Chapter 1. Information and Arena. The Dual Function of the News Media for Political Elites

Introduction

Why and how do political actors use the news media to reach their political goals? This is the book’s central question. We address it using a common framework that we label the ‘Information & Arena’-model. Looking at the news media from a functional perspective, we argue the mass media essentially fulfill a dual function for political actors. We make a distinction between the media as a source of information for political actors, and the media as an arena for political communication. Within the information function we further distinguish a passive from an active information sub-function. Politicians can learn from the media about the world out there, including the opinions of the public and other political actors. Yet, the fact that information encapsulated in media coverage is, by definition, also public creates a window of opportunity and politicians can profit from the momentum generated by the media to act based on media information. The arena function as well has two sub-functions. On the one hand, politicians try to get access to the media arena to get attention and favorable coverage for them personally. On the other hand, politicians use the media arena to promote certain issues and their interpretation of these issues.

This introductory chapter first positions our functional approach and shows how it differs from previous theoretical frameworks. Second, we further discuss and conceptualize the two central functions, information and arena, and their sub-functions. Third, drawing on the information and arena framework, we formulate four questions that guide the book and indicate how the different chapters of this book help answering them.

How the Information & Arena model is different from other theoretical models

In recent decennia, there has been a growing interest in the relationship between news media and political elites. Classic studies focusing on the power relationship between journalists and...
politicians were mainly interested in news making—and thus in the influence from politics on media—and less in policy making—the influence from media on politics (e.g., Blumler & Gurevitch, 1981; Gans, 1979; Nimmo, 1964; Sigal, 1973; but see Cook, 1989). More recently, the political consequences of the alleged intrusion of the news media in the political sphere gained considerable scholarly traction.

However, so far, the media and politics literature has mainly focused on how journalists and their news products have influenced the world of politics. The mediatization literature, for example, analyzes mainly how politics has adapted to the rules of the media logic. This work basically studies the media’s intrusion into the political sphere and suggests that the media are politically influential (Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). A different approach comes from scholars that study the impact of the news media on political priorities. Students of the political agenda contend that media coverage affects the priorities of presidents, parliaments and parties (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006; Wolfe, Jones, & Baumgartner, 2013). Although mediatization and political agenda-setting scholars differ in their account of how the media influence politics, they share the idea that political elites and institutions follow the media, and that the media thus possess at least some form of political power. When asked directly, many political elites agree that the media exert substantial power. Recent surveys among politicians in Western democracies found that politicians perceive the media to have a large agenda-setting and ‘career-controlling’ power (Lengauer, Donges, & Plasser, 2014; Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2011). In sum, most theories and studies have focused on the relationship—better: the power struggle—between media and politics. This is what Gans (1979) labeled as the ‘tango’ between journalists and politicians, a metaphor that has been used repeatedly in the literature.

Apart from the fact that in most of this work the mass media have been posited ‘against’ politics—news media are implicitly considered to be a kind of ‘foreign intruder’ into politics—the relationship between media and politics has hardly been investigated from the perspective of political actors themselves (Schudson, 2002: 255). Only more recently, a growing literature is putting the political process center stage by discussing the role of the mass media from the perspective of political actors. The PMP-model of Wolfsfeld (2011), for instance, holds that most things ultimately start in the political realm, then spill over to the media, and that, subsequently, political actors react to the media coverage (they themselves caused). In a similar way, Sellers’ (2010) ‘cycle of spin’ starts with politicians willing to promote their message; these politicians take into account how their messages are covered in the media which, in turn, influences their political communication and even the policy debate.
Also Entman’s (2003) cascading model departs from the promotion of frames by political and bureaucratic elites but acknowledges the existence of an important feedback role of the news media.

Without denying the importance of the media, all these scholars start and end their analysis with the actions and goals of political actors. They adopt a political actor perspective and suggest that the media’s impact mainly works via political actors that are (un)able to employ the media to further their goals (see also Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010; Thesen, 2014). Such an alternative view of the media-politics relationship departing from the perspective of political elites is also gaining ground in recent studies on the mediatization of politics. For example, Esser and Strömbäck (2014: 227) observe a shift from a ‘media-centric’ to an ‘actor-centric’ perspective in mediatization research. More and more mediatization scholars seem to support the idea that the media matter not so much because political actors are forced to adapt to their logic, but rather because they (selectively) choose to adapt in so far as it fits their political purposes (see also Landerer, 2013; Marcinkowski & Steiner, 2014). In other words, instead of pitching the mass media against political elites, the emerging actor perspective suggests that the media may have an impact on the struggle of power among different political elites. Although gaining ground, the political actor approach still lacks a systematic theoretical account that explicitly incorporates and compares the different functions the media perform for political elites.

Therefore, as a first step towards such a theory, our ambition in this chapter is to provide a functional framework of the meaning and role of the mass media for political elites in Western democracies. The ambition of the book is to empirically examine the two functions that mass media have for politicians in different contexts and using different methods. Our theoretical approach is ‘functional’ as it zooms in on the different functions the media have for politicians. A functional approach was quite common among the pioneers of mass communication research. For example, a long time ago, Harold Lasswell suggested several functions the media have for society at large (Lasswell, 1948; see also Graber, 2009). Building on his insights, other scholars studied the functions the mass media have for individual citizens, which became known as the ‘uses and gratifications’ approach (Katz, Blumler, & Gurevitch, 1973). These scholars typically generated a list of functions that different media might have in satisfying different sorts of citizen needs (e.g. Katz, Haas, & Gurevitch, 1973). This mass communication work strongly contributed to a shift in thinking about media effects from “what the media do to people” to “what the people do with media”. We believe such a functional approach to be a fruitful way to study the role of media in
politics; it directly addresses some of the shortcoming in previous studies on media and politics.

First, a functional approach focuses on why politicians use the mass media and provides systematic insights in the motives that underlie their interaction with the media. A functional approach can help us with understanding the reasons why some politicians use the media under certain circumstances while others do not, or are not able to. By focusing on the motives of politicians, a functional actor approach is well-suited for comparative research comparing different politicians in different systems. In fact, similar goals can be expected to motivate elected politicians in many systems but the constraints, resources and incentives provided by the political and media system may vary leading to systematic behavioral differences.

Second, a functional approach is in line with the widely accepted idea among political scientists that politicians are strategic actors with specific goals and ambitions that try to pursue those goals as good as they can (see chapter 4). It treats the media as a resource that can be used by politicians in the struggle over political power with other politicians. For instance, by attaining media access, anticipating media attention, or rhetorically using media coverage, politicians can improve their position in the political process. In this way, a functional perspective examines whether and how media affect the balance of power amongst politicians, which probably is the main question political scientists deal with—namely: who gets what, when and how (see chapter 2).

The information function of the media

Information is a crucial asset for politicians in their daily work (Baumgartner and Jones 2014). Just like any citizen, individual politicians learn from the media about the world out there, even about the world of politics. What we call ‘information’ here can be a simple fact, like the actual inflation rate, as well as a government statement about the need to control inflation. So, the media provide politicians with information that they would otherwise not have or not pay attention to. The media do not only make information available but also make it more salient, giving politicians an idea of what issues or persons are currently in the public eye.

There are at least three types of information encapsulated in media coverage. First, media offer easy to digest information about prevailing problems in society. The ultimate job of politicians is to deal with societal problems (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2009) and the
media are routinized and specialized detection instruments constantly digging up dirt and signaling problems across many policy sectors. In particular novel information produced by the media, for example through investigative journalism, has a high informative value and is frequently followed-up by political action (e.g. Protess et al., 1991). The attractiveness of the media information about problems lies in the fact that media signals are succinct and focused, which is according to Kingdon (1984) the type of information that is preferred by politicians. Cobb and Elder (1981: 392) claim that the media are useful for political actors to ‘reduce the overwhelming information-processing tasks confronting policymakers’. Similarly, Kingdon (1984) showed how US members of Congress dealing with an oversupply of information turn to the media to know what really matters.

Second, from the media, politicians also learn about public opinion. They do so directly if media messages contain explicit information about what the public cares about and wants (e.g. media stories referring to opinion polls or containing popular exemplars). Politicians also learn indirectly about the public as they consider the news a proxy for the priorities and the positions held by voters (Herbst, 1998). Pritchard (1992: 105) calls this the ‘media-as-surrogate-for-public-opinion’-function of the media.

There is a third type of information politicians get out of the media: information about the agenda, the positions and the actions of other politicians. Decision-making processes often take place behind closed doors. Politicians thus regularly lack information about what is going on in politics itself, and what other actors are up to. Quite often, information about the policy process leaks out in the press (Hess, 1984; Reich, 2008). Additionally, the media simply cover politics—the statements politicians make, the plans they launch, the visits they undertake etc.—and for a politician this may yield relevant information about what other (often more important) politicians (e.g. from the government) are up to (Linsky, 1986). In sum, politicians also learn from the media because its coverage contains (otherwise hidden) information about other political actors (Brown, 2010: 134; Sellers 2010: 8-9).

All this work on how politicians vie for information about problems, public opinion and what other actors are doing suggests that the media are a provider of sheer information for politicians. However, actual empirical work directly investigating the purely informational sub-function of the media for politicians is as good as entirely missing. Although studies have shown that most politicians are news junkies (e.g. Davis, 2007; Van Aelst et al., 2008), we know little about what they learn from it. There are hardly studies on the ‘media dependency’ of political actors, a lacuna that will be addressed in chapter 7 of this book.
This first information sub-function is purely informational; it relates to the passive role of politicians as mere consumers of information provided by the media. Yet, politicians not only passively learn from the information provided by the mass media, they also actively use it in their daily work, this is the second information sub-function.

Indeed, the empirical proof of the fact that politicians actively use the information provided by the media is substantial. There is a growing body of work about elites’ attentional behavior; media signals about issues do get picked up by elites. Observing the media-reactive behavior of political actors, this literature strongly suggests that politicians derive information from media coverage and that they profit from the momentum generated by the information to use it in their work. When the media address an issue, politics follows suit and politicians increasingly start to talk about it (Eissler, Russell, & Jones, 2014; Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). That media coverage affects the political agenda is empirically proven in both majoritarian and in proportional democracies (e.g. Bonafont & Baumgartner, 2013; Edwards & Wood, 1999; Soroka, 2002; Van Noije, Oegema, & Kleinnijenhuis, 2008; Walgrave, Soroka, & Nuytemans, 2008). However, politicians are by no means naïve or ordinary news consumers (Davis, 2007), but rather rational actors that strategically use the media.

Because typical media messages are better suited to nurture the opposition’s goal, destabilizing and embarrassing the government, opposition members more often profit from the window of opportunity provided by media information than members of government parties (Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010). Also, parties react more to media when the media cover issues that they ‘own’ than when they cover other issues (Vliegenthart & Walgrave, 2011a, 2011b). Parties are advantaged regarding the issues they are considered to be the most competent on (Budge & Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996), which is why they strategically embrace the selective media information that plays to their advantage. Several studies have shown that political actors do not automatically react to media information as it becomes more salient, but mainly, or only, when this information fits their already existing issue agenda. So, the news not only provides useful information about topics and events, but offers a window of opportunity for some political actors to highlight their existing issue priorities (Elmelund-Præstekær & Wien, 2008; Kingdon, 1984).

Not only the saliency of the information on issues encapsulated in the news creates a window of opportunity for politicians. News media also define and interpret issues. Older work by Kingdon (1984) on US congressmen found that opinionated and framed media information, media signals of which the political meaning has been defined, often has a higher informative value for political elites than bare-bone factual information. Facts that have been
predigested require less effort for politicians to make up their mind and adopt a position. So, media frames increase or decrease the relevance of the underlying facts for elites. For instance, Thesen found that opposition parties are especially active on issues when the triggering media story contains a responsibility frame blaming the government for the undesirable state of affairs (Thesen, 2013, 2014). Van der Pas (2014) showed that politicians in the Netherlands and Sweden mainly respond to media coverage when the media frames are closer to their own definition of the issue. This emphasizes the strategic nature of political reactions to media coverage—political actors employ media frames when they are congruent with their own position.

**The arena function of the media**

Politicians get ‘pure’ information from the media and, at the same time, media information, through its salience and framing, creates an opportunity to act. But for politicians to reach out to the public, they need to ‘enter the media arena’ and become the object of coverage themselves. We distinguish two arena sub-functions: getting personal access to the media arena and getting your message across in the media arena.

For ordinary citizens, the news media are the dominant way to learn about most actors, issues and policies (Bennett & Entman, 2001; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2014). Since politicians in democracies need public support and since the media provide the most important channel to gain such support, political actors have little choice but to play the media game. Besides a direct electoral connection, presence in the media arena can also have indirect electoral effects. Parties may put candidates that successfully enter and perform in the media arena higher on the ballot list or mediatized candidates may attract more funding from sponsors. The importance of entering and performing in the media arena goes well beyond elections. Kunelius and Reunanen (2012), for instance, show that media attention can also strengthen one’s position in the policy process (see also Cook, 2005: 143).

In many ways, the media arena is comparable to other arenas, such as the parliamentary arena. Competing actors make statements, undertake actions and try to get the upper hand. Similar to other arena’s, the media arena follows standard practices and routines (Sparrow, 2006) that are a consequence of the function and aim of the media in modern society. The arena is ruled by news values (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; O’Neill & Harcup, 2009) and produces news in specific formats (Altheide & Snow, 1979). Thus, politicians’ media arena inclusion or exclusion is not random, but obeys a number of well-known criteria guiding news makers in their decisions regarding who is in and who is out. In other words, the news media form an
institution characterized by recurring patterns of behavior and collectively shared beliefs of what is news (Cook, 2005). Journalists’ decisions to incorporate events or actors in the news and to give them the space to present their points of view are steered by particular media routines and standards of newsworthiness rather than by what political actors consider to be relevant (Wolfsfeld, 2011: 72; Cook, 2005: 63). To enter the media arena and to successfully get their version of the facts into the news, politicians need to learn and incorporate these media rules (Davis, 2007; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). The media arena is not a level playing-ground and in that respect not so different from the other arenas politicians operate in. Media routines advantage particular politicians, just like the rules in the parliamentary arena favor certain actors (e.g. the priority government initiatives get in most parliaments). Note that for politicians willing to enter the mass media, their competitors are not journalists, but rather other politicians (even of their own party) who vie for a place in the media spotlights as well. Journalists and editors impose the rules of the media game to the players, they can be considered as the referees that assess whether the actors play to the rules, but the real competitors are the other politicians. In sum, politicians have a strong interest in entering the media arena to communicate to the public and therefore they have to incorporate the media rules.

Since media attention is skewed in favor of actors with formal political power, getting access to the media arena is highly predictable (Bennett, 1996; Van Aelst, Sheafer, Hubé, & Papathanassopoulos, 2016). Also for common politicians, for which access may even be more crucial, relative small status differences—e.g. for a parliamentarian: being a committee chair or not—are strong predictors of media exposure (Sellers & Schaffner, 2007; Tresch, 2009). The news media prefer charismatic, communicative and attractive politicians but, at the same time, highly value the institutional status of elites and rather strengthen instead of challenge the politically defined hierarchy (Wolfsfeld, 2011). So, the rules of media access are to some extent specific to the media logic but they are also strongly related to essentially political and often institutional features of politicians (for an overview see Vos, 2014).

Frequent media access may be a privilege of the powerful and a necessary condition for self-promotion, it does not automatically imply that the attention is positive. The favorability of news coverage can be crucial in how citizens’ perceive a political actor, in particular in election times (e.g. Druckman & Parkin, 2005). A lot depends on whether the covered actor gets the chance to promote the issue or frame he or she would like to get across to the public. The US President is seen as the prime example of someone being able to broadcast his messages in the news. The combination of a strong institutional position, professional public
relations techniques, and specialists in news management, makes the US government an exceptionally influential communicator often succeeding in getting its message out in the media (Kernell, 2007; Manheim, 1998). This dominant position may not seem uncommon for scholars of US policy and media, but it is rather exceptional in many other countries. Most governments have less political communication resources and, more importantly, their messages are more often challenged by multiple actors. For instance, in European multi-party systems most political debates involve multiple political parties that each promote their definition and interpretation of the issue at stake. Even in the US, more often than not, frames are contested by counter-frames (Chong & Druckman, 2013; Hänggli & Kriesi, 2010, 2012).

The fact that the media form an indispensable arena for politicians to show themselves to the public and to highlight their version of reality, does not mean that all battles over the meaning of issues are fought out in the media arena. Sellers (2000) showed that in legislative debates in the US, the majority party mostly prefers to keep the debate inside congress, while the minority party has more to gain by expanding the debate to the media arena. In particular when its frame is more in line with public opinion, the opposition party can win a legislative battle over a party in government by going public. Political actors in a weaker institutional (minority) position need media access more than those having institutional political power.

Four questions that guide the book

We argued so far that the media exert a dual function for political actors. They are providers of information that can be passively consumed or actively used by politicians. And, they form an arena actors need access to in order to promote themselves or their issues. We showed these functions and sub-functions implicitly underlie a good many of the extant studies on media and politics. Yet, we think the usefulness of the functional information and arena framework for studying the relationship between media and politics should be further examined and tested as will be done by several chapters in this book. A functional framework not only allows to conveniently classify existing studies and create some order in the chaos. It also highlights the lacuna in the present literature and shows which questions are left unanswered. We identify four questions will be at the core of this book. The first question deals with our model and it’s central concepts. The next three questions deal with more empirical aspects that we know relatively little about.

1. Should the information and arena model be broadened and/or refined?
We asked the contributors to this book to use but also to challenge, broaden or refine parts of our information and arena model. In particular the two central concepts of our model will receive in-depth attention: ‘the media arena’ and ‘political actors’. First, related to the media arena, both Davis (chapter 9) and Strömbäck and Esser (chapter 5) provide alternative, more developed conceptualizations of the media arena. Lawrence and Boydstun (Chapter 3) argue, based on the example of the amazing election of Donald Trump as the Republican candidate for the US presidency, that the media arena for political actors should be broadened by including entertainment media. In addition, they suggest to include celebrities as political actors. This raises the question whether also political journalists can or should be conceived as a distinct sort of political actors. Both the chapters of Thesen (chapter 2) and that of Vliegenthart & Mortensen (chapter 4) deal with that issue.

2. What motivates politicians to use the media?

As argued before, we believe a functional approach forces researchers to think about the underlying motives of politicians’ media behavior. The arena and information model suggest that politicians use the media for different reasons and goes beyond the idea that politicians are only interested in news exposure for electoral reasons. However, studies seldom explicitly study what drives politicians’ interactions with the news. It is obvious that media matter for a politician during an election campaign, but it is less clear why seeking (or avoiding) media attention might be relevant for policy making. Chapter 12 of Melenhorst & Van Aelst, for instance, digs deeper in the value of the media for parliamentarians in the case of lawmaking. And also chapters 5, 6, and 9 tackle politicians’ motives to use the mass media.

3. How media dependent are politicians?

Our model suggests that the mass media function as an important source of information for political elites. Just like any citizen, individual politicians learn from the media about the world out there, even about the world of politics. We expect politicians to learn more from media information about problems and public opinion than about the political game itself, but we hardly have a clue of how pervasive the information function of the media really is. We know that politicians react to and use news coverage strategically, but that does not tell us what politicians actually learn from the news and what they get from other sources. Chapter 7 of Walgrave, Sevenans, Zoizner & Ayling addresses this shortcoming by focusing explicitly on the media dependency of politicians. Also the chapters from Sevenans (chap. 6) Zoizner,
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Fogel-Dror & Sheafer (chap. 8), and Fawzi (chap. 13) assess, in an indirect way, what kind of information political elites get out of the media.

4. How do politicians differ in their use of the information and arena function?

The information and arena functions are more or less central to the goals and functioning of different types of politicians. Talking about the functions of the media for the politicians may not be a good idea, though. Politicians occupy different positions and work in different institutional settings. A crucial distinction that deserves further attention is the government-opposition divide. Some studies suggest that differences between government and opposition politicians can be adequately tied to the media’s two functions, information and arena. For opposition actors the media is mostly a valuable source of often negative information that they can actively use to challenge the government. Government actors, on the other hand, have a clear structural advantage when it comes to access to the media arena. However, many of the conditions and mechanisms of these two functions remain unclear. For instance, when can government actors not only enter the arena, but also influence the tone or framing of the coverage? Chapter 11 of Green-Pedersen, Mortensen and Thesen deals with this question, and it is also addressed in chapter 7 and 12. In addition, Chapter 10 by Dalmus, Hänggli & Bernhard does not compare between politicians, but compares how political parties in different countries use different media strategies during an election campaign depending on the political context.

The information and arena model is used as a basis for the chapters. All authors discuss the role of the news media from the perspective of the political actor focusing on both the opportunities and the constraints the news media provide. In the first four, theoretical chapters different authors extend, criticize and expand the model. The following eight chapters operationalize and examine aspects of the model in different contexts and dealing with different aspects of politics. In the conclusion, we take these empirical findings into account and suggest a research agenda for future studies.
References


