. There are many reasons for this, of which one is the ineffective monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of capacity development. This paper therefore explores how donors can better monitor and evaluate capacity development interventions in developing countries. This was largely done by creating, for potential use by donors, a conceptual framework for M&E of capacity development that bricolaged key elements of existing M&E frameworks identified in academic literature. Using a capacity development project implemented by the Belgian Development Agency (BTC) in Rwanda, this framework was tested and adjusted where necessary.

The testing process demonstrated that the bricolaged framework adequately captured most organizational areas that must be addressed for capacity to develop, as well as most reported changes to capacity itself. The subsequent inclusion of other elements in the framework resulting from the testing process further improved the framework’s power. This conceptual framework can be integrated into the logical framework, which is currently the most common tool that donors use to plan, monitor and evaluate capacity development projects. Piloting of this framework is recommended, however, to further validate this paper’s findings.
1. INTRODUCTION

Capacity development of developing countries is considered central to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, and approximately 25% of financial support from international donors goes to this purpose (IOB, 2011). Despite the commitment by donors to increasing developing country capacity, a consultation by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) in preparation for the Fourth High Level Forum in Busan, South Korea in 2011 showed that there was little evidence of progress made in this area (IOB, 2011). One reason for this is that development practitioners rarely possess a blueprint or proper understanding of how to develop capacity (Engel et al., 2007). This, unfortunately, has led to capacity development interventions disproportionately targeting the ‘hard’ aspects of capacity, such as structures, skills and material resources, while paying insufficient attention to the ‘soft’ sides of capacity, such as vision, strategy, and culture (Datta et al., 2012; ECDPM, 2008; Engel et al., 2007).

Monitoring and evaluation of these interventions similarly often fail to assess whether the appropriate combination of hard and soft capacities exists (Engel et al., 2007). Traditional evaluation and planning models continue to be used, which seldom satisfy either donors or programme managers. Besides not adequately assessing all dimensions of capacity, traditional objective- and indicator-based models also fail to capture many capacity development processes in general, which are far more unpredictable than these models can manage (Horton, 2011). Indeed, a recent evaluation of Dutch support to capacity development programmes concluded that, given inadequate concepts and frameworks for monitoring, the effectiveness of donor support for capacity development was not routinely demonstrable (IOB, 2011).

Insufficient M&E, unless addressed, will continue to chronically undermine recent capacity development-focused changes to the development cooperation agenda. In the absence of evidence of effectiveness, inter alia, inappropriate interventions may persist; transparency to stakeholders may be compromised; comparisons of capacity development support will be difficult; and weaknesses in programme design and resource deployment will persist (IOB, 2011). As such, understanding how best to monitor and evaluate capacity development interventions is a priority to the development cooperation community.

This paper therefore focuses on determining how donors can better monitor and evaluate capacity development interventions in developing countries. Common donor approaches/challenges to M&E of capacity development are first identified, after which a conceptual framework is tested that resolve the identified challenges. The assessment draws upon secondary data (primarily reports from a selected capacity development project of BTC) as well as primary data collected via interviews with BTC staff. The data collected in this manner complemented and validated information aggregated from a literature review of academic journals and policy papers. Chapter 3 explains the methodological process in greater detail.

The structure of the paper is as follows: section two reviews definitions for important terms and concepts related to the topic, and existing conceptual frameworks for M&E of capacity development. Additionally, it proposes a bricolaged conceptual framework for M&E of capacity development. Section three presents the research methodology; section four presents the results of the testing of the bricolaged framework on the selected BTC project; and section five concludes and discusses the policy implications of the research findings.
2. **LITERATURE REVIEW**

2.1. **Defining capacity (development)**

A review of literature indicates that there is little agreement on what ‘capacity’ and ‘capacity development’ mean. For some, the notion of capacity development conjures images of skills training or the provision of buildings and computers. For others, capacity development emphasizes empowerment, participation and organizational development (Ubels, 2010). For the purposes of this study, the following definition of capacity will be employed:

“That emergent combination of attributes, assets, capabilities and relationships that enables a human system to perform, survive and self-renew (Baser and Morgan, 2008: 3).

Capacity development can therefore be considered to be increases in capacity over time. For clarity, the other widely used definition of capacity development – i.e. a purposeful, external intervention to strengthen capacity over time – will only be referred to using the term capacity building (Simister and Smith, 2010). Additionally, for the extent of this paper, capacity building will refer to efforts focused on institutions and the people within them, and not to individuals outside of an organizational context. For example, developing the capacity of farmers to employ more sustainable farming practices is not an example of capacity building for the purposes of this paper because these farmers are not situated within an organization. However, developing the capacity of a Ministry of Agriculture to encourage farmers to employ more sustainable farming practices is relevant to this paper’s focus. Development programmes often aim to strengthen various capacities of national institutions to increase their ability to fulfil their mandates and contribute to achievement of national goals (UNDP, 2010). This paper therefore focuses on understanding capacity as it relates to such institutions – not the development goal itself.

In the same way that capacity development and capacity building differ, so does the monitoring and evaluation of each. M&E of capacity development focuses on assessing the changing capacity of an organisation (or individual, or society). Conversely, M&E of capacity building focuses on the quality and relevance of activities involved in capacity building efforts, and the immediate changes that occur as a result. The wider changes resulting from any improved capacity may still also be determined using either type of M&E (Simister and Smith, 2010).

2.1.1. **Conceptual clarifications**

2.1.1.1. **Capacity vs. performance**

Donors are prone to view improvements in performance, which is viewed as the delivery of predefined results, as a proxy for improved capacity (Ubels, 2010). Indeed, a study by Watson (2006) concluded that there were very few examples in the literature of monitoring of ‘capacity’ itself. Monitoring of performance was instead utilized as a means of formulating conclusions as to the development progress of different capacities. However, while both are interrelated, they are not in fact synonymous; performance is just one component of capacity (Watson, 2006).
Further, experience with technical assistance has demonstrated that capacity development may not necessarily lead to increased performance, especially in the short-term. Patterns of both capacity development and performance are in fact uneven; the assumed cause and effect relationship is blurred given the variety of factors, including actors outside the system, that shaped both performance and results (Baser and Morgan, 2008). This distinction between terms is therefore important for the delimitation of this paper’s analysis: M&E of capacity development will be considered in a much broader sense than just the measurement of performance.

2.1.1.2. **Capacity as a means or an end?**

In the same way that there are divergent views on the definition of capacity development, so there are divergent views on its purpose. Increased capacity is viewed as both a means to a greater end, as well as an end in itself (Whyte, 2004). United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for example, situates increased capacity within a larger process of achieving development goals in areas such as health, education and agriculture (Otoo et al., 2009). Conversely, others argue that a country having the capacity to choose and implement its own development path is a development result in and of itself (ECDPM, 2008). The OECD’s 2006 report “The Challenge of Capacity Development - Working Towards Good Practice” acknowledges capacity as both a process and an outcome (OECD, 2006). Indeed, one study by Simister and Smith (2010) indicated that international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were often sharply divided about whether capacity building should focus on achieving immediate project-specific results or whether it should be in service of long-term efforts to improve civil society. Similarly, donor agencies often view capacity building as either a process toward an objective, or the objective itself (Whyte, 2004).

This distinction is not merely an academic one – each perspective on the purpose of increased capacity influences approaches to capacity building. As a means to an end, capacity building often addresses specific issues related to an organization’s activities within the context of a particular project or programme in which it is involved. In such cases, capacity building often focuses on technical improvements to service delivery to satisfy the requirements of the organization’s key stakeholders. These key stakeholders are, in practice, often the donors who provide project/programme financing. Fundamental processes of organizational change involving addressing the culture, vision, values or other core elements of the organization are rarely addressed – or monitored (Simister and Smith, 2010). Conversely, when increased capacity is seen as an end, capacity building activities focus on improving an organization’s overall (i.e. not project-specific) performance as well as its ability to adapt to changing conditions. The nature of such an approach often involves carefully examining organizational culture, values and vision and is often slow, complex and continuous (Simister and Smith, 2010). Clearly articulating these purposes is therefore central to adopting appropriate M&E approaches, which require adequate theories of change that set out both how organisations change and what the results of those changes might be.
2.2. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Development cooperation still has a mixed record of achievement in supporting the development of sustained capacity (ECDPM, 2008). There are many reasons for this, of which a few key ones are disagreements about what capacity actually is; uncertainty about how capacity develops; and ineffective M&E of capacity development.

2.2.1. DISAGREEMENT ABOUT WHAT CAPACITY IS

The development cooperation community lacks a consensus about the operational definition of capacity development as well as what results should be expected from capacity building efforts. As such, capacity building efforts often suffer from inconsistent conceptual frameworks, poorly grounded theories of change, and a lack of a common terminology (Otoo et al., 2009; Leblanc, 2012).

This lack of understanding of capacity is in part because some aspects of capacity are not readily observable. Kaplan (1999), for example, identified a hierarchy of capacities that must be taken into consideration for capacity development purposes. At the bottom of the hierarchy are elements of organizational life that are readily observable, such as material and financial resources, skills, organizational structures and systems. At the top of the hierarchy, however, are elements such as vision, strategy and organizational attitude, which are largely observable only through the effects they have rather than the elements themselves (Kaplan, 1999). As such, they are often omitted from explications of capacity. Consequently, measures of capacity often fail to measure all its relevant components – an instance of construct underrepresentation that often threatens construct validity (Shadish et al., 2001) and therefore also the validity of M&E of capacity building efforts.

Conventional approaches to capacity building tend to focus on the lower, more tangible end of the hierarchy. These approaches include one-off trainings and workshops, technical advice and project management assistance (Datta et al., 2012). Unfortunately, such approaches often leave the higher, intangible, elements – which determine the fundamental patterns in the organization, and for which appropriate indicators are hard to identify – largely unaffected (Ubels, 2010).

The ambiguity of what the results of capacity building are also remains a key obstacle to M&E of capacity building (UNDP, 2010). Simister and Smith (2010), for example, highlight the difficulty in defining what a positive change actually is. An organisation may go through a period of crisis, which is deemed as negative, but may in fact be necessary for its evolution into something better; the reverse may also be true.

2.2.2. UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOW CAPACITY DEVELOPS

The donor community often fails to realize (or remember) that capacity development processes often evolve in unpredictable ways. Their paths can rarely be anticipated and often appear to contravene the logic used in programme planning (Ubels, 2010). Indeed, capacity development often appears to emerge from a complex interaction of the tangible, such as the supply of resources, and the intangible – the power, incentives, and tensions that catalyse the motion, direction and change of an organization (Datta et al., 2012). As such, capacity building efforts that supply resources and tangible assets, without appreciating that the process also requires negotiation and accommodation due to power and political considerations, will largely
fail. Even after identifying the factors that can stimulate or inhibit capacity development, the context in which each intervention occurs may differ and evolve over time (ECDPM, 2008).

As such, standard intervention approaches that rely on a cause-and-effect relationship between actions and results often fail to bring about the organizational change and development results expected due to the inherently uncertain, ambiguous and contradictory nature of the capacity development process (Ubels, 2010). This is often the experience of development agencies, which often apply formal results-based management/logical framework approaches rigidly to programme design (Watson, 2006).

Further, sustainable development and change take time. However, donor approaches emphasizing results-based management often stress short-term ‘products’ or delivery at the cost of the emergence of long-term processes of change (Watson, 2006).

### 2.2.3. Ineffective Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Ineffective M&E of capacity building efforts has been a chronic challenge faced by the development cooperation community and is the primary focus of this dissertation. The persistence of unproven assumptions and inappropriate interventions, due to insufficient evidence being available on which interventions are most effective in which situations, are some of the consequences of this failure to properly assess the results of capacity development work (Otoo et al., 2009). Indeed, Watson (2006) concluded that ineffective M&E explains why the reasons for partial or complete failure of most projects oriented towards developing capacity in the 1980s and 1990s remain ill specified. The inability to measure capacity and its changes further prevents development stakeholders from determining what capacities exist at baseline; where obstacles to capacity development exist and what programmatic responses best overcome them; and how much institutions have increased their capacity to fulfil their mandates (UNDP, 2010).

There are various reasons why attempts to monitor and evaluate capacity development have been so dissatisfactory. Among them include a lack of priority and resources by development stakeholders; disagreement over whether quantitative or qualitative measurement is the best monitoring approach; and a fundamental clash over whether M&E is for accountability or learning purposes. These will be elaborated upon below.

#### 2.2.3.1. Lack of Priority

Where capacity building is seen as a means to a broader end, M&E of capacity development is often subordinated to the M&E of the broader project goals. One study by Simister and Smith (2010) indicated that the pressure donors put on partner organizations to achieve results often causes a loss of focus on the means of getting there, which in this case included capacity building activities. In practice, few of these donors developed any systematic approach to carry out M&E of capacity building while pilot initiatives to improve M&E of capacity building sometimes foundered due to insufficient support from senior management (Simister and Smith, 2010).
2.2.3.2. **Lack of resources**

Some organizations lack the financial, human and technical resources to conduct effective M&E of capacity building. Substantial money on the part of both recipients and providers of capacity building may be required to conduct formal M&E and, given the already substantial reporting expectations that partner organizations often have to institutional donors, few additional resources will be committed to what may be considered merely additionally reporting requirements. Where M&E is often conducted, organizations may prefer to devote resources to monitoring other areas deemed more important than something as amorphous as capacity building (Simister and Smith, 2010). Indeed, core funding devoted to M&E, or M&E methodologies that can be incorporated into project processes are central determinants of systematic and effective M&E (Simister and Smith, 2010).

Additionally, some organizations, despite wanting to, may simply not have sufficient staff or technical knowledge to effectively carry out M&E of capacity building. A study by Ubels (2010) indicated that staff was rarely hired with a clear intention of carrying out all the purposes of M&E. Indeed, it concluded that unless resources and responsibilities for effective M&E were embedded in specifications for project design, M&E simply would not happen.

2.2.3.3. **Measurement or illustration?**

There is continued debate about whether quantitative or qualitative methods are more suitable for M&E of capacity development, i.e. whether measurement or illustration is better to capture changes. Some argue, for example, that if capacity building includes efforts to improve intangible organizational elements such as vision, values and culture, then it may prove impossible to quantitatively measure the wider results of such changes. Illustrating change by highlighting specific examples of changes may therefore be the most appropriate approach. This is especially so given the difficulty of determining attribution of organizational change to specific capacity building interventions – an ever-present threat to the internal validity of impact evaluations (Simister and Smith, 2010; Shadish et al., 2001).

The study by Simister and Smith (2010) also indicated that organizations that specialized in providing capacity development support and attempted to evaluate their impact often relied on illustration rather than measurement. The increasingly competitive nature of the development sector, however, has led many other organizations to prioritize ‘hard’ quantitative data as indicators of their success, whether or not these are most appropriate to effectively monitor and evaluate capacity development (Ubels, 2010). Indeed, because development banks and donors still largely rely on formal results-based management approaches for their monitoring that emphasize ‘measurement’ of results, many organizations perceive the use of qualitative data as less effective in attracting funding (Watson, 2006; Ubels, 2010).

2.2.3.4. **The clash of accountability and learning**

Accountability and learning are viewed as the two primary functions of M&E. Traditionally considered distinct functions, the development sector has struggled to reconcile both of them within M&E systems. Some prioritize accountability over learning in M&E systems, arguing that emphasizing learning is actually detrimental to accountability. Others are of the view that capacity development and other processes of change are often viewed in overly idealized, linear, terms that deem accountability an effective M&E approach, when in fact it may be
unrealistic (Ubels, 2010).

Many partner organizations, however, still orient their M&E systems more toward accountability (to donors) than toward learning. Donors have made sizeable investments in capacity building and these investments have been accompanied by traditional accountability frameworks that characterize donor-funding relationships. Due to the financial power of these donors, they largely determine how capacity building is monitored and evaluated and partner organizations may feel they have little to gain by challenging donors’ approaches (Simister and Smith, 2010).

Unfortunately, such accountability frameworks, which can be rigid and regulatory, risk stymying learning processes because they prioritize the meeting of pre-set performance agreements over fundamental inquiry that may lead to strategic changes (Ubels, 2010). Practitioners sometimes complain, for example, that monitoring generates information that flows from the implementing level to the donor level, with little, if any, analysis flowing back in return. Feedback is often only provided if the performance does not meet pre-planned targets and is often perceived as criticism, thus discouraging honest reporting and reflection on the part of practitioners. Monitoring is therefore seen as a ‘policing function’ in which practitioners provide data to their superiors that may be used to judge their performance and achievement of targets (Ubels, 2010).

In their defence, donors themselves must report to their stakeholders the returns to their investment. These stakeholders may include politicians, parliamentary committees, national audit offices and ultimately the public. These stakeholders are often unaware of the complexities of international development but still expect to be presented with evidence that their funding is having an impact, such as in reducing poverty or realizing human rights (Simister and Smith, 2010). Under such circumstances, donors deem project framework/results-based management approaches most appropriate to do this (Watson, 2006).

A more fundamental challenge to the tension between accountability and learning, however, is that they are considered distinct functions at all – that is, accountability is somehow not learning (Ubels, 2010).

2.3. Conceptual frameworks for M&E of capacity development

The conceptual frameworks presented here are divided into three categories: conceptual frameworks that emphasize the process through which capacity should develop; conceptual frameworks that emphasize the product of capacity building efforts; and conceptual frameworks that involve both the process and the product of capacity building. Each category will be presented below, along with associated frameworks.

2.3.1. Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework

In light of the emphasis of capacity building on the improvement of institutions, the first framework to be considered is the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework proposed by Ostrom et al (2001). The IAD framework is useful when considering capacity development constraints because of its multi-disciplinary nature, which transcends the theoretical and conceptual boundaries of any one discipline, yet is compatible with many of them. It illustrates the ways in which the attributes of a community; physical and materials conditions;
and rules-in-use shape the actors – and scenarios through which they navigate – in order to arrive at policy outcomes such as improved capacity (Ostrom et al., 2001). The framework offers the ability to analyse such phenomena at multiple levels, whether they be at the operational, policy-making, or constitutional level. The figure below illustrates the IAD institutional framework.

**FIGURE 1. THE INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK**

In this conceptual framework, the context includes the physical conditions, attributes of a community, and rules-in-use that affect how the organization makes decisions. Improving each of these elements would constitute one aspect of capacity development. The action arena is a complex conceptual unit containing one set of variables about an actor and another set about an action situation. An actor can be either a single individual or a group of individuals who have a regularized way of making decisions (Ostrom et al., 2001). In the context of capacity development, the actor may be the government or partner organization that makes decisions about how it will improve its capacity. In this framework, the incentives that the actors perceive in a given arena affect the patterns of their interactions as well as the outcomes of their actions, which have a recurrent effect on both the context and action arena. As such, the process of capacity building would involve engaging with the context and action arenas that result in patterns of interaction and ultimately capacity improvements.
2.3.2. **The Kaplan Framework**

In 1999, Kaplan (1999) presented six elements in an organizational setting required for an organization to achieve capacity. These elements, presented in order of decreasing importance, are below:

- A *context and conceptual framework* reflecting the organization’s understanding of the world. Please note that this ‘conceptual framework’ is different from the way in which we use the term for most of the paper, which is to refer to an analytical framework used by researchers to study a phenomenon (like capacity development for example).

- An *organizational ‘attitude’* reflecting the organization’s confidence in its ability to effectively engage, and accept responsibility for, the social and physical conditions in the world. An important dimension of this is the organisational culture - the norms and values that are practiced in an organization.

- Organizational *vision and strategy*, with a concomitant sense of purpose and will, helps the organization identify what its unique contribution will be given its particular set of abilities and strengths. Subsequently, it will identify the particular methodologies of practice, suitably adapted that will help it realize its vision.

- Clearly articulated organizational *structures and procedures* in which roles and functions, lines of communication and accountability, and decision-making are clearly defined and functional.

- Relevant individual *skills, abilities and competencies*, which are typically addressed by training courses;

- Sufficient and appropriate *material resources*. (Kaplan, 1999)

Central to this framework is the assertion that the less tangible elements such as culture, vision and attitude, are fundamentally more critical than the more tangible items such as individual skills. For example, skills training for staff are often unlikely to have anything more than a short-term effect if an organization does not have a sufficiently developed understanding of what contribution it intends to make to society and is not adequately structured to harness training and the acquisition of new skills to pursue that goal (Kaplan, 1999).

In this model, capacity is considered qualitatively different from the sum of the six elements and is expressed in performance (which differs from the position taken by this paper to distinguish capacity from performance). Additionally, capacity-building interventions must focus on individuals and their interactions as a starting point (Ubels, 2010).

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[1] Kaplan (1999) first introduces this element only as ‘conceptual framework’. Later in that same text, however, he refers to it as ‘context and conceptual framework’. Subsequently, researchers have retained the latter (fuller) name to describe the element – see Datta (2012) for example.
2.3.3. **ECDPM Framework**

The following conceptual framework presents a point of departure from conventional conceptual frameworks for capacity development. Instead of focusing on the process of achieving capacity development, the conceptual framework emphasizes defining capacity itself – i.e. what exactly is the end product of capacity building efforts?

In 2004, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) conducted one of the largest empirical studies on capacity development in the development sector. The study sought to investigate the capacity of organizations and groups of organizations; the endogenous development of capacity over time; and its relationship to improved performance. Using points raised by real stakeholders in 18 case studies, ECDPM proposed a conceptual framework that identified 5 core capabilities that must be measured when assessing the capacity of organizations. Capabilities refer to “the collective ability of a group or a system to do something either inside or outside the system” (Engel et al., 2007: 5). All five were necessary to ensure overall capacity but none was sufficient itself to do so (see figure below).

**Figure 2. ECDPM conceptual framework for capacity development**

The 5 core capabilities are:

- **The capability to survive and act**, which relates to an organization’s ability to have volition, choose, exert influence and develop with some strategic intent even in the face of resistance or non-cooperation of others, and not be trapped or immobilized.

- **The capability to generate development results**, which is the most common way of thinking of capacity issues, which is about producing programmatic outputs and outcomes such as...
better maternal health and declining poverty. This capability is often considered synonymous with effective performance management in the form of better service delivery. In this framework, this capability also views improved capacity as a legitimate development result in its own right as well.

- **The capability to relate** refers to the ability of an actor in a system to relate to others within the context in which it functions; to enter into (in)formal alliances and partnerships; and gain legitimacy among these actors.

- **The capability to adapt and self-renew** which refers to an organization's or system's ability to master change and the adoption of new ideas.

- **The capability to achieve and maintain coherence** refers to an organization's ability to carefully balance the need to specialize, differentiate and decentralize, from the need to adopt a centralized, coherent, and sometimes more general approach (Baser and Morgan, 2008; Engel et al., 2007).

These core capabilities (which overlap in some areas), when developed and integrated successfully, enhance the overall capacity of the organization to be productive, and can be used to monitor an organization over time. Their interaction and the relative importance of each capability vary with time and context, however. The framework is particularly relevant because the case studies on which the study was based looked at capacity in a variety of social organizations, including small organizations, nationwide informal networks, and multinational organizations (Engel et al., 2007). As such the capabilities are applicable to each level of human system, be it an individual, a team, an organization, a network of organizations, a sector or even a country (Ubels, 2010).

These five capabilities provide a framework for monitoring the capacity of an organization at a given point and then tracking it over time by serving as criteria for capacity and performance (Engel et al., 2007). Importantly, the success of capacity building interventions is then measured against their demonstration of having appropriately, effectively, efficiently and sustainably changed these core capabilities, in line with the strategy and objectives the system has set for itself (Engel et al., 2007).

### 2.3.4. UNDP Capacity Measurement Framework

The next conceptual framework, UNDP’s Capacity Measurement Framework (CMF) operates within the context of the popular ‘managing for development results’ approach (UNDP, 2010). The CMF incorporates capacity itself into the framework as opposed to just factors that bring it about, even if it is still part of a broader development goal. As such, it clearly states that capacity is an institution’s ability to perform, sustain performance over time, and manage change and shocks (UNDP, 2010). The figure below illustrates the CMF.
As illustrated in the figure, the CMF measures capacity at two levels, which can be considered as the product and process levels. At the product level, actual capacity is measured – the ability of an institution to perform effectively and efficiently, repeat good performance over time, and manage change and shocks as they come. These three components (i.e. performance, stability and adaptability) are themselves broken down into sub-components. Performance is divided into effectiveness and efficiency; stability is composed of institutionalization and risk mitigation; and adaptability is composed of investment for innovation and continuous improvement. In an attempt to situate the framework within the logical framework approach, capacity at this level is considered as an outcome in the CMF. At the process level, capacity is measured by the factors that bring it about – in this framework these are institutional arrangements and
incentives; strategic leadership; the knowledge and skills of human resources; and public interface or accountability mechanisms. In keeping with the logical framework, these are considered outputs (UNDP, 2010). The development goal is considered the impact level in keeping with the result-based approach, and each level is inextricably linked.

Central to the CMF is the assumption that the stronger an institution’s performance (i.e. ability to convert inputs to productive use), stability (i.e. ability to seek resolutions to problems and remove barriers) and adaptability (i.e. ability to adapt to changing realities and demands) is, the better it will be able to fulfil its mandate and achieve national development goals. Robust institutional arrangements; visionary, competent and ethical leaders; open and equal access to knowledge; and vibrant accountability and voice mechanisms are the drivers necessary to make this happen (UNDP, 2010). Programmatic responses can address each of these elements at the environmental, institutional, and individual levels.

### 2.3.5. **World Bank Capacity Development Results Framework (CDRF)**

The World Bank, in 2009, created the next conceptual framework presented. Referred to as the Capacity Development Results Framework, the CDRF positions capacity (to achieve a development goal) as an end, while articulating the development of ‘capacity factors’ as part of the process. The figure below illustrates the main elements of the framework.

---

**Figure 4. World Bank Capacity Development Results Framework**

![Diagram](Image)

- **Capacity for achieving a development goal**
  - Local ownership, effectiveness, and efficiency of resource use
    - Conduciveness of sociopolitical environment
    - Efficiency of policy instruments
    - Effectiveness of organizational arrangements

- Change process driven by change agents
- Learning outcomes

**Source:** Otoo et al. (2009)
The main elements of the framework are:

- A development goal that drives the capacity development effort
- Capacity factors that determine the extent of local ownership, efficiency and effectiveness in the effort to achieve the development goal
- A change process driven by agents of change that leads to improvements in the capacity factors
- Activities and instruments designed to achieve the necessary learning outcomes for the agents of change.

Central to this framework is the emphasis on capacity factors that impede the achievement of development goals, which are:

- The conduciveness of the socio-political environment to achievement of the goals
- The efficiency of the policy instruments and other formal means by which the society guides action to achieve the goals
- The effectiveness of the organizational arrangements that stakeholders in government and outside government adopt to achieve the goals (Otoo et al., 2009).

These capacity factors are the primary operational targets of any capacity development programme, progress of which can be measured using a standard set of measurable capacity indicators. In addition to emphasizing the importance of the measurability of indicators, the CDRF also emphasizes a structured change-process logic that it argues can provide concrete evidence of capacity building results (Otoo et al., 2009). This framework also emphasizes changes in the use of knowledge and information that empower local agents (Otoo et al., 2009). A unique feature of the CDRF is its assertion that capacity development is a process of organizational change, and learning primarily drives such changes. For that reason, the CDRF focuses on deciding which changes in capacity factors can be facilitated by learning, and using learning outcomes to drive activity design (Otoo et al., 2009).

### 2.3.6. TOWARDS A USEFUL FRAMEWORK FOR DONOR-FUNDED CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS – BRICOLAGING EXISTING FRAMEWORKS

Each of the conceptual frameworks presented above demonstrated advantages as well as weaknesses compared to the others. In our opinion, for example, it is important that a framework clearly incorporates improved capacity as both a means to an end as well as an end in itself. In this regard, only the CRM and CDRF accomplish this. The IAD and Kaplan frameworks both emphasize the way in which an organization can achieve capacity without emphasizing what the end actually looks like in terms of capacity. The ECDPM framework focuses on capacity as a product while failing to describe the processes needed to get there.

In other ways, however, the ECDPM and Kaplan frameworks are superior. In particular, they are heavily based on reflections on context- and time-variant experiences and are increasingly used among practitioners (Ubels, 2010; see IOB, 2011 & Lopez Acevedo et al., 2010 for examples). Meeting such criteria increases the credibility of the framework relative to the others. The table below therefore summarizes these, and other, strengths of the different frameworks.
Table 1. Summary of Strengths of Different Conceptual Frameworks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>FRAMEWORKS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emphasizes capacity improvement as both process and product</td>
<td>IAD</td>
<td>Kaplan</td>
<td>ECDPM</td>
<td>CRM</td>
<td>CDRF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on experience across many contexts</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Based on experiences across time</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increasingly adopted by practitioners</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinguishes 'capacity' from 'performance'</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledges both tangible and intangible aspects of capacity</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not emphasize (quantitative) measurement</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning central to framework</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawing on the identified strengths of each framework, a new conceptual framework is presented below which is a bricolage of the afore-mentioned frameworks.
Figure 5. Proposed Bricolaged Framework

- Development Goal
- Capacity to Achieve Development Goal
- Adaptability
- Stability
- Performance

**Soft’ elements**
- Context & Conceptual Framework
- Organizational Attitude
- Vision & Strategy

**‘Hard’ elements**
- Structure & Procedures
- Individual Skills, Abilities and Competencies
- Material Resources

**Impact**

**Final Outcome**

**Intermediate Outcome**

**Output**

**Input**

Resources
Important notes about this new framework are:

- It uses, as a base, the CRM approach of measuring capacity at two levels – what may be considered the output and outcome levels. This approach means that the results or outputs of capacity building activities, and capacity as an outcome itself, can both be monitored.

- The outcome level is itself split into two levels – an intermediate outcome level and a final outcome level. At the intermediate outcome level, performance is viewed as a key component of capacity, but must interact with other components – stability and adaptability – to bring about increased capacity. These three components are also taken from the CRM framework. Capacity as a final outcome, however, is still considered more than the sum of its components and, as such, is at a higher level.

- At the output level, Kaplan’s six elements of capacity are used to group the expected results of capacity building activities (hereafter referred to as ‘output elements’). These six elements were arrived at through reflection on extensive context and time-variant experiences and are increasingly utilized by practitioners. Grouping results in this way also serves to focus the goals of capacity building interventions as well. These elements are presented as ‘soft’ and ‘hard’, and on a balancing scale, to reflect that distinction made by the ECDPM framework, and the importance of sufficiently addressing each type.

- The theory of change undergirding this framework, especially between outputs and outcomes, is influenced in part by Engel (2007): the hard elements at the output level, when enhanced, may lead to increased performance more so than stability or adaptability at the outcome level. Conversely, the soft elements of the framework tend to lead to increased adaptability and stability. Additionally, at the intermediate outcome level, performance, stability and adaptability interact, emerging from which is an increased capacity to achieve development goals (final outcome level), which then results in actual achievement of development goals (impact level). See Figure 6 below, which illustrates this relationship between the output and intermediate outcome levels in particular.

The arrows leading to higher levels become narrower, more faded and increasingly broken. This indicates the decreasing confidence in attaining the next level of the framework. That changes at one level will result in changes at a higher level of the framework is increasingly uncertain the higher up one goes, given the unpredictable, emergent, nature of capacity and development itself. The introduction of the first broken arrow between the output and outcome level indicates the point at which stakeholders, especially donors, can no longer guarantee change.

[2] It is the lead author’s choice, however, to make performance a bigger wheel in the bricolaged framework – the three components are equal in the CRM framework.
**Figure 6. Theory of Change Connecting Outputs to Outcomes**

**Outputs**
- Context & Conceptual Framework
- Organizational ‘attitude’
- Vision and strategy
- Structures and procedures
- Material resources
- Individual skills, abilities and competencies

**Outcomes**
- Adaptability
- Stability
- Performance
This proposed framework attempts to resolve some of the previously identified challenges to capacity development projects. It first helps resolve the disagreement about what capacity is by providing the major components of capacity that must be observed in order to claim development of capacity. It does this, however, in a relatively, simple and intuitive manner. Second, it tries to resolve uncertainly about how capacity develops by emphasizing six areas that capacity building should target, which are based on practitioner experience. More importantly, it emphasizes where in the results chain donors have sufficient control over and which parts of the results chain can only be connected using plausible theories of change. That is, the conceptual framework offers a plausible means by which capacity develops while acknowledging its emergent, unpredictable, nature.

In subsequent chapters, this bricolaged framework will be applied to a BTC capacity development project recently completed in Rwanda to determine its suitability and make adjustments to it where necessary. While the conceptual framework provides a useful way of understanding what to focus on when monitoring and evaluating capacity development, it provides little guidance on how to do it, which summarizes the remaining unaddressed challenges to ineffective M&E of capacity development – how do you conduct M&E when it is not a priority, when there are inadequate resources, and when constant tension exists between accountability needs and learning needs? As such, subsequent chapters will use the above-mentioned capacity development project in Rwanda to explore methodologies and tools that are most suitable to achieve this goal.
3. **METHODOLOGY**

3.1. **CASE SELECTION**

In order to test the suitability of the bricolaged framework as a tool for M&E of capacity development interventions, we have confronted the framework with the reality of a capacity development project. Feedback from this application exercise was used to revise the framework where necessary until a satisfactory framework and approach to M&E of capacity development was determined. The case selected for this specific study was a BTC-funded capacity development project in Rwanda.

BTC is the implementing agency of Belgium’s Directorate-General for Development Cooperation (DGD) and supports more than 200 cooperation projects in some 20 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (BTC, 2012a). In 2006, Belgium agreed to implement a Capacity Building Facility as part of its commitment to development cooperation with the Republic of Rwanda. This led to the implementation of the 5-year project “Support to Capacity Development (SDC) in Rwanda” by BTC starting in 2007. This project was meant to offer support to training civil servants, boosting organizational effectiveness of public institutions, and strengthening Rwanda’s Human Resources and Institutional Capacity Development Agency (HIDA) whose goal was to implement Rwanda’s national capacity development strategy. This case study was selected because it had:

- A very significant capacity development component
- Project documents that were entirely in English, as well as project staff who could converse in English – the only language spoken by the lead author of this paper
- Potential to be considered a successful capacity development project

3.2. **DATA SOURCES AND METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION**

3.2.1. **PRIMARY DATA COLLECTION**

Primary data were collected by the lead author of the paper who gathered information mainly through email and Skype interviews, and general electronic correspondence. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with BTC project staff in Rwanda and BTC Headquarters staff in Brussels. Please see Appendices I and II for the list of persons interviewed and the interview questions asked. Official meetings at BTC headquarters were also attended, which provided a means of participant observation of how a donor agency monitors, evaluates and formulates capacity development projects.

3.2.2. **SECONDARY DATA COLLECTION**

An extensive desk review of academic literature on the subject of M&E of capacity development was conducted. Additionally, content analysis was conducted of numerous BTC reports and knowledge products associated with each project. These included technical and financial files; quarterly reports; annual reports; evaluation reports; lessons-learned reports; and minutes of steering committee meetings. This was done partly in order to test the ability of the proposed framework to:

- Clearly capture the changes that each project indicated that it made
- If not, determine what needed to be adjusted to the framework in order for it to capture those changes.
4. **FINDINGS, DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

4.1. **Introducing the Case**

The Government of Rwanda (GoR) has made capacity development one of its top priorities in recent years. In 2005, the GoR launched a long-term Multi-Sector Capacity Building Program (MSCBP) partially in response to evaluations of Rwanda’s first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that had concluded that limited public sector capacity had contributed to a disappointing PRSP performance (BTC, 2007a). The MSCBP therefore aimed to guide the preparation and implementation of capacity building actions in Rwanda and overcome the fragmented project- and programme-specific support that characterized capacity development projects in the past. In this way public sector institutions would be enabled to better deliver services as articulated in Rwanda’s Vision 2020, its second PRSP and the National Investment Strategy (BTC, 2007b). HIDA was therefore created under the Ministry of Public Service and Labour (MIFOTRA) to coordinate this implementation.

In 2007, the Belgian government began offering support to the MSCBP to help reduce the estimated gap of 65% between the cost of implementing the MSCBP and the resources available to the GoR (BTC, 2007b). The log frame of the 5-year “Support to Capacity Development in Rwanda” project, which was to be co-managed by HIDA and a small team representing BTC, is indicated below.
### General Objective

To contribute to the realization of the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) in the framework of Rwanda’s Vision 2020

### Specific Objective

**To strengthen the capacity of public institutions and civil servants to improve service delivery in Rwanda.**

- Improved performance of the trained civil servants
- Improved performance of the supported public institutions (e.g. increased demand for services)
- Improved performance of HIDA.

### Means of Verification

- Mid term evaluation
- Final evaluation

### Results

#### Result 1: Support the implementation of EDPRS through the provision of training and skills development for public servants.

- Progress on budget execution (in %)
- Post training satisfaction with impact, applicability and multiplicability of training by trainee
- % of trainings and skill development initiatives to female civil servants (target 50%)

### Means of Verification

- Financial project report
- Tracer studies

#### Result 2: Support the implementation of EDPRS through strengthening the organizational effectiveness of public institutions in Rwanda for improved service delivery.

- Progress on budget execution (in %)
- Number of CB strategies developed with support from the project

### Means of Verification

- Financial project report
- Activity reports of the project

#### Result 3: Strengthen HIDA’s role as the coordinating institution for capacity building activities across the public sector in Rwanda.

- Mechanism to channel training request is operational
- Number of public institutions relying on HIDA for CB
- % of donor support to CB is mapped and coordinated by HIDA

### Means of Verification

- Activity reports of the project

*Source: BTC (2007b)*
The vast majority of funds for activities were to be allocated based on requests that public institutions submitted in accordance with their sector’s strategy – a requirement predicated on the assumption that such strategies were properly prepared. As the project progressed, this and other assumptions were proven partially incorrect and led to revisions of project goals and implementation strategies. Further, HIDA, which was responsible for co-managing the project, was dissolved and a new agency formed, the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS), which focused exclusively on public sector development. Key activities during this period included:

- Supporting a strategic planning process in PSCBS
- Advocating for a strategic approach to capacity building under upcoming Belgian support to Rwanda
- Developing an organizational assessment tool and piloting it in different organisations
- Supporting the production of a Handbook for public sector capacity building
- Funding a long term M&E coach to improve the M&E of capacity building at PSCBS
- Funding new specialized staff in PSCBS to engage with specific sectors and
- Supporting a baseline study of the management and coordination of capacity building (Messiaen, 2012).

Please note that ‘PSCBS’ will now be used when referring to the activities of ‘HIDA’, unless intentionally otherwise. When the project ended in 2012, the BTC’s Lessons Learned report indicated that the project had achieved two major successes in supporting capacity building in Rwanda:

1. The inclusion of capacity building in the Government’s budget cycle, creating a system for capacity building management in the public sector based on the capacity building handbook prepared under the project.
2. The inclusion of a substantially greater allocation of funding in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda Indicative Cooperation Programme (ICP) compared to previous ICPs (Messiaen et al., 2012).

Testing the bricolaged framework (see Figure 5) on this project involved reviewing BTC project documents and conducting interviews to see if:

1. Project activities and outputs could be comprehensively captured in the three output elements: conceptual framework; vision and strategy; organizational ‘attitude’; structures and procedures; individual skills, abilities and competencies; and material resources

2. Changes to GoR capacities could be comprehensively captured in the three outcome categories: performance, stability, and adaptability.

The impact and input levels of the conceptual framework contained no sub-components that required validation and as such, they were not tested.

[3] The ICP is the partnership agreement signed between the GoR and Belgium regarding the nature of the development cooperation that will take place between both countries over a specific number of years.
The framework was also tested at multiple levels within the GoR. As the logical framework for the project indicates, the project focused on increasing the capacity of PSCBS (formerly HIDA) in particular (i.e. Result 3 of Table 2), as distinguished from increasing the capacity of public sector institutions as a whole. As such, in the first instance both the output and outcome levels of the framework will be tested on activities and changes related to PSCBS alone (see section 4.2.1). In the second instance, in line with Results 1 & 2 and the specific objectives of the log frame, the framework will be tested against activities and changes related to the broader government (see section 4.2.2). Indeed, as became apparent, both frameworks are interlocked – the outcome level of the PSCBS framework may be considered the output level of the broader government framework.

4.2. Testing the framework

4.2.1. Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat

Figure 7 below summarizes the findings of the test of the conceptual framework on the outputs and outcomes of PSCBS. Because it is essentially the 6 output elements and the 3 intermediate outcome categories of the bricolaged framework that are being tested, only these levels of the framework are presented. Green indicates that this output or outcome was reflected in organizational changes or activities as described by project reports; red indicates that organizational changes/activities did not reflect the output or outcome; and orange indicates that though the reports did not clearly reflect it, the importance of the output or outcome was alluded to.
The details of the findings of the test at both the output and outcome levels will be elaborated upon below.
4.2.1.1. Outputs

The table below lists key project outputs related to increasing PSCBS’ capacity as reported in BTC documents, and categorizes each one using the six output elements of the conceptual framework. If there was a project output that did not fit into any of the 6 output elements, it was labelled as ‘not applicable’. If, on the other hand, there was an output category that was not reflected in any project output, project reports were first searched to determine if there was a need in this category that the project did not attempt to meet, thus resulting in no project output. If this was not the case, then the output element was identified as possibly unnecessary.

**Table 3. PSCBS-related project outputs, organized by output element**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT OUTPUTS</th>
<th>OUTPUT ELEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline study of the management and coordination of capacity building in Rwanda’s public sector supported*</td>
<td>Context &amp; conceptual framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational development assessment of PSCBS carried out***</td>
<td>Context &amp; conceptual framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS’ first 5-year strategic plan produced***</td>
<td>Vision and strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic approach to capacity development in the next Belgium-Rwanda ICP promoted**</td>
<td>Vision &amp; strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Procedures manual, strategic guidelines and budget allocation completed to help PSCBS operationalize Capacity Building Fund**</td>
<td>Structures &amp; procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;E Coach provided to PSCBS to help implement new M&amp;E system***</td>
<td>Individual skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New PSCBS specialized staff funded to engage with different Sectors*</td>
<td>Individual skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS website, capacity development events, media relations, and best-practice documentation managed**</td>
<td>Individual skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with development partners facilitated to agree on key capacity development issues**</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * Messiaen et al. (2012) ** BTC (2010a) *** BTC (2011a)

4.2.1.2. Context & Conceptual Framework

The ‘context and conceptual framework’ as an element, according to Kaplan (1999) may be considered as an understanding of the context in which an organization operates. According to Kaplan (1999), who proposed the six elements that constitute the output level of the framework, the development of a ‘conceptual framework’ that reflects the organization’s understanding of the world is the foundation on which all other aspects of capacity depend. The two project outputs reflecting this category in Table 3 were both attempts by PSCBS to gain a better understanding of the context in which the organization was placed. Firstly, a baseline study of capacity building across the public sector provided PSCSB with an opportunity to become aware of the extent of present capacity development efforts in the environment it was
mandated to improve. Secondly, an organizational assessment of PSCBS itself provided the agency with information on its own strengths and weaknesses regarding its ability to affect the external environment. One stakeholder underscored the importance of having a contextual understanding with the following comment:

“In monitoring CD [capacity development] it is also crucial to assess context opportunities and constraints for capacity development (understanding the momentum, political environment, recent history of changes in an organization just to name a few, etc.). They should also be part of the assessment.”

4.2.1.3. **Organizational “attitude”**

As articulated previously, this category refers to an organization’s confidence in its ability to effectively engage, and accept responsibility for, the social and physical conditions in the world. No project output directly reflected this category.

4.2.1.4. **Vision and strategy**

While organisational vision provides an understanding of what the organisation plans to undertake to do; strategy centres on how the organisation intends to realise this vision (Kaplan, 1999). For example, the project was able to support the development of a 5-year strategic plan for PSCBS. As is usually the case, the creation of a strategic plan involves articulating a vision first, and this plan was able to accomplish that. Additionally, the project team helped PSCBS to strategically engage planners during the preparatory phases of the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP in order to achieve its long-term goals (BTC, 2010a). This was most evident in the facilitation of a study tour of PSCBS officials to Belgium. Among the different purposes of the tour was the project team’s intention to get PSCBS officials to meet key personnel at BTC head quarters involved in preparing the upcoming ICP and demonstrate PSCBS’ competence and ability to contribute to the planning process. One stakeholder believed this contributed to an increased focus on capacity building in the 2011-2014 ICP.

Another stakeholder indicated that an unclear project strategy at the project’s inception undermined its success – there was uncertainty about whether PSCBS was to use the donor support as a training fund that simply provided financial support to public servants who applied, or whether it was to provide more targeted capacity building support. Midway through the project, the project team’s recommendation that PSCBS stop the training fund mechanism and adopt a more programmatic strategy oriented towards local governments was accepted. In this way the project was able to help PSCBS identify a more effective strategy of capacity building.

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[5] Interview with International Technical Assistant, BTC-Rwanda project team, 10 August 2012.
[6] Interview with Junior Assistant, BTC-Rwanda project team, 31 July 2012.
4.2.1.5. **Structures and procedures**

This is one of the more common output elements in capacity development projects, and BTC’s project was no exception. Support, for example, was initially offered to PSCBS to create the necessary manual and procedures for the smooth operation of their above-mentioned training fund, called the Capacity Building Fund. This was partially in response to the seemingly ad hoc approval of individual training requests which lacked any formal connection to capacity building strategies of the public institutions or sector with which the individuals were affiliated (Messiaen, 2012).

Assessments of structures and procedures, especially the ones for financial management, are also important to donors because of the large volume of funds often entrusted to partner governments. BTC’s assessment of PSCBS’ financial management capacity had indicated that it was sufficient, perhaps explaining why no project outputs had focused on improving those structures and procedures in particular (BTC, 2012b).

4.2.1.6. **Individual skills, abilities and competencies**

In the absence of individual skills, abilities and competences, donors often adopt three approaches to resolving this: training existing staff in beneficiary agencies in the required skills; providing budgetary support to hire additional staff who have those skills, or having the project team do the jobs where those skills are required. The BTC project adopted all three approaches. In the absence of individual skills in monitoring capacity building projects, for example, an M&E coach was hired to train PSCBS staff in the use of the organization’s new World Bank-funded M&E system as well as oversee implementation (BTC, 2011a). Additionally, BTC provided funding to hire additional PSCBS staff to engage with different sectors. In the absence of trained, or additional staff, the project team also directly provided support where skills were lacking by managing PSCBS’ website, capacity development events, media relations and documentation/dissemination of best practices (BTC, 2010a).

4.2.1.7. **Material resources**

Recall that material resources cannot be considered the same as money. While money might be considered the input in the conceptual framework, material resources would be what this input has been used to provide, such as buildings, equipment, infrastructure etc. The lead author did not find references to the provision of, or increases in, material resources to PSCBS due to the project.

There was one project outcome “Relations with development partners facilitated to agree on key capacity development issues” that did not fit into any of the output elements. An analysis of this will be conducted further in the chapter.

4.2.1.8. **Outcomes**

Table 4 below lists the outcomes of the process of capacity development at PSCBS, as described in project reports, categorized using the three components of capacity: performance, stability and adaptability. These outcomes for PSCBS can be separated from outputs because the outputs largely centred on the ways in which the BTC project was able to strengthen PSCBS. Conversely, outcomes reflected the consequence of those strengthening activities in
terms of PSCBS’ ability to carry out its mission, do so sustainably and demonstrate an ability to learn and change where necessary.

**Table 4. PSCBS-related project outcomes, organized by outcome categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT OUTCOMES FOR PSCBS</th>
<th>OUTCOME CATEGORY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public servants in government institutions trained*</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guide for strategic capacity building in the Public Sector developed**</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS’ capacity building cycle integrated into budget cycle requirements across all public institutions**</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government allocation to strategic capacity building increased in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP***</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS identified as coordinator of all capacity building components of 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP**</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building Fund shifted from MIFOTRA to PSCBS*</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight responsibilities of PSCBS shifted from MIFOTRA to Ministry of Finance (MINECOFIN)*</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in project strategy approved***</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Learning clinics’ revived****</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * BTC (2010a) / ** BTC (2011a) / *** Messiaen et al. (2012) / **** Interview with International Technical Assistant, PSCBS, 6 August 2012

4.2.1.9. **Performance**

Performance can be considered “[a] combination of the effectiveness and the efficiency with which an institution fulfils its intended purpose.” (UNDP, 2010). Various achievements of PSCBS fell into this outcome category; indeed, it is the most common category that is used to indicate increased capacity. PSCBS’ achievements will be considered in terms of performance as a whole and not in terms of its suggested constituent parts. The deconstruction of performance into effectiveness and efficiency, as proposed in the UNDP CMF, from which the outcome level categories were taken, did not prove to be useful.

PSCBS was able to successfully support the training of hundreds of public servants over the project period, and this can be considered a (albeit crude) measure of the performance of the agency. When the project commenced, a Public Servants Training Fund was created to fund activities under Result 1 of the logical framework. Project reports indicated that at least 29 public institutions and 785 public servants benefitted from this support (BTC, 2010a). Support was given to trainings in information and communication technologies, English, the Judiciary, strategic planning skills, postgraduate and undergraduate/short courses, as well as support to local training institutions (BTC, 2011a).

[7] This was also the case for the other two components of stability and adaptability; neither one was deconstructed into the respective subcomponents proposed in UNDP’s CMF.
Another major example of the performance of PSCBS was the development of a Guide for strategic capacity building in the Public Sector. This guide, among other things, provides tools and procedures to conduct capacity needs assessments and create capacity building plans linked with government priorities (BTC, 2011a). PSCBS was also successful in getting the powerful Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) to require that all public institutions include capacity building plans as part of its budget cycle, thus mandating public institutions to implement the capacity needs assessment and capacity building plan tools and templates designed by PSCBS (BTC, 2011a).

4.2.1.10. Stability

Stability can be considered the “[d]egree to which an institution can identify and mitigate internal and external risk through risk management and decrease volatility through institutionalization of good practices and norms.” (UNDP, 2010: 33). Measures of stability provide a picture of an institution’s performance over time. The linking of PSCBS’ capacity building cycle tools to national budget cycles and requiring public bodies to communicate their capacity building plans to PSCBS, for example, served to institutionalize demand for PSCBS’ products and services, thus reducing risk of the organization becoming obsolete (BTC, 2011a). This was acknowledged by the project’s midterm review, which stated that “[t]he Project is embedded in institutional structures that are likely to survive beyond the life of the Project, as PSCBS receives high priority from the GoR.” (BTC, 2011b: 27). This has brought stability to PSCBS in terms of its long-term ability to keep improving public sector capacity.

The stability of PSCBS was also enhanced by a greater allocation of BTC funding to capacity building (part of which will go directly to PSCBS) in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP. The agreement also reinforced PSCBS as the coordinating institution for capacity building interventions in the supported sectors (BTC, 2011a).

Other indicators of increased stability of PSCBS and its work in capacity building were the shift of management of the Capacity Building Fund from MIFOTRA directly into the hands of PSCBS. This sizeable boost in the amount of funding given to PSCBS to administer indicated the increase confidence placed in the agency. Because the Capacity Building Fund was to be the focal point for capacity development nationally by funding and/or offering no objection to all capacity building activities in the public sector, its management by PSCBS reinforced the organization’s integration into the national capacity development strategy (BTC, 2010a). Similarly, responsibility for oversight of PSCBS was shifted from MIFOTRA to MINECOFIN in order to “[i]nstitutionalize the linkage of national planning, monitoring and evaluation, the budget cycle and the overall strategic capacity building interventions for the public sector.” (BTC, 2010a: 8).

Not all indicators of stability are positive, however. Project reports and interviews with stakeholders indicate that high staff turnover continued to be a major problem faced by the agency (BTC, 2010a).  

[8] Correspondence with M&E Coach, PSCBS, 10 August 2012.
4.2.1.11. **Adaptability**

Adaptability can be considered the “‘[a]bility to perform in future conditions and meet future needs...to anticipate, adapt and respond to an ever-changing environment.’” (UNDP, 2010). The Lessons Learned report clearly indicated that learning from experience and adapting was central to bringing about changes in the project (Messiaen et al., 2012). PSCBS demonstrated a willingness, for example, to suspend its training funding mechanism in favour of a targeted sector specific approach when it realized that the original approach was not effective; this openness to try different approaches is an example of its adaptability. This learning was in part facilitated by PSCBS’ conducting of ‘learning clinics’, which were internal meetings of the staff, with some external attendees, to discuss issues or topics.⁹

4.2.2. **Government of Rwanda**

Figure 8 below summarizes the findings of the test of the conceptual framework on the GoR-related outputs and outcomes. As mentioned above, green indicates that this output or outcome was reflected in organizational changes or activities as described by project reports; red indicates that organizational changes/activities did not reflect the output or outcome; and orange indicates that though the reports did not clearly reflect it, the importance of the output or outcome was alluded to. The details of the findings of the test at both the output and outcome levels will subsequently be elaborated upon.

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[9] Interview with International Technical Assistant, PSCBS, 6 August 2012.
**Figure 8. Summary of Findings of Test of the Conceptual Framework on GOR-related Outputs and Outcomes**


- **Adaptable**
- **Stable**
- **Performance**

**'Soft' elements**
- Context & Conceptual Framework
- Organizational Attitude
- Vision & Strategy

**'Hard' elements**
- Structure & Procedures
- Individual Skills, Abilitues and Competencies
- Material Resources

**Output**

- Reflected in project reports
- Not reflected, but alluded to, in project reports
- Not reflected in project reports
4.2.2.1. Outputs

Before testing the framework on the GoR, it is important to note that in the same way that PSCBS as a government institution is a part of the broader GoR, so too are activities to strengthen the capacity of PSCBS ultimately part of activities to strengthen the capacity of the broader GoR. Specifically, as this section of the paper will demonstrate, the achievements of PSCBS at the outcome level described above may themselves be considered outputs when considering capacity development of the GoR as a whole. For example, PSCBS’s ability to train civil servants in other public institutions may be considered an outcome of efforts to strengthen PSCBS’ capacity. However, the training of those servants is an output (i.e. an effort itself) because it is expected to lead to the outcome of public institutions and civil servants across Rwanda better delivering services (i.e. the objective of the project). The table below summarizes the project outputs at the broader GoR level. It is at this level that the project’s logical framework was considered, of which increasing the capacity of PSCBS was but one part. As such, the table below list PSCBS-related outcomes that are outputs at the GoR level, as well as additional non-PSCBS-related project outputs.

Table 5. GoR-related project outputs, organized by output element

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECT OUTPUTS (GOR LEVEL)</th>
<th>OUTPUT ELEMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guide for strategic capacity building in the Public Sector developed**</td>
<td>Vision and strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building Strategy for Local Governments validated by GoR**</td>
<td>Vision and strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS’ capacity building cycle integrated into budget cycle requirements across all public institutions**</td>
<td>Structures and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSCBS identified as coordinator of all capacity building components of 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP**</td>
<td>Structures and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building Fund shifted from MIFOTRA to PSCBS*</td>
<td>Structures and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversight responsibilities of PSCBS shifted from MIFOTRA to MINECOFIN*</td>
<td>Structures and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public servants in government institutions trained*</td>
<td>Individual skills, abilities and competences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government allocation to strategic capacity building increased in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP***</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes in project strategy approved***</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Learning clinics’ revived****</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4.2.2.2. Context & Conceptual Framework

Though no project outputs at the GoR level involved establishing a context & conceptual framework for the government, project documents indicate that this may have been because the GoR had already conducted various studies of the capacity constraints facing the
country. These included District Capacity Needs Assessments; a National Skills Audit Report; and a Mapping of Ongoing and Planned Capacity Building Activities in Rwanda report (BTC, 2008). This suggests that the GoR may already have had a reasonable conceptual framework, or context, established in which it was trying to develop public sector capacity.

4.2.2.3. **Organizational ‘attitude’**

At the GoR level, changes in organizational ‘attitude’ could be reflected in any of the plethora of public institutions that constitute the government, ranging from central government to local government to semi-autonomous agencies. No such changes were evident from project reports.

4.2.2.4. **Vision and strategy**

The creation of a *Guide for strategic capacity building in the Public Sector* helped the GoR clearly formulate a vision and strategy for the ways in which it would increase capacity for service delivery among public institutions and public servants. The GoR also validated a Capacity Building Strategy for local governments, for which the MINALOC subsequently formulated an implementation plan (BTC, 2011a). This plan should result in increased capacity of local government institutions for improved delivery as well.

4.2.2.5. **Structures and procedures**

The integration of the capacity building cycle into the national budget cycle reflects an effort on the part of the GoR to create structures and procedures that compel institutions to keep increasing their performance. Most of the PSCBS outcomes related to stability also resulted in improvements in the structures and procedures of the GoR in achieving its broader capacity strengthening objectives. These included PSCBS being identified as the reference institution for capacity building in the country, the Capacity Building Fund being shifted from MIFOTRA to PSCBS, and PSCBS itself being shifted from MIFOTRA to MINECOFIN. As mentioned in the 2010 Rwandan Annual Report, such changes reduce overlaps between interventions and improve the quality of capacity building interventions and ultimately greater improvements in service delivery (BTC, 2010a).

4.2.2.6. **Individual skills, abilities and competencies**

As mentioned before, PSCBS’s facilitating the training of hundreds of civil servants contributed to GoR efforts to improve the capacity of GoR civil servants to deliver services.

4.2.2.7. **Material resources**

At the GoR level, the lead author found no evidence of material resources being provided to any of the institutions that formed part of the GoR. However, inadequate funding to implement capacity development interventions in public institutions was identified as a risk facing the project, which would presumably be used to secure, *inter alia*, necessary material resources (BTC, 2011a).
4.2.2.8. **Outcomes**

The table below shows the changes to the GoR as a whole, in terms of capacity to improve service delivery, which can be ascribed to the different outcome level categories.

**Table 6. GoR-related project outcomes, organized by outcome categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project outcomes for GoR</th>
<th>Outcome category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Government allocation to strategic capacity building increased in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolution of HIDA into PSCBS</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Messiaen et al. (2012)*

At the outcome level, changes in the performance of different GoR public institutions were not measured. The project’s mid-term review indicated that trainings, for example, may have changed working procedures and decision-making in some institutions, but it was still difficult to determine whether there were actual improvements in service delivery (BTC, 2011b).

In terms of stability, the continued high staff turnover rate remained an indicator of the challenges the GoR still faces. As the mid-term review also confirmed, “*Even if the outcome is good and satisfaction high amongst individual trainees, the Project will have much lower impact and sustainable effects on the capacity of Rwandan public institutions if there is no effective staff retention policy in place.*” (BTC, 2011b: 27).

As can be seen from the table, at the outcome level changes were only seen in the area of adaptability. The increase in the proportion of funding allocated to capacity building in the 2011-2014 Belgium-Rwanda ICP was an indication of adaptability because it signalled the GoR’s increased investment in improving its public service by continual training, learning, and evaluation – a quality that is central to adaptability. If the amount of funding available for capacity building had increased only because the total amount of funding in the ICP had increased, then this would not have demonstrated increased interest in improvement. It is the increased allocation that indicates this commitment to adapting.

The emergence of PSCBS as the coordinator of capacity building is also a signal of the GoR’s adaptability. Due to various problems at HIDA, including the redirecting of HIDA’s primary funding source, the World Bank, away from the agency, there was concern that the agency would have dissolved and not been replaced by another (Messiaen et al., 2012). Instead, PSCBS was created and given a mandate that increased from being a project implementation unit for the Capacity Building Fund to supporting the capacity development of all public institutions across the country (BTC, 2011a).

4.3. **Adjusting the framework**

The testing of the outputs and outcomes of the bricolaged framework on the BTC project in Rwanda demonstrated that the framework successfully captured most of the changes occurring, outputs planned/accomplished, or needs identified, during the projects’ implementation. There are ways, however, in which the framework can be improved and these are articulated below.
4.3.1. **Identifying Missing Elements**

4.3.1.1. **Partnership**

Table 3 above, which summarizes the different outputs of the BTC project in Rwanda, includes one output, “Relations with development partners facilitated to agree on key capacity development issues”, that is not compatible with the output elements of the bricolaged framework. This output may be considered to be an issue related to partnership.

Partnership is indeed an important element that should be focused on at the output level. The 2011 annual report on the Rwandan project indicated that “[T]he project’s main successes were made possible because of the quality of our partnership and ability to work together” (BTC, 2011a). Interviews with stakeholders underscored this importance, indicating that partnership between BTC and PSCBS led to adaptability and flexibility that allowed the project to make changes to improve its effectiveness where necessary. The co-management modality of the project by PSCBS and BTC was particularly viewed as central to the project’s ability to be innovative. While the co-management modality is really an administrative/financial modality and less related to implementation of activities, the resulting need for the PSCBS project director to interact frequently with the BTC-funded international technical assistant resulted in increased partnership, as was PSCBS’s freedom to select project staff to hire instead of BTC, which was providing the funding. This partnership also led to increased trust and legitimacy, which was crucial to the project’s success (BTC, 2011a).

4.3.1.2. **Leadership**

PSCBS stakeholders also identified leadership as being important to the project’s success. One stakeholder indicated that specific leaders in PSCBS, for example, created an environment of psychological safety in which stakeholders were more likely to be open to learning and flexibility, and helped develop a subculture of innovation within parts of the organization.

4.3.1.3. **Ownership**

Ownership is another important and related element that is missing from the framework, but at the outcome level. The reason that partnership is being distinguished from ownership in the framework is because while partnership is something that donors have significant influence over, ownership is not. In both projects, BTC was able to do concrete things to bring about increased partnership between itself and the government of Rwanda. For example, executing the project in Rwanda under a co-management modality, convening multi-stakeholder workshops, and creating awareness campaigns are all actions that BTC had control over. However, while BTC hoped that this increased partnership would lead to ownership, BTC

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[10] Interview with M&E Coach and BTC Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 27 July 2012.
[12] Interview with M&E Coach and BTC Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 27 July 2012.
[14] Interview with International Technical Assistant, BTC-Rwanda project team, 10 August 2012.
could not guarantee that the GoR would form PSCBS after HIDA was dissolved to ensure that there was a national agency still focusing on capacity building.

The ways in which the lack of ownership undermines the capacity development process is illustrated throughout Rwandan project documents of both projects. The mid-term review of BTC’s Rwanda project, for example, indicates the ways in which some beneficiary institutions were slow in submitting project proposals to even receive capacity building support under the project, and rarely submitted progress reports even after receiving funding (BTC, 2011b).

Partnership is also not the only output level element that may affect ownership. The 2011 annual report on the Rwandan project indicates that “[o]wnership is also affected by the fact that there is a tendency of high staff turnover in the Rwandan public sector” (BTC, 2011a: 11). As such the inconsistent supply of individual skills, abilities and competencies also impacts ownership at the outcome level.

4.3.2. Incorporating the Cyclical Nature of Development

The project documents and interviews also demonstrated the cyclical and non-linear nature of the capacity building process that was not fully captured in the bricolaged framework. For example, initially, BTC helped PSCBS create the structures and procedures (i.e. an output level component) to operate the Capacity Building Fund to train civil servants. After noticing how training funds were being approved in an ad-hoc fashion that diminished the effectiveness and efficiency of PSCBS’ work (i.e. outcome level), the project went back to the vision and strategy (i.e. output level) of PSCBS to re-formulate it. In so doing, ad-hoc individual trainings were stopped and targeted programmatic support to local government was adopted instead, which promised to be a more useful approach to carrying out the mission of PSCBS. In this way, efforts at the output level led to a review of expected changes at the outcome level, which led to revising efforts back at the output level. Indeed a study of capacity development by ECDPM concluded that an incremental approach to development planning based on small experimental steps that adjusted based on experience, was more likely to be effective to fixed pre-planning (ECDPM, 2007). As such, the bricolaged framework must reflect the ways in which projects must be designed as complex adaptive systems, and not linear cause-and-effect ones.

4.3.3. Merging Intermediate and Final Outcomes

The bricolaged framework initially sought to separate outcomes into two levels: intermediate and final. The rationale for this was that capacity consists of a combination of three components: performance, stability and adaptability (i.e. the intermediate outcome level). However, the mere presence of these three does not guarantee capacity to achieve a development result (i.e. the final outcome level). Instead, capacity emerges from the interactions between these three components. The precise degree of interaction or amount of each component necessary will vary with time and context, however, underscoring the unpredictable nature of capacity development.

After reviewing project documents and conducting interviews, however, it is clear that the final and intermediate outcomes must be merged as one. This is because no measure of capacity as a stand-alone quality could be found that was separable from performance, stability, adaptability (and now, ownership); having “capacity” as a separate outcome level was superfluous. Increased capacity may therefore be considered to be the quality that emerges from in-
increased performance, stability, adaptability and ownership. While no-one is sure what the right amounts of – and degrees of interaction between – the four components is appropriate, each component seems necessary. As such, the bricolaged framework can have only one outcome level for capacity that consists of the four components.

4.3.4. A REVISED FRAMEWORK

Given the above-mentioned changes, the revised conceptual framework is below. Notably the differences are:

- The former ‘intermediate’ outcome level has become the only outcome level
- “Ownership” has been added as an outcome category
- An arrow flowing from outcomes back to outputs has been added
- “Partnership” has been added as an output element
- “Leadership” has been added as an output element
- “Organizational attitude” has been removed because there was no evidence of its importance to capacity development based on the analysis of project reports
- “Context & conceptual framework” has been simplified to “Context” to avoid confusion with the academic definition of “conceptual framework” (though this does not challenge the fundamental principle of the component)
**Figure 9. Revised Bricolaged Framework**

- **Impact**
  - Development Goal

- **Outcome**
  - Ownership
  - Adaptability
  - Stability
  - Performance

- **Output**
  - ‘Soft’ elements
    - Partnership
    - Context
    - Leadership
    - Vision & strategy
  - ‘Hard’ elements
    - Structure & Procedures
    - Individual Skills, Abilities and Competencies
    - Material Resources

- **Input**
  - Resources and elements
As such, the project’s updated theory of change, to reflect the addition of partnership and ownership, is shown below. Correspondence with stakeholders confirmed that performance depends more on hard elements and stability and adaptability depend more on the soft ones.\(^\text{15}\)

**Figure 10. Revised theory of change connecting outputs to outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OUTPUTS</th>
<th>OUTCOMES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partnership</td>
<td>Ownership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Context</td>
<td>Adaptability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vision and strategy</td>
<td>Performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structures and procedures</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual skills, abilities and competencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This framework also reinforces the horizontal relationship between performance, stability and adaptability. At one stage, consideration was made to situate stability and adaptability at a higher outcome level than performance, based on comments from stakeholders.\(^\text{16}\) The rationale for this was that increased performance, and its greater dependence on hard elements at the output level, was often easier to attain than increased stability or adaptability, which more often depended greater on the soft elements at the output level. As such, stability and adaptability may be best situated higher up in the results chain than performance.

\[^{15}\] Correspondence with Governance Expert, BTC, 17 August 2012.

\[^{16}\] Correspondence with Governance Expert, BTC, 17 August 2012.
This point underscores the fact that performance, stability and adaptability may indeed be suitable at equal outcome levels. Donors, instead must move away from relying so heavily on hard elements in their capacity development strategies and seek to balance, if not emphasize, the soft elements of capacity development to insure that improvements are seen not just in performance, but stability and adaptability as well. The present dissatisfaction with current capacity development results, which often are only seen in terms of performance – if at all – suggests that a new strategy (perhaps the one proposed here) is worth adopting. Indeed the framework has served to identify a fundamental weakness in capacity development efforts by showing an overemphasis on the hard aspects of capacity development and the consequent overemphasis on performance, to the detriment of stability, adaptability and ownership.

4.4. Applying the framework: operationalizing M&E

Now that the conceptual framework has been tested and adjusted, this paper will now turn to its application. BTC, like most donors globally, uses the logical framework approach to plan, monitor and evaluate development projects. Given its ubiquity, is the logical framework approach (LFA) compatible with the proposed conceptual framework? Further, can the conceptual framework be used to evaluate the project, as well as the project team itself?

4.4.1. Compatibility of the conceptual and logical frameworks

Before determining whether the conceptual framework is compatible with the logical framework (hereafter referred to as the ‘log frame’), it is useful to review whether the log frame, despite its ubiquity, is actually useful. While the project’s mid-term review suggested that the log frame might not be a useful tool to use in capacity development projects such as this one, interviews with stakeholders suggested that it was not the tool itself that was challenging, but how it was used (BTC, 2011b). Stakeholders complained about the contents of the logical framework (for example, the indicators selected to monitor progress), but not about the fact that it was being used. According to one stakeholder “I don’t want to believe 100% that the logframe is unsuitable for CD interventions. It also depends on who is behind the formulation process and what is being included in the logframe.” These findings were corroborated by recent research that indicated that it is often difficult to determine if the shortcomings of the LFA are because of inadequate application of the framework or because of the framework itself (Roduner, 2008; Gasper, 2000).

One strength of the logical framework is its ability to clearly summarize the key elements of a development initiative. Unfortunately, the logical framework is often misused as a recipe, from whose precise directions project teams should not deviate. Further, since agreements between donors and implementers are often based on the project’s design, there is often hesitation to alter the log frame, even when concrete experience indicates that it is necessary. In addition, projects are often implemented with the assumption that projects will unfold exactly as depicted in the log frame. Users often forget, however, that the strength of causality between the four levels of the log frame decreases from activities level to impact level, as external influences increase (Roduner, 2008). In capacity development projects, where the emergence of capacity is so unpredictable, this rigid planned approach often leads to frustration.

The logical framework should in principle provide teams not with a guarantee of

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[17] Interview with M&E Coach, PSCBS, 10 August 2012.
how events must unfold, but with a guide to how activities may contribute to broader goals. In fact the log frame should force organizers to articulate a theory of change, the absence of which undermines efforts to monitor and evaluate capacity building projects (Simister and Smith, 2010). In the case of BTC’s Rwandan project, the project’s theory of change was not particularly clear.18

The conceptual framework can help overcome this challenge by integrating itself into the logical framework. This is done by dividing the output level of each capacity development logical framework into the seven distinct categories of the conceptual framework, and dividing the outcome level in the four outcome categories of the conceptual framework. In so doing, the logical framework will automatically be imbued with the theory of change inherent to the conceptual framework (see Figure 10 above) and the risk of projects being planned that lack logic is reduced.

To ensure project flexibility, however, the specific activities that lead to outputs in the seven categories would not be fixed before project implementation and would be completely open to change during project implementation. Only the anticipated outputs would be fixed and monitored to ensure that all seven output elements identified as important to successfully increasing capacity are considered during implementation. Where no activities or results were planned in a particular category, the implementing team would be expected to identify ways in which those areas were already sufficiently developed. As such, project staff would not be held accountable for complying with their work plans – just their outputs in the prescribed categories.

Such an approach gives flexibility to the project team to learn and innovate. One stakeholder commented on the Rwandan project that the strategy of the project became more diversified and less planned, and some of the unplanned activities turned out to be key activities for the project’s success.19 Indeed, an analysis of the BTC project in Rwanda suggested that of the key activities that the project embarked upon, of which there were at least seven, only one was part of the project’s original design (Messiaen, 2012).

Even greater flexibility in project planning and M&E has already been introduced to some donors. According to Ubels (2010), neither the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) nor the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development Cooperation (BMZ) uses logical frameworks any longer when planning programmes. AusAID only sets objectives, and broad parameters and assesses progress biannually, while BMZ uses ‘results chains’ that merely sketch expected changes; only outcome targets and indicators are determined before implementation. In both cases, implementing teams and their partners are given the freedom to determine details related to inputs, activities and outputs, which are open to being adjusted over time.

[18] Interview with International Technical Assistant, PSCBS, 10 August 2012.
[19] Interview with Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 31 July 2012.
4.4.2. **Selection of indicators**

Part of the flexibility desired in project log frames will occur when donors feel confident that, regardless of how project teams bring about positive changes, some changes will be demonstrable that they can in turn present to the governments, politicians and citizens to whom they are accountable. This can partly be accomplished with good indicators, which do not necessarily have to be quantitative, especially at outcome level. Indeed Simister and Smith (2010) comment that if qualitative data accompany quantitative data at outcome level to further illustrate and even explain how change occurred, then most donors may be satisfied. Qualitative indicators at the outcome level may prove especially important where changes may not be predictable (and thus incompatible with pre-planned indicators), or the pace of change may be too incremental to be captured with quantitative measures. Similarly, qualitative indicators may be useful at the output level where work plan flexibility has led to different activities that aren’t captured by quantitative indicators (though the activities still fall within the output elements).

Qualitative indicators differ from quantitative indicators in that they may not necessarily be pre-planned events or actions that have an obvious baseline and endline condition. They may in fact be stories or anecdotes or experiences that indicate the state of a particular outcome category at a given time, which is at the heart of techniques such as Most Significant Change. This builds inherent flexibility into the project M&E mechanisms because anything that has happened during the project that stakeholders think demonstrates change in an output or outcome category can be mentioned.

For example, from a GoR perspective, the fact that GoR allocated more money to capacity building in the new Belgian-Rwanda ICP is an indication of adaptability (specifically a commitment to continuously improving, which is central to being able to adapt). While this would be considered an indicator of change at the outcome level, it is unlikely that a quantitative indicator would have been designed in the logical framework that would have anticipated such a change. Nevertheless the anecdote is a useful illustration of the changes that M&E systems should seek to capture. Note, further, that the conceptual framework tested in this paper was almost entirely tested using such qualitative descriptions.

Therefore, part of the periodical process of M&E should be identifying what anecdotes or stories are useful indicators of changes at the outcome and output levels. The act of collecting qualitative illustrations of change may even help achieve project goals by increasing ownership and strategic thinking by encouraging stakeholders to deeply observe, analyse and reframe project activities and processes (Ubels, 2010).

It is for this reason that tools such as outcome mapping can be useful because of its emphasis on qualitatively identifying change as well as encouraging participation. With outcome mapping, stakeholders can articulate changes that they wish to see, which can then be sorted according to the four outcome categories of the conceptual framework (i.e. performance, stability, adaptability and ownership). By still applying the four categories of the framework, donors are still able to add some structure and theory of change to the evaluation process while not limiting the descriptions of change. Roduner (2008) concluded that the ability to merge outcome mapping’s focus on capacity building with LFA’s results focus could be very productive, and such an integrated approach was appealing to at least one stakeholder interviewed.20

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20 Interview with Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 31 July 2012.
4.4.3. **Operating across Multiple Stakeholders**

While donors are often tempted to work with multiple stakeholders in development projects, this approach can make M&E increasingly difficult. Stakeholders in BTC’s project in Rwanda commented, for example, that the many actors involved, and the diversity of support that the project attempted to offer made M&E difficult.\[^{21}\] Besides PSCBS, the project began extending support to at least five other government institutions to build their capacity and the monitoring of these institutions was fraught with challenges (BTC, 2011b). Attempts to monitor these projects for purposes other than financial, however were largely unsuccessful.\[^{22}\] Additionally, there were various institutions that initially received funds for training at the beginning of the program, for which there was no evidence of monitoring. PSCBS, and the BTC project team by extension, did not have the M&E capacity to manage so many stakeholders.

Such an experience underscores the increasing realization among donors that smaller, more manageable interventions may be more ideal. Besides the obvious advantages of easier monitoring on the part of donors, this approach acknowledges the inability of many country organisations to implement complex programmes (ECDPM, 2008).

An important part of avoiding having too many stakeholders is clearly identifying which ones the project will work with from the beginning. In this sense, outcome mapping’s use of boundary partners is helpful, from which the log frame of the project in Rwanda might have benefitted (Roduner, 2008). The Rwandan log frame only identified PSCBS as the institution with which it would work, though the project quickly extended this to include others. Indeed, the Rwandan Lessons Learned report commented “In terms of defining the theory of change of the upcoming intervention, the first question to ask should be ‘With whom the intervention will work?’” (Messiaen et al., 2012: 21).

Creating log frames for each institution with which the project will work is one way to gain clarity about how exactly each institution is involved for monitoring purposes. There were criticisms, for example, of the irrelevance of the Rwandan project’s log frame indicators.\[^{23}\] The 2011 annual report for the Rwandan project further commented that "The final evaluation of the project should therefore not be limited to the project logical framework as it is. It will otherwise miss out part of the project’s contribution to PSCBS’ work" (BTC, 2011a: 9). A closer analysis of the log frame reveals that much of the project teams efforts centred on supporting PSCBS, while the log frame in the project report had adopted a broader GoR approach. This mismatch between the project team’s efforts and the project’s log frame was further compounded by the fact that any changes the project brought about at PSCBS that might have impacted the broader GoR were more in terms of stability and adaptability, than of performance, which is what the log frame emphasized. The log frame therefore seemed doubly incapable of capturing the results of the project team’s efforts. Had there been a separate log frame for PSCBS, then the project team would have found it more relevant to the work that they were doing. In the same way that the conceptual framework of this paper was tested on both PSCBS and GoR while acknowledging the ways in which PSCBS’ outcomes feed into GoR’s outputs, so too both log frames could have fed into each other, an approach which would have made M&E easier.

Producing log frames for each institution involved also serves as a crude gauge of the project team’s capacity to manage interventions as well. If a project team recognizes that

\[^{21}\] Ibid.
\[^{22}\] Interview with Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 31 August 2012
\[^{23}\] Interview with Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 31 July 2012.
it has only managed to create comprehensive log frames for 4 institutions with which the project is involved, then this may indicate the limit to the number of institutions it has the ability to work with. Not only does creating a log frame for each institution involved force the project team to objectively assess its intervention capacity, it also compels the team to comprehensively approach capacity development of each institution instead of conducting ad hoc capacity building activities. The project team will be forced to justify why, for example, it may only be conducting trainings (i.e. the individual skills, abilities and competencies output element) for a particular institution, with no consideration for the other 6 output elements. This does not mean that the project team must attend to each output element necessary. The team must, however, ensure that every category is attended to whether by itself or the leadership of that institution, as might be demonstrated in capacity building strategies that the organization might have. In this example, if the project seeks only to provide training to an institution, while other output elements demonstrate lack of attention, then the likelihood of this strategy increasing institutional capacity would be called into question. Indeed, the mid-term review’s comments on the lack of commitment on the part of some beneficiary institutions to the selective support offered by PSCCBS suggest that a more comprehensive approach may indeed be warranted (BTC, 2011b).

4.4.4. Taking the Evaluator into Consideration

Reviews of project documents also highlighted the need, when conducting M&E of capacity development interventions, to always ask, “WHO is doing the evaluation?” It is important, for example, to differentiate the donor’s project (or implementing) team from the donor department/unit responsible for project oversight. Both entities may conduct M&E, but sometimes for different purposes. The project team may find the conceptual framework useful because it helps to evaluate whether its capacity building activities fit the 7 categories at the output level; whether changes have occurred to the beneficiary institution(s) at the outcome level in terms of performance, stability, adaptability and ownership; and whether the project’s theory of change remains valid. This close monitoring can lead to adjustments to strategies at the output level where necessary.

The evaluation conducted by the donor department overseeing the project team has a more extensive evaluation responsibility. Beyond evaluating project outputs and outcomes, the donor department is also responsible for monitoring and evaluating the project team itself, most popularly in the form of mid-term and end-term reviews. Has the team managed donor funds correctly? How relevant have the implementation activities conducted by the team been in achieving project goals? Was the team efficient in achieving project goals? The conceptual framework of this paper will not answer those questions. As such, donors may need to rely on the widely accepted OECD criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact. Reviews of project reports suggest, however, that donors must also judge the project team using an additional criterion: the ability to learn & adapt. The project team should be held accountable for demonstrating that it has used knowledge of changes (or lack therefore) at the outcome level to adjust strategies at the output level. In this way, donors hold their project teams accountable for learning. According to one project team member, “[I]f the reports were the project team’s opportunity to demonstrate learning, then perhaps it would be more valuable.”24

Holding BTC project teams accountable for learning is also an effective means of

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24 Interview with Junior Assistant, PSCBS, 31 July 2012.
compelling project teams to utilize the log frame and therefore ensure that program activities are guided by logic. This can occur if project teams are required to demonstrate that they have monitored project outcomes and used those findings to re-adjust activities at the project output level as necessary. Being required to demonstrate this will result in actual use of the log frame. Further, this increased demand for M&E to demonstrate outcomes may result in increased allocation of resources to meet the demand.

Importantly, the project team should not be responsible for results that are beyond their control; they should not be responsible for project outcomes. The Rwandan mid-term review indicated, for example, that various issues had undermined the performance of the project, but this did not reflect the quality of the project team, which was competent and driven (BTC, 2011b). This comment underscores the fact that outcomes are fundamentally about behaviour changes, and no one can guarantee that another person or institution’s behaviour will change. As such BTC project staff should not be held accountable for institutional changes. Indeed, as articulated by UNDP (2010: 4) “It is desirable, but not definitive, that outputs and outcomes have a cause-and-effect relationship; outputs may be produced without any change happening, or change may occur without the production of outputs.” Unfortunately, this can only work effectively if the donor organization does not itself feel responsible for demonstrating impact to the government, politicians and citizens in its own country to which it must account.

Additionally, while government institutions may themselves be held accountable for higher levels in the results chain, donors and their project teams cannot. Given the Paris Declaration’s emphasis on country ownership and building country capacity to achieve development goals, this would be inappropriate. The impact level is still kept in the conceptual framework, however, to remind its user that capacity development must take place in order to achieve something greater. That is, the presence of the impact level constantly asks the question of the conceptual framework, “Capacity for what?”
5. CONCLUSION & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Capacity development continues to be central to the activities of development cooperation. Indeed, capacity building may be the most important externally financed intervention in development cooperation today, and there is reason to believe that this emphasis will only increase. Simultaneously, there has been an increased demand for accountability within the field, and results have become central to the present aid architecture since the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals (Roduner, 2008). These two ideals, while complementary in principle, have clashed in practice because of the amorphous, unpredictable nature of capacity development, which is often not compatible with contemporary donor demands for results. While there are many capacity building activities, the increase in actual capacity, and the subsequent achievement of actual development results, is never guaranteed.

This paper sought to ameliorate some of the pressures donors face in capacity development interventions by investigating the most effective means of monitoring and evaluating capacity development interventions. Specifically, the paper sought to identify common donor approaches to M&E of capacity development; determine the biggest challenges donor face; and deduce feasible solutions.

Good M&E is dependent on good planning, and donors use the logical framework approach extensively in their monitoring and evaluation of capacity development interventions (Simister and Smith, 2010). M&E of these interventions has proven difficult however, due in part to inadequate conceptualizations of capacity, i.e. uncertainty about what capacity is and how it actually develops. M&E has also suffered from an inability to effectively apply M&E frameworks due to a lack of priority and resources; uncertainty about the role and validity of qualitative vs. quantitative means of indicating progress; and tension between conducting M&E for learning vs. accountability purposes.

In order to address the inadequate conceptualization of capacity, a conceptual framework for M&E of capacity development was created during the research process that integrated key elements of existing frameworks for M&E. The disaggregation of capacity into performance, stability and adaptability was adapted from UNDP's Capacity Measurement Framework; capacity's development resulting from changes in 6 organizational areas was adapted from Kaplan's framework; and the importance of balancing the 'soft' and 'hard' elements of capacity was adapted from ECDPM's framework. This bricolaged framework was then tested on project reports and stakeholders of a BTC-funded capacity development project in Rwanda.

The testing process demonstrated that the bricolaged framework adequately captured most organizational areas that must be addressed for capacity to develop, as well as most reported changes to capacity itself. The subsequent inclusion of partnership and leadership as other organizational areas, and ownership as another capacity category, significantly improved the framework's power. The further addition of a loop from the outcome level back to the output level of the framework to demonstrate the complex adaptive nature of capacity building and capacity development was also necessary.

[25] It is important, however, to note that the framework can only capture changes that are reported to donors. Indeed there may be changes that are (not) taking place that will not be reported to donors, and therefore not subjected to analysis in this framework, but this is the nature of all development projects.
In order for donors to apply this framework in practice, further analysis showed that the conceptual framework could be integrated into the logical framework, thus also resolving many of the criticisms of the log frame itself. This can be accomplished by dividing the output level of the log frame into the output elements of the conceptual framework and dividing the outcomes level of the log frame into the outcome categories of the conceptual framework. In doing so, the logical framework is automatically imbued with the conceptual framework’s theory of change, thus reducing the risk of a log frame being produced without one. Additionally, the conceptual framework’s openness to qualitative measures of evaluating project progress compliments the log frames typically quantitative application, thus resolving the uncertainty regarding illustration or measurement.

The loop that exists in the conceptual framework also emphasizes the importance of learning from changes in project outcomes in order to adjust project outputs. By integrating this into the logical framework that implementing teams use, three results can be expected. First, the tension between learning and accountability may be diminished because implementing teams will need to demonstrate that they have adopted this ‘looped learning’ approach of adjusting output strategies in response to changes at the outcome level. That is, they can now be held accountable for learning. Second, this accountability for learning will increase the priority of M&E, since it is on the basis of M&E and the log frame that teams will demonstrate learning. Third, as demand for M&E increases, so will the resources that are allocated for it.

The table below summarizes the challenges, proposed solutions and conclusions that were arrived at during this research process.
**Table 7. Summary of Challenges, Proposed Solutions and Conclusions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Challenges</th>
<th>Proposed solution</th>
<th>Conclusion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagreement about what capacity is</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capacity is an entity’s ability to perform, do so stably and adaptably,</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and own the purpose for which it is performing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uncertainty about how capacity develops</td>
<td>Conceptual framework designed</td>
<td>Capacity develops unpredictably from the balanced enhancement of 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and tested</td>
<td>organizational areas: context; vision and strategy; culture &amp; leadership;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>structures and procedures; individual skills, competencies and abilities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>and material resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of priority</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requiring implementing teams to demonstrate ‘loop’ learning by applying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the conceptual framework will increase priority for utilizing M&amp;E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of resources</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increased demand for M&amp;E will lead to increased investment in its provision.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Measurement or illustration?</td>
<td></td>
<td>The integration of the conceptual framework into the log frame leads to</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>complementarity between measurement (which typically undergirds the logical</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>framework) and illustration (which characterizes the conceptual framework).</td>
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<tr>
<td>The clash of accountability and learning</td>
<td></td>
<td>By requiring implementing teams to demonstrate that they have adjusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>output strategies in response to changes at the outcome level based on the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>loop of the conceptual framework, teams will be accountable for learning.</td>
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</table>
These findings must be taken into consideration in light of existing limitations, however. First, there is little consensus on how to define capacity and its development. As such, the definition chosen for this paper results in a framework, analysis and policy recommendations that may not be relevant to donors that employ a fundamentally different definition. However, it is believed that most members of the development cooperation community will find at least some aspects of this policy paper useful for their specific contexts, regardless of definition.

Another limitation relates to the field of academic literature in which this research is grounded. The field of capacity building has shifted from focusing on implementing discrete projects aimed at skills enhancement, to addressing broader societal and systemic challenges of state building (ECDPM, 2008). As such, it may seem natural to squarely situate this research in the academic literature on good governance or state effectiveness. Those are broader processes than capacity development, however (OECD, 2006). This paper, instead, approaches M&E of capacity development from a social sector performance management perspective rooted in the development studies (and not private sector management theory) literature. Though this runs the risk of depriving the analysis of broader frameworks and perspectives, this was still considered the most appropriate approach at the time of conducting the study.

Another important consideration is that the research did not focus on actually evaluating the performance of BTC’s capacity development projects. The research instead focused on determining how to evaluate such projects. As such, while this approach naturally led to some conclusions about the success of the project, this analysis is by no means a comprehensive assessment of the project’s performance.

Finally, the perspective taken for this paper is that of the donor and not the beneficiary governments. As such, the paper’s findings may be less applicable to governments seeking to better monitor and evaluate capacity development projects than it will be to donors. Donors’ M&E of such projects may have different requirements from that of governments because of the exogenous accountability that exists between donors and governments in externally financed interventions that is absent in internally financed ones, as well as because of the smaller scale of donor projects, which are often only sector- or region-specific. While it is likely that some of the findings presented here will be useful to governments, this cannot be guaranteed.

5.1. **Policy Recommendations**

The conceptual framework tested and validated is a useful tool that donors can apply in the monitoring and evaluation of capacity development projects. As such, this paper recommends that it be piloted in the respective donor organizations. Other policy recommendations include:

- Donors must monitor their capacity development strategies to ensure that the soft elements of capacity building are balanced with, if not emphasized over, hard elements to insure that improvements are seen not just in performance, but stability and adaptability as well.

- Donors should integrate qualitative indicators into their monitoring of capacity development projects. Part of the evaluation process may include asking stakeholders to identify anecdotes that indicate changes at the outcome level.
• Conducting M&E across too many stakeholders appears to be ineffective. An important part of avoiding this is to clearly identify which stakeholders the project will work with from the beginning.

• Applying log frames to each institution involved may be a useful strategy for project teams to clearly identify the institutions with whom they will work, as well as crudely gauge the maximum number of institutions that the team can effectively engage.

• Implementing/project teams should be held responsible for delivering project outputs in the seven categories and for demonstrating learning by adjusting output strategies based on having monitored outcomes that they aimed to contribute to. They should not, however, be fully responsible for delivering these outcomes. In order to effectively learn, however, each team must have at least one person skilled in M&E who can collect and present data at the output and outcome level for the team to reflect on and plan.

• Donors should also not hold teams accountable for specific activities that lead to outputs in order to facilitate flexibility and innovation on the part of the project team. As such, outputs can be articulated in the 7 categories at the planning stage and thereafter monitored, but activities do not have to be.

5.2. FUTURE RESEARCH

As is the case with new conceptual frameworks, this one requires careful piloting before widespread adoption is recommended. Much of this paper centred on creating and validating a conceptual framework, but many questions still remain unanswered at this time. Future research questions therefore include:

• To what degree, and in what proportions, do performance, stability, adaptability and ownership need to increase in order for donors to be satisfied that capacity has increased?

• If leadership is in fact an important output element, what exactly should outputs in this area be?

• Is organizational ‘attitude’ (or culture) really unimportant to capacity development? Though this paper could not demonstrate ways in which this variable was important, this may have been because it is a difficult variable to measure (Hoffman, 2000). Further, research has indicated that leadership influences organizational culture, so perhaps the effect of culture was merely masked by leadership in this paper’s analysis (Shiva and Suar, 2012).

• If culture is in fact important, given the acknowledged difficulties in actually changing it, what are new approaches that donors can adopt to do so? (Leftwich and Sen, 2010)?

• If project teams are not to be held accountable for outcomes, what can they be held accountable for if some project outcomes are themselves outputs at a broader project level?
The final question that remains unanswered, however, is when is external monitoring and evaluation of capacity development no longer necessary? Is the answer when the country has attained pre-established development results, or when it has demonstrated adequate ownership of the capacity development process itself? Watson (2006) commented, for example, that while several ECDPM case studies demonstrated that ‘endogenous’ performance monitoring and accountability mechanisms strongly motivated performance improvement, there was little unambiguous evidence that exogenous accountability did so. Therefore, if the answer is the latter, then a country’s capacity to develop itself should be seen as a goal of development cooperation. This will not happen, however, until donors prioritize the creation of capacity itself over the services that capacity is meant to provide (Fukuyama, 2004).
REFERENCES


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**APPENDIX I**

**PERSONS INTERVIEWED OR CORRESPONDED WITH FOR RESEARCH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laurent Messiaen</td>
<td>International Technical Assistant</td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laure-Ann Pieck</td>
<td>Junior Assistant</td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Batte</td>
<td>M&amp;E Coach</td>
<td>PSCBS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myriam Van Parijs</td>
<td>M&amp;E Expert</td>
<td>BTC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joëlle Piraux</td>
<td>Governance Expert</td>
<td>BTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joris Elegeert</td>
<td>Governance Expert</td>
<td>BTC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX II

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Would you say that the practice of being flexible and learning by PSCBS (or any other institutions the project worked closely with) was less before the project started (or you arrived)?
   a. In what ways was this evident?
   b. In what ways did the project increase this adaptability among Rwandese stakeholders?

2. If there was improved ability to learn among Rwandese stakeholders, how do you think this took place primarily? By observing BTC staff, by learning-by-doing through participation in the Steering Committee, etc.?

3. The importance of 'ownership' was highlighted in the various reports as being important to the project. What were some of the ways in which GoR demonstrated 'ownership'?

4. The reports mention much talk of the excellent level of cooperation between BTC and PSCBS and how it translated into project implementation. Could you explain how you think this cooperation directly led to increased capacity of PSCBS or GoR?

5. What role has this excellent partnership and trust played in increasing ownership, if any?
   a. Do you think there is anything else BTC might have done to increase ownership?
   b. How was this good partnership and trust demonstrated? That is, how did you know good partnerships existed? Could you measure it quantitatively?

6. Some view 'capacity' to be an institution's ability to perform, keep performing (i.e. have stability) and adjust itself when necessary to keep performing (i.e. be adaptable). If PSCBS or GoR were able to show improvements in these three areas (i.e. performance, stability and adaptability) do you think Rwandan stakeholders would feel that the capacity of PSCBS/GoR had improved?

7. What are some of the ways in which M&E could have gotten greater priority in the project?

8. Sometimes lack of resources hinder M&E. How have you been able to get around any lack of human resources that you’ve experienced for M&E? In practical terms, have you had reduce the number of reports required from partner organizations, limit indicators, what?
9.

10. A big part of M&E is establishing baseline (as even indicated in the Mid-Term Review). Given your experiences in BTC projects in Rwanda, how can this be done in the short time frame allotted for project planning?

11. What were some of the most important aspects of the project that you wished were subjected to proper M&E?

12. What were some of the greatest accomplishments of the project that you think could not be measured?

13. Have the reports you are required to submit to BTC been an opportunity to learn, or have they felt more like meeting requirements set by BTC?

14. There has been mention of the log frame and the planned approach being unsuitable for CD interventions. What is it about the log frame that is so bad? Is it the pre-planned aspect of it or the requirement that everything be quantified, or something else?

15. It seems to me that some of the best indicators in the logical framework are some of the ones that were hardest to collect data on, like, “Number of public institutions relying on PSCBS for CB” & “% of donor support to CB is mapped and coordinated by PSCBS”. Could you talk about why it was so hard and what ways you found to get around this?

16. Generally, how easy would it be to get quantitative data for indicators?

17. Could you explain more about CB now being linked to the national budget cycle and what the anticipated effect of that will be?

18. How do you keep track of progress of the performance of the different institutions the project heavily invested in, like the National Land Centre (NLC), the Rwanda Cooperatives Agency (RCA), the National Institute of Statistics of Rwanda (NISR) and the Rwandan Association of Local Government Authorities (RALGA)?

a. How frequently do you get reports from them, or interact with them for example? Or is there no monitoring of them really?

19. There has been mention of the log frame and the planned approach being unsuitable for CD interventions. What is the precise weakness about the log frame? Is it the pre-planned aspect of it or the requirement that everything be quantified, or something else?
20. Generally, does BTC allow the indicators in a project’s log frame to change during the project’s implementation?

21. When project stakeholders discussed capacity building, do you think they had a clear sense of what enhanced capacity was supposed to look like? Was it mostly about improved service delivery, for example, or did they consider it to be more than just performance?

   a. If they considered it more than performance, what else did they consider it to be?