Exit Arusha? Pathways from Power-Sharing in Burundi
A manuscript outline

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**Preface: Exit Arusha, the book project.**

This manuscript outline is the first step on a journey towards the publication of a book on the use - the rise and, more importantly, the fall - of power-sharing as an instrument of peace and democracy in Burundi. The outline summarizes the main arguments to be developed in each of the book chapters.

**Research reaching out to its audience while it unfolds**

The final outcome matters, of course. But so does the process. Writing a book usually is a lonesome undertaking and that also applies to Exit Arusha. At the same time, Exit Arusha seeks to become an increasingly participatory process. This manuscript outline, published as an IOB working paper, sets the tone. It is meant as a teaser and an invitation for the reader to contribute by challenging the author, by countering thoughts expressed in the chapter outlines, by signaling omissions or by feeding the analysis with documentary sources. Burundian readers are particularly welcome to contribute.

Throughout this journey, draft chapters will be published – in whole or in part – as IOB working papers. In their final version, they will be together make up Exit Arusha? Pathways from Power-Sharing in Burundi, to be published as a book.

A webpage, part of the website Law, power and peace in Burundi (www.uantwerpen.be/burundi), is the virtual meeting place for those interested in the book project. Through its twitter account #exitarusha the book project reaches out to a wider audience interested in Burundi’s contemporary history and, more broadly, in institutional engineering of peace and democracy.

**Slow science**

This book project sets off without a timeline or deadline. It starts in January 2017 at a moment when (ethnic and political) power-sharing is under threat in Burundi. Thus, the object of analysis is, to some extent, developing while the book project takes shape, which makes it even harder to anticipate on the timing of its successful completion. The provisional title includes a question mark, which may no longer be the case by the end of the drafting process.

All draft chapters are published in English and French. Translating slows down but, more importantly, questions the author, pushing him to think twice about how ideas are worded and arguments are built.
**INTRODUCTION**

In situations of negotiated peace, power-sharing is one of the most commonly used instruments to overcome violent ethnic conflict and prevent its reoccurrence (McCulloch and McGarry 2017). On the African continent, Burundi stands out as an example of conflict resolution through power-sharing. In Burundi, the more commonly used sharing of power between incumbents and insurgents was combined with a more rare and sophisticated ethnic power-sharing, turning it into the most consociational state in Africa (Lemarchand 2007). After a turbulent decade of failed democratization and ethnic warfare, power-sharing (*gusangira ubutegetsi* in kirundi) was negotiated and signed in Arusha (Tanzania) in August 2000. It guaranteed a representation in the state institutions to Burundi’s ethnic segments and provided for a broad based coalition government. The Arusha agreement was supplemented by peace negotiations with the two main remaining rebel movements. This paved the way for democratic elections in 2005. Burundi has been widely praised as an example of institutional engineering of ethnic pacification (Reyntjens 2015).

Over the past few years, however, Burundi’s consociational power-sharing arrangement has increasingly been under threat. This occurred against a wider background of democratic backsliding, in particular following the 2010 elections that put Burundi on the road towards a de facto one party state, controlled by the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD (National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy). The 2015 elections were marked by protests against President Nkurunziza’s third term ambition, culminating in a failed coup d’Etat attempt. In 2016, consultations led by the National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI), a body criticized for being controlled by the dominant party, revealed a “popular desire” to revise certain “errors” agreed upon in Arusha. This may well cast a dark shadow over the future of consociational power-sharing in Burundi. While the academic literature has paid major attention to the emergence, the modalities and the performance of consociational and other types of power-sharing (i.a. Lijphart 2007; Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Binningsbo 2013; McCulloch 2014), limited attention has so far been paid to the fall of consociational arrangements. Under what circumstances do consociational institutions disappear? This manuscript unravels and analyzes the (attempted) de-consociationalisation of the Burundian state and its linkages with democratization and conflict resolution.

After a first chapter on the rise and functioning of consociationalism in Burundi, six chapters look into the “Arusha exit modalities”. These are the various factors – a combination of structural features and elite choices – that explain the (attempted) end of consociationalism in Burundi. Some of these exit modalities are unfolding during the writing of this manuscript. A concluding chapter draws general conclusions on the lifespan of power-sharing in post-ethnic conflict settings, thus also shedding additional light on the durability – or immobilism (Horowitz 2014) – of consociationalism. This case-study on Burundi is therefore both inductive and hypothesis-generating (Levy 2008). It seeks to enrich our understanding of the hiccups of Burundi’s turbulent political transition, while also contributing to the process of theory building around the institutional engineering of peace, stability and democracy. Comparative references are added where useful to illustrate or contrast other experiences.
CHAPTER 1. THE RISE AND FUNCTIONING OF CONSOCIATIONAL POWER-SHARING IN BURUNDI

This chapter is mostly an updated and consolidated version of papers I published earlier, in English and in French, on Burundi’s institutional transformation into a consociational state.

First, the introduction of ethnic power-sharing is explained from the perspective of Burundi’s extremely violent political history. Post-colonial Burundi was characterized by decades of authoritarian one party rule under a military regime controlled by part of the Tutsi ethnic minority group. On several occasions, violent attacks by insurgents from the Hutu majority group were violently suppressed. The most violent episode was the 1972 selective genocide (Lemarchand and Martin 1974) that eliminated most of the (current and future) Hutu elite, including the parents of Burundi’s current leaders (also referred to as the ‘1972 orphans’). In response to a combination of domestic and international pressure, President Pierre Buyoya embarked upon a process of democratization in the early nineties. To start with, he introduced a modest form of ethnic power-sharing at the level of the UPRONA single party. Multi-party elections were held in 1993. Four months after his election, Melchior Ndadaye, leader of FRODEBU and first Hutu president ever, was assassinated. This marked the start of a decade of ethnic civil war and of peace talks, including a number of unsuccessful ethnic power-sharing attempts. Strong international involvement, in particular by mediator Nelson Mandela, proved key to the acceptance of a consociational power-sharing arrangement in Arusha in 2000, signed between FRODEBU (and some smaller predominantly Hutu parties) and UPRONA (and smaller predominantly Tutsi parties).

During approximately one decade, under the interim government and after the 2005 first post-conflict elections, Burundi’s complex power-sharing arrangement was by and large implemented surprisingly smoothly. This chapter outlines the power-sharing modalities and evaluates the performance of power-sharing within Burundi’s political and security sector institutions. Burundi’s power-sharing arrangements are presented on the basis of a documentary analysis, enriched by an analysis of their implementation in actual practice (see also De Roeck et al. 2016). A major achievement was the de-ethnicization of political competition. At times, even government officials note that thanks to the power-sharing arrangement laid down in the Arusha Accord, there is no more risk of genocide or mass atrocities in Burundi (Shingiro 2017). Contrary to a widely formulated critique against consociationalism, there is general agreement that the use of a largely consociational approach in Burundi did not ‘freeze’ ethnic identities, thus further antagonizing societal segments. Burundi built in a centripetal dimension in its ethnic power-sharing institutions.

This chapter analysis to what extent the survival of consociationalism in Burundi is under threat by internal dysfunctions, i.e. weaknesses in the consociational arrangement itself. Contrary to other consociational countries (including Belgium), executive formation rules are simple, which has enabled Burundi to avoid long periods of institutional void in the aftermath of elections. Where rules are not clearly formulated – which, e.g., is the case for ethnic representation in the public service - they were initially applied in a way so as to avoid major contestation around their application. This changed with the climate of distrust that prevails since the 2015 crisis. With the benefit of hindsight, would mono-ethnic parties (excluding the use of coopted ‘Tutsi de service’ in Hutu parties and vice versa) have been better at safeguarding minority representation and interests? In the next chapters, we explore external threats: a number of contextual evolutions and, more importantly, political elite actor preferences and strategies.
CHAPTER 2. “WE ARE ALL BARUNDI NOW.”: THE POLITICAL SALIENCE OF ETHNICITY AND CITIZENSHIP

A potentially important explanation for the decline of consociational arrangements is that their institutional set-up does not match (or no longer matches) with the underlying social groups and divisions and their political relevance. If that is the case, maintaining the consociational status-quo risks being out of phase with social realities.

This chapter, first, deals with some peculiarities of Burundi’s ethnic make-up. Rather than traditional ‘objective’ criteria (like language, religion, region), the paternal line of descent and self-identification are the defining criteria to distinguish Burundi’s ethnic groups. Demographic dominance of the Hutu (estimated around 85% of Burundian population) in a (nearly) bipolar situation is not a favourable condition for introducing and maintaining consociationalism (Bogaards 1998; Nyamitwe 2009; Wolff 2011).

Next, an overview is presented of recent ethnographic and sociological research into the evolution of Burundi’s ethnic segmentation, people’s self-identification and of the political relevance of the Hutu-Tutsi divide since the 2000 Arusha Agreement.¹ This research generally points at the continued relevance of the ethnic factor in people’s identities but also suggests that the political salience of ethnicity has strongly diminished.

Particular attention is paid to how political elite actors make use of the – real, perceived or alleged – changes in the ethnic segmentation to argue for or against the maintenance of Arusha style consociational power-sharing. One argument sometimes put forward is that Burundians no longer associate themselves with the old ethnic categorization, identify themselves as Barundi citizens and that, therefore, Burundi’s institutions should henceforth be based on citizenship, not on ethnic affiliation. This argument is somewhat in line with the Rwandan post-genocide approach based on ‘ethnic amnesia’. Another argument put forward is that the Arusha Agreement was based on ‘wrong’ ethnic categories: not Tutsi in general, but Tutsi of the Hima clan from the southern part of the country controlled Burundi’s political and military institutions. Thus, the alleged general Hutu-Tutsi divide – in itself a colonial artefact - was an artificial and erroneous bipolarity used to justify consociational power-sharing by the Arusha negotiators.

The chapter concludes with a paradox. For the government, the 2015 electoral crisis was largely due to an international conspiracy to induce regime change in Bujumbura, which received the support of a predominantly Tutsi opposition party and Tutsi dominated civil society. On government friendly social media, sindumuja protestors (including both Hutu and Tutsi - literally ‘I am not a slave’) against Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term, have increasingly been labelled as contemporary ‘sans échec’, the urban, Tutsi dominated militia of the mid-nineties. While thus confirming the political relevance of the ethnic factor, the pro-government camp nonetheless tends towards a removal of much of Burundi’s consociational features. At the same time, the opposition insists that the current crisis is political, not ethnic. And yet, most of the opposition parties campaign for the maintenance of ethnic power-sharing in Burundi. The paradox is solved in the following chapters.

[¹] This includes research on the political salience of ethnicity (Schraml 2012), ethnicity and voting behaviour (Nimubona 2005), ethnic versus partisan political identities (Van Acker 2016), ethnicity and youth (Uvin 2009; Berckmoes 2014; Alfieri 2016), ethnicity and military integration (Samii 2013), ethnicity and diaspora (Turner 2008); ethnicity and gender political representation (Ingelaere and Verpoorten 2017 - forthcoming).
 CHAPTER 3. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE FOUNDING PROCESS UNDER ATTACK

“The participants to Arusha 2000 want to bring back their misdeeds and crimes in 2016, crying for those who may back them that the Arusha renegotiation is necessary: their daily needs have largely increased while the then reached results no longer meet their egocentric interests” (Communiqué N°011/2016 of the CNDD-FDD of 30 June 2016).

The success of ethnic power-sharing in Burundi and its role in peace-building and state-building has to a large extent been associated with the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000. The Agreement’s success came as a surprise to many actors and observers, most of whom were quite skeptical at the time of its signature. Over the years, in particular among civil society groups and opposition politicians, the Arusha Agreement has gradually obtained some sacrosanct status as the roadmap to peace and democracy in Burundi. At the same time, the CNDD-FDD leadership increasingly expressed its aversion vis-à-vis the agreement. By questioning the legitimacy of the Arusha peace process in which ethnic power-sharing is rooted, the case is made that the current consociational institutions are illegitimate as well. Some of the recent CNDD-FDD critiques voiced against ‘Arusha’ are old, while other are new. The ‘old’ critiques were voiced already in tempore non suspecto, when the peace process had not been completed (see i.a. Van Eck 2009). These are, in part, related to the absence of CNDD-FDD during the Arusha peace negotiations. The ‘new’ critiques appear to have been constructed on purpose, so as to delegitimize the Arusha acquis. Some of the recycled ‘old’ critiques only related to Arusha’s short term war termination capacity but did not necessarily also imply a critique on Arusha’s consociational power-sharing provisions.

This chapter presents and analyses the (valid or flawed) critiques undermining the legitimacy of the Arusha Agreement, the bedrock of consociational power-sharing in Burundi:

- Argument 1: The Arusha Agreement was an elite deal. It was designed to benefit bourgeois politicians, not ordinary citizens. At its core, Arusha was all about sharing access to resources and to the benefits that come with control over the State. (As part of this critique, it is sometimes added that Hutu elites at Arusha were fooled by Tutsi negotiators: no quota were agreed upon to ensure Hutu representation at the level of the judiciary and of civil society organisations, both Tutsi dominated.)

- Argument 2: The Arusha Agreement was a political agreement, but has no legal status and, a fortiori, no constitutional or supra-constitutional status. It was signed with major reservations on behalf of the Tutsi parties and it was incorporated in Burundian law through an ordinary law. As a result, there is no legal obstacle to revising it. (See also Chapter 6 for an analysis of the Constitutional Court ruling of 4 May 2015 on this matter, which confirmed the constitutional legal status of the Arusha Agreement.)

- Argument 3: The Arusha Agreement was by no means unique. It did not bring even peace. It was one in a series of other peace agreements, most notably the Global Ceasefire Agreement of 16 November 2003 between the interim government and the CNDD-FDD (to which no one attributes any constitutional status).

- Argument 4: The Arusha Agreement was not meant to be everlasting. Its evaluation is part of the CNDI mandate and Burundi will enter a new stage on the basis of the CNDI conclusions and recommendations.

- Argument 5: The opposition is also divided about the Arusha Agreement. Opposition movement CNARED identifies itself with the safeguarding of the Agreement – which in itself further undermines its universal acceptance. Opposition movement MORENA (Tutsi dominated) criticizes the Arusha Agreement and calls for its renegotiation, claiming an ethnic alternation at the level of the presidency, thus revealing a “hidden Tutsi agenda” and constituting a surprising anti-Arusha ally for CNDD-FDD (MORENA 2016).
Chapter 4. Elections Undermining the Negotiated Power-sharing Equilibrium

While the democratizing effect of elections in consociational power-sharing settings has been welcomed by some authors (Norris 2009), the Burundi case shows that post-conflict elections can promote autocratization and at the same time undermine power-sharing. The three post-conflict election cycles - in 2005, 2010 and 2015 - have fundamentally altered Burundi’s political landscape. The new power balance is radically different compared to the political context at the time of the Arusha Agreement, thus (logically?) posing a threat to the sustainability of power-sharing in Burundi. In other words, due to the elections, the political pact negotiated in Arusha in 2000 is no longer aligned with the new distribution of organizational power, or political settlement, as defined by Khan (2010). Two dimensions are addressed in this chapter.

First, the post-conflict elections were won by a party that did not negotiate the Arusha Agreement and strongly criticized it (CNDD-FDD 2000). The two main signatories of the Arusha Agreement (FRODEBU and UPRONA) are in shambles. Eye-witnesses note that, although the CNDD-FDD adhered to the Arusha Agreement in 2003, it was never really the intention of the military wing of the party to abide by consociational power-sharing (Rufyikiri 2016). For them, Arusha rather marked an intermediary stage rather than the end of their conquest. Altering the modality of Burundi’s transition, the ballot-box paved the way for the victory they did not obtain on the battlefield. The Burundi case suggests that not only in cases of military victory (Lyons 2016) but also in situations of negotiated settlement, post-conflict elections can help ‘post-rebel parties’ to consolidate their power and build authoritarian rule.

Second, the return to a dominant party (de facto single party) system no longer matches with Arusha’s coalition government oriented system. The 2005 electoral results were generally in harmony with Burundi’s power-sharing arrangement. Although, in 2010, power-sharing arrangements had a moderating effect on CNDD-FDD’s landslide electoral victory (Vandeginste 2011), tension between the party’s hegemony and the constitutional power-sharing arrangements increased. Although even after the 2015 elections Burundi formally continues to have a coalition government composed in accordance with the Constitution, the dominant party has designed clever ways to erode and by-pass power-sharing as conceived by the Arusha Agreement engineers (see also Chapter 7). In addition, presidentialism rather than parliamentarism (preferred by consociationalists) characterizes the current political setting. Also, realizing President Nkurunziza’s (possible?) president-for-life ambitions would inevitably require reneging on the two term limit laid down in the Arusha Agreement. Seen from that angle, an Arusha exit serves two purposes: ending power-sharing and enabling Nkurunziza’s long-lasting presidency. Divided and undermined, opposition parties are increasingly perceived as lacking electoral support; power-sharing is increasingly framed as a life jacket of the opposition and as opposite to democracy (CNDD-FDD 2016). Asymmetric preferences are not only an obstacle for introducing power-sharing (Horowitz 2014), they threaten its durability.

Related to this second dimension, this chapter also analyze to what extent the CNDD-FDD has become a dominant but at the same time consociational political party (Bogaards 2014). If so, the case can be made that ethnic diversity and the representation of the Tutsi and Twa minority segments are achieved at the level of the party and are no longer needed at the level of the Burundian state institutions.
CHAPTER 5. WANING INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT

“Attempts by the government to force through constitutional amendments that reverse elements of the Arusha Agreement could permanently undo years of progress and exacerbate instability” (Thomas Perriello, Final Speech as U.S. Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region of Africa, 15 December 2016)

Although rooted in domestic trial and error in the early nineties and therefore home grown, consociational power-sharing in Burundi came about as a result of strong international involvement with the civil war. Two mediators with high moral authority, former Tanzanian President Nyerere and former South African President Nelson Mandela, took the lead in the Arusha peace negotiations (1998-2000). Mandela forced the negotiating parties to accept a power-sharing way-out. At times heavily criticized by Tutsi negotiators for considering Hutu as victims of Burundi-style apartheid, Mandela viewed both the causes of the Burundian conflict and the solution in highly ethnic terms (Bentley and Southall 2005). Similarities between South Africa’s interim constitution and the power-sharing arrangement in the Arusha Agreement were striking. This confirms Mehler’s (2013) finding that norm-diffusing external actors play an important role in the adoption of power-sharing based constitutional reforms.

An Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC), chaired by a UN representative and including representatives of the OAU and the Regional Peace Initiative, supervised and coordinated the implementation of the Arusha agreement during a transitional period (initially of 36 months). The Burundi case thus confirms the correlation which Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) found between the successful use of power-sharing and the presence of an international peacekeeping operation. A military operation (initially the AU’s MIAB, later the UN’s ONUB) went hand in hand with an important political presence to monitor and ensure the implementation of the peace accords. Each year, until December 2014, the presence of a UN political office in Burundi (BINUB, later BNUB) was extended by the UN Security Council, be it with a gradually more limited mandate. With the gradual retreat of international actors on the ground, their message that there was no alternative to the power-sharing settlement agreed at Arusha resonated less and less clearly.

With the successive rounds of post-conflict elections, Burundi moved away from a situation of de facto international tutelage and regained its de facto sovereignty. Throughout and beyond the 2015 electoral crisis, most international actors reiterated their support to the Arusha Agreement. An impressive number of international statements insisted on “the need to safeguard Arusha”. EU aid sanctions under the Cotonou ACP-EU partnership agreement mention the respect for the Arusha Agreement as an expected commitment. However, as I suggested elsewhere (Vandeginste 2016), international actors are generally vague about what exactly they expect. For some, a reference to Arusha was diplomatic shorthand for ‘no third term (or fourth term) for President Nkurunziza’. Others identify Arusha with the safeguarding of ethnic power-sharing. A third, less ambitious interpretation is that international partners ‘merely’ wish to see the spirit of Arusha respected: inclusive dialogue and consensus, non-violent politics.

This chapter is situated against the background of a general trend in international involvement with fragile situations. International engagement with Burundi is no longer inspired by the ambitious liberal peacebuilding agenda of the early nineties (Paris 2004) but increasingly driven by a narrow view of stabilization as crisis management (Rotmann 2016).
CHAPTER 6. JUDICIAL PATHWAYS FROM POWER-SHARING: OF LITTLE RELEVANCE IN THE BURUNDI CASE

The legality of peace deals based on power-sharing has received relatively little attention in international academia (see, however, Bell 2008 and Levitt 2012). It is generally the case that law is shaped in accordance with the political pact, even if that involves a rupture with the prevailing constitutional order. However, in a number of cases, the use of consociational arrangements to manage ethnic conflicts has been challenged in court, either domestically or at an international level (Mc Crudden and O’Leary 2013). The main arguments against consociational power-sharing are based on human rights provisions pertaining to non-discrimination and equal treatment. While potentially relevant also in Burundi, this has, in reality, not been an explanatory factor of (attempted) de-consociationalisation here.

First, this chapter looks at the enforcement and contestation of power-sharing legislation before administrative and judicial bodies in Burundi. Insofar as power-sharing provisions are implemented in the context of electoral competition, an important role is taken up by the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), which, i.a., is in charge of the cooptation of members of parliament in case the electoral results do not satisfy power-sharing requirements. This has given rise to some judicial contestation at the level of the Constitutional Court, in particular regarding the selection of the Twa minority representatives. In May 2015, the Constitutional Court also ruled on the status of the Arusha Agreement under Burundian constitutional law. While this ruling, for the first time, clarified the constitutional value of the Arusha Agreement, the verdict of the Court on President Nkurunziza’s third term at the same time seriously undermined its legitimacy (Vandeginste 2015).

Second, attention is paid to how international human rights bodies have reacted to Burundi’s power-sharing arrangement. This includes the UN Independent expert on minorities, the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination, the UN Human rights committee and the African commission on human and peoples’ rights. In addition, this chapter looks at how power-sharing in Burundi has been addressed from a transitional justice perspective. On the one hand, ethnic power-sharing might be seen as one way of promoting reconciliation and as a guarantee of non-recurrence. On the other, as the Burundi case shows, power-sharing usually goes hand in hand with the absence of truth and accountability for past human rights abuses (Vandeginste and Sriram 2011).

CHAPTER 7. CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION: FROM EVASION TO ANNULMENT OF CONSOCIATIONALISM?

“Thus, the current proposal of amendment preserves the spirit of Arusha as far as the promotion of social cohesion and maintenance of peace are concerned.” («Ainsi, la présente proposition de révision préserve l’esprit d’Arusha en ce qui est du souci de promouvoir la cohésion sociale et la sauvegarde de la paix»)
(Explanatory note to the proposed constitutional revision, October 2013)

This chapter, first, analyzes the attempts at revising the Arusha based Constitution of 18 March 2005. Next, it unfolds how, thus far without formal constitutional amendment, consociational power-sharing arrangements have been informally altered (evaded, eroded and hijacked). Seen from this angle, the latest unilateral (CNDD-FDD driven) initiative to amend the constitution might well be the formalization of an informal degradation process.
In his 2012 new year’s address, President Nkurunziza announced a revision of Burundi’s constitution. Although not implemented, this fueled speculations about forthcoming unilateral attempts at doing away with ethnic quota and other consociational rules laid down in the 2005 Constitution. In November 2013, much to the surprise of observers and political actors alike, the government out of the blue tabled a proposal for a replacement - later reformulated as a revision - of the constitution in parliament. Again, this gave rise to fears about the near end of Arusha style power-sharing. In its explanatory note, the government explained that it wanted to maintain the spirit of Arusha, including ethnic quota in the political and security institutions, while introducing some technical amendments. This chapter analyses the power-sharing dimensions of the proposed constitutional amendment. The proposal did not pass in parliament. After the 2015 elections, the government established a National Commission for Inter-Burundian Dialogue (CNDI). Its mission included an evaluation of the Arusha Agreement and the constitution. In its interim report, the CNDI noted that the Burundians want to have the “errors” of the Arusha Agreement corrected and the “imperfections” removed from the Constitution (CNDI 2016). On 16 November 2016, on the 13th anniversary of the peace agreement signed by the CNDD-FDD and the transitional government established on the basis of the Arusha Agreement, the government decided on the establishment of a commission in charge of preparing a revision of the constitution. In his 2017 new year’s address, President Nkurunziza announced the establishment of that commission.

Despite a continued formal adherence to the Arusha arrangement, power-sharing in Burundi has, in reality, gradually been fundamentally undermined in its two core dimensions. In its political dimension, this was due to the nyakurisation of political parties, i.e. the orchestrated splitting of all opposition parties and the formal recognition of the newly created CNDD-FDD-friendly wing as the official political party leadership. This undermines the typically consociational use of a coalition government agreed upon in Arusha. In its security dimension, this was due to the gradual transformation of the dominant party’s youth wing (imbonerakure) into a parallel agency de facto in charge of law and order. Not formally regulated, this security (or, according to numerous critical voices, in-security) agency is not concerned by the ethnic power-sharing provisions laid down in the Arusha Agreement and in the 2005 Constitution.

While, at the time of writing of this manuscript outline, it is too soon to try and anticipate on the formalization of the informal breakdown of Arusha, an important question is what will remain of ethnic power-sharing after the (announced) constitutional revision? One scenario is for Burundi to evolve towards a situation similar to the one that, for a short period of time, existed in the early nineties: a one-party system with some informal ethnic balancing. (Contrary to the 1989-1992 period, this would in this case amount to a de facto rather than de iure single-party rule with a predominantly Hutu rather than predominantly Tutsi party).
CONCLUSION

Burundi illustrates the general observation that power-sharing comes in different forms and is often supposed to serve various objectives in sometimes notably different contexts (Binningsbo 2013). For obvious reasons, it is premature to try and anticipate on the substance of this concluding chapter, which, however, will try to achieve at least two things.

First, some puzzles that require further analysis will be identified. One such puzzle may well be the economic dimension of power-sharing. Hardly regulated by the Arusha Agreement, economic power-sharing (or wealth sharing or amagaburanyama – literally ‘meat sharing’ in kirundi) between old and new political elites may well have been one of the largely overlooked cornerstones of stability in Burundi prior to the 2015 crisis. Other areas of follow-up research will be suggested.

The conclusion will also come up with insights for the thematic literature on the nexus between power-sharing, conflict resolution and democratization. What does the Burundi case-study tell us about the favourable factors for sustaining consociational power-sharing? Did Burundi need more power-sharing (more quota, more enforcement mechanisms, etc.) to enhance sustainability? What are the challenges associated with institutionalized ethnic power-sharing that comes about in the context of peace negotiations where combined (short term) conflict resolution and (longer term) democratic governance objectives are at stake? Consociational theory originated from an empirical study of stable democracies in deeply divided societies. What does Burundi tell us about the use of power-sharing for the purpose of ethnic pacification in a context of democratic backsliding? What are the chances of reducing or fully removing consociational power-sharing without a return to armed conflict?
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