Doing leadership: a management team in action

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1. Introduction

1.1 Why this topic?

Considering the diversity and the complexity of the phenomenon that ‘leadership’ is said to represent, it is not surprising that any one definition of leadership is elusive. Moreover, even if one single definition were possible, it would be so vague as to offer us little more than leadership is ‘all things to all men’ (Bresnen 1995). Not unsurprisingly, there is a malaise within the community of leadership researchers which Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003a: 359) sum up:

“Leadership is a topic—or rather a label for a variety of more or less related issues—that has received attention in thousands of empirical studies, theoretical work, and popular writings offering more or less well-grounded recipes for successful managerial work. Still, there is considerable discontent with what has been accomplished and it can be argued that we still do not understand leadership particularly well.”

In an attempt to make the awkwardly elusive concept of leadership more visible and thus analyzable, Alvesson has also been one of the main proponents of a call for more qualitative research into leadership (e.g. Alvesson 1996; Conger 1998; Osborn et al. 2002). Such a call is critical of the ‘mainstream’ research that has been carried out into leadership which has been criticized for its high level of abstraction, its lack of intimacy with the data and for the fact that it is largely driven by researchers’ a priori theorizing. On the other hand, the call for more qualitative studies into leadership seeks a more contextually sensitive approach which focuses on particular events that say something significant about some aspect of leadership rather than providing a grand theory which ignores the particular. However, in a review of qualitative research into leadership, Bryman (2004) concludes that there is an over-emphasis on interview based studies and a lack of qualitative work based on observation. Moreover, qualitative research that deals
explicitly with leadership using transcripts of talk-in-interaction is extremely rare. The most notable exceptions are Knights and Willmott (1992) and Fairhurst and Sarr (1996).

1.2 The research question

The purpose of this research is therefore to add to the growing qualitative trend in leadership research by analyzing transcripts of a management team in action. Using transcripts of naturally-occurring talk recorded during business meetings, this research seeks to emphasize the fact that leadership is a members’ practical achievement which is produced through talk-in-interaction. Consequently, such research might give an insight into leadership from a perspective that has not yet been seriously investigated. Furthermore, by studying the ‘doing’ of leadership as a lived situated practice, it might also be possible for such research results to be fed back into the lives of practitioners and so improve their leadership skills: practitioners require a better understanding of the everyday practices of talk that constitute leadership rather than more abstract grand theories of leadership.

As pointed out previously, a definitive and all encompassing definition of leaders is perhaps an unattainable objective. However, most contemporary definitions of leadership treat leadership as some form of influence (e.g. Alvesson 1992; Hosking 1988; Holmes and Marra 2004; Knights and Willmott 1992; Palmer and Hardy 2000; Pfeffer 1997; Pondy 1978; Yukl 1989 and 1999) but despite consensus among researchers that leadership is some form of influence, any attempts to ‘define’ influence have been limited to providing taxonomies of influence (e.g. Lamude and Scudder 1995; Kipnis and Schmidt 1985; and Falbe and Yukl 1992). Consequently, research into the discursive resources that are employed to ‘do’ influence has been neglected.

Moreover, this thesis takes a social constructionist approach to leadership which considers leaders to be managers of meaning or sense givers. The leader is therefore, the participant who is able to achieve most influence in the sensemaking process or, in other words, in the social construction of reality (Bryman 1996; Conger 1991; Morgan 1986; Smircich and Morgan 1982; Thayer 1995; Pye 2005). More specifically, this thesis is also situated within the call in leadership research for more qualitative and contextualised work. It seeks to investigate the relatively underexploited link between the process of
leadership and language by investigating the ‘doing’ of influence whereby influence is seen as a gloss for a myriad of sequential and categorical resources which are employed rhetorically to achieve dominance in the process of sensemaking or authoring social reality.

1.3 The usefulness of the topic

A piece of research is arguably useful insofar as it is capable of informing the practices of those involved in leadership. Mintzberg (1982) makes this point of view abundantly clear when he (provokingly) calls for leadership research to pass a ‘usefulness-for-the-practitioner’ test. Mintzberg calls for leadership researchers to use fewer a priori constructs, fewer instruments for measuring and fewer definitions: instead researchers should place a greater emphasis on the practical actions of leaders. Such a call for bottom-up data-driven research would thus enable practitioners to ‘do’ the talk that brings leadership into being.

Such a call also implies a move to more qualitative research which aims to say something about some aspects of leadership rather than providing a grand theory of leadership which is perhaps not applicable to all situations. By providing a ‘thick’ account of the doing of leadership in one particular context, this thesis hopes to provide an analysis that does not stand proxy for the in situ doing of leadership but which provides an account of leadership that is warranted through a fine-grained analysis of what actually goes on in the turn by turn doing of leadership as workplace practice in one particular context. The situated nature of such research obviously implies a restriction on its applicability to organisations and teams which are radically different to those described in this thesis. Nevertheless, the findings of this thesis can be useful to the practitioner in two ways. First, whilst acknowledging the contextual limitations of the qualitative research provided by this thesis, meetings are universal to all organisations and so, contextual idiosyncrasies apart, the results of this research may be applicable in some ways to other kinds of organisation. As Sacks (1984a: 21) points out, the machinery of talk has generic qualities that make it available to practitioners in other similar conditions. Second, this research points to a reflective approach to management training, whereby practitioners are asked to reflect upon their practice. Such an approach to management training (advocated more
fully in section 12.5) argues against prescriptive catch all accounts of leader-talk but asks the practitioner to develop a conscious awareness of the ‘seen but unnoticed’ communication skills that they already have. The aim is not to provide them with prescribed, standardized applications of general theory so often found in the ‘how to’ business communication recipe books but to provide them with analytical tools that will allow them to develop as reflective practitioners (Schön 1983) and so become more critical of their own practice.

1.4 Method

This thesis is situated within a social constructionist framework in which language is regarded as being performative. In other words, language does not simply reflect the world ‘out there’ but it is used to actively construct such a world. In short, language reifies rather than reflects (organizational) reality. However, such a construction of the nature of organizational reality is not an apolitical event: it is skewed according to the sequential and categorical resources that are available to the participants and the participants’ rhetorical skills in making use of such resources. However, social constructionism per se is a way of seeing the world; it does not provide a methodology for the analysis of the linguistic construction of reality. In order to do this, this thesis draws essentially on discursive psychology (DP), which takes an agnostic stance as to the existence of ‘a reality’ and concerns itself with “the constructive nature of descriptions, rather than of the entities that (according to the descriptions) exist beyond them” (Edwards 1997: 48). In order to fulfill this research agenda, DP draws extensively on the research tradition of conversation analysis, ethnomethodology and rhetorical analysis. Thus, it provides an ideal methodology for providing an account of how organizational reality is talked-into-being and the achievement leadership through this process.

1.5 Outline of the thesis

Chapter two of the thesis situates this research project within the existing literature on leadership from both a mainstream organisational perspective and a social constructionist perspective and it reviews previous research that has considered leadership from a
linguistic angle. Chapter three introduces the reader to discursive psychology (DP) as a research methodology and it discusses DP’s relationship with rhetoric, ethnomethodology, conversation analysis, and membership categorization analysis. Chapter four describes the research site. Chapters five to eleven analyse different aspects of the interaction and its relationship to the notion of leadership. Chapter five discusses the establishment of the team through talk at the beginning of the meetings. Chapter six analyses the way in which identity is established through access to discursive resources that are used to mediate turns. Chapter seven introduces the notion of facilitation and shows how apparently facilitative utterances can in fact be used to do influence. Chapters eight and nine build on the previous chapter and demonstrate how leadership emerges through decision-making. Chapter ten considers leadership in relation to repair and chapter eleven gives an account of leadership in relation to the making of assessments and the negotiation of epistemic primacy. Finally, chapter twelve offers some observations and conclusions and points out some possibilities for further research and the application of this research to practice.
2. Literature review and theoretical background

2.1 Introduction
This chapter opens with a brief review and critique of post-war leadership research which, following Bryman (1996) can be summed up in four broad movements: trait theory, the style approach, the contingency approach and new leadership. As is noted in the critique, the findings from this largely quantitative approach to leadership research are said to be limited and this has led to a call for more qualitative research into leadership. But, as Bryman (2004) points out, despite this call for more qualitative research little work has used direct observation of leadership as in situ workplace practice and, consequently, our knowledge of leadership as lived phenomenon remains patchy. However, despite this lack of direct observation of leadership-in-action, most researchers agree that influence, in some form, is essential to the notion of leadership. Consequently, the second section of this chapter considers the centrality of influence to leadership and reviews the literature on influence and leadership in organizational research. The third section focuses on social constructionist notions of leadership and influence. More specifically, the section draws attention to the role of language in influencing the social construction of organisational reality and, therefore, in doing leadership.

2.2 The main trends in leadership research
2.2.1 Trait theory
Until the late 1940s, the trait theory was the most predominant theory within leadership research. Trait theory, also known as the ‘great man theory’, attempted to locate and define key personality traits of leaders which were classified under such headings as physical attributes, abilities, and personality characteristics. Since leadership traits were seen as rooted in psychology, this led to the use of personality tests which were used to assess people’s leadership abilities. The most notable test was the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers 1962) which was based on Jung’s personality ‘types’ and which tested four dichotomous styles of behaviour (i.e. introverted versus extroverted, thinking versus
feeling, sensing versus intuitive and judging versus perceptive). When the results of these personality tests were placed in a matrix, this gave 16 personality types, some of which were assumed to correlate with leadership traits and other not. However, the trait theory became unfashionable in the late 1940s. The theory ignored context, there was little consistency between the lists of leadership traits, successful leaders appeared not to have a core of common traits that researchers could agree on, the exact definition of the traits proved difficult to pin-point with any degree of precision or consensus (e.g. what exactly is confidence?), the assumption that personality traits were stable was challenged, and the possibility of informal leadership was ignored.

2.2.2 The style approach
From the late-40s the trend in leadership research moved away from what leaders ‘are’ to what leaders ‘do’ and the relationship between their behaviour and outcomes. The Ohio State approach (Stodgill 1950) is perhaps the best known of these approaches. Questionnaires concerning the leader’s behaviour were given to subordinates and the responses to these questionnaires were then quantified. The Ohio State research concentrated on two main aspects: consideration and initiating structure. Consideration referred to the leaders’ concern for their subordinates and included such behaviours as responding to suggestions or being approachable. Initiating structure referred to the leaders’ ability to set goals for subordinates clearly and comprised of task behaviours such as meeting deadlines, maintaining organisational standards and so on. Yet, as with trait theory, style theory failed to provide a contextualised approach to leadership research. Leadership behaviours which worked well in one situation did not necessarily work well in other situations and the use of questionnaires assumed in advanced who the leaders were and ignored the issue of informal leadership.

2.2.3 The contingency approach
In the 60s and 70s, the contingency approach became the predominant research paradigm. This grew out of the observation that the situated nature of leadership had been ignored. This approach to leadership research, whilst regarding leadership style as relatively fixed, took note of the fact that some leadership styles were more effective than others
depending on the situation. Fielder (1967) distinguished three main situational variables that could affect the effectiveness of leadership style: task structure, position/power (i.e. the degree to which the leader’s power base is legitimised) and leader-member relations. However, Fielder’s research relied on a scale (least preferred co-worker scale) which was used to measure the leadership orientation of the person completing it. This scale had echoes of trait theory and one again placed an emphasis on the personality of the subjects.

2.2.4 New leadership and other recent trends

Since the 1980s the so-called ‘new leadership’ charismatic and transformational accounts of leadership have been predominant. This approach was inspired by Burns’ (1978) work on political leaders. Burns used the dichotomy of transformational and transactional leadership. Transactional leadership is leadership that is based on reward and punishment whereas transformational leadership is based on the leader inspiring his/her subordinates. Bass (1985) defined transformational leaders as those who used vision to inspire subordinates to achieve better results as opposed to transactional leaders who achieved simple conformity with the organisation’s goals. Transformational leadership therefore placed an emphasis on the centrality of vision to enact such transformations (e.g. Bennis and Nanus 1985). However, such research remained largely quantitative and relied on rather fuzzy notions such as charisma or inspiration. ‘New leadership’ has also been criticized for being non-situated and for concentrating too much on the top leaders. Bryman (1996) in his review of leadership research also noticed other trends that were important in the 90s. He notes that there has also been an increase of interest in ‘followers’ because prior to the mid-90s leadership research was too leader-centric and did not concentrated enough on the fact that leaders cannot exits without followers (e.g. Collinson 2006; Howell and Boas 2005). However, research that has paid attention to followers can be criticized on three counts. First, research into followers has tended to do so in terms of unidirectional models concerning the effect of leaders on subordinates. Second, as a consequence of this, followers are assumed to be acting as judgemental dopes who are simply rule following and are not active agents. Third, such research often assumes the a priori identities of leaders and followers in terms of their hierarchical position in the company.
The growing interest in followers, as well as leaders, is commensurate with the notion that leadership is dispersed within teams (e.g. Katzenbach and Smith 1993) and is not necessarily attributed to any one individual. In a recent survey of the literature on distributed leadership (DL), Bennett et al. (2003) note that whilst DL has been interpreted in many different ways, its core assumptions are as follows:

- DL is an emergent property of a group
- DL is a group activity not individual
- DL involves many people in the process of leadership and thus stands in contrast the notions of heroic and individual leadership
- DL sees varieties of expertise which are widely distributed across many people

In a further development, Bryman (2004) also refers to a growing interest in the process of leadership rather than the product ‘leader’ (e.g. Hosking 2006). The process view of leadership concentrates on the process of doing leadership rather than the emergence of any one individual as leader (the product). Leadership, from this perspective becomes a question of relational dynamics rather than hierarchy and as such leadership cannot be reduced to any one social actor but it is located in the complex and ongoing relationships between organisational players. Placing the emphasis on the process, therefore, takes an antithetical stance to the predominate approaches to leadership which still covertly refer back to a heroic notion of the ‘leader’.

Finally, there is also a trend within recent leadership research which casts doubt on the existence of leader and leadership as concrete entities. Some researchers (e.g. Gemmill and Oakley 1992; Bresnen 1995) suggest that leadership is a myth that serves only to reinforce existing social beliefs and structures about the necessity of hierarchy and leaders in organizations. Thus, as Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003b: 985) argue, “leadership may mean very little apart from having an impact on the self-esteem of its subjects, and providing an ideology promoting subordination of employees to managers supposed not only to exercise control but also to exhibit ‘leadership’.” Thus, from this perspective there is no substantial phenomenon behind the discourse of leadership yet the
concept of leaders and leadership is employed by people as a discursive resource to account for themselves or other phenomena. Other researchers (e.g. Meindl et al. 1985) argue that the notion of leadership is used to make sense of complex organizational events. Consequently, whilst leadership as a concrete phenomenon may not exist, if a company fails this failure may be explained away in terms of poor leadership, which acts as a gloss for a myriad of complex causes.

2.2.5 Criticisms of previous work on leadership

As can been seen by the brief sketch of leadership research over the past 50 years, the bulk of leadership research to date has been conducted within a quantitative research tradition and the cumulative findings of such research have been severely criticised (e.g. Morley and Hosking 2003; Alvesson and Sveningsson 2003a; Yukl 1989; Alvesson 1996; Barker 1997; Osborn et al. 2002.). As Alvesson (1996: 457) states:

“[leadership research] fails to meet its own criteria of knowledge accumulation. If the philosophical assumptions and rules for method were sound, then more than one or a set of empirically well supported theories, explaining leadership phenomena and providing valuable advice for practitioners would have been provided. But this is not the case and rather than calling for five thousand more studies – according to the logic “more of (almost) the same” – the time has come for a radical rethinking.”

The principal criticism of ‘mainstream’ leadership research is that by attempting to identify the variables of leadership in concepts of measurable and quantifiable traits and behaviours, sight has been lost of how leadership is socially constituted in practice. Such criticism can be summed up as follows.

1. There has been too much research that seeks to identity traits or behaviours that leaders bring to situations as inputs which are measurable in terms of the output of followers. But such ‘macro’ analyses which rely on quantitative measures of traits based on interview data give aggregate glosses of leadership rather than observations of specific behaviours. Consequently, such analyses reveal little of how leadership works in concrete situations.
2. The search for ‘grand theories’ of leadership based on aggregates of traits or behaviours has ignored the contextual diversity of the process of doing leadership. Consequently, grand theories give relatively few insights into the complexity, richness and situated nature of leadership. This view reinforces the heroic concept of leadership and is perhaps a reflection of the need to explain complex organisational events in terms of good/poor leadership (Meindl et al. 1985).

3. The extensive use of interviews or self-report may be ideal for obtaining the subject’s views about leadership but it offers little in the way of observation of how leadership is enacted. In short, as Alvesson (1996) points out, the leaders who are interviewed may be repeating popular discourses of leadership which bear no relation to what they actually ‘do’. Interviews are not necessarily a way of getting to the ‘truth’. They are an opportunity for the discursive construction of a reality that the interviewee would like to see and are an opportunity for the interviewee to render their actions accountable.

4. The selection of subjects for interview or questionnaire-based research often makes an a priori selection of who is the leader. This has tended to conflate leadership with hierarchic positions in an organisation. Yet, more recent notions of dispersed leadership and a process approach to leadership indicate that it might be a false assumption to equate organisational hierarchy with leadership.

5. The findings of mainstream leadership have been considered to be too general, contradictory and ill-defined to be of help to practitioner (Mintzberg 1982). In order to be of practical use, Mintzberg suggests that leadership research should abandon questionnaires and the use of a priori definitions before collecting data. Instead, he calls for an emphasis on observing what leaders do and how they do it.

6. Research on leadership, rather than problematising the issue in an ethnomethodological sense, assumes its existence in an unproblematic commonsense way that presupposes its relevance to practitioners.
2.2.6 The call for qualitative leadership research

Calls to address these criticisms of mainstream leadership research have largely centred upon the need for a more qualitative, ethnographic and situated approach. For example, Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003c) assert that the largely quantitative approach to leadership research, which relies on questionnaires and interviews, encourages the recycling of contemporary discourses on leadership without considering the nature of leadership as a practical accomplishment. Using interview data to explore how middle and senior managers in a Research and Development company view leadership, they discovered that such data displays that managers can put forward notions of leadership in accordance with ‘fashionable scripts’ concerning how one should conduct leadership but when pushed to define leadership practice as an action their accounts became self-contradictory and vague. Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003c) conclude that this tells us little about leadership apart from the fact that it is popular in discourse. They recommend that more ethnographic work should be carried out to avoid the recycling of the discourse of leadership which is then mistaken for leadership. Similarly, Conger (1998) also calls for more qualitative and contextualised research. He argues that such research will capture the dynamic nature of the process of leadership, whereas most quantitative research on leadership ignores the deeper structures of leadership-in-action and allows researchers to offer only generalised and relatively abstract notions of what leadership is and how it is enacted.

However, Bryman’s (2004) review of qualitative research in leadership research notes that even if qualitative leadership research is gaining in popularity, it is still a minority activity. He also notes that the main method of data collection within the qualitative approach to leadership appears to be qualitative interviewing. In 56 out of the 66 qualitative articles reviewed, the principal research method is semi-structured interviews. Observation rarely figures as a prominent method of data collection and even if observation is used, it tends to be as an ancillary technique and it is rarely in the form of participant observation or ethnography.
2.2.7 Qualitative research on leadership and language

Despite the recent trend in leadership research which calls for a more qualitative approach to leadership, very little of this research has focused on direct observation of the doing of leadership and the relationship between language and leadership. Pondy (1978) in a much quoted article with the promising title ‘Leadership is a language game’ notes that, for example, Martin Luther King was a good leader not because he had a dream but because he was able to communicate it. Yet, despite noting that a leader ‘puts into words’ what the group is doing so that it becomes a social fact, he fails to offer any ‘talk’ as a basis of analysis. Thayer also falls into this ‘trap’: after claiming that “leaders emerge in communication” (1995: 257), he fails to offer an explanation of how this might happen.

However, within leadership research there are a few notable exceptions to this rule and some researchers have indeed made use of transcripts of speeches as a basis for their research. Conger (1991) uses transcripts of speeches and mission statements to examine the rhetorical construction of the leader as manager of meaning. Shamir et al. (1994) and den Hartog and Verburg (1997) analysed speeches in order to study the use of rhetoric by charismatic leaders. Harrison and Young (2005) used critical discourse analysis and systemic functional linguistics to analyse a speech and a memo and demonstrated how discursive choices reflected leadership styles.

The use of transcripts of talk, rather than speeches, as data remains equally rare in mainstream leadership research. Knights and Willmott (1992), drawing on traditions of existentialism, phenomenology and structural analysis, studied leadership as a practical achievement. For this they used an analysis of transcripts of a business meeting. Moreover, they argued that ‘mainstream’ leadership research and the preoccupation with the measurements of elaborate constructs preclude an analysis of the actual practices of leadership. They called for more “analyses that seek to illuminate how processes usually identified as leadership are practically accomplished” (Knights and Willmott 1992: 777). This, of course, as Knights and Willmott acknowledge, has echoes of the ethnomethodological research paradigm. However, their call has been largely ignored. Cohen (2004) used transcripts of talk as data for his analysis of leadership but he drew his data from literature rather than naturally-occurring talk-in-interaction. Fairhurst and Sarr
(1996), is perhaps the most well-known and often quoted piece of research that, drawing on Goffman’s concept of framing, used transcripts of naturally-occurring talk from a variety of organisational genres to demonstrate how a leader manages meaning through talk. They list ‘tools’ for framing such as the use of metaphors, contrasts or stories so that a leader can achieve influence. Fairhurst (1993) also provided an account of women leaders in industry which was based on transcriptions of interaction based on naturally-occurring talk. However, she assumes the procedural consequentiality of the identity ‘woman’ and she equates leadership with hierarchic manager (i.e. assumes that the managers are leaders). Other work on leadership and gender, also based on transcripts of naturally-occurring talk from a feminist perspective, similarly assumes the relevance of gender and the equivalence of manager and leader identities (e.g. Troemel-Ploetz 1994).

There have also been some attempts to tackle the issue of leadership using conversational analysis and ethnomethodology (e.g. Samra-Fredericks 2000a and 2000b; Clifton 2006a). Samra-Fredericks used a conversation analytical inspired research methodology to draw attention to the emergence of leadership in top management teams and Clifton used CA to explicate how managers do leadership through the use of formulations. Recently, a project on workplace interaction at the University of Wellington, New Zealand has used a corpus of naturally-occurring talk to produce a series of papers concentrating on culturally different patterns of leadership (e.g. Holmes and Marra 2004; Marra and Holmes 2005, Holmes 2005).

Despite this recent flurry of research, leadership as a specific issue studied using the transcripts of naturally-occurring speech is not well developed within the field of pragmatics. However, there is a wide range of literature that uses transcripts of naturally-occurring speech to study workplace interaction in general (e.g. Drew and Heritage 1992) and more specifically there are numerous works on meetings (e.g. Boden 1994; Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 1997; Huisman 2001) but little of this work specifically provides analyses of leadership. Similarly, within organisational research despite the fact that some researchers are using the study of transcripts of naturally-occurring talk (Cooren 2004; Mangham 1986; Watson 1997) little of this specifically deals with leadership issues.
2.3 Leadership as influence

As can be seen from the brief sketch of leadership research over the past fifty years there are various ways of considering leadership. In some respects leadership research is like the proverbial tale of the blind men trying to define what an elephant is. One person touches the trunk and declares an elephant to be like a snake, another feels the leg and declares the elephant to be like a tree and another touches the tail and declares the elephant to be like rope and so on. Similarly, leadership can be conceptualized at different levels: individual, dyadic, group or organisational. It has been regarded as character traits, styles of management, contingent on the situation, dispersed within a group, formal or informal, transactional or transformative. It has been dealt with by asking ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’ to fill in questionnaires, by interviewing ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’, by observing leaders in action and by administering personality tests. It is perceived as being culturally, temporally and situationally contingent. Consequently, it is not unsurprising that leadership escapes any decontextualised, shared collective meaning and so the ‘grand theory’ of leadership that has universal application and ‘truth’ has proved tantalisingly elusive. Indeed, the quest-like search for a definitive version of leadership is certainly doomed to failure from the start, as following Wittgenstein (1972) the meaning of concepts are tied to the contexts and occasions of their use. However, as illustrated below, and as Yukl (1989: 252) points out, “most definitions of leadership involve an influence process, but the numerous definitions of leadership that have been proposed appear to have little else in common.”

“leadership is defined in this paper as the exercise of influence by people in a superior position to subordinates by using, at least in part ‘voluntary’ means to direct their feelings and thinking.”
Alvesson (1992: 192)

“Those who achieve most influence in the course of negotiations, who do so most consistently, and who come to be expected and perceived to do so, are defined as leaders.”
Hosking (1997: 302)

“leadership is generally defined as the ability to influence others”
Holmes and Marra (2004: 439)
“formal leadership is defined as the incremental influence of position holders exercised via direct and indirect means to maintain and/or alter existing dynamics in and of a system.”
Osborn et al. (2002: 803-4)

“when it comes to people in organizations, the aim of leadership is primarily to influence them. Leaders are those who can influence the people in the organisation to carry out behaviours required of them.”
Palmer and Hardy (2000: 236-7)

“most people would agree, I think, that leadership is a form of social influence”
Pondy (1978: 87)

“leadership is a relational concept implying two terms: the influence agent and the person influenced. Every act of influence on a matter of organisational relevance is in some degree an act of leadership.”
Katz and Kahn (1966: 301)

“[leadership is] influencing task objectives and strategies, influencing commitment and compliance in task behaviour to achieve these objectives, influencing group maintenance and identification, and influencing the culture of an organisation.”
Yukl (1989: 253)

“Leadership inevitably requires using power to influence the thoughts and actions of other people.”
Zaleznik (1977: 69)

Whilst leadership cannot be seen as directly synonymous with influence, it is at least one of the key components of leadership that most researchers agree upon. Consequently, this thesis considers leadership from the perspective of doing influence and more specifically, as explained later (section 2.4), this thesis takes a social constructionist stance on leadership which regards leaders as managers of meaning i.e., leaders are the person or persons who are most influential in the authoring of an intersubjective version of organisational reality. Before going on to consider influence and the management of meaning in more depth, the rest of this section reviews pervious research on influence.
Previous research on influence in organisational settings has largely been limited to dividing behaviours into various categories of tactics. Kipnis et al.’s (1980) Intra-organisational Influence Scale, modified and added to by Yukl and Falbe’s (1990) study, is the most widely used measure of influence in organisational and management research (Lamude and Scudder 1995: 168). Kipnis et al. (1980) used self-report and questionnaires to locate eight dimensions of influence. They defined these as: assertiveness, ingratiation, rationality, sanctions, exchange, upward appeals, blockings and coalitions. These influence tactics are summed up as follows:

- Assertiveness (i.e., being forceful to achieve one’s ends)
- Ingratiation (i.e., using behaviours designed to increase one’s likeability)
- Sanctions (i.e., the use of organizational rewards and punishments)
- Rationality (i.e., the use of factual and logical argument)
- Exchange (i.e., offering time, skills, effort or access to organizational resources in return for compliance)
- Upward appeal (i.e., appealing to those higher up in the organisation to achieve one’s objectives)
- Blocking (i.e., impeding the progress of somebody else’s plans that are in opposition to yours)
- Coalitions (i.e., mobilising the support of others to achieve influence)

Yukl and Falbe (1990) sought to modify and expand Kipnis et al.’s (1980) original taxonomy. They dropped ‘sanctions and blocking’ because of infrequent use and ‘conceptual problems’ and included two more items that came from recent literature on managerial leadership. The first was ‘inspirational appeals’ which they defined as arousing enthusiasm by appealing to values, ideals and aspirations. The second was consultation which they defined as seeking participation in the planning of strategy. Yukl and Falbe (1990) used self-report questionnaires (as Kipnis et al. had) but they also sent questionnaires to the target subordinates as well as leaders and so claimed to look at upward (i.e., subordinates influencing superiors), downward (i.e., superiors influencing subordinates) and lateral influence tactics (persons of the same hierarchic level influencing each other). They concluded that despite some differences in the direction of
influence the eight tactics they identified remained relatively constant when used in a downward, upward or lateral direction. According to their research, consultation and rational persuasion were the most used tactics.

Furthermore, managers/leaders using such tactics have also been divided into ‘types’. For example, Kipnis and Schmidt (1983) divided managers into three types in their attempts to influence subordinates. The types were: shotgun managers who emphasised assertiveness, tacticians who emphasised reason and bystanders who used little influence. Other taxonomies that have been proposed divide leadership in terms of its effectiveness and its ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ nature. Falbe and Yukl (1992), for example, use the self-report of critical incidents to assess the effectiveness of influence tactics and they use the taxonomy of hard or soft tactics. Soft tactics being consultation, inspirational appeals and ingratiating and hard tactics consisted of applying pressure, building coalitions and legitimising claims. More recently, such research on influence in leadership has taken on a more cross cultural perspective (e.g., Fu and Yukl 2000, Xin and Tsui 1996, and Rao et al. 1997). Yet, this research is still based on taxonomies derived from earlier studies and the use of questionnaires and self-reports.

Whilst such research neatly categorizes various forms of influence and their users, it is not without its critics. First, as Higgins et al.’s (2003) survey of research on organizational influence tactics concludes, confusion surrounds such taxonomies. For example, Gordon (1996) sees self-promotion and ingratiating as being in the same category but Godfrey et al. (1999) regarded them as distinct notions. Second, such taxonomies are decontextualised exogenous categorizations that are removed from the participants’ own concerns. Third, they are based on an (over) reliance on questionnaires and self-report that give practitioners’ perceptions of how they or others ‘do’ influence but such methods fail to provide data derived from observation of practitioners doing influence. Fourth, most of the research on influence has dealt with top-down influence assuming that it is the hierarchic superior who is the most influential and that influence is mono-directional (though see, for example, Yukl and Falbe 1990 or Kipnis and Schmidt 1988 on upward influence tactics).

Finally, as Kipnis and et al. (1980: 451) were aware, and as Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003c: 1457) aptly point out, “all people influence each other. This is once again a pretty
mundane and everyday type of act/outcome that is constructed as extraordinary through
the notion of leadership.” Consequently, if influence is to be more than the extra-
ordination of the mundane as Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003c) indicate, the notion of
leader influence has to be qualified in some way. As will be explained later, this thesis
considers influence from a social constructionist perspective in terms of how participants
in a meeting influence the construction of organisational reality and so ‘manage meaning’
in order to make their accounts of what is ‘going on’ in the organisation count.

2.4 Social constructionism, influence and leadership
2.4.1 The social construction of reality
Social constructionism can be simply defined as an approach which considers that “the
real world is what counts as the real world, and this is a product or feature of, rather than
something prior to, descriptive practices” (Edwards 1997: 51). It takes a critical stance on
the positivist/empirical claims that a ‘real’ world exists and that it can be revealed by
‘scientific’ observation. Social constructionism argues for the co-existence of a
multiplicity of temporally and culturally bound ways of understanding the world. Thus,
contemporary ‘western’ ways of understanding the world or the self are radically
different from, for example, Maori versions of the world (Potter and Wetherell 1987: 104
ff.). And historically such contemporary understandings of the world are very different
from the world as perceived 100 years ago. For example, in the Victorian era apologists
for colonialism regarded the ‘superiority’ of the white race as a natural reflection of the
world and thus a justification for colonialism (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 124 ff) whereas
such a view would be untenable at the present. Social constructionism therefore regards
knowledge of the world and self as a socially sustained, rather than perceptual, process.
In short, knowledge of the world is constructed in social interaction.
Berger and Luckmann’s (1967) seminal text on the social construction of reality claimed
that each person is born into a social world in which he/she encounters significant others
who socialise him/her and so impose a definition of ‘reality’ on him/her. Over time, a
dominant and socially reinforced view of the world becomes factified, diffused and
widely internalized into the group’s definition of what counts as reality. In Berger and
Luckmann’s (1967) terms, such talk reifies ‘reality’ which is then regarded as ‘fact’ by its
producers. Progressively, this leads to institutionalization whereby, through a process of socialization, this particular construction of social reality becomes accepted. Over time, this socially constructed position becomes institutionalised as the reality accepted by the social actors and it becomes a constraining feature of future action. Reality, thus defined, is regarded by its producers as having cognitive validity that purports to be a natural and ‘true’ version of the world and so it becomes legitimized. Deviations from such ‘norms’ are held accountable and in extreme cases can be regarded as signs of madness (cf. Smith 1978). Reality, thus socially constructed, comes to be a resource and a constraining force on social action: social actors produce and are produced by their own discursive creation of reality. Furthermore, such legitimization of ‘commonsense’ knowledge of the world (what everybody knows cf. Garfinkel [1967]) is assumed by the individual to concur with other people’s commonsense view of the world. In other words, social actors assume that the world which surrounds them is ‘more or less’ the same world that surrounds their interlocutors. Failure to make such an assumption would be symptomatic of faulty socialization or of being an autistic who is locked into a private world and is thus unable to communicate (assumed) shared understanding with others. In sum, the essence of social constructionism is that the reality by which social actors live out their mundane lives has been socially constructed and is made intersubjectively available in and through various forms of interaction. However, the central and most pervasive, yet generally hidden, feature of such intersubjectivity is that it is taken for granted and perceived by social actors as being naturally the ‘way things are’ and the extremely banal and mundane nature of the social construction of reality through talk-in-interaction is largely ignored.

2.4.2 Social constructionism and language

Social constructionism regards language as performative: it builds the social reality that surrounds us rather than just reflecting it. To take a rather well worn metaphor, language is seen as the building bricks of reality rather than as a mirror reflecting reality (cf. Potter 1996: 97 ff). In the mirror metaphor, language is a simple reflection of reality though at times this view maybe distorted according to where the observer is standing in relation to the mirror. The second metaphor, that of the brick, corresponds to a social constructionist take on language. Using this metaphor, reality, or at least a version of reality, is
constructed through language. To push the metaphor further, the building blocks of reality are held together by the cement which are the practices of talk-in-interaction by which the factification of reality is achieved.

The metaphor of the mirror sums up what Harris (1981) has termed the ‘telementational myth’. Telementationalism regards language as a system for conveyance of thoughts or perceptions of a pre-discursive world. The mind combines these experiences of reality into thoughts about the world which then find expression in words which are simply the external signs/symbols/mirrors of thoughts. To communicate, it is enough to place words together in syntactically correct utterances and so thoughts are conveyed to the recipient. A recipient of the same culture decodes the strings of words and so understands what is being talked about and in this way, communication is achieved. Propaganda, advertising, rhetoric or any other Machiavellian type manipulation of language would then be ‘just another level’ of analysis which complicates the decoding. Harris (1981: 9), quoted in Coulter (2005: 80), sums up the telementational approach to language thus:

Suppose A has a thought that he wishes to communicate to B, for example, that gold is valuable. His task is to search among sentences of a language known to both himself and to B, and to select that sentence which has a meaning appropriate to the thought to be conveyed; for example, in English, the sentence Gold is valuable. He the encodes this sentence in its appropriate oral or written form, for which B is able to decode it, and in virtue of knowing what it means, grasps the thought which A, intended to convey to him, namely that gold is valuable.

Such a vision of language presupposes that there is a one to one relationship between ‘realities’ and words. On the other hand, a social constructionist approach to language places more emphasis on the indexical ‘meaning’ of words whereby that the meaning of words are dependent on the context in which they are used so that the meanings of utterances arise out of the socially situated context in which they occur and such meaning can then be negotiated on the basis of ‘what everybody knows’ (Garfinkel 1967: 4-5). Thus, from this perspective, understanding is not a simple transmission of messages that are encoded and decoded but the meanings of utterances are actively constructed by the participants in interaction. In short, the meanings of words are dependent on context and locally perceived in situ exigencies. Words are no longer the reflection or perceptions of
the world that are held privately in the ‘mind’ and then transmitted which ignores the
dialogic nature of talk and the joint construction of conversational realities (Shotter1993).

2.4.3 The social construction of ‘organisational’ reality
From a social constructionist stance, it follows that if ‘reality’ is socially constructed
principally through language, then so are organisations. This goes against most
mainstream organisational research which treats organisations as pre-discursive ‘fixed’
structures that have an objective reality. Conversely, then, a social constructionist
approach to organisation considers organisation to be emergent from a reality-creating or
sensemaking process so that organization is at once, to borrow a term form Garfinkel
(1967: 40), the process and the product of social interaction. This concept is often
summed up in the concept of organizations being active processes (verbs) rather than
fixed entities or ‘nouns’ (Chia 1996: 55). This post-modern approach to organization
therefore argues for a shift in focus from organization to organizing and a move away
from an ontological commitment to being to one of becoming. Organizational studies
should therefore, “eschew thinking in terms of reified ‘entities’ such as ‘organizations’ in
preference for an examination of relational processes such as micro-practices of
organizing and representing which produce effects that we take to be entities in
themselves” (Chia 1996: 49/50). From such an anti-essentialist stance, language becomes
central to the concept of organization or organizing. As Mumby and Stohl 1996: 58) state:

For us, organization – or organizing to use Weick’s (1979) term – is a precarious ambiguous,
uncertain process that is continually being made and remade. In Weick’s sense, organizations are
only seen as stable, rational structures when viewed retrospectively. Communication, then, is the
substance of organizing in the sense that through discursive practices organization members
engage in the construction of a complex and diverse system of meanings’

The acknowledgement of the centrality of language to organization has led to the so-
called ‘linguistic turn’ in organisational research. In a review of discursive approaches to
organizational research, Putnam & Fairhurst (2001) announced that the study of discourse
and organizations has come of age and that a significant number of organizational
scholars have recognized the importance of how language use and communication represent a promising path for knowledge about organizational life. The linguistic turn in organisational research revolves around the social constructionist notion that language is not a mere reflection of a pre-existing reality but language has a central role to play in the construction of such a reality. In other words, organisational discourse is not discourse about organisation as if it were some kind of pre-discursive entity but it relies on the realisation that discourse brings into being the entity that it is commonsensically perceived to describe. As Chia (2000: 513) notes, organisations:

“do not have a straightforward and unproblematic existence independent of our discursively-shaped understandings. Instead, they have to be forcibly carved out of the undifferentiated flux of raw experience and conceptually fixed and labelled so that they can become the common currency for communicational exchanges.”

Moreover, as Weick et al. (2005: 413) point out, “communication is a central component of sensemaking and organizing”. It is through the talk of organisational players that sense is made of the raw flow of events that surround and permeate the organisation, the history, the here-and-now and the future of the organisation and the people who act in these events. Weick (1995: 17 ff.) sets out seven properties for this sensemaking process. According to Weick, sensemaking is:

1. grounded in identity construction. The process of making sense depends on who the sense-maker is. Who we think we are within an organisation shapes our interpretation of events. Thus identities play a key role in the ‘allowability’ (cf. Levinson 1992) of contributions to the sensemaking process and to the interpretation of what utterances ‘mean’ according to the relationship of the speakers relative to each other.

2. retrospective. The way in which the environment is made sense of is dependent on what has gone before. Yet, because the past is referred to from the present it is obviously influenced by the current context. From this perspective, organisational history is a question of rewriting, not discovery.
enacted in sensible environments. In other words, there is no pre-discursive reality but participants are created by and create their own realities by orienting to the (discursive) possibilities that the environment provides them. This concept is similar to ethnomethodology’s concept of the reflexive nature of talk and social structure whereby organization is accomplished by and for practitioners through talk-in-interaction: it is not attributable to exogenous structures acting upon participants. In other words, organizations are reflexively structured so that social actions are sensitive to the context in which they are performed but reflexively they also produce context. In Heritage’s (1991: 94) terms, they are context shaped and context renewing.

4. Sensemaking is not an intrapersonal construct: it is the achievement of an intersubjectively negotiated version of reality that is a dialogically achieved practical issue whereby mutual understandings are produced through talk.

5. Sensemaking can never be completed: it is always in a state of flux and it is continually ‘up for grabs’ (Weick 1995: 85).

6. based on extracted cues. The flow of events that surround an organisation are undifferentiated and it is only by becoming the focus of attention that they become noticed and thus they also become available for sensemaking. Weick (1995: 1) for example points out that it is only recently that child abuse has become a ‘noticed phenomenon’. A ‘phenomenon’ has to be ‘noticed’ and labelled otherwise it cannot be acted upon and it just makes up the background noise that surrounds organization. In other terms, for sense to be made out of a phenomena it must be noticed or it must become the topic of talk.

7. driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. In other words, since there is no pre-discursive reality, accuracy is not an issue. Indeed the concept of accuracy
falls into a realist trap of assuming that there is a ‘real’ world ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered and ‘correctly’ interpreted. Conversely, a plausible and persuasive rhetorical description of what is taken to be ‘reality’ counts. Consequently, what is primordial in the process of the social construction of reality is that sensemaking accounts become accepted as intersubjectively negotiated versions of reality since their accuracy, in terms of reflecting a presumed pre-discursive reality that exits ‘out there somewhere’, is not relevant. This places an emphasis on the rhetorical construction of accounts so that they influence the achievement of the intersubjective construction of ‘reality’.

From such a perspective the nature of organisational reality is therefore negotiable, fluid, and dialogic. In order to illustrate his point, Weick (1995: *passim*) cites extensively from Porac *et al.*’s (1989) work on sensemaking in a Scottish knitwear manufacturers. Porac *et al.* (1989) demonstrate that the sensemaking of the company’s managers led to the development of socially shared beliefs about the competitive environment which then guided the strategic choices of the company. In short, the nature of organisational reality was socially constructed by the management and over time this definition of organisational reality was objectified, diffused within the company and widely internalised so that it became a generally accepted consensus of ‘what is out there’. To use Porac *et al.*’s (1989: 399) phrase, such core beliefs became a “socially reinforced view of the world”. Their research was based on four assumptions. First, the activities and structure of an organisation are based on the actions of social actors. Second, such action is based on social actors noticing and giving meaning to events in the environment surrounding them. Third, they assumed that the ‘meaning’ of these events is problematic and is open to negotiation. Fourth, this process of reification of organisational reality is realised through talk. Taken together this leads to the social construction of organisational reality “in which subjective interpretations of externally situated information become themselves objectified” (Porac *et al.* 1989: 398). Not only does sensemaking within an organisational environment factify the environment in which the organisation operates but it also factifies the organisation. When
practitioners sensemake, they are talking their relationships, which constitute the structure of the organization, into being. From this perspective, the organization is not regarded as an exogenous pre-discursive structure but, in ethnomethodological terms, it is a members’ accomplishment which is achieved through members’ orientation to what they perceive as social structure and in so doing they reify social structure and reproduce it in their actions. The organization is, thus, to be found not in reified organizational charts rather it exists in the oriented to constraints and resources in the here-and-now activities of practitioners going about their everyday workplace activities. In this sense, “social structures are ‘incarnate’ to the practices of their display and recognition” (Hilbert 1990: 796). Consequently, talk is not *just* talk, but rather it is the medium through which the structure of the organization is constituted (or talked into being) and by which people’s relative rights and obligations in relation to the authoring of organizational reality are defined and policed. Reflexively and retrospectively the ‘organizational structure’ is then treated as an exogenous entity which carries with it constraints and resources. The organisation exists not in the abstract empty corridors but in the moment-by-moment ongoing construction and reconstruction of the organisation in talk-in-interaction. In short, talk is not only about the state of the company, it is the state of the company.

Chia (1996: 51) thus calls for a poststructuralist concept of organisation where organisations are reconceptualised as the intrinsically human activity of forging order out of disorder. Ontologically speaking, organisations cannot exist until they are created or talked into being by organisational members. Workplace interaction is thus the primary locus where institutions are enacted and in their turns at talk organisational members construct the organisation and the interpersonal relationships which bind the organisation together. Moreover, through the fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction it is possible to make visible the ‘seen but unnoticed machinery of talk’ through which such a process of construction takes place. The interactional properties of everyday talk are therefore reflexively tied both to the occasion of speaking and, simultaneously, to the organisation as a whole. Boden (1994: 14) sums up this perspective by stating that, “when people talk they are simultaneously and reflexively talking their relationships, organisations, and whole institutions into action, or into being.” Moreover, Pye (2005) explicitly links
sensemaking to issues of leadership and argues that Weick’s notion of sensemaking sums up the central concept of leadership and Pye (ibid 2005: 33) also argues that viewing leadership in terms of sensemaking “will encourage a more informed appreciation of the daily doing of leading, grounded in organizing, just as it is in everyday life”.

2.4.4 The social construction of (leader) identity

From a social constructionist perspective, not only does talk ‘construct’ the organisation but it also talks into being the identity of players within the organisational landscape. Identity is thus not a reflection of a pre-existent essentialist self of traditional social psychology but as Burr (1995: 53) states, “our identity therefore originates not from inside the person, but from the social realm, where people swim in a sea of language and other signs, a sea that is invisible to us because it is the very medium of our existence.” Consequently, identity, as a product of social interaction, is an in situ members’ accomplishment which is culturally and temporally bound.

Similarly, within an organisational context, identities are not pre-discursive entities: they are discursively created in and though talk. Thus, McHoul (1987: 370) argues against a ‘realist’ position adopted by Clegg (1987) in which Clegg argues that knowing that PW is the project manager and that Ray is the site foreman is enough to explain the talk in terms of who has power over whom. McHoul (ibid) suggests that the identity of foreman and manager are constructed in talk and are not pre-existent and so he argues that pre-discursive identities cannot be invoked to explain power relationship in organizations since “being a manager or foreman, in this society, at this time, in these particular material circumstances, is constituted to all intents and purposes by, for just one example, access to differential turn-rights and -obligations when plans for construction are being handled” (McHoul 1987: 370). Identities, and relationships between identities, are thus talked into being and are constructed in talk through a dialogic and discursive relationship between participants: they are not pre-discursive entities.

More specifically, then, from the point of view of leader identity, most previous research on leadership has tackled the problem form a position whereby the identity ‘leader’ is usually conflated with hierarchic position and is considered to pre-exist talk. Consequently, previous research into leadership has tended to ignore the way in which
leader identity is constructed in talk and has tended to address the issue of how leaders talk rather than the issue of the reflexive construction of leader identity through talk. Conversely, a social constructionist perspective on leader identity considers leader identity to be a members’ achievement which is accomplished in talk. One way in which leader identity is achieved is by participants crafting their own identity as leader in and through talk (literally talking themselves into being as the leader) by gaining predominance in the process of constructing organizational reality. Thus, the identity of leader is not necessarily attributed to the hierarchically established superior but has to be actively negotiated and oriented to by participants in talk and is achieved through the process of influencing the management of meaning. As Hosking (1988: 154) states:

“leadership is considered as a process in which social order is negotiated, sometimes tacitly, and sometimes explicitly. Those who achieve most influence in the course of negotiations, who do so most consistently, and who come to be expected or perceived to do so are here defined as leaders”

In short, the leader is a manager of meaning (Smircich and Morgan 1982: 258) who emerges from the process of negotiating organisational reality and so manages the meaning of the flow of events that surround the organisation. Conger (1991) drew on the notion of framing, which he (Conger 1991: 32) glossed as “defining the process of organisation in a meaningful way”, to demonstrate how leaders use ‘rhetorical crafting’ to convey such framing in the most convincing way possible. And Pye (2005: 46) argues that leadership is a question of one person shaping a definition of reality. Leaders thus act as ‘meaning makers’ (Conger 1991: 44) who make sense of the hustle and bustle of events that surround the organisation and then communicate this sense in a rhetorically convincing manner to subordinates. Fairhurst and Sarr (1996) also dealt with the notion of framing and, in agreement with Conger (1991) and Smircich and Morgan (1982), consider leaders to be the managers of meaning who frame events and thus ‘construct reality’. Similarly, Thayer (1995) also emphasises the fact that a leader is a ‘creator of social reality’ (1995: 242). Hosking (e.g. 1988 and 1999) also takes a stance that is inspired by social constructionism. To sum up her writings; she sees leadership as a social, dialogic process that is based on a performative view of language which constructs organisational reality and the identities of social actors within this reality. The leader
emerges as the person who has, or persons who have, most influence in this process of construction of organisational reality. Consequently, she argues that leadership research should therefore switch focus from the leader as person to the leader as process. She defines leaders and leadership as follows:

First, leadership is a fundamentally social phenomenon, and some form of social interaction, usually face to face is required. Second, leadership has the effect of structuring sense-making processes. Third, to be defined as leader, a participant must be perceived as salient, relative to others; in particular they will be recognised as of higher status in terms of their contribution to influence.

Hosking (1988: 152)

In this way she avoids conflating leadership with organisational hierarchy which ignores the informal aspects of leadership and the fact that there may be more than one leader. The leader’s role, from a social constructionist perspective, is thus one of practical authorship which allows the leader to frame a particular version of reality and to influence other social actors so that they accept this. Influence is therefore central to the social constructionist notion of leadership and the process of the management of meaning.

2.5 Conclusion

In sum, this brief review of the literature on leadership reveals that there is still considerable diversity of opinion concerning the exact nature of leadership. However, the single common theme running through most concepts of leadership is the notion of influence. Yet, as with most work on leadership, the notion of influence (and leadership) has not been seriously considered using a qualitative research paradigm based on observation of the in situ doing of influence. More specifically, social constructionist inspired accounts of leadership consider leaders to be the managers of meaning and they emerge through the interaction by influencing the authoring of organisational reality. But despite the fact that social constructionist accounts of leadership point to the primordial role of language in this process, little research has sought to provide a fine-grained analysis of how meaning is managed and how influence, and so leadership, is achieved within such a process. As discussed in the following chapter, this thesis proposes
discursive psychology as a research paradigm that can provide a fine-grained analysis of the doing of influence and leadership.
3. Methodology

3.1 Introduction

Considering leadership to be a question of influencing the management of meaning, this thesis takes a social constructionist stance on leadership. However, whilst social constructionism provides a particular way of perceiving social reality, it does not prescribe the use any one methodology for specifying how meaning is managed as an in situ practice (Potter 1996: 205; Semin 1990: 151). And paradoxically, despite the fact that organizational research is taking the linguistic-turn (Alvesson and Kärreman 2000) which gives prominence to the performative nature of language in the construction of organizations, such research often fails to take this turn far enough and fails to provide fine-grained analyses of talk which explicate how organizational ‘reality’ is constructed in and through workplace interaction (e.g. Porac et al. 1989; Shotter 1993; Weick 1995).

Similarly, social constructionist research on leadership, whilst noting that leaders emerge through being able to influence the process of the management of meaning, also fails to take the linguistic turn in organizational research far enough in order to show how this is done and how the identity of leader emerges in talk in sequential and categorical terms. Using discursive psychology (DP) as a research methodology, which combines conversation analysis, ethnomethodology, membership categorization analysis and the study of rhetoric, this thesis seeks to explore the process of influence and leadership in the management of meaning from a perspective that can explicate how the oriented-to sequential and categorical properties of talk are deployed to ‘do’ leadership.

3.2 Discursive psychology

DP, as Potter (2003: 784) notes, is an approach to social investigation that is embedded in a web of methodological and theoretical assumptions. Moreover, many of these methodological and theoretical assumptions are drawn from CA and EM (Potter and Edwards 2003: 169) and rhetoric. Edwards and Potter (2005: 243) define DP as follows:
“DP focuses on person and event description in talk and text. It examines how factual descriptions are assembled, how they are built as solidly grounded or undermined as false, and how they handle the rational accountability (or otherwise) of actors and speakers. We focus particularly on what we (provisionally) call ‘mind and reality’ – on how people deploy common sense notions of an ‘external’ reality as a kind of setting for, and evidential domain for inferences about, a range of mental states and personal characteristics.

We also emphasize rhetorical organization, how descriptions and their inferences routinely (and not only in adversarial contexts) attend to possible or actual counter versions. Descriptions are constructive of their objects. This is not to say that talk brings things into the world, but rather, that descriptions are categorizations, distinctions, contrasts; there are always relevant alternatives available. This permits descriptions to be performative; they offer one construction rather than another, produced in sequential and rhetorical contexts, where the specifics matter for the action being done.” (italics in original)

As such DP is an ideal tool for examining the social construction of reality as an in situ member’s practice. Firstly, then, DP assumes an explicitly epistemic rather than ontological social constructionist perspective (Edwards 1997: 47/48). In other words, whilst remaining agnostic as to the existence of any external pre-discursive ‘reality’, DP concerns itself with the nature of people’s accounts of ‘reality’ and the actions that these accounts perform. For example, Edwards (2005: 268) demonstrates how during a counseling session in which husband and wife are recounting their problems, the husband’s description of another participant in the story as being ‘a bit of a lad’ is done to manage an accusation that his wife is flirtatious and defend himself from an argument that he jealous. How the construction of the husband is deployed in talk and how this is achieved is the focus of enquiry rather than the ‘truth value’ of the account. In short, DP is more interested in how versions of reality are constructed than the presence or not of any underlying truth to accounts and descriptions. DP therefore considers ‘reality’ to be a socially situated dialogical and practical matter for people rather than an individual and metaphysical concern. For example, Edwards and Potter (1992: 97 ff.) illustrate this discursive and rhetorical (re)construction of reality in the case of Lawson’s memory. To sum up their argument briefly: the data refers to an incident in the 80s in the UK when Nigel Lawson, the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, resigned following a disagreement
with the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. The first part of the story, as told by Edwards and Potter, refers to a press conference where the journalists who were present at the briefing stated that Lawson was going to cut pensions. This interpretation, or version of reality, was contested by Lawson. In such a situation, what is ‘reality’ becomes a very public debate in which political standing is at stake. The solution that Edwards and Potter advocate emphasizes the socially and rhetorically constructed nature of the differing versions of events and the contested/negotiated nature of reality. As Edwards and Potter (1992: 74) note:

“these different versions need to be understood as organized rhetorically. Participants’ versions of events, and their selection criteria for truth, could not be disentangled from the pragmatic deployment of these formulations”

Reality, in the sense of the truth about what happened at the briefing was not just a simple matter of retrieving cognitive versions of the event in one’s mind and then (re)presenting such ‘reality’ in talk. Rather, defining the true story (past reality) is a politically and rhetorically organized discursive act.

### 3.3 Discursive psychology and rhetoric

Returning to the example discussed above concerning Nigel Lawson’s memory, Edwards and Potter (1992: 97 ff.) demonstrate how such rhetorical devices as seeking consensus for one’s version of reality or dismissing rival versions of events actively construct what, for the participants, is fact. For example, they study Lawson’s resignation letter to Thatcher and demonstrate how this version of the resignation (reality) was designed to show how Lawson did not want to resign of his own volition but his resignation was due to the exogenous features of the situation and was therefore beyond his ‘control’. Rhetorically, Lawson achieves this by removing the human agent from the letter in order to emphasize his own lack of choice and to defend himself from criticism that he resigned out of self-interest because he could earn more in the City.

Rhetoric is thus one of the key ways in which social actors seek to influence others and to achieve an account of ‘reality’ that counts. Such a perspective comes to the fore in
Shotter’s (1993) notion of rhetorical responsive social constructionism. First of all, the social construction of reality is rhetorical because social actors have to defend their constructions and attack the ‘reality’ building of others. It is responsive because the construction of reality cannot take place in isolation but takes place in a social forum or in Shotter’s (1993) terms through ‘joint action’. Rhetoric is thus a key element in the negotiated nature of social reality and in the persuasion of others to accept one version of reality rather than another. Since the Enlightenment rhetoric has been associated with ways of hiding lack of substance in (academic) debate and distracting from scientific discovery rather than being an integral part of it (cf. Latour and Woolgar 1979). However, Billig (1987) revives the ideas of the classical rhetoricians and demonstrates the pervasiveness of rhetoric in mundane talk and the importance of rhetoric in persuading and therefore influencing. Basic to the idea of rhetoric is that it is a mixture of offensive strategies and defensive strategies. Offensive strategies seek to undermine an opponent’s arguments and defensive strategies that seek to bolster one’s own argument. Rhetoric is thus concerned, on the one hand, with fact construction which enhances one’s own version of reality and, on the other hand, with fact deconstruction which seeks to find gaps in the arguments of one’s opponents. Such attacking and defending strategies constitute the essence of persuasion. As Caxton, quoted in Billig (1987: 52), states, rhetoric is “a science to cause another man by speech or by writing to believe or to do that thing which thou wouldst have him for to do”. Thus, despite contemporary popular distrust of rhetoric (‘mere rhetoric’), rhetoric plays a pervasive, yet largely unseen, role in establishing an authorized/legitimized version of reality.

However, contrary to a more traditional perspective on rhetoric, such as Caxton’s, which is essentially cognitive in the sense that it aims to make somebody change their ‘mind’, DP examines the rhetorical and persuasive nature of talk without the psychological trappings. Since language does not provide a ‘window’ into the mind it cannot be ‘proved’ that a change of cognitive state has occurred. Rather, members are held socially accountable for their displays of states of mind which are presumed to be a window on cognitive states. Words are thus perceived as actions or moves in the game rather than a reflection of cognitive states. Thus, even if a researcher could ‘know’ what somebody was thinking at any moment in time, this would be irrelevant since it is not what one
‘thinks’ that leads to persuasion: it is what one says or does. Since one can never know what the other is ‘really thinking’, persuasion is not about changing mental states but is about getting someone to agree to a particular version of reality. Consequently, rather than concentrating on persuasion as a way of changing people’s minds as a psychological process, DP considers the rhetorical and dialogical way in which reality is negotiated and in which parties in talk seek to construct or deconstruct various versions of these realities in their everyday workplace practice. As Clifton (2006a) shows, by using the rhetorical device of formulations (Heritage and Watson 1979) a particular version of reality can be authored which cancels out the voice of opposition and imposes a version of reality that is accepted by the others. As Clifton (2006a: 214/5) states:

In sum, through getting his formulation of the past and present state of affairs accepted, Nick is able to achieve consensus for agreement to a future state of affairs. Through the use of formulations, he has thus been able to make sense of past, present, and future organizational reality and have that interpretation agreed upon. Thus, through using formulations, Nick has managed to ‘fix’ his version of ‘reality,’ make retrospective sense of the job in progress, and prospectively make a decision that constrains the future actions of the participants. Consequently, he has ‘talked himself into being’ (crafted his identity through language) as leader. Moreover, over time, if reinforced, such a definition of organizational reality will come to be accepted as official policy – ‘the way we do things round here.’

Rhetoric becomes important in the social construction of reality because, from a social constructionist perspective, reality is seen as something negotiable and ‘up for grabs’ rather than something that is ‘out there’ waiting to be perceived and transmitted to another person. Organizational reality is not, therefore, the cause of noticing but the result of noticing which is transformed through rhetoric into something external and pre-existing that is reified as having been perceived or discovered rather than created. One way in which influence (and thus leadership) is achieved in this negotiation of reality is thus in the rhetorical abilities of participants to construct a more convincing version of reality than the others. The leader emerges as the most influential person in defining organizational reality and the respective identities of organizational players in relation to the emergent organizational reality.
Smith (1978) draws on notions of rhetoric and links this with the factification of somebody’s (K’s) madness. She demonstrates how the facticity of K’s mental illness is constructed through talk and how this version of reality is constructed so that it becomes the authorized/legitimized version of reality and other alternative accounts are discounted. In short, ‘factual’ accounts of K’s madness are designed to be persuasive so that the information and observations presented by the speaker are to be treated by the reader/hearer as the ‘hard’ facts of the situation. Yet, as Smith points out, from a social constructionist perspective the ‘facts’ are not exogenous to the account and the account itself is not merely a reflection of reality that is perceived by an observer and ‘communicated/transmitted’ in an impartial and independent way to an interlocutor. As Smith (1978: 35) notes:

A fact is something which is already categorized, which is already worked up so that it conforms to a model of what a fact should be like. To describe something as a fact or to treat something as a fact implies that the events themselves – what happened – entitle or authorize the teller of the tale to treat that categorization as ineluctable. ‘Whether I wish it or not, it is a fact. Whether I will admit it or not, it is fact.’

If something is to be constructed as a fact, then it must be shown that proper procedures have been used to establish it as objectively known. It must be seen to appear in the same way to anyone.

She lists three rhetorical techniques which are used to bolster the account of K’s mental illness and to counter potential opposing versions. The first technique is displaying that the account is reluctantly arrived at and that this is independent of the teller’s wishes and therefore it is more believable. Second, the teller seeks to display consensus which indicates that their version of events is believed and supported by others. Third, the teller seeks to display that this consensus has been arrived at independently and therefore points to the existence of an external pre-discursive reality.

3.4 Discursive psychology and reflexivity

If, as the previous section has indicated, ‘objective truth’ is treated as a discursive achievement, a researcher must also accept that his/her text is also a social construction and the researcher must take into account, and make explicit, his/her relationship with the research process and the interplay between philosophical assumptions and the research
itself. Pollner (1991: 372) sees two types of reflexivity: endogenous and (radical) referential. Endogenous reflexivity refers to “how what members do in, to, and about social reality constitutes social reality. Thus, language and action are not merely responses to an *a priori* reality but contribute to its constitution.” Referential reflexivity “conceives of all analysis – ethnomethodology included – as a constitutive process. Not only are members deemed to be involved in endogenous constitution of accountable settings, but so are analysts.”

From a social constructionist stance, if the ontological assumptions of the research process draw attention to the members’ active construction of social reality then following a *tu quoque* line of argument the research process itself is also a social construction. Knowing as a researcher is, therefore, not regarded as having an accurate perception of a pre-discursive reality that is out there waiting to be discovered, rather it is regarded as a member’s active achievement. A radical approach to reflexivity demands that attention should be paid to the interpretive and rhetorical nature of the research process. As Watson (1994) points out, both the business practitioner who constructs a version of organizational reality and the researcher who researches how this version of reality is constructed are rhetoricians and this should be acknowledged if a valid account is to be provided.

Consequently, radical reflexivity rejects a positivist stance whereby the relationship between the researcher and reality is regarded as an unproblematic exposition of ‘truth’ (reality) which is ‘out there somewhere’ and can be ascertained through observation and analysis. From a radical reflexive position researchers are aware that their own accounts are rhetorically constructed so as to build robust versions of particular realities. As Cunliffe (2003: 988) states:

> “social constructionists argue that we construct and make sense of social realities in various forms of discourse; conversation, writing, reading. Radically reflexive researchers recognize their own place in this process, suggesting we construct intersubjectively the very objective realities we think we are studying: we are inventors not representers of reality.”

Once this position is adopted, certain researchers therefore adopt radically different styles of writing to emphasize the way in which academic conventions obscure the researcher’s
role in the active construction of a research text. Thus, for example, Ashmore et al. (1995) write in a fictive diary format which draws attention to the researcher’s construction of the text, Watson (1997) uses sections in italics to explicitly introduce the researchers own voice, and Edwards and Potter (1992) use text boxes to present the reader with dialogues between the authors so that they, as researchers, can deal with the way in which their own accounts of how others construct ‘reality’ are themselves constructed. Such writing practices draw attention to the fact that the truth/reality is up for grabs and is constantly changing. In this way, the researcher demonstrates that his/her account is just one account of social ‘reality’ constructed within, and legitimized by, the social and academic constraints of the time. Consequently, research does not offer the ‘truth’ but rather an account of what is going on which is an interpretation of what is going on and which is thus open to the possibility of alternative interpretations since other accounts in history or in other cultural or political dimension may be equally valid. However, because reflexivity also draws attention to the fact that the researcher’s accounts of the participants’ construction of social reality are also constructions, this can lead to a problem of infinite regress since each attempt to explain the process of construction is itself a process of construction. Potter and Wetherell (1987: 182) appear to offer a way out of the problem posed by the issue of infinite regress when they note:

“Most of the time this problem does not actively trouble discourse analysts as they practice their craft. It is possible to acknowledge that one’s language is constructing a version of the world, while proceeding with analyzing texts and their implications for people’s social and political lives. In this respect, discourse analysts are simply more honest than other researchers, recognizing that their own work is not immune from the social psychological processes being studied. Most of the time, therefore, the most practical way of dealing with this issue is simply to get on with it, and not to get either paralyzed or caught up in the infinite regress possible.”

Thus, through taking this approach to reflexivity it takes into consideration the ways in which the social context of the research and the interplay between researcher and research object shape the results of the research output. It avoids therefore treating the language of the research account as an unmotivated reflection of ‘how things are’ and thus the researcher as somehow standing outside the ongoing construction of reality, which from a social constructionist perspective is an impossibility.
3.5 Discursive psychology and mind

In line with its stance on the social construction of reality, DP regards concepts of the mind as a Cartesian social construction that is commonsensically employed as a resource by social actors. Therefore, when somebody says ‘I think…’ this should not primarily be seen as a ‘true’ reflection of the ‘thoughts’ and beliefs of that person but it should be considered in terms of the action that it performs. Firstly, then, DP re-specifies standard psychological topics as discursive practices rather than as windows into the minds of people. Consequently, the psychological thesaurus is not considered to be a way of understanding the mind but it is explored for its situated occasioned and rhetorical use. DP is concerned with how the uses of cognitive concepts are accountably employed in descriptions of events, objects, people or actions. In short, statements of intent, emotion or cognition are considered for the actions that they perform in talk rather than for any cognitive ‘truth’. For example, in the following example taken from Edwards and Potter’s (2005: 244) account of a marriage counseling session with Jimmy and Connie, Jimmy’s utterance:

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and uh:: (1.0) Connie had a short skirt on
I don’t know
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is not equated with any one to one correspondence with Jimmy’s mental states. Rather Potter and Edwards examine the use of ‘I don’t know’ for the actions that it performs. In this case, ‘I don’t know’ fulfils the rhetorical purpose of displaying ‘disinterest’ which counters potential allegations from Connie that Jimmy is jealous and suspicious. Yet, despite this display of a lack of concern for the length of Connie’s skirt, in subsequent descriptions he displays details of the skirt’s length and what she did with it in a way that builds Connie as being incumbent of the category ‘flirt’ and which shows extensive knowledge of Connie’s skirt. ‘I don’t know’ is thus not a reflection of a cognitive state but is rhetorically deployed to construct a particular version of events and mental states. Similarly, Goodwin (1987) indicates how forgetfulness is not necessarily connected to a state of mind but can be used to bring, for example, a spouse into a conversation as a display of ‘togetherness’. In short, as Drew (2005: 161) notes, “we cannot know from the
speaker’s behaviour in conversation, that is from what is said, what they were thinking or feeling as they spoke”. And indeed nor should this necessarily be of any importance in the interaction since we cannot know for sure what anybody else (or ourselves for that matter) are thinking, feeling or believing. However, we can observably display and ascribe inner states to others. From a DP stance, then, the organization talk is systematically socially organized and it is independent of the cognitive states of individuals.

This can be shown for example in conversation analysis’ (CA’s) concept of preference. CA argues that sequences of talk set up preference structures which have nothing to do with the psychological state of the speakers but which reflect the accountable nature of talk and institutional/structural choices that are available to members (Blimes 1988). So, for example, refusals of an invitation are met by pauses, hesitation or dispreference markers (such as well or er), accounts or explanations of why one cannot accept and these accounts may or may not reflect a state of wanting to or not wanting to accept an invitation. On the other hand, acceptance of invitations have none of these features and are met by a simple acceptance without delay. But this has nothing to do with psychological states, it simply means that agreement (in most cases) will come in an unmarked way as a sequential next action which orients to normative and accountable nature of talk-in-interaction. Consequently, participants’ cognitive states can be autonomous to their contributions to talk. What is said and when it is said is not determined by cognitive processes but by the sequential exigencies of turns-at-talk. Talk is thus socially rather than cognitively organized.

3.6 Discursive psychology and ethnomethodology

Ethnomethodology (EM) can be glossed as a special kind of social enquiry in which members’ methods for making sense of social order in social life are the focus of enquiry. The term itself was coined by Garfinkel in the mid-50s and it attempts to capture the idea of people’s own methods (ethno-methods) of making sense of the social world. Ethnomethodology refers to the study of the “body of common-sense knowledge and the range of procedures and considerations by means of which the ordinary members of society make sense of, find their way about in, and act on the circumstances in which
they find themselves” (Heritage 1984a: 4). Moreover, through these ethno-methods of making sense of ‘what is going on’ they also reflexively constitute what is ‘going’ on and so produce social order. EM thus grew in reaction to contemporary sociology which at that time was dominated by Talcott Parson’s view that social actors were driven by a series of norms whereby abstracted rules were ‘internalized’ and then followed by the social actor. Consequently, such rule following produced the stable features of society - the social actors’ accomplishment and practical understanding of the social order was ignored. Garfinkel (1967: 68) famously labeled people in such a Parsonian concept of social action as ‘judgmental dopes’. Conversely, EM argues that social order is created and (re)created through interaction and social actors actively sensemaking and it is not pre-existent in some kind of macro-structure which then influences people’s actions. However, the ethno-methods for making sense of and so reflexively constituting the social world are so mundane that they escape attention. Therefore, in order to investigate how the social world is ‘constructed’, ethnomethodologists devised several research strategies to reveal the accomplishment of the social order. These methods can be summed up as: breaching experiments, participant observation, case studies and becoming the phenomena.

3.6.1 Breaching experiments

Perhaps the most well-known way in which Garfinkel revealed the seen but unnoticed ethno-methods for achieving social order were his breaching experiments whereby he set up experiments in which social norms were breached. Through disturbing ‘normal’ mundane orientation to a commonly held social order the way in which the social order is achieved was revealed. One of Garfinkel’s better known breaching experiments, shown below, involved his students deliberately failing to return greetings.

The victim waved his hand cheerily.

(S) How are you?

(E) How am I in regard to what? My health, my finances, my school work, my peace of mind, my .?

(S) (Red in the face and suddenly out of control.) Look I was just trying to be polite. Frankly, I don’t give a damn how you are.
E = experimenter
S = subject

Garfinkel (1963), cited in Heritage (1984a: 80)

On the face of it, this breaching of a greeting can be seen in Parsonian sense of deviance (due to inadequate socialization) from the internalized rule: when somebody says hello, reply. However, from an EM perspective, failure to return a greeting is a question of choice rather than a question of blindly following rules. The student/experimenter chooses not to reply but is held accountable for doing so.

Another one of Garfinkel’s breaching experiments concerned the setting up of fake student counseling sessions (Garfinkel 1967: 79). Students were invited to speak about their problems at university and the ‘advisor’ was instructed to respond just ‘yes’ or ‘no’ at random. Garfinkel then interviewed the students and tried to uncover how they made sense of the interaction. All the students had made sense of the responses and interpreted the responses as being \textit{bona fide} advice even though the advice was in fact contradictory. They made sense of incomplete, incongruous or unsatisfactory answers by attributing some special reasoning to the advisor or by waiting to see if the response would be clarified as the session progressed. As such, as Heritage (1984a: 92) points out, “the subjects so managed their interpretations as to view the ‘advice’ they had been given as coherent, as compatible with ‘given conditions’ as represented by the normatively valued social structures perceived by the subject, and as the trustworthy product of properly motivated advisers.” In this way Garfinkel demonstrates that making sense of what is going on is an active process and that ‘rules’ of normative behaviour (a counselor is morally accountable for providing advice) were invoked to make sense of what was going on and to constitute it as a counseling session even though from the design of the experiment it was not intended as such. Consequently, from an EM perspective, rather than having any inherent ‘meaning’ members make sense and give meaning to social events by invoking rules of ‘social interaction’ such as ‘a counselor will give advice’ and this rule not only makes sense of what is going on but it also constitutes an event as a counseling session (or whatever). Rules are thus interpretive and reflexively constitutive.
of social order: they are not unconsciously internalized and followed but are invoked by members to achieve social order.

3.6.2 Participant observation

A second way in which ethnomethodologists observed the member’s constitution of social order is through participant observation. The classic work using participant observation is found in Wieder’s (1974) work ‘Telling the code’ which is based on his experiences in a half-way house for offenders released from prison and allowed him to understand as a participant observer the first hand use of the code as a constitutive part of social order. The code is a set of unwritten rules for interaction between staff and inmates, which is not written down or formalised, but through invoking the code the situation can be defined. The code, then, rather than being a set of rules which are followed and thus cause social action in a Parsonian sense, is a context dependent interpretive device that renders the actions of others intelligible. It also makes normative/moral reasoning of members’ observable to the other participants and the researcher. As Wieder states (1974: 172), “accountings-of-social action, ‘telling and hearing the code’, are methods of giving and receiving embedded instructions for seeing and describing a social order”. For example, refusal to organise a pool tournament can be justified through ‘telling the code’ (do not cooperate with the staff) and refusal to answer the researcher’s questions can be justified by the rule, ‘don’t snitch’. The invocation of the rule ‘you know I won’t snitch’ in reply to a researcher’s question also formulates what is going on as a request to snitch and so achieves social order. This invokes the ethnomethodological concept of reflexivity (Garfinkel 1967: 7) whereby the action being performed by, for example, invoking a rule is not just descriptive but is also constitutive of the social order.

Rules, rather than having a strict controlling causal effect on social actors, are in fact much more open ended and in need of interpretation and flexible according to their employment in interaction. Potter and Hepburn (forthcoming) therefore illustrate this point in terms of chairing a meeting whereby the chairman invokes rules or policy to justify his actions: “I am required by board policy to finish all the speakers within an hour” and therefore uses this rule to account for his action of limiting the time. Yet, at the
same time he distances himself from the rule (e.g. ‘I am required’, suggests reticence). Thus the chairman invokes the rule equivocally so as to mitigate his authority and to display fairness yet at the same time to retain control. Rules, far from rigidly determining behaviour and causing actions, can therefore be sensitively invoked by social actors to achieve certain ends such as managing a dilemma of authority, fairness and democracy. The instantiation of rules is thus a strictly accountable and moral issue. As illustrated in the above two examples taken from Wieder (1974) and Potter and Hepburn (forthcoming), social actors can account for doing, or not doing something, through invoking the code or rules.

3.6.3 Case studies and becoming the phenomena

A further way of making the tacitly assumed rules that constitute ‘society’ available for analysis is the use of case studies which is typified by Garfinkel’s (1967) own analysis of Agnes, a young transsexual. This study entitled *Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person*, appeared in chapter five of Grafinkel’s (1967) *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. The account concerns the case of Agnes, born a man, but who was undergoing surgery and hormone treatment to become a woman. Garfinkel’s interest was in how Agnes had to consciously learn how to pass as a woman and through a series of interviews with Agnes he sough to make visible these ethnomethods that had not been acquired through the normal process of socialisation. Thus, in Grafinkel’s (1967: 180) words, Agnes became a practical methodologists who was “self consciously equipped to teach normals how normals make sexuality happen in common place settings as the obvious, familiar, recognisable, natural and serious matter of fact.”

As a result of this study, Grafinkel draw attention to the fact that gender is achieved through mundane social interaction and it is not an *a priori* biological fact and he made visible the ways in which Agnes had to learn to be a woman as a socially situated achievement by consciously attempting to be a woman. *Passing and the managed achievement of sex status in an intersexed person* thus became a classic study in the learned and socially sanctioned ways of doing gender.

Garfinkel’s account of Agnes therefore relied on the analyst’s second-hand accounts of how members consciously learn the tacit socially situated rules that allow them to
construct social order. Other researchers have gone one stage further and in order to render a first-hand account of how social order is achieved as an in situ phenomena they have become the phenomena and immersed themselves in a new situation and documented their own learning experience of the rules. This is typified by Sudnow’s (1978) seminal work on learning to become a jazz musician. Thus, thorough immersion in new social environment, routine sense-making procedures were not available to the researcher/participant and so the researcher has to ‘learn’ or be ‘taught’ the unwritten rules of social interaction that will allow him/her to ‘become the phenomenon’.

3.6.4 The unique adequacy requirement

One of the key ‘beliefs’ of EM, is that researchers have to immerse themselves in the data in order to provide a valid account of what is going on. It is argued that the researcher must have at least some vulgar competence of the practices of the community which they are studying and so fulfil the unique adequacy requirement Garfinkel and Wieder (1992: 182). In its weak form, for any analysis to be valid it must be carried out by a researcher who is able to understand what is going on in the same way as the participants understand what is going on. An example of this would be Cicourel’s (1992) study of medical interaction where what is going on cannot be understood by the analyst with simple member’s knowledge as an over-hearer of the interaction unless the researcher is aware of who the participants are and how such specific medical interaction is carried out. A further example is cited by Crabtree (2000), where he draws attention to the fact that during a group discussion of a transcript of medical interaction one of the analysts, a professionally qualified nurse, was able to explicate what was going on more fully on account of her medical training. Vulgar competence is therefore a prerequisite for some kinds of ethnomethodological analysis. That is to say, that a researcher’s membership knowledge as a member of the same society might be enough to understand what is going on as a ‘over-hearer’ of some conversations but in more specific situations, such as workplace interaction, vulgar competence of professional ‘ways of doing things’, that is sometimes obscure to the outsider, is required. Fulfilment of the unique adequacy requirement can be obtained through acquired immersion (Francis and Hester 2004). In other words, the analysts should take steps to achieve an understanding of particular
knowledge and competences that are taken for granted by practitioners as they go about their daily workplace routines. Classic studies where researchers immerse themselves in the everyday practices of the other in order to fulfil the unique adequacy requirement are thus, as previously mentioned, Wieder’s (1974) work in a half-way house as a participant observer and Sudnow’s (1978) account of becoming a jazz musician. Fulfilment of the unique adequacy requirement thus allows researchers to give a fully nuanced account of what people are actually doing through their utterances. In short, the researcher has to become part of the phenomena. For example, in order to understand the following data taken from a police interview relating to a charge of criminal damage, it is necessary for the researcher to understand something of the professional practice that surrounds the interview. In this way, the researcher understands the event as the participants, or at least the professional in this occasion, understand it.

1 P So a–as y’ punched the window. (.) have y’ wanted t’ put
2 The window through
3 (0.9)
4 A I duunno: I didn’t think o’ that I [jus’ punched it
5 P [no
6 (0.3)
7 P A’right okay.= s’y’ jus punched it. So (0.4) if it
8 went through it went through. If it [didn’t [it didn’t=
9 A [yeh [it didn’t=
10 P =it’s just a couple of punches
11 (0.4)
12 P okay

Edwards (2006: 44)

In order to understand ‘what is going on’ it is necessary for the researcher to have knowledge, as the police officer undoubtedly does, of section 2 (1) of the 1991 Criminal Damage Act which reads as follows:
2.—(1) A person who without lawful excuse damages any property belonging to another intending to damage any such property or being reckless as to whether any such property would be damaged shall be guilty of an offence.

The key phrase is highlighted in italics. If the police officer can get the suspect to admit that he was reckless (line 8: *if it went through it went through. If it didn’t, it didn’t*) then the officer can charge the suspect with criminal damage. If the officer cannot ‘get an admission’ of recklessness and the suspect says that he didn’t intend to break the window, then no charges can be bought. Consequently, in order to offer a valid account of ‘what is going on’, it is important for a researcher to understand the interaction as the participants themselves do.

Garfinkel and Wieder (1992: 183) also set out a strong version of the unique adequacy requirement which they describe as follows:

in its strong use the unique adequacy requirement of methods is identical with the following corpus-specific finding of EM studies. Available to EM research, the finding is used and administered locally as an instruction: *Just in any actual case* a phenomenon of order already possess whatever as methods could be of [finding it] if [methods for finding it ] are at issue (italics in original)

The strong requirement amounts to the fact that order is apparent in any situation and that no ‘external’ theorising is required to account for the ‘what is going on’. Consequently, the researcher should not draw upon extra-textual ‘theories’ to explain the interaction. He/she should use his/her membership knowledge of that ‘community of practice’ to explicate the theories-in-action of the participants without having recourse to exogenous theories to do so. The use of such external theories that are the privileged domain of the researcher leads to explanation which assumes that some kind of hidden meaning, unavailable to the participants, needs to be revealed by the social scientist. As Garfinkel (1967: 75) states:

“a concern of the nature, production and recognition of reasonable, realistic and analysable actions is not the monopoly of philosophers and professional sociologists. Members of society are concerned as a matter of course and necessarily with these matters both as features of and for the socially managed production of their everyday affairs”
Ethnomethodologists therefore seek to explicate rather than explain what is going on. Explicating assumes that order is a locally produced members’ achievement and that in order to understand what is going on the researcher has no need of external theorising but should ‘fold back’ the members own theories-in-use with which they constitute ‘what is going on’ (Tulin 1997: 103). The researcher’s role, using his/her membership knowledge, is to make explicit the implicit rules by which the members constitute what is going on. This contrasts with ‘explanation’ whereby external theories, available to the researcher but not to the participants, may be invoked to give insight into what is going on.

### 3.7 Discursive psychology and conversation analysis

Many of CA’s basic assumptions can be attributed to its roots in EM. However, rather than using breaching experiments, participant observation, case studies or becoming the phenomena, CA uses the rigorous transcription of talk in order to act as an estrangement device by which the seen but unnoticed features of the *in situ* accomplishment of the social order become visible, and thus available, for analysis. The research tradition of conversation analysis was developed by Harvey Sacks and colleagues during the mid-1960s and can be said to have grown from Garfinkel’s ethnomethodological roots. It involves the detailed examination of recordings of naturally-occurring speech from which researchers describe the sequential organization of everyday language use and the social order that it reveals. As Sacks (1984b: 413) states, the main objective of CA “is to see how finely the details of actual, naturally-occurring conversation can be subjected to analysis that will yield the technology of conversation.” CA’s concern then is not only in the sequential properties of talk but what is achieved by the sequences of talk and thus how orientation to sequences of talk instantiates order. Heritage (1984a: 290) sums up this fundamental claim of CA when he states that:

> the details of little, local sequences which at first seemed narrow, insignificant and contextually uninteresting, turn out to be the crucial resources by which larger institutionalized activity frameworks are evoked. Such institutional contexts are created as visible states of affairs on a turn-by-turn basis. It is ultimately through such means that ‘institutions’ exist as accountable organizations of social actions.
Such an approach to sociology underlines the need for the analysis to be based on recordings of naturally-occurring talk-in-interaction. This ensures that, rather than theory-driven research agendas, the researcher is dealing with ‘real lives’, ‘real interests’ and ‘real worlds’. The recordings of such data are then transcribed and analyzed following a caveat of ‘unmotivated looking’ that ensures that the findings are grounded in the participants’ own orientation to what is ‘going on’ rather *a priori* theories. In short, CA aims at a genuinely emic research perspective.

Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998: 23) sum up the central findings of conversation analysis in the following way:

- Talk-in-interaction is systematically organized, deeply ordered and methodic
- The analysis of talk in interaction should be based on naturally-occurring data
- Analysis should not initially be constrained by prior theoretical assumptions

### 3.7.1 The methodic organization of talk

As Sacks (1984a: 22) famously stated, in conversation there is “order at all points”. This can be glossed as the observation that talk-in-interaction is orderly because if we are to understand it and produce it, it must be orderly to us. Moreover, because it is orderly it is describable. This is something which prior to Sacks was regarded with scepticism since contemporary linguists (e.g. Chomsky 1965) were arguing that natural speech was too disorderly and chaotic to make sense of. Therefore, as Sacks (vol. 1. 1992), quoted in Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998: 19), points out, there are certain ‘methods’ for ‘doing things with language’ that stem from this orderliness. For example;

- How to get someone’s name without asking for it? (give yours)
- How to avoid giving your name without refusing to give it? (initiate repair)
- How to avoid giving help without refusing it? (treat the circumstances as a joke)
Therefore, the orderliness of conversation allows us to do things. This would be impossible if conversation had no order because we would neither recognise what the other was doing nor would we be able to design our utterances as recognizable actions. This belief in order at all points drove Sacks’ search for the machinery of conversation which can be glossed as the linguistic resources with which social activities are enacted. In Sacks’ (1984b: 413) own words, he defines the basic aims of CA as follows:

“The gross aim of the work I am doing is to see how finely the details of actual, naturally occurring conversation can be subjected to analysis that will yield the technology of conversation. The idea is to take singular sequences of conversation and tear them apart in such a way as to find rules, techniques, procedures, methods, maxims (a collection of terms that more or less relate to each other and that I use somewhat interchangeably) that can be used to generate the orderly features we find in the conversations we examine.”

The past 40 years or so of CA research has thus had as its raison d’être the ‘discovery’ of the machinery of talk. Consequently, CA has made visible a battery of resources such as repair mechanisms, adjacency pairs or preference structures which constitute the machinery of talk. However, considering CA’s sociological origins, Sacks was not interested in language per se but in what talk does (Sacks 1984a: 24). In other words, to return to the previous examples, giving your name can be used ‘to get someone’s name without asking for it’. Talk is thus constructed and understood by participants for the action or actions that it may be doing. CA’s concern, then, is not only in the sequential properties of talk per se but what is achieved or enacted by the sequences of talk. Through the actions that are achieved by talk, orientation to what participants perceive as social structure is displayed. As Schegloff (1995: 187) states:

“conversational interaction may be thought of as a form of social organisation through which the work of the constitutive institutions of society gets done - institutions such as the economy, the polity, the family, socialization and so on.”

For example, Schegloff (1987: 222 ff.) demonstrates how the turn-taking system creates social order. He takes the example of presidential press conferences and school lessons. The point that he makes is that it is through the participants’ own orientation to the
constraints and resources of characteristic turn-taking systems they enact ‘a lesson’ or ‘a presidential press conference’. It is the variations in turn-taking rights and obligations that differentiate a lesson from a presidential press conference. For example, in each case the turn taking system is strictly mediated by one of the participants. In the lesson the teacher asks the questions and determines the appropriacy of the answers. However, in the press conference it is the president who is asked questions yet he also determines the appropriacy of the answer. Thus CA has the potential to make visible the seen but unnoticed way in which social events are constructed through members’ orientations to the constraints and resources of turn-taking. In sum, CA, in line with its ethnomethodological roots, considers the sequential properties of mundane interaction to be society.

### 3.7.2 The use of naturally-occurring data and transcription

Such an approach to sociology brings us to Hutchby and Wooffitt’s next point: the analysis of talk in interaction should be based on naturally-occurring data. As Sacks (1984a) points out, one of the problems with traditional sociology is that it is theory driven and therefore restricts any analysis to what is believable or imaginable to an audience of fellow researchers. On the other hand, CA’s data-driven approach starts with things that are not imaginable but which emerge from transcriptions. Sacks’ research was thus generated through unmotivated looking. In other words, he had no *a priori* research question which could influence his findings. In his words:

> “when we start out with a piece of data, the question of what we are going to end up with, what kind of findings it will give, should not be a consideration. We sit down with a piece of data, make a bunch of observations and then see where they will go.”

(Sacks 1984a: 25)

Early conversation analysis was based on audio recordings of naturally-occurring talk in interaction. Such recordings, as Sacks (1984a) points out, are not the data: there are many things going on that are not captured by the recording. As Sacks (1984a: 25) observes, despite the fact that things other than those captured on tape no doubt occurred, at least what was on tape happened and as such the tape-recorded materials constituted a good
enough record which can provide for a data-driven analysis that avoids the researcher’s *a priori* theorizing at the expense of ‘discovering’ what is in the data and the emic orientations of participants that this reveals. Since Goodwin’s pioneering work in the early-80s (e.g. Goodwin 1981), video-recordings of interaction are becoming increasingly popular in CA research. The video also allows the researcher to capture the non-verbal elements of situated action and it makes these data available for analysis. Such non-verbal elements are not treated in isolation but attention can be brought to bear on the use of gesture, eye gaze, interaction with artefacts and so on in the *in situ* accomplishment of social activities. However, as with audio recordings, the video taped data is not a complete record of the event: the position of the camera inevitably determines what is and is not captured on film and possible movements of the cameraman may affect the interaction. For example, focusing on what the camera decides is relevant may attract the participants’ attention to what has become a focus of interest for the cameraman but would otherwise not have become the centre of focus for the participants. Thus, researchers such as Mondada (2006) and Lomax (1998) argue for reflexivity in the data gathering process. The talk that is recorded should be reflexively considered as a recorded conversation and not just a conversation (Mondada 2006: 12). Consequently, researchers should be reflexively aware of their camera’s ability not only to preserve the event for analysis but also to (re)present the event.

Reflexivity is also called for in terms of the transcription since, as many researchers have observed (e.g., Ashmore and Reed 2000; Bucholtz 2000; Coates and Thornborrow 1999) the act of transcription is unavoidably theory-laden. This is because what is attended to is to some extent dependent on what “we might want to transcribe” (Jefferson 1985: 25). Ten Have (2002: 23), drawing on Ashmore and Reed (2000), presents the following schema to explain the ‘theorising’ nature of transcription:

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Original (inter-)action ➔ recording ➔ (audio/video-) record ➔ transcription ➔
transcript ➔(action) understanding ➔ procedural analysis ➔ analytical argument
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The italicized processes, as the researcher moves from left to right (or from reality to textual representation), are selectively reductive of the original event and serve to ‘construct’ a textual version of the event which is quite clearly not the event itself. Moreover, the decontextualised text is then entexted in a new text wherein the writer has framed it according to his or her research interests (Blommaert 1997). Blommaert is not alone (cf. for example, Bucholtz 2000; Lapadat and Lindsay 1999) in calling for a more reflexive approach to transcription. In other words, the researcher should make clear his/her relationship with the text and participants, give details of how the recording was carried out and be frank about the context of the research. Thus, taking ten Have’s italicized processes one by one: first, the process of recording can be affected by the researcher’s assumptions. For example, a priori assumptions about teacher and student roles in a classroom affects how the recording equipment is set up and consequently what is, and what is not, captured by the recording yet these assumptions are rarely treated by researchers (Blommaert 1997; Mondada 2006). Second, as previously discussed, the transcription is clearly influenced by the researcher’s analytical objectives. Jefferson (1985) for example, shows that laughter can be transcribed to differing degrees of detail depending on the researcher’s objectives. Similarly, Bucholtz (2000), taking a wider stance, draws attention to the socio-political aspects of transcription. For example, journalists’ decisions on whether to ‘tidy up’ transcripts of speech or leave in non-standard varieties of English alter the perception of the speaker. Third, understanding is affected by the researcher’s own knowledge of the situation. Blommaert (1997), for example, gives anecdotal data to the effect that he refused to share data because he felt that somebody who had not been involved in the collection of such data would be unable to ‘understand’ it. Fourth, when the researcher analyses the transcript and reproduces it in another text, the transcript is recontextualised and embedded in the researcher’s text (research article). Consequently, the transcription becomes associated with a new context and it is accompanied by the researcher’s metadiscourse which provides a ‘preferred reading’ for the data which has been ‘lifted’ from its original context. Blommaert (1997) argues that contextualisation is necessary and without it the text cannot be ‘understood’. The ‘bare’ data or the transcript itself remains a highly abstract artifact that is open to multiple interpretations. He cites an instance in a workshop where
the participants were sent completely un-contextualized data. Until some background information was revealed it was impossible to say what was going on. He concludes that without the provision of some kind of background information it is doubtful whether any of the participants at the workshop would have been able to answer the question as to why this data could have been the site of racist discourse as the ‘owner’ of the transcript claimed. In sum, then, some form of contextualization is required: indeed, when one does have such background data it is impossible not to use it to interpret the data. Consequently, if the researcher is to avoid an analysis that is based on a series of unquestioned assumptions concerning the event itself the recontextualisation of the transcript should be treated reflexively. In this way, knowledge about the (con)text and the procedures by which the transcript was achieved are made explicit.

Thus, whilst not naively accepting that the transcripts of an event are the event itself and accepting the appeal for more reflexivity in the process of transcription, transcripts still provide, in the spirit of Sacks’ work on transcription, a good enough record of what happened (Sacks 1984a: 26). More importantly, rather than seeing the construction of society through the theoretical conceptualization and categorization of sociologists, the bottom-up approach to the analysis of transcripts allows the researcher to perceive the seen but unnoticed ethno-methods that members use to ‘construct’ their own realities. Transcription, thus, guards against the limitations of idiosyncratic intuition and selective recollection that might be found in field notes or less rigorous methods of data collection. Consequently, the use of transcriptions provides some kind of reliability and validity to the research process.

3.7.3 CA and the lack of a priori theorizing

As discussed above, the use of naturally-occurring data and the act of transcription help ensure that CA is a data-driven research methodology and that researchers are cautious of importing a priori theorizing into the analysis. Schegloff (1997) for example, first analyses a stretch of talk from a critical feminist perspective. He then re-analyses the same data and shows that ‘what was going on’ was not linked to the relevance of gender. In short, he concludes that when researchers deploy terms that pre-occupy them rather than the participants this can lead to a critical analysis that does not bind with the data
and ends up being merely ideological. However, Schegloff does not rule out the possibility of using the fine-grained analysis of talk in interaction for critical ends. Schegloff (1992a: 105) points out that, such theorizing is “an extension of CA’s sociological office and not its basis.” He (e.g., Schegloff 1997) warns that wider theorizing should always be preceded by a fine-grained technical analysis. The technical analysis thus constitutes the object to which wider theorizing may be applied. Such an approach to analyzing what is ‘going on’ is pre-theoretical since it eschews the use of prefabricated theories whereby the theoretical interests of the researcher drive the research. Consequently, this approach emphasizes close attention to the commonsense knowledge that members have and how they use it to produce their activities. In this way, reification of the researcher’s own theories is avoided and any claims that the researcher makes must be demonstrably grounded in an emic perspective that is made visible through an analysis of transcripts of talk-in-interaction. As Schegloff (1996: 167) states CA can lead to:

“the development of an account of action grounded in the observable details of conduct in naturally-occurring social settings, which can be juxtaposed to the abstract and theoretical accounts of past and current work”

The essential problem for juxtaposing a fine-grained analysis of talk at a turn-by-turn level with wider social theorizing is that of relevance (Schegloff 1991: 49 ff.) i.e. that any analysis of what is going on has to demonstrably relevant, for producing and interpreting the interaction, to the participants in the interaction at the moment of analysis. This becomes visible via the next turn proof procedure (Sacks et al. 1974: 728) whereby the understanding of the previous turn is displayed in the current turn and the emic relevance of social facts, such as identities in talk, is also displayed.
3.8 Discursive Psychology and Membership categorization analysis (MCA)

A further consequence of DP’s reliance on an ethnomethodological and conversation analytical driven approach to analysis is that it takes account of the categorization work that members do. For example, Potter (1996: 122) notes that, “the facticity of an account can be enhanced through working up a category entitlement.” In other words, in order to make an account count or be more persuasive depends on who is doing the talking. Thus how members are able to construct identities that carry more weight than other identities and project weaker identities onto other participants is an integral part of the process of influence in sensemaking activities.

Sacks’ work, including some of his most well-known articles (e.g. Sacks 1972, 1979 and 1986), deals with category analysis. However, after his death in 1975, MCA and CA went their separate ways. Yet, some researchers (e.g. Housley and Fitzgerald 2002; Watson 1997; Hester & Eglin 1997a) argue that MCA and CA should be combined to give a full and nuanced account of talk-in-interaction. In contrast to Sacks’ work on identity, which Hester and Eglin (1997b) criticize for being decontextualised and non-situated, they argue that the focus of MCA should be on the in situ use of categorization and its reflexive relationship with the sequential development of talk-in-interaction. From this perspective, identities are therefore regarded as something that people ‘do’ rather than something they ‘are’. In other words, if categories are to have procedural consequentiality to the interaction, they have to be invoked and oriented to by the participants. Procedural consequentiality (Schegloff 1991: 52) refers to way in which participants’ orientations to the setting or context have consequences for the sequential properties of the interaction.

Antaki and Widdicombe (1998: 3) sum up the MCA view of identity when they state:

1. For a person to ‘have an identity’ - whether he or she is the person speaking, being spoken to, or being spoken about - is to be cast into a category with associated characteristics or features (the sort of thing you’d expect from any member of that category; their actions, beliefs, feelings, obligations, etcetera).

2. Such casting is indexical and occasioned. That is, it only makes sense in its local setting.

3. The casting makes relevant the identity to the interactional business going on.
4. The force of 'having an identity' is its *consequentiality* in the interaction - what it allows, prompts or discourages participants to do next.

5. All these things are visible in people's exploitation of the *structures of conversation*.

(italics in original)

These five points are developed in more detail in the following sections.

**3.8.1 Association of characters or features (Predicates)**

Sacks (1986) developed the notion of category-boundness by demonstrating that certain activities are bound to incumbents of certain identities so that picking up a crying baby is bound to the identity mother. However, this notion has been extended to associating not only actions but also other characteristic and features (predicates) to identities (e.g. Jayyusi 1984; Hester and Eglin 1997b; Eglin and Hester 1992). Thus, following Eglin and Hester (1992: 41), for a fiancé-fiancée pair predicates would include features conventionally related to the pair such as being in love, making plans for marriage, wearing rings and so on. It would also predict future matters such as marriage and children. Predicates can thus be seen as a cluster of expectable features such as actions, character traits, ways of thinking, motivations, dress codes, locations and so on that can be inferred from categorization. Moreover, this is an explicitly moral concept (Baker 2000; Lynch and Bogen 1997; Jayyusi 1984). Those incumbent of these categories are held accountable for deviations from such category-bound predicates. Consequently, when a member is ascribed, or claims, membership of a particular category this also gives him or her access to certain socially sanctioned discursive resources - the use, or non-use, of which is a morally accountable matter. Therefore, for example, somebody whose situated identity is that of chairperson is accountably expected to control the talk during a meeting. If the talk gets out of hand and degenerates into schismatic talk then the chairperson is held morally accountable for the non-use of discursive resources that are available to him/her for controlling a meeting. Consequently, when an activity is undertaken by somebody incumbent of a certain identity, a certain standard of performance is already embedded and implicit in the ‘doing’ of the activity. In the workplace one is therefore constantly held accountable, according to one’s identity, for what one does and how one speaks. An example of such moral work in action can be
drawn form Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005). They demonstrate that a caller to the
doctor specifically invokes her identity of ‘grandma’ in order to avoid moral
accountability for not dealing with a child’s medical problem.

Doc: You oh but you didn’t ask him ((the doctor)) to check him ((the child)) then
Caller: No well I’m (only) his grandma


The fact that the caller states ‘I’m only his grandma’ is hearable as invoking a category
that has fewer care-giver rights and obligations than a mother. Consequently, the making
relevant of this identity enables her to avoid the moral accountability for not fulfilling the
obligations linked with the category ‘mother’. People can, thus, construct identity to suit
the exigencies of the moment and use their identities as warrants for claims that they
make.

However, claiming the incumbency of a particular identity is not a unilateral
accomplishment in talk: it is a negotiated phenomenon. For example, a claim to category
made through an utterance is dependent on how it is oriented to in subsequent turns. In
this way a claim to incumbency of a particular category is either confirmed or challenged.
Atkinson et al. (1978), for example, explicate how “right….er” when uttered by someone
who is incumbent of the identity chairperson is oriented to as the start of a meeting
because the chairperson has the category-bound moral right to start a meeting. Whereas if
somebody who does not have incumbency of the category ‘chairperson’ utters these
words, the next speaker would respond to the utterance as if it were a joke (cf. Richards
2006a). Consequently, any first turn in a sequence may claim incumbency of a particular
category but the response in the next turn is integral to the enactment of incumbency.

3.8.2 Indexical and occasioned nature of identity

The indexical and occasioned nature of identity refers to the notion that every invocation
of an identity is ultimately defined by its occasioned use as an in situ members’
achievement. This is to say, that there are no a priori existing pre-discursive identities but
that identities are invoked by their use in specific occasions. Consequently classifying
somebody as an X only has sense in the local context in which it occurs and that
classification can be doing a range of differing actions. For example, Edwards and Potter (2005) demonstrate how invoking the identity of somebody as being ‘a bit of a lad’ in the following transcript taken from a counselling session is designed to do a particular context specific action:

7 Ye:h. (.) I musta met Da:ve before.
8 (0.8)
9 But I’d heard he was a bit of a la:d ( ).
10 He didn’t care: (1.0) who he (0.2) chatted
11 up or (.) who was in Ireland (.) y’know
12 those were ( unavailable) to chat up with.
13 (1.0)
14 So Connie stood up (0.8) pulled her skirt
15 right up her side (0.6) and she was looking
16 straight at Da: ve (.) > «like that»

Edwards and Potter (2005: 244)

Thus describing Dave as ‘a bit of a lad’ is used in this context of a counseling session as a foil to demonstrate that the speaker’s partner, Connie, was indeed being flirtatious and that the speaker had cause for concern considering his partner’s behavior. The speaker thus uses the ascription of the identity ‘a bit of a lad’ to justify these concerns. In another context the ascription of the identity ‘a lad’ may be employed to carry out a totally different action.

3.8.3 Relevance

Relevance basically refers to the fact that, considering that each member has a portfolio of possible identities that can be invoked at any moment in the interaction, the analyst has the responsibility for demonstrating from the data that the participants themselves are orienting to a particular identity that is sequentially relevant in the turn-by-turn development of the talk-in-interaction (Schegloff 1991: 49). Consequently, one cannot assume that certain identities are a priori and necessarily relevant in any particular stage
in the interaction. The fact that the interaction is taking place in the workplace does not necessarily make workplace identities relevant to the participants (Whalen and Zimmerman 1987). In sum: categories are dependent on their situated use and the member’s orientation to them.

### 3.8.4 Consequentiality

The fourth point that Antaki and Widdicombe make is the consequentiality of identity to interaction. In short, incumbency of identity is reflexively linked to the accountable use of discursive resources. Zimmerman (1998) distinguishes three levels of identity: situated, discursive and transportable. Transportable identities are identities that are potentially relevant in any given situation but these identities are not necessarily oriented to, so that a participant may be aware that they are talking to a ‘young girl’ in a given context but this identity may not have consequences for the sequential orientation to the interaction. Discourse identities are linked to the proximal context or the turn-by-turn development of talk-in-interaction. Such identities would include; listener, current speaker or repair initiator and so on and as such they vary according to the sequential progression of the talk. Situated identities can be glossed as social identities such as, for example, teacher, husband, police officer and so on. Discourse and situated identities are reflexively linked so that one’s situated identity is consequential to the interaction because it prescribes the discourse resources available to participants and thus the discourse identity of the participants. Reflexively, then, the discourse identity creates and is created by the situated identity. Thus incumbency of a situated identity is *per se* consequential to the interaction since it is reflectively linked to accountable access to discursive resources.

Two further identities have to be added to Zimmerman’s (1998) list: omni-relevant and default. Default identities are identities that are generally recognized as being relevant to a particular context and to which participants in talk would normatively be expected to orient (Richards 2006b: 60). Thus, while an individual has many potential identities (e.g. male, footballer, husband, teacher, Jew etc) which may or may not be relevant in any particular sequence of talk, certain identities can be said to be normally relevant or oriented to by the participants in a specific context. Examples of default identities could
be teachers and students in a classroom or doctors and patients in a hospital. The notion of omni-relevant identities was introduced by Sacks and refers to the notion that when certain activities that have no fixed slot in the interaction are done the ‘doer’ invokes his/her omni-relevant identity. An example that Sacks (1992 vol. 1: 312) gives, is that of a seminar where everybody is sitting around talking in a homogeneous group but the omni-relevance of the identity of the teacher can be invoked at any moment since he/she is accountable for closing the interaction and when this happens the identity teacher which has been suspended is re-invoked. In short, omni-relevance does not imply that a category (e.g. of teacher in a seminar) is relevant at all times but that, in certain contexts, it can become relevant under pretty much any circumstances.

Consequentiality of identity is also linked to the notion of turn-type pre-allocation (Atkinson 1982), whereby certain turns at talk are the prerogative of members who are incumbent of certain identities. That is to say that certain activities are category-bound to people with certain identities in talk. So, in a court for example, turns at talk are carefully regulated according to identities: questioning is limited to the prosecution or defence lawyers and is not a discursive resource that is available to the jury or witnesses. Thus identities are made consequential to the interaction in terms of the division of resources. Moreover, as Schegloff (1992a: 109) points out, “much of what is meant by ‘social structure’ in the traditional sense directly implicates such characterizations or categorizations of the participants”. Thus orientation to the relative identities of participants in interaction and the relative distribution of discursive resources talk into being what has traditionally been regarded as social structure. This is because people design their turns according to the identity of their recipients (recipient design) and hold each other accountable for knowing who they relevantly are and what is ‘going on’. In this way, members construct the interaction as meaningful and accountable and hence reproduce what has traditionally been referred to as ‘social structure’ and which, for them, has become an exogenous and constraining social fact. Recipient design thus talks social structure into being.
3.8.5 Identity and the structure of conversation

The final point that Antaki and Widdicombe make is that categories are visible in people's exploitation of the structures of conversation. This is because since the sequences of talk are reflexively tied to the identities of participants, structures of talk invoke identity in the same way as identity determines possible sequences of talk. Thus, the study of the sequences of talk is inevitably also the study of identity and vice versa. As Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005: 153) state:

“the conversational actions that a person performs vis-à-vis another may have implications for enacting and maintaining incumbency in a relationship category. When a person engages in just those conversational actions or activities that are recognized as appropriate for incumbents of the relationship category, the person can be seen to be enacting/claiming/maintaining incumbency of that relationship category”

The participants’ on-going analysis of category work is made available to each other and the analyst through the sequential analysis of turns at talk. This is assured through the next turn proof procedure, whereby the next turn in talk displays understanding of the previous turn and thus ensures intersubjectivity. In this way, participants demonstrably display and construct a mutual understanding of what they themselves perceive as ‘being done’ (including the category work) through the talk. This display, available to other participants, is also available to the analyst who is able to understand what is demonstrably ‘going on’ through his/her own member’s knowledge. For example, the following exchange comes from a transcript of naturally-occurring classroom talk:

Teacher: Give me a sentence using an animal’s name as food, please.
Student: We shall have a beef for supper tonight.
Teacher: Good. That’s almost right but ‘beef’ is uncountable so it’s ‘we shall have beef’, not ‘we shall have a beef’

Brazil and Sinclair (1982: 45)

As McHoul (1978: 183) notes, “rules allow for and require that formal classroom situations be constructed so as to involve differential participation rights for parties to talk depending on their membership of the social identity-class student/teacher.” Such an
unequal distribution of resources that is characteristic of most classrooms can give rise to the initiation-response-feedback (IRF) pattern of interaction whereby the teacher initiates a turn in the form of a question, the student replies and then the teacher evaluates this response. It is thus through orientating to the discursive rights of the relative identities that the identities of teacher and student are constructed. Moreover, this is visible to the members and to the analysts through the sequences of talk – in this case a three part initiation, response and evaluation pattern of interaction.

3.8.6 The ‘political’ nature of categorization

Since talk instantiates identity, doing categorization is a ‘political’ act as members jostle for relative status in interaction. Identities can be worked up and worked down according to the situation, they can be used subversively and they can be ‘projected’ on to others. For example, Wooffitt and Clark (1997) demonstrate how a clairvoyant uses the sequential machinery of talk - notably overlaps - to anticipate the content of a client’s utterance in progress and complete it. In this way, she attempts to establish the discursive identity of a knowing participant and the situated identity of a clairvoyant. The clairvoyant thus uses the sequential possibilities of talk in interaction to author for herself an identity on which her claims to be a genuine clairvoyant (as opposed to a charlatan) are based.

Whilst Wooffitt and Clark (1997) make no claims as to whether the clairvoyant is ‘genuine’, Sacks (1972) introduces the notion of subversion whereby a member, being a competent language user, can subversively claim incumbency of a category to which he/she is not entitled. The notion of subversion is developed in several of Sack’s lectures (1992 vol. 1: 254) where he notes that people make use of a ‘normal’ way of going about things in order to carry out subversive acts. In other words, by giving an observable appearance of belonging to a category people can be attributed membership of a category. For example, a woman walking casually away from a supermarket with a baby that is not hers is let pass because observably she is a mother with her child (Sacks 1992 vol. 1: 254).

Moreover, categorization is not only important to the extent that the identity of the speaker allows access to certain discursive resources and sanctions the use of other
resources (category entitlement) but the ascription of category incumbency is also
rhetorically consequential. Potter (1996: 204) notes that Lawson (a former Chancellor of
the Exchequer) when in dispute with journalists over what was said at a press conference
describes the journalists as a ‘hacks’. In so doing, he ascribes a deviant identity to the
journalists and so detracts from the credibility of their accounts.
Finally, since identities are negotiated in talk they can become contested. As Day (1998)
indicates, members of ethnic minorities can resist the noticing and hence the relevance of
ethnicity as a category to the interaction. Similarly, Drew (1987) illustrates how teasing
can be used to attribute deviant identity to other people. Yet, he also notices how the
attribution of a deviant identity though a tease can be contested by a po-faced response
i.e. by recognising the tease but by treating it as not serious enough to address. Thus, the
attribution of categories can be a contested issue as participants jostle for position in
interaction.

3.9 Discursive psychology, managing meaning and leadership

To sum up the methodology so far: leaders are regarded as the person, or persons,
achieving predominance in the management of meaning. However, despite interest in the
linguistic turn, leadership research has failed to show how this is realized as an in situ
members’ achievement and how the identity leader emerges out of the management of
meaning. DP, on the other hand, is able to offer a radically endogenous perspective
concerning the allocation of rights and obligations that are available to participants in this
sensemaking process in which meaning is managed. Sticking closely to the details of the
talk, as the only resource available to the researcher for analyzing the participants’
displayed orientations to what they consider to be the relevant dimensions of ‘the
context’, DP offers a ‘way in’ to analyzing how activities such as ‘managing meaning’
and ‘defining reality’ are interactionally organized and how they are influenced by
participants’ access to, and use of, discursive resources.
DP thus considers the (social) construction of leadership and the identity of leader as a
members’ accomplishment that emerges from sensemaking. Leader as an identity and
leadership as the process that talks this identity into being can therefore be pointed to as
relevant to the interaction and this claim can be warranted in the fine-grained analysis of
talk in interaction. A fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction can thus be used, on the one hand, to uncover the practical reasoning through which the taken for granted world of the workplace is constructed and, on the other hand, it can reveal the resources that members have for creating, sustaining or challenging such a ‘world’. A fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction can, therefore, reveal the rhetorical, sequential and categorical resources with which members ‘do’ influence within the ongoing turn-by-turn construction of social reality.

3.9.1 Managing meaning: achieving an intersubjective version of organizational reality

As previously stated, influence in organizational literature and leadership literature has largely been explained in terms of taxonomies of ‘skills’ with little attempt to explicate these ‘skills’ or to explicate ‘influence’ as a members’ accomplishment. From a DP perspective, this thesis attempts to explicate influence and hence leadership as an *in situ* members’ accomplishment. First, DP takes an agnostic stance to the existence of the mind. It does not deny the (possible) existence of mind but it considers language, as representations of thoughts or reality, to be secondary to language as action. Consequently, influence cannot be seen in the intuitive terms of changing somebody’s mind since neither the researcher nor the participants have a window into the mind of other members. From a DP perspective influence is concerned with ‘moves’ in the language game so that participants arrive at a *display* of consensus and agreement. The cognitive, emotive or affective commitment to that consensus is unanalysable: what counts is the ‘getting to yes’ and the action of displaying consensus to other participants. Influence is thus explicated in discursive rather than cognitive terms. It is thus a question of creating ‘intersubjectivity’ or an agreed, negotiated version of organisational reality that, after time, becomes institutionalised and accepted as ‘the reality’ that constitutes the organisation.

Intersubjectivity deals with how members share a common experience of what is perceived as the natural and social world and how they communicate this experience to each other. Members can never have identical experiences of anything but in order for social interaction to occur they assume that each other has a reciprocal common sense
knowledge of ‘how thing are’. This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s beetle in his *Philosophical Investigations* (1972), whereby Wittgenstein uses the analogy of people having a box in which they keep what has become to be known as a beetle. However, nobody can look in the other person’s box to check whether what is in their box is indeed a beetle. This is analogous to the mind – we assume that when one uses the word ‘beetle’ it refers to the same thing but there is no way of knowing this for sure. In fact, what Wittgenstein argues is important is not that the beetle is the same but that it is assumed to be the same and so intersubjectivity is achieved.

Key to this is, then, the fact that intersubjectivity does not happen through ‘transferring’ and ‘coding’ cognitive perceptions of the world. The achievement of intersubjectivity is a question of active negotiation and construction. To quote Edwards (1997: 101):

> “this is not to say that joint understandings are produced cognitively, in the sense of individuals possessing the same ideas or beliefs; nor that intersubjectivity is interactionally straightforward. It is to say that the phenomena of mutually intelligible social interaction is a practically accomplished public production, and not a matter, outside of that, of people ‘actually’ (from a God’s-eye point of view) understanding or misunderstanding each other.

Consequently, intersubjectivity is seen as something that is oriented to by members as a practical matter and not as a cognitive transferring of ideas, beliefs or concepts from one mind to another. In other words, the construction of intersubjectivity is a members’ achievement which a fine-grained analysis of talk can make visible. For example, Potter and te Molder (2005) demonstrate how the intersubjective nature of an event is constructed in a call to a child helpline.

1    ((phone rings))
2    CPO    hello you are through to the NSPCC?
3    Caller    hello I’m actually phoning (0.2)
4    f-for some advice regarding an incident that I
5    witnessed today

Potter and te Molder (2005: 35) simplified

CPO = child protection officer
NSPCC = National Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children
At the start of the call the caller has information that the CPO does not. According to the telementationalist approach, in order to ‘transfer’ this knowledge, the caller codes this knowledge in the mind and transmits this state of knowing via language. The listener decodes the message and so knowledge is transferred. However, from a DP perspective the state of knowing and the description itself cannot be so neatly separated and the two are negotiated ‘in the space between interlocutors.’ As Potter and te Molder point out, the caller uses the term ‘incident’ which is a neutral descriptor awaiting ‘interpretation’ by somebody with the category entitlement to define the event. The call then continues as follows:

1 CPO okay so y-you (0.2) something
2 you’ve witnessed today has worried you:
3 (.)
4 .h [h h ] u:m (.) can you just tell me a little bit
5 caller [yeah]
6 CPO about that.

Potter and te Molder (2005: 35) simplified

The CPO uses the term ‘something’ which defers ‘defining’ the event in any coding/decoding sense and leaves it open to negotiation or the ability of the professional to later interpret what ‘that something is’ in a dialogic (if albeit asymmetric) way. The nature of ‘reality’ and the creation of intersubjectivity is thus a members’ interactive achievement rather than a transfer of pre-discursive ‘thoughts’.

Similarly, Schaeffer and Maynard (2005) show how versions of reality are jointly produced in survey questions. They demonstrate how something as supposedly simple as a standardized survey interview which is designed to elicit what the interviewee ‘thinks’ is in fact a jointly achieved process. In short, they demonstrate how the interviewer shapes the interaction so that the interviewer and interviewee jointly perform ‘cognition’. In this way, they cast doubt on the individualistic psychological model of cognitive processing and locate the creation of intersubjectivity in interactional terms. For example, in the following extract, they demonstrate how in response to the interviewer’s question
(line 75: *what kind of business or industry is this?*), the classification of the response as ‘something else’ is not independently arrived at by the interviewee as a simply reflection of what he/she thinks but is the result of a joint negotiation.

In short, talk therefore is more than a reflection of individual cognitive processing. Talk reflects an intricate joint authoring of a codable answer to the interviewer’s question. Antaki (2006) also demonstrates how what somebody with learning difficulties (Mal) knows about his money is less a cognitive matter but is a practical and situated matter as the social worker mediates what Mal ‘understands’ so as to arrive at a jointly, though asymmetrically, authored version of Mal’s state of knowledge concerning his money. Moreover, Antaki points out that what is acceptable to the social worker as Mal’s inner mental state is situated in the professional practice of social work. Courts, IQ testers or
opinion surveys have differing criteria concerning acceptable responses to questions about what one knows. One’s ‘inner cognitive state’ is thus not a pre-discursive and unsituated notion but, as Antaki (2006) demonstrates, it is jointly constructed as part of the in situ purposes of the participants.

3.9.2 Influence and intersubjectivity

However, as hinted by Antaki (2006) as discussed above, such intersubjective versions of reality do not take place in a social vacuum: they are politically and asymmetrically determined according to access to discursive resources. Taylor (1995), for example, demonstrates how following a family dispute the daughter comments that it was a fight yet the father corrects this version of events which the child accepts and later repeats to the researcher. Consequently, it is revealed how the child surrenders her world view and accepts that of the more powerful father. Thus reality is not only collaboratively but also asymmetrically constructed. This is because it is the child’s ‘meaning’ of events, which she describes as a ‘fight’, is reworked so it is reframed as not-a-fight:

108 Dad: ((eating, facing plate)) You think it was a fight?
109 (0.2)
110 Janie ((with emphatic nod as she turns to dad)) No
111 Mom hh hh hh hh .H ((slight bemused laugh, grinning))
112 (2.4) ((Dad keeps eating; Janie resumes eating))

Taylor (1995: 296)

Thus in line 108, Dad effects an other-initiated self-repair. Janie’s ‘no’ aligns with this repair initiator and she reverses her ‘opinion’ that the family dispute was a ‘fight’. But as Taylor argues, not only does this repair lead to realignment but it also leads to a co-construction of the events as ‘not-a-fight’. In other words, Dad’s repair initiator, Mum’s silence and Janie’s alignment collectively and intersubjectively deconstruct the meaning ‘fight’ and reconstruct the event as not-a-fight; in this way, the child’s first hand experience of the world is rewritten. Thus as Taylor (1995: 297) notes: “At one level, Janie’s ‘no’ may be indexing and reconstituting her as one not entitled (or, as in the tale-
world account, not old enough) to make such judgement – that what she witnessed was a fight.” Thus meanings are open to negotiation and which meaning to privilege becomes an interactional issue open to influence.

Intersubjectivity is, thus, worked up interactionally, through the sequential properties of talk, so that what is jointly known is part of the accountable nature of ‘what is going on’. Even in mundane exchanges, as outlined above, shared knowledge is actively managed and accountably oriented to by the participants. It is not a question of cognitive states that speakers ‘express’ in their talk. What counts for the members as intersubjectivity is thus not an unmotivated, apolitical act but is necessarily asymmetrically and politically determined according to the discourse resources available to participants. Such discourse resources are unevenly distributed throughout the participants according to the organisational identities they are able to create, their status or their expertise and the individual’s ability to employ such linguistic resources to effect. If leadership is a process of influencing the achievement of intersubjectivity in the way that the social workers, fathers or interviewers do, then leadership is not a question of peering into the minds of people to see if they change their opinions. Leadership is rather a question of the rhetorical design of sequences of talk and the category work that such sequences do that allow certain participants to dominate the process of sensemaking.

3.9.3 Leadership/influence as a language game

Leadership, in Pondy’s (1978) terms, is a language game. Wittgenstein (1972) uses the term language games in order to bring into prominence the fact that speaking of language is part of an activity, rather than an external manifestation of thoughts. Taken from this perspective, it is not ‘what is going on’ in the participants’ minds as the game is played that is important or analysable but the research emphasis should be on the actual moves that are made within the game (i.e., the sequences of talk that are designed to achieve intersubjectivity). Consequently, influence is seen not in cognitive terms but in discursive resources in a language game whereby “arguments are like a game of drafts in which the unskilled player is always hemmed in and left without a move by the expert” (attributed to Plato quoted in Billig 1987:10). Thus, what participants/leaders think as they act out their game is not important and, moreover, in the absence of a ‘window’ on the mind,
what the participants ‘think’ is, indeed, unanalysable. However, a fine-grained analysis of talk in interaction can make the linguistic moves in the game visible and thus analysable. Consequently, if leadership is considered from the perspective of the language game, there is a limited scope for strategy and deliberate ‘thinking’. More significantly, unless participants at a meeting specifically draw attention to the issue of strategy, strategy remains an extra-textual issue that is of limited interest to the researcher. Viewed from this perspective, strategy is conceived of as an emergent skill rather than conscious and pre-planned. As Sacks (1992 vol. 1: 11) says:

> When people start to analyse social phenomenon, if it looks like things occur with the sort of immediacy we find in some of these exchanges, then, if you have to make an elaborate analysis of it – that is to say, show that they did something as involved as some of the things I have proposed – then you figure out that they couldn’t have thought that fast. I want to suggest that you have to forget that completely. Don’t worry about how fast they’re thinking. First of all, don’t worry about whether they’re ‘thinking’. Just try to come to terms with how it is that the things come off. Because you’ll find that they can do these things. Just take any other area of natural science and see, for example, how fast molecules do things. And they don’t have very good brains. So, just let the materials fall as they may. Look to see how it is that persons go about producing what they do produce."

For example, Moerman (1988) and Heritage (1990/91) both draw an analogy between thought and action and the spontaneous subconscious reflexive skills of sportsmen in which the sportsmen’s actions are reflexive and unconscious responses to the other’s game. Consequently, as Heritage (1990/1: 327) states, it is difficult to perceive intention on account of the fact that “the sheer depth of unconscious skill and mastery of conversational procedures in talk is deeply opaque to intentionalist attributions”. Furthermore, Hopper (2005) points out the problems, from the researcher’s point of view, of fixing when a strategy emerges in talk and when it is planned. He takes the example of Lyndon B. Johnson’s telephone calls and analyses several calls for evidence of ‘strategy’ when dealing with a particular event. Hopper (2005: 149) concludes that, even though the calls contained similar features which would suggest that there was a certain amount of planning involved, “strong evidence of pre-strategy seems relatively rare and to the extent that it occurs it usually cannot be located precisely in time”. Thus, from a DP
perspective, the interactional performance of leaders is not to be found in any cognitive explanations of strategizing but in the reflexive ‘cut and thrust’ of interactional moves in a language game. This is not to say that participants in a meeting or leaders never think before they speak but that thought before speech is not essential and indeed in the rough and tumble of a meeting planning what one is going to say is perhaps the exception rather than the rule.

Participants are constrained or empowered by access to sequential opportunities that are made or presented during the interaction. This, of course, does not rule out the possibility of the existence of some kind of pre-planned strategy that is put together before a meeting. Indeed, ‘how to books’ and web-sites abound with texts on these kinds of subjects. However, without attributing a ‘god-like’ window on the mind of participants to the researcher and discounting members’ own accounts of such strategies as ‘accountability-work’, it is impossible to decide what is strategy and what are *ad hoc* spontaneous moves in a language game.

Intention should not be seen as a mental state but it is employed in interaction to ‘do’ something as part of the ‘game’ being played. For example, Edwards and Potter (1992: 215) discussing Lawson’s (a former Chancellor of the Exchequer) resignation indicate that he constructs his discourse so as to display that the reasons for resignation were outside his control. Thus, he counters possible criticisms that his intention is to resign so that he can work in the City. Thus, intentions become ways of accounting for actions rather than being pre-discursive cognitive acts that are then encoded in talk. Intention is therefore not a ‘cognitive problem’ but is a practical and accountable matter for participants.

### 3.9.4 Leaders as *homo rhetorius*

Since DP places an emphasis on the discursive rather than the cognitive construction of organisational reality and on the authoring of consensus rather than any changes in mental states, it casts the leader as *homo rhetorius*. Their talk is organised in ways which make a particular reality appear solid, factual and stable and above all persuasive. To accomplish this, leaders draw on a range of rhetorical devices. Leadership is therefore seen as a skill. Leaders discursively create intersubjective consensus as to past, future and
present organisational reality. They are practical authors, they create new possibilities for action, new ways of being and relating to the indeterminate ‘hustle and bustle’ that surrounds them and above all they argue persuasively so that they have more influence in the organisational sensemaking process. Leaders have most influence in the process of constructing organisational identities and organisational reality. They are not rational agents (judgemental dopes) acting out fixed roles in a pre-existing and pre-discursive reality. Rather, they are wordsmiths who sensemake and who construct, and are reflexively constructed by, their organisational realities. Leader is a category/identity that is talked into being in the process of organising. As Samra-Fredericks (2000b: 311/312) concludes:

“only through skilled language use or talk can leaders: manage meaning and the sense-making activities of others and so define reality; tell convincing or persuasive strategic stories; secure attributions of expertise, esteem and power; and be tactful diplomatic, persuasive as well as assertive. Presumably also, they can only ‘craft’ strategies through a talk-based interactive process”

Therefore, the fact that DP draws on CA’s fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction allows DP to catch the participants’ sensemaking practices in flight as an in situ accomplishment. It also allows the phenomena of leadership, and gaining influence in the process of organizational sensemaking, to be explicated as a members’ accomplishment which does not rely on a priori theorizing about the concept of leadership.
4. The data

4.1 The research site: ‘The Language Academy’

4.1.1 The structure of the company
The data for this thesis is uniquely drawn from one research site given the fictitious name the ‘The Language Academy’ which is situated in a large town in the north of France. It is dependent on the local Chambre de Commerce et Industrie who fund the school in part. However, the school is also partly self-financing and is very conscious of making a profit in a highly competitive market of private language schools and other centres such as the universities who also offer language courses. Considering the extent of the competition, the school markets itself as a provider of quality made to measure language courses for local businesses. These courses can either be held on the client’s premises or in-house. The school has about 20 classrooms in two different locations in the metropolitan area. Whilst providing language training to local companies is the main ‘business’ of the school, it also provides language lessons to undergraduate level students studying at business schools linked to the local Chambre de Commerce et Industrie, intensive lessons for school children during the school holidays and language lessons for the general public in the evenings. The school was also one of the pioneers of giving lessons over the phone and over the past few years the school has been making use of new technologies to give lessons using computer video-links and webcams. The company also prides itself on having its own in-house software which gives it a commercial advantage over its less well equipped competitors. The school teaches various languages but its main business is the provision of English, German, Dutch, Spanish and French as a foreign language. Consequently, the staff, of about 50 teachers, consists of a mix of nationalities since many of the teachers are native speakers of the language that they teach. Within the company, teachers speak to each other according to which language is the easiest for them but often the lingua Franca is either English – since native English speakers make
up the majority of the staff - or French which is generally spoken by all the staff to some
degree of fluency. On the administrative side, the school has about 10 employees for
administrative and secretarial support. Most of these staff members are monolingual
French speakers. In order to avoid an English speaking clique developing, the official
company policy is that French should be spoken for ‘official’ business.
The company is roughly structured as set out in the organizational chart below:

![Organizational Chart of the Language School](image)

The chamber of commerce thus ‘owns’ the business. The director is responsible for the
day-to-day running of the business, which can be divided into three sections: the
administrative staff (receptionists, cleaners, handyman and so on); the marketing and
sales department which is responsible for liaising with clients, selling the courses and
developing new products/courses; three senior teachers who share joint responsibility for
such things as training, selection of materials and course books, developing new
pedagogic technologies and so on. Previously, there had been a director of studies who
was responsible for the day-to-day pedagogic issues but the position was suppressed in
2002. In 2002, the previous director was persuaded to take early retirement on account of
the poor performance of the school and the post of director of studies was suppressed
following complaints of incompetence. The director of studies could not be sacked since
he had the status of a ‘civil servant’ so the post was suppressed and was given the choice of taking a job as a teacher with a cut in salary or getting a golden handshake and leaving the company – which he did. The new director therefore became directly responsible for the administrative, commercial and pedagogic sides of the school.

4.1.2 The ‘reunions pédagogiques’

The meetings that I was allowed to record were pedagogic meetings which were attended by the three senior teachers (given the pseudonyms: Nigel, Beth and Liz) and the director (given the pseudonym: Alice). The aim of the meetings was to discuss issues such as teacher training, selection of course materials, and so on. They were supposed to be held approximately once a month but in practice they were held about once every six months. In all, I recorded three meetings and each one lasted for about one and a half hours. The meetings had no formal agenda and there were no minutes. Following a policy of using French for official business, the language of the meetings was French. Despite the fact that three of the participants (Liz, Beth, Nigel) were not native speakers of French, this caused no apparent problem during the meetings since: they had all been in France for between 10 and 20 years; were all married to French native speakers and spoke French at home; all had higher degrees in French and in two cases had been teachers of French in their native countries before coming to France.

4.1.3 The participants at the meetings

Alice had been recently promoted to director following the unceremonious removal of the previous director in which she had been instrumental. Prior to being the director, she had worked in the company for over 10 years as a teacher of English, had been very active in setting up a teacher’s union and had used this position to undermine the previous management. Nigel has qualified teacher status from the U.K. and is perhaps the most senior teacher in the school. He has about 20 years service in the company. Beth, also a trained teacher, has about 15 years service in the company and is regarded as one of the most senior teachers. Liz, on the other hand, is much younger than the others (late 20s), she only has only about 7 years teaching experience of which 5 is in the Language Academy, and, moreover, she is not a formally qualified teacher.
4.2 My relationship with the data and the unique adequacy requirement

I began working at the Language Academy in 1994 and left in 2002. From about 1996 onwards I was a senior teacher in the school and I attended the pedagogic meetings as part of my usual workplace routines. On beginning my doctoral research I started looking for a research site. However, many of the companies that I approached through cold calling refused to allow recording. This was mainly justified through concerns for confidentiality. In the end, I approached my former company and was allowed to videotape several pedagogic meetings. Consequently, I have known all the participants at the meeting for between five and ten years and I have in vivo knowledge of what the meetings ‘are about’. Thus, I had privileged insider knowledge of, the institution, the participants, and the speech event that I was recording. Moreover, the fact that I had attended such meetings in the past fulfilled the unique adequacy requirement whereby the researcher is required to have competence in the field in which he or she is researching.

4.3 The recordings

As can be seen on the following page, the meetings took place in the director’s office which had a classic layout consisting of a working desk at one end of the room and a circular table in the middle (see figure two). The position of the video camera was decided on account of access to plugs. Once in place, the camera was left in a fixed position throughout the meeting and was focused in such a way as to cover the faces and body movements of all four participants. Though I sat beside the camera taking notes throughout the meeting, I did not refocus or move the camera thus making no a priori assumptions as to who or what was important during the interaction by focusing upon them. Furthermore, the video was also left running throughout the meetings so that a priori considerations as to what is and is not important were not considered.
Figure 2: layout of the director’s office and recording equipment.
5. Achieving the team meeting

5.1 Introduction

Both teams and meetings have received a lot of attention in popular management literature designed for practitioners and from more serious organisational research. Schwartzman’s (1989) seminal work on meetings claims that meetings form the essence of organisational life and are the main locus of management action. She estimates that between 70-90% of a manager’s time is taken up in verbal interaction and that most of this is time spent in meetings of some kind. Yet, a cursory glance at the literature on meetings designed for the practitioner shows either that meetings are not defined (presumably, this is because readers are assumed to already have an intuitive grasp of what a meeting is) or the authors have recourse to catch-all exogenous definitions that define meetings as, for example:

“a gathering of essential participants only, each of whom has something to contribute, to discuss a problem touching on all their interests, to arrive at certain decisions, all as required by the pre-determined aim of the meeting itself”

Martin (1994: 5)

Similarly, teams and team leadership have been the object of speculation within both popular and more serious organizational research. However, most organisational research considers teams to be pre-discursive entities that once established have an unproblematic existence. They are collections of individuals who share tasks, goals, responsibilities for outcomes and who are regarded as intact social entities that are embedded in a larger organisation (see, for example, Cohen and Bailey 1997). In sum, such an approach to teams, meetings and leadership assumes that they pre-exist their discursive construction in talk. However, from a broadly ethnomethodological perspective, teams, meetings and leaders are considered to be interactional achievements rather than pre-discursive entities. The leader, or leaders, of the team are thus not regarded as a priori but have to be established in talk. The leader, defined as the person who has, or persons who have, most
influence in the sense making process emerge because they are oriented to as having a right or obligation to define organisational reality. This is achieved through, reflexively, having access to more powerful discursive resources that are made available to them through participant orientation to the speech activity in which they are engaged as ‘a meeting’ and this makes procedurally consequential team/institutional identities and the category-bound ‘allowability’ (Levinson 1992: 97) of contributions to the sensemaking process.

### 5.2 Institutional interaction

Levinson’s (1992) notion of participants’ orientation to what they perceive as allowable contributions to a speech activity according to their identities can be found in the participants’ orientation to the interaction in a meeting as institutional. As such, their orientations can be visible to each other and the researcher in terms of:

- Turn-taking organisation
- Sequence organisation
- Turn design
- Lexical choice
- Epistemological and other forms of asymmetry

Heritage (1997: 164)

Within institutional interaction, or more specifically in this case within team meetings, turn-taking organisation is potentially category-bound so that, for example, a designated chairperson will probably have the category-bound right to mediate turns at talk. Such turn-taking organisation can build up into a predominate form of sequential organization that dominates the interaction. For example, in schools the identity of teacher gives the teacher the right to ask questions and to assess the adequacy of the students’ responses. This gives rise to sequences of talk, such as the initiation-feedback-response pattern, which are said to dominate classroom interaction (McHoul 1979). Turns at talk are thus designed by participants’ orientating to the relevance of institutional identities both in
terms of what actions the turn performs and the means (choices of talk) by which such actions are performed. This may involve, in part, the lexical choices that are available to the participants and, for example, can take the form of avoiding lower register expressions in certain situations. Finally, epistemological and other forms of asymmetry may become procedurally consequent. Asymmetries in knowledge are basic to talk since, as Linell and Luckmann (1991: 4) note, “if there were no asymmetries at all between people, i.e. if communicatively relevant inequalities of knowledge were non-existing, there would be little or no need for most kinds of communication” but as some researchers (e.g. Heritage and Raymond 2005 and Drew 1991) have pointed out, rights to display knowledge are not necessarily reflections of actual states of knowledge. Consequently, displays of what one knows and how one comes to know it are designed according to the identities of the participants in talk vis-à-vis each other and this, therefore, has consequences for the sequential organisation of talk-in-interaction. Thus, for example, as Strong (1979) notes, doctors when accompanying their children to medical consultations act like parents by suspending a display of medical knowledge. In short, as Heritage (1997: 179) points out, “in institutional interaction, then, knowledge may not be enough; one must also be entitled to the knowledge, and have come to it in an appropriate way”. Thus, interactionally relevant asymmetries in knowledge do not necessarily relate to actual states of knowledge. Rather they index the social distribution of knowledge and the discursive right to express such knowledge.

Moreover, all the above phenomena are implicative of the notion of moral accountability. Categories carry with them a cluster of expectable features or predicates such as actions, character traits, ways of thinking, motivations, dress codes, locations and so on that can be inferred. Such predicates, therefore, include orientation to the aforementioned aspects of the institutional nature of team meetings. Participants are thus held accountable for displaying, or failing to display, states of knowledge, orientation to institutionally sanctioned turn-taking procedures, lexical choices and so on which are commensurate with identity claims made within the oriented-to relevance of the meeting. Consequently, displaying certain states of knowledge, orienting to turn-taking procedures and so on is basic for the assessment of a participant’s performance as acceptable or not and it is these orientations that constitute the relevant context as a team meeting.
5.3 Teams and team meetings

Meetings, then, from a broadly ethnomethodological perspective are talked into being through participants’ orientation to what they perceive as allowable contributions to a speech activity which they reflexively construct as ‘a meeting’. Their orientation to a speech activity as a ‘meeting’ is available to each other, and the researcher, through the next turn proof procedure (Sacks et al. 1974: 728) whereby a speaker makes visible his/her understanding of a first turn in the next turn and so an intersubjective version of ‘what is going on’ (i.e. a team meeting) can be sustained. Participants’ orientation to the interaction as a meeting is available to themselves and the analyst through the sequential properties of talk which are sensitive to the event as a meeting and which reflexively, as the talk progresses, renew the context as a meeting and make procedurally consequent the institutional identities of the members. Thus, as Sacks et al. (1974: 729) point out, the sequential properties of talk display the members’ orientation to an event as a meeting and so differentiate the talk from other forms of interaction. They (ibid 1974: 729) specifically allude to the right to pre-allocate turns, linked to the identity ‘chairperson’, as being crucial in the members’ orientation to an event as a ‘meeting’. What is, or is not, a meeting in an organizational setting then is also inextricably tied up with the relevance of institutional identities. However, Sacks et al. (1974: 729) also note that this orientation to the chairperson’s rights and obligations to mediate talk is also a question of formality and informality which involves “various mixes of pre-allocation and local-allocation” of turns. Thus, as researchers such as Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris (1997) or Boden (1994) point out, meetings may shift on a turn-by-turn basis from orientation to strict regulation of turns to ‘freer’ interaction associated with conversation. In sum, meetings are not pre-discursive phenomena which govern the actions of the participants in some kind of Parsonian sense, they are locally produced by the participants’ orientation to allowable contributions.

Since participant orientation to what counts as an allowable contribution to interaction displays what the participants themselves consider to be a meeting, their differing orientations, reflected in the sequential properties of talk, can therefore talk into being different kinds of meetings. Thus, for example, Larrue and Trognon (1993) describing interaction during a section meeting of the French Communist Party explicate a very rigid
form of turn taking in which the participants signal a desire to speak to the chairperson by raising their hand and then the chairperson notes this and then he/she selects the next speaker according to the list he/she has established. This kind of rigid turn taking contrasts with the meetings described by Grosjean (2004) who carried out research into meetings held when shifts of nurses change in hospitals and in which she notes a lack of specific procedures for interaction and thus she explicates a less regulated form of turn-taking than that reported by Larrue and Trognon. Meetings, then, cannot be neatly encapsulated in catch all exogenous definitions.

Team meetings, then, can be seen as a specific subtype of meeting which can expectably have a particular participant orientation to allowable contributions which are displayed in the sequential properties of talk and which differentiate team meetings from other types of meetings. Teams are therefore not regarded as pre-discursive entities that are part of the organizational chart but they are achieved in and through members talk. From this perspective, teams are thus achieved when participants orient to each other as being co-incumbents of a category device (in this case ‘management team’) which has within it categories such as manager-subordinates which can be heard to go together (Sacks 1986: 334). Sacks (1986: 332) refers to such devices as duplicatively organised membership categorization devices (MCDs). He cites the example of a family which is a device that consists of categories that go together (e.g. mother, father, brother etc) and as such form a prototypical team. Sacks (1986: 334) defines MCDs as follows:

“When such a device is used on a population, what is done is to take its categories, treat the set of categories as a defining unit, and place members of the population into cases of the unit, and place members of the population into cases of the unit. If a population is so treated and is then counted, one counts not numbers of daddies, numbers of mommies, and numbers of babies but numbers of families – numbers of ‘whole families,’ numbers of ‘families without fathers,’ etc. A population so treated is partitioned into cases of the unit, cases for which what properly holds is that various persons partitioned into any case are ‘coincumbents’ of that case”.

Moreover, some duplicatively organised MCDs have a proper number of incumbents for certain categories in the device. Thus, a nation-state, for example, has only one president. On the other hand, there may be no limit to the numbers of other co-incumbents such as
the population of the nation state. According to Sacks (1972), categories are often operative in pairs such as husband-wife or parent-child which may, or may not, be part of duplicatively organised MCDs or teams. Moreover, these standard relational pairs (SRPs) constitute a locus for a set of rights and obligations concerning activities that are expectable for somebody who is an incumbent of such a category. Incumbents are, thus, accountable for exercising those rights and obligations in relation to other parties with whom they constitute such a pair. Sacks (1972) illustrates the notion of rights with the case of a suicidal person who has ‘nobody to turn to’. He demonstrates that a potentially suicidal person will work through relational pairs in terms of who is expected to give help (e.g. family and friends). A person can then make an assertion that they have ‘nobody to turn to’ if nobody is prepared to fulfil the rights and obligations of family or friend to help in suicide prevention. Consequently, if family members or friends cannot or will not fulfil their obligations, the suicidal person then turns to a stranger/professional because they have ‘nobody to turn to’.

Thus, SRPs are a locus of rights and obligations in talk which are displayed in the sequential properties of talk. Moreover, these rights and obligations may be potentially asymmetrically distributed according to the identities within the SRP and may therefore make procedurally consequent “a contrastive organization of rights/duties and/or knowledge and skills between them” (Jayyusi 1984: 122). Asymmetric relationships can include two phenomena: turn-type pre-allocation and turn-type mediation (Atkinson 1982: 102/3). Turn-type pre-allocation relates to situations in which participants orient to restrictions on what sort of action can be done in a turn relative to their interlocutors. Turn mediation refers to practices of somebody, archetypically a chairman, having special rights and obligations to mediate turns in interaction.

Such asymmetric categorization may be relevant in duplicatively organised MCDs since, in order for a team to become an accountable social unit, incumbents have obligations and rights relative to each other. As Atkinson et al. (1978: 146) point out as regards team meetings:

“persons present have to be, and have to be seen to be, occupying their appropriate roles (and that includes listening and talking properly), so that those present can see the meeting to have been properly and seriously constituted, so that business may be seen to have been done in a proper and legitimate manner.”
Consequently, as Atkinson et al. (1978) demonstrate, when the expression ‘right erm’ is uttered by the chairperson, it is oriented to as the start of the meeting giving that person the discursive identity of ‘authorised starter’ which confirms the speaker’s situated identity as chairperson. It sets up a SRP of chairperson-team member: the chairperson has the right to mediate talk and the others have the obligation to allow this. Failure to orient to these identities and respective rights and obligations would mean that the meeting might not be considered as accountably achieved. For example, if ‘right erm’ is uttered by somebody who is not oriented to as an authorised starter it will be treated as a joke. Richards (2006: 30 ff.), for example, presents data that demonstrates that in the absence of the chairperson an attempt to start the meeting by a non-authorised starter ends in failure.

In conclusion, teams are regarded as interactional achievements which emerge from the category and sequential work of the participants as they orient to each others’ identities and the possibilities for action that these identities allow. However, the team members experience the team as a ‘social fact’ that exists prior to, and separate from, their discursive construction of the ‘team’ which is then reified as fact and even though the rights and obligations within the team are achieved in talk, because the participants orient to such constraints as ‘fact’, they then reproduce the social order of the team as if it were exogenous reality.

**5.4 Analysis: achieving the team**

In the following section, the beginning of one of the meetings that were recorded is analysed and the way in which the duplicatively organised MCD - the management team - becomes procedurally consequent to the interaction is explicated.

**5.4.1 Pre-meeting talk**

Place is significant in categorization because certain activities are associated with certain places (Jayyusi 1984: 171). For example, a lovers ‘tiff’ would be inappropriate in a public place and members orient to the accountable constraints, or ‘setting-tied’ actions in Jayyusi’s terms, that are operative in certain settings. Similarly, this can also be linked to time – since the morally accountable nature of activities varies according to the time. For
example, being drunk in a pub at midday may be less morally acceptable and might carry with it different categorizations compared to being drunk in a pub at midnight. Yet, the fact that the participants have been summoned to a meeting, in the manager’s office at an appropriate time for meetings does not necessarily make the duplicatively organised MCD or the speech activity ‘meeting’ and institutional identities within that team procedurally consequent to the interaction: they have to be achieved. What follows is an explication of the achievement of the team meeting as an interactional accomplishment.

Extract 5.1

1  J  are the lights on ↑Nigel
2  N  .hh no:
3  L  it would be interesting to see what ((sound cut off))
4  N  the it flicks but ((sound cut off))
5  J  that should be up and running ↑now
6  N  right ↑[alright]
7  J  [yeah]
8  L  so you’re not staying around ↑ then
9  J  yeah
10 L  ↑oh you are
11 J  yeah yeah, I'll er :: (0.2) I'll stay and play with my camera here (2)

The recording begins with the researcher addressing Nigel on the issue of whether the recording equipment is ‘up and running’. This topic concerns a research task and as such does not invoke Nigel’s institutional identity. Additionally, the artifact that is the focus of attention is associated with the identity of researcher and not Nigel’s institutional identity. Liz then self-selects (line 3) to take a turn which orients to the research task (it would be interesting to see what). This choice of topic again invokes non-institutional identities for the participants. The recording then stops as the researcher continues setting
up the equipment. When the microphone is turned on again, Nigel is orienting to this artifact (*it flicks on*) and he thus maintains the relevance of his non-institutional identity. When the microphone comes on again the researcher is addressing the task of ‘getting the equipment working’. He enlists Nigel’s aid in this by asking *‘this should be up and running now’*, which again orients to non-institutional identities. In sum, this stretch of talk is ‘talk at work’ rather than ‘talk as work’ – at least as far as Liz and Nigel are concerned (Zimmerman 1992).

5.4.2 Transition to participants’ orientation to ‘team meeting’ and institutional identities

The talk-at-work in which a non-organisational task invokes non-institutional identities gives way to the ‘start of the meeting’ where institutional identities become relevant.

Extract 5.2

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>yeah digital recorder very in thing (1.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2 | A | les jeunes vous avez lu le compte ↑rendu  
  |   | *kids you’ve read the ↑summary* |
| 3 | L | oui  
  |   | yes |
| 4 | B | oui  
  |   | yes |
| 5 | N | ‘memory drive’  
  |   | ‘memory drive’ |
| 6 | A | ça vous ↑va  
  |   | *it’s okay for you* |
| 7 | B? L? | oui  
  |   | yes |
| 8 | N | ‘yeah beautiful’  
  |   | ‘yeah beautiful’ |
| 9 | A | les points qu’on va regarder  
  |   | *the points we’re going to look at*  
  |   | (23) ((Alice moves out from behind her desk and sits at the round table))  
  |   | suis en retard (9) donc er : pour er : bon moi j’ai quelques points sais  
  |   | *I’m late (9) iso er : for er : good me I’ve got several points dunno*  
  |   | pas si vous avez des points mais d’après ce que vous m’avez dit lors des réunions
In line 1, Nigel is still ‘doing’ admiration of the recording equipment and thus has not invoked his institutional identity that Alice’s summons to the meeting projects as relevant. In line 2, Alice is still behind her desk but she addresses the participants in French (kids you’ve read the ↑summary). This is significant as French is the official language of the company and is used for official business. Such code-switching signals a change in footing which implies a change in the alignment between participants (Goffman 1979) and, in this case, it makes relevant institutional identities. The talk becomes hearable as a pre-sequence which announces the business to come. Pre-sequences can be glossed as turns that project a future action (in this case starting the meeting) but which provide a slot for ratification so that in the case of encountering problems the projected action can be modified or in extreme cases abandoned altogether. In this instance, Beth and Liz orient to the pre-sequence by replying in French and providing a conditionally relevant second-pair part to Alice’s question and so the opening of the meeting can go ahead in an unproblematic way. As Atkinson et al. (1978) point out an utterance that starts a meeting must be analysed in terms of speaker, scene and utterance. Thus, for kids you’ve read the ↑summary to be recognised by the participants as a pre-sequence calling a meeting to order, Alice must be oriented to as the chair and the setting must (now) be oriented to as a meeting. This must be confirmed by the participants: as Pomerantz and Mandelbaum (2005: 168) point out, “the first move may instantiate a presumption of incumbency in a particular relationship category, but the
response to it is integral to the enactment of incumbency”. Beth and Liz’s confirmation of this pre-sequence confirms the shift in identities which makes the SRP chairperson/members of the management team relevant and invokes the procedural consequentiality of the speech activity ‘team meeting’. However, on a turn-by-turn basis Nigel continues to speak in English (line 5) and does not orient to Alice’s pre-sequence. Alice, on the other hand, continues in French and orients to the ‘official’ business of the meeting. This orientation receives alignment from either Beth or Liz (line 7: yes). However, Nigel (line 8) still persists in a non-institutional role – speaking English and addressing a non-institutional task i.e. the recording equipment. At this point, Alice moves out from behind her desk (line 9). This has the physical effect of uniting the ‘team’. The management team is duplicatively organised (Sacks 1986) so that the categories in the device are not equivalent or interchangeable but they have the character of team organization in the sense that different categories have a relationship to each other and can be seen to work together. This also means that there are a proper number of incumbents for certain categories within the device. Consequently, there is only one chairman yet the number of team members can be variable. When Alice comes out from behind the desk and physically joins the team the quorum for the team to be constituted is achieved and the meeting can be seen to accountably begin (Turner 1972: 370). Furthermore, in line 10, Alice sits down and begins (so I’m late (9) so er : for er : good me I’ve got several points dunno if you have any points but after what you told me during meetings) which is hearable as the start of the meeting. Nigel confirms this as the start of the meeting by stating ‘yes’ (line 13) and ‘first point’ (line 16). Significantly, this is spoken in French, the official language of the meeting, and so he now aligns with the other participants and confirms Alice’s discourse identity of ‘authorised starter’ which invokes her situated identity of chairperson and allows her to accountably perform the act of opening the meeting which is category-bound to chairperson. Alice then announces the topic which is the training of the new teachers. Moreover, subsequent talk is seen as getting on with the meetings which invokes the default identities of the team.
6. Chairperson identity and turn-mediation

6.1 Introduction

As seen in the previous chapter, Alice is talked into being as the chairperson of the team and whilst this is not, necessarily, synonymous with ‘leader’ identity, as shall be argued in the following chapter, the chairperson (Alice) has access to more significant resources with which to ‘do’ influence in the sensemaking process. This is largely associated with her ability to mediate turns at talk and which can be further divided into three phenomena: the category-bound right to initiate topic, the category-bound right to close topic, and the category-bound right to mediate turns at talk during topic progression.

As previously noted, institutional interaction is often considered to be produced by participant orientation to allowable contributions to the interaction. In certain instances, the orientation to allowable contributions to the interaction and restriction in turn-taking procedures is fairly clear cut as in the case of classrooms (McHoul 1978) or courtrooms (Atkinson and Drew 1979). In other settings, as in the case of ‘informal’ business meetings, what counts as an allowable contribution is less clear. Certainly, in terms of turn-taking, various researchers (e.g. Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris 1997; Boden 1994; Huisman 2001; Kangasharju 1996) have demonstrated that less formal business meetings can move from orientation to a pre-allocated system of turn-taking to conversational turn-taking procedures on a turn-by-turn basis. The findings of this thesis concur with such research since the participants in the management team meetings at the Language Academy do not orient to a strict mediation of turns and team members can thus contest the chairperson’s category-bound control of, and influence over, the interaction.

6.2 Topic opening: announcing the agenda

As the previous chapter has demonstrated, once the meeting is called to order and starts, the default identities of chairperson-team members become relevant until there is a
change of footing. Once the team is interactionally established and the identities chairperson and team member are interactionally achieved, Alice is oriented to as having the category-bound right to mediate the talk. Turn mediation is defined as occurring when, “one participant is recognized as having special rights to decide who may speak when, what may be talked about, when a present speaker should stop speaking, etc, a chairman perhaps being the paradigm case of turn mediation” (Atkinson 1982: 103).

This is significant in terms of sensemaking and leadership, since the informal agenda that she presents at the beginning of each meeting determines which issues are to be discussed or what is to be noticed (Weick et al. 2005: 411). As such they are influential in the first stage of the sensemaking process in which issues are ‘noticed’ and thus become the theme for sensemaking. Making sense of issues can only be done if the phenomena are on the agenda in the first place: what is not put on the agenda cannot be made sense of. Thus, the initial agenda, which is set by Alice (cf. chapter 4), determines what issues are to be made sense of and so influences the sensemaking process, as it were, before it even begins. And, as pointed out previously, the main agenda has been set by Alice. It has not been circulated prior to the meeting and so control of the agenda and progression through the points in the agenda is solely in the hands of Alice.

Thus, in the extracts below, which are the beginnings of two of the meetings, it is Alice who announces the agenda and thus influences the sensemaking process by determining what is talked about. In extract 6.1, Alice announces the points on the agenda (the points we’re going to look at) and in extract 6.2 (we begin with the content of the feedback in relation to the training sessions of the sixth and seventh September after maybe see how we can organise ourselves for the beginning of term). In so doing, Alice’s omni-relevant identity of chairperson becomes interactionally relevant and this allows her to introduce the agenda as an allowable contribution to the meeting. An omni-relevant identity can be glossed as an identity that is not relevant all the time in a given context but it is tied to an action (such as opening a meeting) that has no fixed slot in the interaction but when it is done the ‘doer’ invokes his/her omni-relevant identity (Sacks 1992 vol. 1: 313) Thus, the incumbency of the category chairperson is invoked, together with the MCD ‘the management team’ and the SRP chairperson-member which are the default (i.e. normatively expected) identities within the team and which also becomes relevant when
the identity chairperson is invoked. In short, when the ‘authorized starter’ announces the agenda and this action is aligned with through subsequent actions, then the MCD management team is talked into being and it becomes procedurally consequent to the interaction (i.e. the participants orient to the MCD management team as context and this orientation has consequences for the interaction).

Extract 6.1 (repeat of part of extract 5.2)

9 A les points qu’on va regarder
the points we're going to look at
(23) ((Alice moves out from behind her desk and sits at the round table))
10 suis en retard (9) donc er : pour er : bon moi j’ai quelques points sais
I'm late (9) so er : for er : good me I've got several points dunno
11 pas si vous avez des points mais d’après ce que vous m’avez dit lors des réunions
if you have any points but after what you told me during meetings
12 (0.2)
13 N oui
yes
14 A des diverses réunions dont on va discuter aujourd’hui donc je ne sais pas par ou on va
various meetings of which we'll speak today so I don't know where we are going to
15 commencer
start
16 N >premier point<
>first point<
17 A premier point formation des nouveaux profs
first point training of the new teachers

In extract 6.1, Alice announces: I’ve got several points dunno if you have any points but after what you told me during meetings various meetings of which we’ll speak today so I don’t know where we are going to start. Despite the fact that, according to Alice, what is going to be discussed has been based on points that have been raised in various meetings, it is, nevertheless, Alice who has decided on the agenda. In this instance, she has actually put the five or six points to be discussed on paper and she has distributed the agenda just as the participants enter the room. It is, thus, Alice who controls the main topics to be
discussed. However, she does offer some participation in the agenda-setting by allowing
the participants to decide in which order the topics are to be discussed.

Extract 6.2, which is the start of the second meeting that was recorded, follows a similar
pattern though this time no written agenda is presented to the team members.

Extract 6.2

1 A on commence par le contenu et du retour par rapport aux formations des six et sept
we begin with the content of the feedback in relation to the training sessions of the
sixth and seventh
2 septembre après peut être voir comment on peut s’organiser pour cette rentrée
September after maybe see how we can organise ourselves for the beginning
3 .hh évidemment qu’on devait le faire l’année dernière [(0.2)]
of term .hh obviously we should have done it last year [(0.2)]
4 L [oui ]
[yes]
5 A et qu’on l’a jamais fait sauf ponctuellement avant de commencer demain matin c’est pour
and we didn’t do it apart from occasionally before beginning tomorrow morning it’s for
er : lundi soir=
er: monday evening=
6 7 L =EFAP c’est pour mardi soir
=EFAP it’s for tuesday evening
8 A donc elle va t’appeler demain matin
so she’ll call you tomorrow morning
9 L non c’est pas pour le seize le prochain cours c’est le vingt-trois °il me semble°
no it’s not for the sixteenth the next lesson is the twenty third °it appears to me°
10 A donc mardi prochain c’est confirmé c’est commandé
so next tuesday it’s confirmed it’s ordered
11 L okay
okay
12 A je savais pas si tu le voulais demain soir ou [er : ] (1.0) et j’ai redemandé newsweek
I didn’t know if you wanted it tomorrow evening or [ er: ] (1.0) and I’ve asked for
newsweek
13 L [non]
[ no ]

1 The woman in the newspaper shop.
[qui] est d’abord plus facile que time donc c’est commandé (0.5) donc il faut aller le
[which] is first of all easier than time so it’s ordered (0.5) so you’ve got to
chercher avant midi mais demain si elle m’appelle je vais dire non (°  °)
fetch it before lunchtime tomorrow if she calls me I’ll say no (°  °)
donc comment voulez vous qu’on y aille pour la formation du six au sept septembre
so how do you want to deal with the training of the sixth to seventh September
Nigel il était pas là=
Nigel wasn’t there=
=ah non [nigel] il était pas là
=ah no [Nigel] wasn’t there
[j’écoute]
[I’m listening]
bon er :
good er :
vous avez beaucoup de ↑retours
you had a lot of ↑feedback
(0.5)
[yes er :]
[et je ] pense que c’est plutôt là-dessus=moi j’ai des retours j’ai quelques questionnaires
{and I } think it’s rather concerning that=me I had some feedback I have some
de satisfaction
feedback forms
((A looks down and opens a file containing the questionnaires which is on the table in
front of her))
est-ce qu’il y avait des remarques particulières
were there any particular comments
oui alors (0.2) bon des remarques particulières (. ) il y avait beaucoup des gens
yes so (0.2) good any particular comments (. ) there were many people
qui ont demandé de voir quelque chose sur l’élaboration d’une stage
who asked to see something on the elaboration of a course
In lines 1 following, Alice simply announces that: **we begin with the content of the feedback in relation to the training sessions of the sixth and seventh September after maybe see how we can organise ourselves for the beginning of term obviously we should have done it last year [(0.2)] and we didn’t do it apart from occasionally before beginning.** There is then a brief sequence (lines 5-18) in which Alice talks to Liz about buying a magazine for a particular set of lessons. Alice then opens the meeting by announcing the first point on the agenda: *so how do you want to deal with the training of the sixth to seventh September.* Thus, as with the first meeting, despite the fact that the agenda has been unilaterally decided by Alice, she makes some gestures of limited participation for the other participants allowing them to decide how exactly to deal with the topic of the training sessions. Beth begins by stating that Nigel was not present which is confirmed by Alice in the next turn. Nigel states that he will listen. Beth then self-selects to begin a turn (line 22) which is prefaced by *good er:* which projects further talk. However, Alice does not acknowledge this first turn construction unit which projects further talk and she self-selects to ask if *you had a lot of ↑feedback* (line 24). She, thus, orients to Beth as not having the right to initiate the first topic on the agenda despite having asked: *so how do you want to deal with the training of the sixth to seventh September.* After a slight pause Beth begins to provide a response to this *yes er:* (line 25). However, Alice self-selects at the same time and, despite the fact that her TCU projects further talk, Beth cedes the floor and displays orientation to Alice’s right to control topic development. In this way, Alice stops Beth from developing her utterance and so developing topic in potential competition to Alice’s topic. Beth, line 29, then asks, *were there any particular comments* and so confirms Alice’s topic of the feedback forms as the topic to be attended to. Alice has the files on the table in front of her and orients to them by looking down and opening the file. Thus, in sum, in this instance, not only does Alice announce the main topic on the agenda but, despite asking how the team members want to deal with the issue, she in fact initiates the first topic: ‘feedback’. She does this by displaying no acknowledgement of Beth’s turn prefices that project further talk and so she keeps topic control in her hands despite her claims to the contrary.
6.3 Topic closing: the use of formulations

The omni-relevance of the identity chairperson also becomes relevant when closing down the main topics on Alice’s agenda. Since the closing of topic has no special slot, it is Alice, incumbent of the situated identity chairperson and discourse identity of mediator of talk, who decides when it is appropriate to close topic. The category-bound right to close topic can be important in terms of influencing the sense making process since it stops the talk on a particular topic and thus can be used to ‘fix’ the meaning of the talk-so-far. This can be done through using a formulation of the talk-so-far as a pre-closing device which is then followed by a topic closure and a shift in topic which serves to fix the meaning of the talk-so-far. The chairperson thus has, as it were, the last word in fixing the meaning of the talk-so-far.

6.3.1 Formulations

Formulations, as Drew (2003) points out, have varying forms and functions according the setting in which they occur. However, following Heritage and Watson (1979), they can be defined as characterizing a state of affairs that has already been described or negotiated in whole or in part in the preceding talk. Formulations are extremely important in the negotiation of intersubjective (organisational) reality as they characterise the state of affairs already formulated or negotiated in the talk-so-far and thus fix the meaning of the talk. Moreover, formulations occur as adjacency pairs which make receipts of the formulation a conditionally relevant action in the next turn. The preferred form of such receipts is that of agreement since to disagree could potentially terminate the talk in order to find a new understanding of what the talk-so-far has been about or it may challenge the formulator’s capacity and competence in summing up. Furthermore, formulations are implicative of topic closure since “the provision of formulations to mark newly arrived-at understanding of gist may, in turn, become a way to terminate talk to some topic prefatory to the establishment to some new topic-at-hand or indeed the termination of the conversation as a whole. In this respect, formulations may work to give a “signature” to a section of topical talk” (Heritage and Watson 1979: 151).
6.3.2 Formulations and topic closure

In the extract below Alice uses a formulation to fix meaning and close topic (indicated by an arrow, lines 31 and 44).

Extract 6.3

1 A autre chose pour la formation

anything else for the training

2 N oui je pense que ça serait intéressant quand même de reprendre cette idée de

yes I think that it would be interesting all the same to pick up again this idea of

fiche technique (0.2) mais qu’on pourrait rajouter compétences au moins fournir à

a technical form (0.2) but we could add skills at least give each

3 chaque nouveau professeur une fiche à remplir et faire contresigner [non] pas uniquement

new teacher a form to fill in and be signed = not

4 L [oui]

[yes]

5 N pour l’aspect technique labo² valiphone³ et ce [tera] c’est important mais aussi pour les

for the technical aspect labo valiphone etc [tera] it’d important but also for the

6 L [uhu]

7 N compétences donc même si c’est un quart d’heure de contact >c’est un quart d’heure de

skills so even if there is a quarter of an hour’s contact > it’s a quarter of an hour’s

8 contact< il a appris comment faire un enregistrement er er : il a compris comment

contact< he’s learned how to do a recording er er : he’s understood how

9 faire une page web et transformer en exercice [ça] c’est les compétences des micro-
to do a webpage and to transform into exercises [it’s] the skills the micro

10 L [uhu]

11 N compétences qu’on transfore et qui doivent être notées quelque part sinon c’est c’est parti

skills that we transfer and that must be noted somewhere otherwise it’s it’s lost

12 en l’air

in thin air

13 (0.3)

14 L oui [ je pense que c’est]

yes [ I think that it’s]

15 N [ par exemple :] comment faire = c’est intéressant de noté que ce professeur

² Labo = language laboratory
³ The valiphone is a teaching tool that is used to simulate telephone calls.
[for example::] how to do=it’s interesting to note that this teacher

now knows that there are PowerPoint exercises that he knows that it is available to
disposition ça ça ça doit être noter quelque part (0.6) une sorte de passeport vers la er :
him that that must be noted somewhere (0.6) a sort of passport towards the er :
((N looks into middle distance))

compétence [un passeport de compétence]

[un passeport de compétence] et er : [chaque (   )]
[a passport to competence] and er: [each (   )]

[un passeport de compétence] et er :
[en ce moment] c’est uniquement pour
[in that case] it’s only for the

les nouveaux [prof’s]

new [teachers]

[non ] non pour tout le monde pour tout le monde je pense que c’est une idée
[no] no for everybody for everybody I think that it’s an idea
qui fera boule de neige [pourquoi pas]
that will snowball [why not]

Mandy était la dernière personne que j’ai vu avec ça
Mandy was the last person I saw with that

Mandy †était
Mandy †was

(0.3)

était la dernière depuis ça >[moi]< j’ai pas continué puisque depuis mais er :
was the last since then >[me]< I’ve not continued since but er:

[ .hh]
[ .hh]

(0.3)

donc il faut reprendre des fiches de compétences
so it’s necessary to pick up again the skills forms

on reprend les fiches techniques
we’ll pick up again the technical forms

.hhh mais peut être rajouter des choses (0.2) PowerPoint
.hhh but maybe add stuff (0.2) PowerPoint

34 A oui [parce que c’est pas à jour]
   yes [ because it’s not up to date]

35 N rajouter PowerPoint rajouter] email rajouter création des exercices rajouter les
   [add PowerPoint add       ] email add creating exercises add the
tenses for example (.) add er

36 temps par exemple (.) rajouter er :

37 L des choses [(° °)]
   stuff [(° °)]

38 N [je pense que]c’est uniquement par ce biais qu’on va réussir à officialiser
   [I think that ] it is only in this way that we are going to officialise
   (0.5)

39 A d’accord fiches techniques moi je vais essayer de les localiser (0.2) c’est peut être dans
   okay technical forms me I’m going to try to find them (0.2) it’s maybe in
   un dossier ISO quelque ↑part [il y] a une photocopie quelque ↑part
   an ISO file some↑where there’s a photocopy some↑where

40 N £oui£
   [Yes£]

41 L moi j’ai un document dans mon bureau
   me I have a document in my office
   £oui£

42 N [oui]
   [oui]

43 L A donc à ce moment là il faut que jevoie la fiche pour la mettre à jour que l’on transforme
   so in that case it’s necessary that I see the form to up date it so that we transform it
   et on donne aux nouveaux profs [début] septembre [pour] voir si on peut l’étendre
   and we give it to the new teachers [beginning of September I to] see if we can extend it

44 N [oui]
   [oui]

45 A d’accord
   okay

46 N oui
   yes

47 A bon autre chose sur la formation (0.2) non (0.3) toi Liz c’est bon donc ressources
   good anything else for the training (0.2) no (0.3) you Liz it’s good so teaching
   pédagogiques
   materials

In line 31, Alice, prefaces her turn with ‘so’ which announces the upshot of the talk-so-far
and, as previously stated, this formulation makes a display of recipiency conditionally
relevant in the next turn. In this case, Nigel, as principal author of the talk-so-far (discussed in more detail below), repeats the utterance and so hearably agrees with Alice’s previous turn. Having fixed the meaning of the talk-so-far, the topic can now be closed. However, retrospectively, the topic is considered as ‘live’ and the formulation is oriented to as being incomplete because, in a third turn, Liz seeks to add to the formulation by suggesting (line 33) .hhh but maybe add stuff (0.2) PowerPoint. This recycles the topic of ‘the fiches techniques’ for the next few turns. Alice then attempts another formulation, again prefaced by ‘so’, which again gives the upshot of the talk-so-far (line 44: so in that case it’s necessary that I see the form to update it so that we transform it and we give it to the new teachers [begin]ning of September [to] see if we can extend it okay). As with the prior formulation, she receives a conditionally relevant next turn in the form of explicit agreement from Nigel (line 48: yes). However, this time, she closes down the topic and so has the ability to fix the meaning of the talk-so-far and so fix the gist of the team’s version of prospective future reality. The formulation and agreement then retrospectively becomes part of a closing sequence. They have provided a means through which a collaborative understanding of the upshot of the talk has been displayed and so the topic can now be accountably closed. Alice prefaces her next turn with ‘good’ which, as Button (1991) states, can be hearable as an assessment which initiates a close of topic. Topic closure is indeed provided by Alice: she continues her turn and she then begins a move to closure by using a topic initial elicitor ‘anything else’ which, as Button and Casey (1984) point out, is used to signal continued availability for talk but does not proffer a particular topic and if no topic is forthcoming then closing can be carried out. In this case, nobody seeks to introduce another topic and Alice closes the topic of ‘passeports de compétence’ and selects the new topic: ‘teaching materials’.

In sum: formulations work to establish the outcome of the sensemaking and this may be category-bound to incumbents of certain identities. As Heritage and Watson (1979: 150) note, “the importance of this role [meaning fixing] for formulations may be noted in the institutionalized distribution of rights to formulate, which may be held by chairperson, judges, and the like”. Consequently, for a topic to be closed, and to be seen to be accountably closed so that the business in hand can be seen to be accountably performed, it has to be done by the chairperson. Since formulations are implicative of topic closure
they are also category-bound to ‘authorised topic closers’. Thus, in the data presented
above, it is Alice who is oriented to as having the right to close topic and thus as also
having the right to move to topic closure through the use of formulations.
Furthermore, formulations are an important discursive resource with which influence can
be achieved because, according to Heritage and Watson (1979: 129), they have three
central properties: preservation, deletion and transformation. These properties can be
used to preserve, delete or transform the voices of the participants in the sensemaking
process and so fix the formulator’s version of organisational reality rather than the
version presented by others. When the data discussed above is given more intra-textual
context, through analyzing lines 1-30 of extract 6.3, Alice’s formulation of the gist of the
talk can be seen to have deleted the voice of other participants. She uses formulation as a
precursor to closing that deletes alternative versions of organisational reality and shapes
the gist of the talk-so-far so that it suits her.
In line 1, Alice uses her category-bound right to ‘do’ a pre-closing. She begins a move to
close topic as indicated by the use of a topic initial elicitor (anything else for the
↑training) and Nigel introduces the topic of ‘fiches techniques’. In lines 5-17, Nigel takes
an extend turn to suggest that the ‘fiches techniques’ should be reintroduced. In line 17,
when he arrives at what, retrospectively, is the end of his turn, he hesitates (er: ). As he
hesitates, he looks into the middle distance and averts gaze from any of the participants
which, as Goodwin (1987: 117) points out, is symptomatic of searching for a word rather
than inviting a participant to take part in the word search. However, despite the averted
gaze, Alice provides a candidate word. In doing so, she collaboratively co-authors the
turn-in-progress with Nigel and specifically aligns with Nigel’s idea. Nigel then ratifies
the candidate word search in a third turn by aligning with it and by repeating it in his next
turn (line 19: ‘passeport de compétence’). At the end of this TCU, Nigel begins with an
increment (and er: ) but when he hesitates, Alice self-selects to begin turn in competition
with Nigel’s continuing turn. Nigel drops out and Alice takes the floor to suggest that in
that case it’s only for the new teachers. Nigel immediately repairs (line 22: no no for
everybody for everybody). However, before the repair is confirmed or contested in a third
turn, Liz takes the floor and initiates a stepwise transition in topic away from the issue of
whether the passeport de compétence should be for everybody or just the new teachers to
the topic of when the *passeport de compétence* was last used (lines: 24-28). Consequently, the issue of who the *passeports* are intended for is left in the balance. Since there is no repair, alignment, or disalignment, there is a potential for a breakdown of intersubjectivity that could lead to a breakdown in the authoring of a team version of prospective organisational reality. However, since the disagreement as to whether the *passeport de compétence* is for the new teachers only or for all the teachers is left temporarily unresolved. Resolution of the disagreement is delayed until later on in the sequence when it is dealt with by means of a formulation of the upshot of the talk-so-far which fixes the gist of the talk so far in Alice’s favour.

Thus, in line 31, as already discussed, Alice prefaces her turn with ‘so’ which announces the gist of the talk-so-far (*so it’s necessary to pick up again the passeport de compétence*). Nigel confirms this in the next turn. There then follows a sequence in which the exact content of the *passeport de compétence* is discussed. Alice then formulates the gist of the talk-so-far again (line 44: *so in that case it’s necessary that I see the form to update it so that we transform it and we give it to the new teachers [begin]ning of September [to] see if we can extend it okay*). When Alice formulates, she deletes Nigel’s idea of having the ‘*passeport*’ for everybody and states that “*we give it to the new teachers [begin]ning of September [to] see if we can extend it okay*”. She, thus, deletes Nigel’s voice and transforms it into a ‘wait and see what happens’ rather than a concrete decision for the future. Secondly, she preserves Liz’s idea (co-authored by herself and Nigel) of updating the form. She completes her turn, with ‘*okay*’ which underlines the conditional relevance of agreement in the next turn which she receives from Nigel. She is then able to close topic. In this way, Alice’s category-bound access to topic closure and formulations, which are implicative of topic closure, means that Alice can fix her meaning and impose this on the team.

Thus, not only does the chairperson have the category-bound right to close down topic but, by means of formulations which act as topic pre-closures, the chair can also delete, insert or modify the meaning of the talk-so-far and once this meaning has been confirmed they can then close down the topic and initiate another topic. In this way, the chairperson can influence the creation of an intersubjective version of organizational reality by fixing meanings of the talk-so-far and preventing further discussion of the topics.
6.4 Team-members’ ability to introduce and close topic

The discursive ability to open and close topic is not only in the hands of the chairperson as authorized topic opener and closer. The team members also have at their disposal the discursive ability to open and close topics. However, this potential is not available for the main themes on the agenda that Alice has set. The other participants are limited to incremental changes of topic within the main topics that have already been announced in the agenda. Consequently, they are less able to influence the sensemaking process because only Alice is able to initiate and close the broader themes. Nevertheless, the team members do have access to discursive resources that enable them to initiate and close topic and so influence the sensemaking process.

6.4.1 Stepwise transition

One way of introducing and closing topic that is open to the team members is stepwise transition. As Sacks (1992 vol. 2: 566) points out, this involves connecting with the previous turn in such a way that the new topic does not appear to have been introduced but the new topic being discussed is very different from the one at the start. Moreover, if stepwise transition allows a shift to a new topic this necessarily involves as step away from the previous topic. Thus, as can be seen in the following extract, access to stepwise transition is one way of opening and closing topics that is available to the team members and this allows subordinates to introduce topics that are presented as triggered by the previous topic and thus allows them an opportunity to challenge the ‘doing’ of influence by Alice’s category-bound access to opening and closing the main items on the agenda and her access to turn mediation.

Extract 6.4

1 A ça de tout façon je sais les formations qui sont des formations nouveaux profs quand un
   that in any case I know the training sessions that are training new teachers when a

2 prof quand on a des nouveaux professeurs ça doit continuer = [moi j’en fait] sur le
   teacher when we have new teachers that must continue = [me I do that] on the
   [“oui d’accord”]
   [“yes okay”]

3 L

103
4 A valiphone pas mal (0.6) j’en ai fait trois sur le valiphone au cours de l’année mais (.) ça doit valiphone a bit (0.6) I did three on the valiphone during the course of last year (.) that must
5 continuer au moins ponctuellement en formation pour les nouveaux profs = continue at least occasionally for training of the new teachers=
6 B = oui mais c’est=’est des choses différentes pour les nouveaux professeurs ?[ (0.3)] il y a =yes but it’s=’it’s a different thing for the new teachers [0.3] there’s
7 A [voilà] [that’s it]
8 B une partie [technique] =qu’on fait toujours ç’est bon c’est facile enfin er : voilà a part [technical] = that we always do it’s good it’s easy well er : there you are
9 L [technique] voilà [technical] that’s it
10 A ((nod))
11 N ce qui manque c’est une formation sur les micro-compétences (.) se présenter devant what’s missing is a training on micro-skills (.) presenting yourself in front of
12 un tableau noir [(.) .hh] écrire pas n’importe où mais d’une façon structurée (.) par a blackboard [(.) .hh ] not writing anywhere but in a structured way (.) for
13 A [uhu : ]
14 N exemple er : présenter un point donné [uh :: ] vocabulaire (0.2) trois méthodes pour example er : presenting a certain point [uh ::: ] vocabulary (0.2) three methods for
15 L [oui] [yes]
16 N apprendre le vocabulaire learning vocabulary

In lines 1 following, Alice, Beth and Liz are talking about the training of new teachers concerning the topic of ‘technical training’ (i.e. how to use the language laboratory, the computer assisted language learning programs and so on). In line 11, Nigel carries out a stepwise transition in topic: he ties his turn to the previous talk and introduces the topic of training on micro-skills and so effects a topic transition away from ‘technical’ training to training about the micro-skills. There is no stark contrast in topic transition but he ties his change in topic to a theme in previous talk (training) and introduces a new aspect to training, in this case the need for training on micro-skills. In contrast to the chairperson, he is unable to close down the previous topic by formulating the gist of the topic or ‘officially closing it down’ through the use of explicit topic closure but he is able to link
his talk to the previous turn and at the same time effect a shift in topic. In this way, the
team-members can also introduce topics or in sensemaking terms ‘do’ noticing and so
contribute to the sensemaking process.
A similar instance of stepwise transition is explicated in the following extract:

Extract 6.5

1 A ou alors si tu trouves un site internet qui a une variété d’articles et qui est raisonnable
   or well if you find an internet site which has a variety of articles and which is reasonable
2 be :h à ce point là on paiera l’abonnement pour ce magazine là
   be :h in that case we’ll pay for a subscription to that magazine
3 (0.5)
4 N pendant que nous sommes sur la question d’abonnement er : <est-ce que nous sommes
   while we are on the subject of subscriptions er : <are we
5 abonnés à des revues ↓professionnelles>
   subscribed to professional ↓magazines>
6 A c’est-à-dire
   meaning
7 N est-qu’on est abonné à IATEFL et puis er : [les] journaux professionnelles=
   are we subscribed to IATEFL and so er : [the] professional magazines=
8 A [non]
   [ no ]
9 A = SI il y en a certain qui arrivent ( .) mais c’est d’une façon très erratique ça arrive de
   = YES there are some that arrive ( .) but it’s in a very erratic way it arrives from time
10 temps en temps (0.2) il faudrait qu’on regard ( .) je pense pas qu’on a un abonnement
   to time (0.2) we need to look into it ( .) I don’t think that we have a subscription
11 car quand ils arrivent c’est en promotion et er :
   because when they arrive it’s a special offer and er :

In the talk prior to this extract, the team have been discussing the possibility of
subscribing to a Spanish magazine or news web-site which could be used as teaching
material. In lines 1 and 2, Alice comes to what is retrospectively the end of the topic. At
the end of her turn, there is a 0.5 second pause. Nigel orients to this as being nothing
more to say on the subject and carries out a stepwise transition in topic which stays with
the topic of subscriptions but shifts from subscribing to a Spanish magazine to
subscribing to a professional magazine. In the following lines, the team then orientsto
subscription to a professional magazine as topic and so shifts from the topic of subscribing to a Spanish magazine.

### 6.5 Topic development

As previously explicated, the chairperson has the category-bound right to initiate and close topics that form the main topics on the agenda as defined by Alice at the opening of the meeting. However, the chairperson also has a right to mediate turns and so manage topic development. In other words, the chairperson has the ability to control the floor which allows him/her to exert a greater influence on the sensemaking process since control of the floor (who speaks to whom when and on what subject) restricts access to sensemaking procedures.

#### 6.5.1 Turn allocation

Alice, as chairperson, has primary rights to allocate turns. This is because, as Sacks et al. (1974: 713) point out, when there are more than three people present there is the possibility of schismatic talk (i.e. two ‘conversations’ going on simultaneously whereby A is speaking to B and C is speaking to D). In order to avoid this and to ensure a common focus, some form of turn mediation or turn allocation may be required (Atkinson 1982). One way of dealing with the possibility of schism is to have some kind of turn mediation whereby turns are allocated by a chairperson who has the moral right/duty to allocate turns. Failure to properly allocate turns and to let the meeting develop into a ‘free for all’ would become sanctionable since the chairperson is morally accountable for ensuring that the meeting is seen to be properly and legitimately ‘done’. The omni-relevance of

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4 I use the expression primary rights since, as Sacks et al. (1974) point out, meetings are half way on a continuum between formal interaction and conversation and thus, as various researchers (e.g. Boden 1994: 99; Kangasharju 1996: 308; Huismann 2001: 144) have demonstrated, less formal business meetings can move from a pre-allocated system of turn-taking to conversational turn-taking procedures on a turn-by-turn basis. Thus, in my data, there are times when Alice, as chairperson, has control of turns yet there are other times when turn allocation is done by other participants. The expression primary rights is intended to convey the idea that turn allocation is not an either/or issue but some negotiation of turn allocation is present.
chairperson is thus again invoked since the action of allocating turns at talk is accountably a predicate of the incumbent of the identity chairperson. Thus, when turns are allocated and accepted in the next turn as recognition that Alice is doing turn allocation, then the identity chairperson is invoked. This invokes the viewer’s maxim (Sacks 1986: 338) whereby:

“if a member sees a category-bound activity being done, then, if one can see it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is bound, then: See it that way. The viewer’s maxim is another relevance rule in that it proposes that for an observer of a category-bound activity the category to which the activity is bound has a special relevance for the formulating an identification of its doer”

Thus when Alice allocates turns and this is accepted and unchallenged, reflexively her identity as chairperson is talked into being and becomes procedurally consequent to the interaction.

6.5.2 Turn mediation: question and answer adjacency pairs

Turn mediation is partly achieved through adjacency pairs. As Heritage (1984: 247) says, “the first speaker’s production of a first pair part proposes that a second speaker should relevantly produce a second pair part which is accountably ‘due’ immediately on completion of the first”. Adjacency pairs can be used to control the topic development by restricting second-pair parts to topics that the turn-mediator has already initiated. Thus, category-bound rights to mediate talk can be used to control the sensemaking process through controlling what gets noticed. Furthermore, access to the first part of an adjacency pair is a doubly powerful discourse resource because not only does it constrain the actions of the recipient but it also gives the first speaker access to a third slot. As Sacks et al. (1974: 717) note:

“although they [answers] are addressed to specific parties – namely, the authors of preceding questions – answers do not select those parties to speak next, because they do not project and require the subsequent performance of an activity by them. Accordingly, if the recipients of questions confine themselves to answering, next turns are left to be allocated through self-selection.”
Furthermore, as Sacks et al. (ibid: 712) also point out, a ‘last as next’ preference is in operation so that the speaker just prior to the current speaker generally has access to the next turn. Therefore, not only does category-bound access to the first part of a pair give the turn-mediator control of what can coherently be said in the second part as an answer but it also provides them with a possibility to take the floor after a minimally complete answer with a third positioned item, or a next question. The third turn can be used to assess the adequacy of the second turn and to carry out repair. Consequently, access to the first position and subsequent access to the third slot can be used not only to dictate topic development but also to judge the adequacy of such responses. Thus, as will be seen later, Alice’s right as chairman to mediate talk also allows her greater influence since it allows her to control topic and to evaluate responses through the use of adjacency pairs.

6.5.3 Interruption

Interruption refers to a subset of overlapping talk that is treated as problematic in some way by the participants (Schegloff 2000 and 2002). Whether some newly starting talk in overlap is interruption or not is therefore an issue for the participants and not the researcher. Speakers recognize that the onset of their turn may be interruptive by the use of such expression as ‘excuse me’, ‘wait a minute’ and so on. This also has a moral dimension linked with allowable and expectable contributions to the talk in terms of who has the right to interrupt who and under what circumstances this action may be performed. Interruption, as a subset of overlapping talk, can therefore be useful in controlling topic development since it can be used to effectively deny the right of another speaker to complete their turn-in-progress. Hutchby (1996a: 85) calls this process of using interruption to hinder the speaker’s development of topic ‘reining back’. Consequently, interruption can control topic development and so restrict the sensemaking process in a meeting to topics decided upon by the mediator of talk or chairperson.

6.5.4 Analysis

In the following extract, which comes about two minutes after Alice has introduced the topic of the training of new teachers, Beth notices a phenomenon: a lack in the existing
software\textsuperscript{5} for the teachers to use. However, coming to a team/intersubjective version of what this means for the organization and deciding how to deal with the issue is not an egalitarian process. Alice, as chairman, has access to more ‘powerful’ discursive resources and so can manage the interaction so that she has most influence in the process of negotiation of organizational reality. Sequentially, she has the right to mediate the talk and uses this to shape and control the authoring of organizational reality by mediating turns at talk through the use of question and answer adjacency pairs, repair and interruptions. On the other hand, the senior teachers have the knowledge of what is going on and are held accountable for displaying it in response to Alice’s questions. There is an asymmetry of knowledge: the boss not having ‘hands-on’ knowledge and the senior teachers having such knowledge. By jointly authoring ‘what the team knows’, and guided by Alice, a joint authoring of the significance of ‘what is going on’ or organizational reality is arrived at.

**Question and answer adjacency pairs**

In the following extract, Alice makes use of question and answer adjacency pairs (signaled by arrows in the text) to control and assess the talk.

Extract 6.6 (full text)

1. B: et je ne sais pas à quel point c’est utile. = and I don’t know to what point it’s useful. =
2. ?
   - oui. = yes.
3. A =((nodding)) (je)
4. B =((nodding)) (I)
5. >par contre si on ne fait pas et moi je pense(rais) que c’est = if we don’t and me I (would) think that it’s =

\textsuperscript{5} In the past, the company has used its own in-house computer assisted language learning software (multi-quest, multi-magic and questor). These programs were then integrated into one global software package, e-learning, but there have been some problems with its implementation.
A: [>°non.°<]
   [>°no.°<]
B: =plutôt pas ((gazes to Alice)) la peine,< [e::h ]
   =rather not ((gazes to Alice)) worth it,< [e::h ]
A: [>°uhum je suis d’accord,°<]
   [>°uhum I agree,°<]
B: =eh donc il faudrait qu’il y ait suffisamment de matériel sur les
   =eh so it’s necessary to have enough material on the
ordinateurs pour que: eh (.) ils [cliquent sur le multi-magic enfin=
computers so that eh (.) they [click on multi-magic or
A: [mais-]
   [but-]
B: =multi-quest >etcetera< et les exercices soient là.° autrement il y a rien.°=
multi-quest >etcetera< and the exercises are there.° otherwise there is
nothing.°
A: =>attends ↑ quand on va sur multi-magic sur l’ordinateur,=
   =>wait ↑ when we go on multi-magic on the computer,=
B: =multi-magic c’est bon, mais [multi-quest]
multi-magic it’s alright, but [multi-quest]
B: [( ])
A: [mais multi- ] magic il y a pas de ↑ problème
   [but with multi-magic there is no ↑ problem
L: non il y a pas de problème la
   no there is no problem there
B: multi-magic il y a que ça=
multi-magic there’s only that=
A: =oui alors et multi-quest [n’existe ↑ plus ] ((gazes at N))
   = yes so and multi-quest [doesn’t exist ↑ any more ] ((gazes at N))
B: [et les scolaires] quand ils faisaient la °grammaire ( )°
   [and the school kids] when they did °grammar ( )°
N: [((shakes head))]
A: multi-quest n’existe ↑ plus ((gaze at N))
   multi-quest no longer ↑ exists ((gaze at N))
N: [((shakes head))]
B: [ il y a plus rien ] d’autre
   [there’s nothing] else
A: ↑ pourquoi ((gaze to N))
In lines 1-9, Beth puts forward a version of what is ‘wrong’ in the teacher training concerning the software programs. She then formulates the upshot of this (in lines 9 ff.) as regards the software package ‘multi-quest’. However, in line 13, Alice uses ‘wait’ as a way of not giving a preferred response to Beth’s formulation concerning multi-quest and of suggesting that Beth’s formulation is in some way incomplete and requiring more explanation. She then reintroduces the topic of multi-magic in the second part of the turn (↑when we go on multi-magic on the computer). However, Liz latches a turn onto Alice’s turn and confirms Beth’s utterance that multi-magic ‘is alright’ she then adds an increment to the turn prefaced by ‘but [multi-]quest’ which prefaces a shift in topic away from Alice’s topic of multi-magic. However, before Liz completes the trajectory of her turn, Alice overlaps and brings the topic back to multi-magic (line 16: [but with multi-magic there is no ↑ problem]). This sets up a question and answer adjacency pair.
which makes an answer conditionally relevant and thus also constrains topic since the reply has to be relevant to the question’s topic. The members’ orientation to the SRP team member/chairperson which is generated by differing states of knowledge and which is made relevant as both Beth and Liz provide a conditionally relevant second turn in response to the question thus indicates that they have both have the right to display the required knowledge and so claim co-incumbency of the identity ‘team-member’. First (line 17), Liz states, *no there is no problem there* and then Beth self-selects to state that, *multi-magic there’s only that*. More specifically, Beth and Liz’s display of co-incumbency of the identity team member in relation to the chairperson/team member SRP takes the form of a buttress whereby the utterance is designed to “reinforce the point of a co-team member’s utterance directed to another party. It does this by ‘adding’ further material onto the utterance which serves to specify or emphasis its point” (Francis 1986: 70). In this way, both Liz and Beth co-author a response to Alice’s question and so jointly provide a conditionally relevant second turn. Since the second turn of Beth and Liz does not select a next speaker, the ‘last as next’ preference means that Alice can self-select as next speaker and she uses the third turn to assess Liz and Beth’s response as adequate and to shift topic as explicated in extract 6.7 below:

Extract 6.7 (part of extract 6.6)

18 B multi-magic il y a que ça=  
*multi-magic there’s only that*=

19 A oui alors et multi-quest [n’existe ↑plus ] ((gazes at N))  
= *yes so and multi-quest [doesn’t exist any ↑ more ] ((gazes at N))*

20 B [et les scolaires ] quand ils faisaient °grammaire ( )°  
[and the school kids] when they did °grammar ( )°

21 N [((shakes head))]

22 A multi–quest n’existe ↑plus ((gaze at N))  
*multi-quest no longer ↑exists ((gaze at N))*

23 N [((shakes head))]  

24 B [ il y a plus rien ]d’autre  
[there’s nothing] else
In line 18, Alice treats ‘that’ as the end of Beth’s turn and she self-selects to change topic. Alice prefaces her turn with ‘yes’ which acknowledges the prior topic but then she effects a shift to multi-quest again setting up control of topic via a question and answer adjacency pair which by gaze she addresses to Nigel (Goodwin 1987). However, (line 20) Beth continues her turn and overlaps Alice’s turn at what would not normally be considered a TRP. Beth continues the turn which she had started in line 18 (multi-magic there’s only that) and which now she retrospectively treats as being incomplete. She does this by adding an increment, prefaced by ‘and’, to her prior turn. This is, therefore, hearable as a continuation of her previous turn at talk (line 18) and it displays her orientation to Alice’s intervening talk as interruptive of her now retrospectively incomplete turn. Beth uses this turn to carry out a stepwise shift in topic to the ‘school kids’. However, despite the fact that the talk was produced in overlap, Nigel responds to Alice’s question addressed to him via her gaze and not to Beth’s intervening talk. He responds non-verbally, by shaking his head, because at the same time Beth is completing her turn and so he avoids overlapping talk yet he is still able to provide a response to Alice. However, when Beth arrives at completion, signaled by a softer voice, Alice self-selects to repeat her question (line 22: multi-quest no longer exists). In this way, she skip-connects (Sacks 1992 vol.1: 349) to her previous turn and does not address Beth’s immediately prior turn which would confirm a stepwise change in topic to Beth’s topic of the school kids. This has the effect of recycling her turn and ignoring Beth’s turn and so fighting off overlapping talk so that the topic remains that of multi-quest and not the school kids (Schegloff 2000). Alice’s meditation of turns, which refocuses on the topic of her choice, is confirmed by Nigel who provides a conditionally relevant second by shaking his head (line 23). As previously, this response is provided non-verbally since simultaneously Beth has self-started to provide a second (line 24: there’s nothing else) to Alice’s question. Again, as previously explicated, following a second part of an adjacency pair, the last as next rule means that Alice has access to a third turn. Alice then takes the floor again and mediates talk so as to control topic development and, holding the team members morally accountable for ‘knowledge’ concerning what is going on, asks ‘why’ [have the exercises not been up-dated].
As Alice asks the question she directs her eye gaze at Nigel thus selecting him as next speaker but Liz (line 27) also self-starts. This indexes the fact that Nigel and Liz are making the co-incumbency of the identity ‘team member’ relevant since Liz demonstrably orients to the fact that she has the knowledge that can provide a conditionally relevant answer to Alice’s question and that she is morally entitled to provide an answer. However, she drops out and leaves the floor to Nigel who provides a response in the second turn ([because all] the data bank [which] existed (. all the exercises which were there er : <are no longer> there>).

Resisting the question and answer adjacency pairs: laughter
Alice considers this response to be incomplete in someway and asks for further details but Nigel’s responds to this by treating it as a laughable and so contests Alice’s ability to control the interaction through the use of question and answer adjacency pairs.

Extract 6.9 (part of extract 6.6)
In line 29, Alice, then, asks “and where are they”. Nigel begins a turn in response to this question but it is interspersed with laughter particles and then finishes in laughter without the utterance coming to syntactic completion. The laughter indexes the fact that he treats the disappearance of the software and/or Alice’s question as a laughable and in this way, Nigel is able to contest Alice’s control of the interaction through the question and answer adjacency pairs. As Jefferson (1979: 80) points out, laughter acts as an invitation to other participants to also laugh and it is in this response that participants display their understanding of the laughter. However, Alice now faces a dilemma: if she laughs with Nigel she shows affiliation and in fact laughs at herself and if she does not laugh, she displays a lack of affiliation with Nigel which could affect their status as team members. Alice resolves this dilemma by giving a pseudo-laugh (Lavin and Maynard 2001: 466), which is an utterance delivered with a smile voice which Buttney (2001: 317) describes as involving “a markedly higher pitch and an intonational contour comparable to laughing during speaking but without any laughter tokens” and which can be used to respond to prior laughter but it avoids giving complete affiliation. The first part of Alice’s turn is produced with a smile voice which recognizes her question as a laughable (Line: 31: £ it appears to be perhaps a stupid question£). Thus by taking a turn which involves self-laughter, Alice transforms laughing at to laughing with (Glenn 1995: 51 ff.). The smile voice then gives way to laughter and she shifts topic with ‘anyway’ which is a technique for the termination of the relevance of laughter Jefferson (1979: 93). However,
as she takes her turn, Alice is overlapped by Beth who extends the laugh by re-invoking the laughable and by ending her turn by laughing. (line 32: *I hope they're not in the dustbin* heh HEH huh huh). This, as Glenn (1995: 45) points out, reinforces the orientation to laughing at but this time the laughable is treated as the disappearance of the software rather than Alice’s question. Nigel prefaces his following turn by laughing and so he aligns with Beth. Thus, so far, by orienting to Alice’s question and to the disappearance of the software as a laughable, Nigel and later Beth have avoided providing a relevant second part to Alice’s question and so have resisted her control of the interaction through the use of question and answer adjacency pairs.

However, after the laugh at the beginning of his turn (line 34) Nigel changes footing and moves from treating Alice’s question or the disappearance of the software as a laughable to providing a conditionally relevant second (i.e. a serious response that does not treat the topic or the question as a laughable). Nigel, thus, states that, *no they are there somewhere* (.)* but they didn’t transfer automatically on* [ ( )]. In this way, he does not take his challenge of Alice’s right to mediate turns through question and answer adjacency pairs to its bitter end by provoking a complete disalignment.

**Interruptions**

The same extract now continues but control of the interaction through question and answer adjacency pairs is supplanted by the use of interruption (indicated by arrows in the text).

Extract 6.10 (continuation of 6.6)

34 N u hhe ha .hhh non ils sont la quelque part (. ) mais ils se reconvertissaient pas

*a hhe ha .hhh no they are there somewhere (. ) but they didn’t transfer*

35 automatiquement sur [ ( )]

*automatically on* [ ( )]

36 B [non il faut faire un travail] [( )] logicielles

*[no it needs a lot of work]* [ ( )] software

37 ➔ A [non non mais attends]

*[no no but wait]*

38 A [c’est] Peter [qui] doit faire ça=
In line 34, Nigel takes a turn in response to Alice’s question concerning the whereabouts of the software. Beth takes a turn which overlaps Nigel’s but which is not oriented to as interruption and which is hearable as bolstering and upgrading Nigel’s turn in progress. However, when Beth arrives at a TRP, Alice overlaps to stop the turn in progress (line 37: no no but wait). Contrary to Beth’s overlapping talk, Alice orients to her own turn as an interruption since through choice of lexis (‘but wait’) she clearly marks the utterance out as designed to stop the turn-in-progress. Since the turn is spoken in overlap, part of Beth’s turn-in-progress is untranscribable and when she arrives at the end of her turn she cedes the floor to Alice and thus acquiesces to the ‘interruption’. In so doing, one of the actions that Alice performs is to control topic development. This right to mediate talk and to interrupt thus allows Alice to control topic development by assessing what Beth has said so far and repairing it. Thus, through not allowing Beth to continue her turn, Alice is able to prevent Beth’s full involvement in the talk since if she allows Beth to continue her turn this might lead to a stepwise transition of topic away from the issue of the work that, as Alice interprets it, should be done on the software. Therefore, if Alice wants to make a contribution she has to tie it to the previous topic and she has to overlap since if she waits for the end of the turn the topic may have shifted and she may not get an opportunity space to repair what has been said. She therefore places an interruption and repair as close to the repairable as possible since any next turn, unless otherwise provided for, is addressed to the prior turn in talk. Consequently, if Alice does not place her repair here, she may not get an opportunity later and the topic may shift.
Repair therefore is also used to control topic. In this way, potentially divergent understandings in talk are not left unresolved but Alice interrupts in order to deal with disagreement rather than ‘letting it go’. In this way she seeks to continue topic-talk until a consensual understanding of the topic emerges in talk and so she seeks to influence the sensemaking process that is in progress.

However, there is some topic attrition since Nigel and Beth have introduced the topic of the amount of work that needs to be done to transfer the old exercises to a new format. Alice interrupts and repairs (lines 37 and 38: *no no but wait it’s Peter who must do that*) but, despite the interruption and claims for the floor, Nigel begins simultaneously in overlap with Alice’s repair in response to Beth’s prior turn (line 39: [*that*] [*that*]). When Alice finishes her turn and without waiting for a pause between utterances, Nigel begins his turn by aligning with Beth’s turn (line 36: [*no it needs a lot of work*] [*software*]) and returning the topic to the amount of time it takes to convert the exercises. Beth (line 41) then takes the floor to give an example which, by citing first hand knowledge as a source for her and Nigel’s assessment, claims epistemic primacy. As Pomerantz (1984a) notes, giving self as a source, can be used to index privileged access to events and thus can be used to infer that the state of affairs is known unproblematically and with certainty and therefore it constitutes one way of substantiating claims to knowledge in a dispute. At a TRP, Alice attempts to mediate the turns and interrupt (line 42: *but wait*). However, Beth persists to completion and ignores the interruption and so Alice’s attempt to stop Beth’s turn-in-progress and thus topic development ‘fails’. The following talk thus does not continue the topic concerning Peter’s responsibility to do this work (Alice’s topic) but the talk continues on the topic of how much work is involved (implicitly by the teachers) to transfer the exercises. In this way, Beth resists Alice’s attempts to control topic through the use of interruption.

In sum, through the use of question and answer adjacency pairs, Alice is able to control the direction of the talk through control of topic and in this way she keeps the focus of talk and prevents the emergence of schismatic talk. However, the focus that is kept is resolutely ‘her’ focus. Moreover, Alice also uses interruption as part of her category-bound rights to mediate talk. In the data presented above, this is successfully used to prevent topic shift and to keep talk focused on what Alice wants to talk about. However,
later on in the same extract (6.10) Alice’s attempts to use interruption to control topic are resisted as both Nigel and Beth continue to co-author the topic of how much time it takes to convert the exercises rather than letting the topic rest on the fact that it is Peter who should be doing this work.

In this manner, the way in which the participants design their interaction takes into account morally allowable contributions linked to category incumbency. This has the effect of placing them in relationships with differential access to discursive resources, which allows Alice to have greater influence in talk via her control of turns. She is able to do this because the participants’ orientation to the management team as context means that chairperson/boss and team member identities become procedurally relevant. A predicate of chairperson is that they are held morally accountable for mediating the talk and through being able to mediate the turns at talk Alice has access to the first part of question and answer adjacency pairs which allows her to set the topic in the first turn and to assess contributions to topic in the third turn. Moreover, Alice also makes use of interruptions to challenge topic shifts.

6.6 Conclusion

Alice has control of the agenda which she has established unilaterally before the start of the meeting. Opening and closing the topics on the agenda is category-bound to her omni-relevant identity as chairperson and is invoked at any stage in the interaction when she decides to open and close topic. Through having the discursive right to close the main topics on the agenda she thus decides when to fix the meaning of the talk-so-far. This is achieved through the use of formulations which also delete the voice of others and fix the meaning that suits her. However, topic transition, other than that connected to the agenda that Alice sets out at the beginning of the meeting, is fluid and is not dependent on incumbency of the category chairperson in the SRP chairperson-team member that has been made procedurally consequent at the start of the meeting. Consequently noticing, the first stage of the sensemaking process according to Weick (1995), can be carried out through the use of stepwise transition when participants are incumbent of the identity
team member. In this way, all the participants can influence the noticing stage of the sensemaking within the main topics that have been introduced by Alice.

Topic opening is important in terms of sensemaking since it corresponds to Weick’s notion of noticing (Weick et al. 2005: 411). If the topic is not noticed, sense cannot be made of it. Therefore, in terms of influence in the sensemaking process, Alice, incumbent of her institutional and omni-relevant identity as chairperson has potentially access to more ‘powerful’ discursive resources with which to ‘do’ influence. Firstly, she has the category-bound right to present the agenda. The agenda contains the ‘main themes’ that are going to be discussed. Moreover, she also has the ability to close topic on these main themes and in so doing decide when to fix the meaning. Using this discursive right strategically she is able to delete the voice of other team members and so favor her own version of organizational reality.

However, in these ‘reunions pédagogiques’ the participants do not orient to a strictly regulated turn-taking system. Rather, in ‘informal’ business meetings participants often orient to ‘freer’ turn-taking systems akin to conversation and this orientation allows the team members to open and close topic through the use of stepwise transition. However, arguably the topics are of ‘lesser’ importance because Alice opens and closes the main topics on the agenda whereas the team members can only use stepwise transition in order to make more subtle shifts in topic.

In terms of influence, then, access to the discursive right to open and close the main topics on the agenda topic through incumbency of the identity chairperson can be used to give the chairperson more influence in the creation of an intersubjective version of organizational reality. However, the other participants also have discursive rights that they can take advantage of in order to influence the sensemaking process but these rights are less powerful since stepwise transition can only make incremental changes in topic and is not used to affect the more important issues on the agenda. Similarly, team members can self-select to ‘notice’ other issues but again these are not major issues as defined by the agenda that Alice sets.

Furthermore, the chairperson of the meeting, Alice, has the category-bound right to mediate and allocate turns at talk and she can use this right to influence the sensemaking process in the meeting. For example, she can use question and answer adjacency pairs
and interruptions to control topic development so that ‘her’ topic becomes the focus of
attention rather than the topic of other participants. However, since the meetings at the
Language Academy are not ‘formal’ meetings, in terms of orientation to turn-taking
possibilities, they are not as rigidly fixed as some other forms of institutional interaction
such as courts or classroom. Consequently, at times, there may be a shift to turn-taking
that resembles ‘conversation’ in the sense that who speaks to whom about what may be
up for grabs. In this respect, the team members, whilst they cannot open and close the
man topics on the agenda, can influence topic by using stepwise transition which move
the topic incrementally so that subtle and incremental shifts in topic may occur. In this
way, the team members can introduce topics of their concern and so influence the
sensemaking process.
7. Facilitation

7.1 Introduction

As seen in the previous chapter, despite the fact that the chairperson has access to the discursive resource of turn mediation which can be used to control the floor and so have greater influence, the accountable right to control the floor can be used to facilitate rather than to dominate the sensemaking process. Facilitating involves ‘opening up the floor’ so that each person has their say and is, thus, a way of diluting influencing which leads to a more ‘democratic’ model of teamwork. As Yeung (2004a) points out there are two basic models for management practice: there is the economic model which is based on top-down planning, cost control and monitoring employee performance, and, at the other end of the continuum, there is the organic model which is based on a bottom-up approach to management that relies on the empowerment of employees by sharing information, employee involvement in decision-making processes and delegating responsibilities. Yet, despite the contemporary interest in bottom-up and facilitative styles of management, Yeung (2004b) has demonstrated that whilst paying lip-service to bottom-up approaches to management, the boss still manages to retain control in meetings by giving a veneer of consultative management practice yet in fact retaining control. In the extracts presented in this chapter, Alice uses her discursive right as chairperson to mediate talk and to control the discourse in an unobtrusive way. In other words, whilst appearing to allow the other participants equal participation in the sensemaking process, Alice in fact denies them voice. Thus, influence during the sensemaking process can be done unobtrusively by presenting a ‘facilitative’ face but, in fact, Alice still manages to do influence by manipulating the others to go first and so she retains control of the interaction through question and answer adjacency pairs as explicated in chapter 6.
7.2 What do you think? Part one.

As Jayyusi (1984: 39) points out, members are held morally accountable for displaying abilities and knowledge that are consistent with the ‘domain of practice’ which has been made relevant through orientation to the task in hand. Thus, in terms of being the chair of a meeting and taking into consideration discourses of participative management, to avoid sanction, Alice as chairperson is also held accountable for allowing participants to have a say so that the meeting can be seen as being ‘properly’ constituted. As such she seeks to construct the identity of ‘facilitative’ chairperson by using expressions such as ‘what do you think’ to invite the contributions of the other team members to the joint authoring of an intersubjective organisational reality. However, ‘what do you think?’ makes the other participants go first and so leaves the third slot open to Alice who uses access to the third slot to cancel out the voice of her subordinates. This patterns reminiscent of the initiation-feedback-response pattern of classroom interaction (Brazil and Sinclair 1982) whereby the students are held in a web of power created by the teacher who not only controls topic through the use of questions but is in a position to evaluate the students’ responses to these questions and so give the ‘correct’ response in the third turn (Clifton 2006b: 142).

Extract 7.1

1 A autre chose sur les visites de soutien pédagogique (0.4) ↑non ça vous ↑va ↓bon (0.2) anything else on the pedagogic support visits (0.4) ↑no that’s ↑okay ↓good (0.2)
2 les créations des cours d’excellence (0.3) par ça ce que je veux dire c’est er : il faut the creation of top quality courses (0.3) by that I mean it’s er : it’s necessary qu’on arrive à développer les compétences des professeurs et surtout en anglais des: that we manage to develop the skills of the teachers and above all in English of:
3 affaires [er : ]alors en anglais des compétences linguistiques sont peut-être là ce qui business [er :] so in English the linguistic skills are perhaps there what’s
4 L [uhu]
5 A manque c’est le contenu er : <affaires > qui n’est pas là (0.3) il faut qu’on arrive à missing is the content er : <business> which is not there (0.3) it’s necessary développer ça [(.)] on a certains professeurs qui l’ont et il faut que les autres arrivent à

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6 Rixon et al. (2006: 25) include the phrase ‘what do you think?’ in a glossary of phrases typically used by facilitators.
to develop that [(. ]we have some teachers who have it and it is necessary that the others

[ °oui°] ((nod))

[ °yes°]

développer des compétences il faut qu’on ait une réflexion là-dessus aujourd’hui j’ai
develop skills it’s necessary that we think about that today I have

quelques idées mais ça ne vaut pas le coup d’en parler parce que ça n’ira nulle part mais
some ideas but it’s not worth speaking about them because they won’t go anywhere but

je voulais savoir un peu ce que vous vous en pensez [comment] vous=est-ce que vous

I wanted to know a little bit what you think [how you]=have you

[.hhhh]

thought or ( ) ((gaze to B and N, makes gathering motion with hands, then shifts gaze to

L))

le problème=moi ça fait des années qu’on demandait à Brian=qu’on faisait des
the problem=me it’s years that we asked Brian=that we did training

formations en septembre mais : il y a plein des choses qu’on faisait pas (0.5)
sessions in spetember but : there are loads of things we didn’t do (0.5)

éventuellement on pourrait apprendre des choses=des différentes matières etcetera pour
maybe we could learn things= different subjects etcetera in order to

pouvoir=bon c’est a nous aussi de travailler mais après il y a des choses très complexes
be able to=good it’s alos up to us to work but then there are things that are very complex

qu’on peut pas apprendre tout seule mais il y a plein des choses très simple etcetera pour

that we can learn alone but there are many simple things etcetera in order to

savoir de quoi on peut parler pendant des cours spécialises bon c’est vrai c’est très vaste
know what to talk about during specialized lessons good it’s true it’s very vast

parce que (. ) ce sont des domaines à choisir parce que ça peut aller de là
because (. ) there are the fields to choose between because it can go from here

((stretches left arm out)) jusque là ((stretches right arm out)) bon uh ::m

((stretches left arm out)) jusque là ((stretches right arm out)) bon uh ::m
to here
good uh::um

là je suis un peu perdue ((gaze to N)) (0.6) je ne sais pas pourquoi

here I’m a little lost (0.6) I don’t know why

(0.5)
out her ideas on the courses. In line 9 following, she then states that *it's necessary that we think about that* which initiates a sensemaking process. However, following this she states that *today I have some ideas but it's not worth speaking about them because they won’t go anywhere but I wanted to know a little bit what you think.* Alice thus uses her category-bound right to mediate the talk not to control it and so ‘do’ influence but to facilitate the joint authoring of an intersubjective organizational reality. She then allocates the turn to the others in the group by gaze and at the same time gestures with her arms, palms turned towards her moving her arms towards her body making a ‘gathering’ motion as a visual illustration of the meaning that she is conveying.

At the end of her turn, line 13, Alice shifts her gaze to Liz. However, despite the gaze being focused on Liz, Beth replies and so treats herself as being co-incumbent of the identity team member. She then takes an extended turn (line 14 following) which gives her reflections on ‘the creation of top quality courses’. Beth’s turn can be glossed a suggesting that the teachers should receive specific training on professional issues. When she arrives at the end of her turn she hands the floor to Nigel, as explicated in the extract below.

**Extract 7.2**

22 B là je suis un peu perdue ((gaze to N)) (0.6) je ne sais pas pour quoi

*here I’m a little lost* (0.6) *I don’t know why*

23 [(0.5) ]

24 N [((N looks to B))]

25 B mais c’est vrai (2.0) ((B returns gaze to N and makes gesture with head extending neck in N’s direction))

*but it’s true* (2.0)

26 N ((looks down))

27 A ((gazes to L to N to B))

28 N £oui£

£*yes*£

(0.4)

29

30 L est-ce qu’il faut tout=on peut pas tout savoir

*do we have to everything=we can’t know everything*

31 B non
no

32 N [ça serait très "intéressant"]
["it’d be very " interesting"]

33 L [je sais je sais je ne peux] pas tout savoir comprendre dans leur métier >donc moi< je
[I know I know I can’t] know everything understand in their jobs >so me< I

sais poser des questions et pousser pour qu’ils m’expliquent
know how to ask questions so that they explain to me

34 B uh : huh :h (nod)

36

37 N .hh c’est devenu un travail très très pointu chez DTZ les gens qui sont
.hh it’s become a very very specialised job at DTZ the people who’ve

38 venus du [risk management] c’est très très pointu : chez DTZ
come from risk management it’s very very specialised er : at DTZ

39 c’est complément er :: er :: chaque service a sa spécialité eux ils
it’s completely er : er : each department has their specialty they they

40 savent pas entre eux ce que l’autre est en train de faire mais
don’t know amongst themselves what the other is doing but

41 ça serait quand même intéressant dans les journées de formation d’avoir par exemple
anyhow it’d be interesting in the training days to have for example

42 (0.2) le directeur des ressources humaines de Brocades qui viendrait parler de
(0.2) the head of personnel of Brocades who’d come to talk about his

43 son rôle [ça] ça serait intéressant quand même et une autre année on peut avoir (   )
his job anyhow that that would be interesting and another year we could have (   )

44 B [uhu]

45 qui viendra parler de l’implantation d’une entreprise en Chine par exemple er : la
who come to talk about setting up a company in China for example er :

délocalisation et son impact (.) ça serait comme même enrichissant [ pour nous]
delocalisation and its impact (.) anyhow that’d be interesting [ for us]

47 B ["oui oui"]
["yes yes"]

48 A ((gaze to L and extends neck in Liz’s direction))

49 L ((grins; shrugs shoulders; opens hands palm out))

50 B °c’est assez complexe°
°it’s fairly complex°

51 A moi ce que je pensais peut être il faut avoir les gens bons on a un professeur qui est
me what I thought was maybe it’s necessary to have people well we have a teacher who is
In line 22, when Beth arrives the end of her turn she closes it with meta-comment: *I am a little lost.* At this point she shifts her gaze to Nigel, which solicits him as next speaker (Goodwin 1981). Nigel, however, is still looking down at his papers and so Beth continues her turn (*I don’t know why*). At the next TRP, Nigel looks up to Beth which displays his availability for talk. Beth continues with another TCU (*but it’s true*) and then returns gaze to Nigel and holds his gaze. Having secured Nigel’s gaze and achieved mutual gaze the turn could be considered to have passed to Nigel (Goodwin 1981). However, he still does not take the turn. Simultaneously, Alice casts her gaze between Liz, Nigel, and Beth, which indexes the fact that she does not seek to take the floor herself but is soliciting a next turn from one of the team members. Thus, Alice uses her gaze during this silence to mediate turns and to offer the floor to the team members. She thus retains her default identity of turn mediator, which reflexively indexes her incumbency of the identity ‘chairperson’. It also maintains the participation framework in which she accountably expects a reply from the others in the group. Whilst Alice is shifting her gaze, Beth moves her head forward in Nigel’s direction by extending her neck, which indexes that she is selecting Nigel as next speaker. However, rather than taking the turn that is being offered to him, Nigel averts his gaze and looks down and states *‘yes’* with a smiley voice. This acknowledges Beth’s turn and that fact that he has been selected as next speaker but it fails to provide a solution to the problem that Beth has outlined at the end of her turn. In short, by averting his gaze Nigel signals a disengagement from the talk. At this point Liz resolves the impasse and the failure of anybody to take the turn by self-selecting (line 30). Liz takes a turn which is supportive of Beth and seeks to account for Beth’s lacks of knowledge: an extensive and technical knowledge of the business world cannot be considered a predicate of (senior) language teacher. In this way, her turn specifically aligns with Beth and orients to her lack of knowledge being normal. This receives an agreement token from Beth (line 31: *no*). Then Nigel and Liz self-select to continue but Nigel drops out and allows Liz (lines 33-34) to provide a conditionally relevant response to Alice’s initial question (*I wanted to know a little bit what you think*) and gives her opinion on how she deals with the problem (i.e. she pushes the learner to explain their job and so draw on the learner’s knowledge and experience as a basis for the lesson. In this way, the teacher does not have to have
specialized knowledge of the learner’s field of work.). At the end of Liz’s turn Nigel then self-selects to give his ideas (lines 37-46) on the issue, which are in favour of having outside speakers coming in to give presentations to the teachers and are thus supportive of Beth. So far, then, Beth and Nigel have taken extended turns in which they have given their views on the subject. In line 48, Alice, then, makes relevant her omni-relevant identity of chairperson and accountably mediates turns and allocates the next turn to Liz by gaze and by nodding/extending her neck in Liz’s direction. However, Liz shrugs her shoulders, grins and opens out her palms and mumbles something that is untranscribable.

In sum, Alice has used her identity as chairperson to encourage the others to present their views and to contribute to the sensemaking process by ‘reflecting’ on how to deal with a problem area of teacher training. However, despite the fact that at the beginning of the topic Alice stated that “I have some ideas but it’s not worth speaking about them because they won’t go anywhere”, after having heard the other opinions, she self-selects to take the floor and authors her version of the situation. This takes the form of an extended turn, which demonstrates that she does, in fact, have a clear opinion on the issue, which is, moreover, in opposition to that expressed by the other participants. She, thus, uses access to the third slot after Beth, Liz and Nigel have given their assessment on the issue of the creation of top quality courses to cancel out their voice and to take an extended turn in which she authors her version of organizational reality which pays scant attention to the talk of her subordinates.

Extract 7.3

51 A moi ce que je pensais peut être il faut avoir les gens bons on a un professeur qui est
me what I thought was maybe it’s necessary to have people well we have a teacher who is
52 responsable d’un cour d’une formation et je souhaiterais que petit à petit on développe des
in charge of a lesson of a training course and I’d like little by little to develop the
gens qui soient là par exemple le jour où on veut parler des finances dans une entreprise de
people who are there for example the day we want to talk about finances in a finance
53 finances qu’on peut envoyer quelqu’un qui soit un peu plus expert dans le domaine des
finances qu’on peut envoyer quelqu’un qui est un peu plus expert in the field of
54 company that we can send somebody who is a little bit more expert in the field of
55 finances=or somebody who is a little more expert in the field of human resources
humaines (.) ou quelqu’un qui soit plus expert dans le domaine ( ) et petit à petit essayer (.)
or somebody who is a little bit more at ease in the field ( ) and little by little try
de développer des compétences (.) parce que je pense que quand on développe des
to develop the skills (.). because I think that when we develop the
compétences dans un domaine elles vont (.) petit à petit elles vont-il y aura un transfert et
Skills in a field they’re going (.). little by little they are going= there will be a transfer and
petit à petit les gens vont comprendre le monde des affaires un peu mieux je pense qu’
little by little people will understand the business world a little bit more I think that we
ont a beaucoup de professeurs qui sont er : des bons généralistes mais ils comprennent
have a lot of teachers who are er : good generalists but they don’t understand
pas le monde des affaires er : [donc] >c’est vrai< bon 
l’idée des présentations d’extérieur
the business world er : { so } >it’s true < well the idea of the presentations
peuvent nous aider pendant des journées de formation mais il faudrait aussi qu’on ait
from outside could help us during the training days but it’s also necessary that we have
les professeurs qui ont une compétence un peu plus pointue dans un domaine qui
teachers who have a skill that is a little more specific in a field who come
viennent me dire moi c’est ce domaine là qui m’intéresse et je veux faire l’effort d’avoir
to tell me that field there interests me and I want to make the effort to have
les ressources dans ce domaine là de connaître les sites internet (.3) et peut-être de faire
resources in that field and know the web-sites (0.3) and maybe to make a
un petit dossier que je passeraï pour partager un petit peu l’expertise quand on parle de
little file that I’ll pass around to share a little bit the expertise when we speak of
finance on a par exemple Mathieu ou telle personne qui pourront faire au moins une
finance we have for example Mathieu or somebody who can do at least a
présentation et on peut aussi s’en servir comme remplaçant quand on a des gens malades
presentation and we can also use them as a replacement when people are sick
on le dit et les gens vont venir car de toutes façons c’est des spécialistes dans un tel
we say it and people will come because in any case it’s the specialists? in a certain
domaine .hh pour faire un cours un peu plus spécialisé (.7) moi je me demande si on n’a
field to do a lesson a little bit more specialized (0.7) me I wonder if we shouldn’t
pas intérêt à réfléchir sur une espèce de domaine de compétence que chacun
think about a kind of field of skills that each person
développerait er : bon c’est une réflexion ↑ euh (.3) pour moi je pense qu’on doit y arriver
would develop er : well that’s for reflection ↑ euh (0.3) for me I think that we must do it
on manque dans cet domaine et il faut qu’on ait des professeurs qui font d’eux
we are lacking in that aspect and it’s necessary to have teachers who do it by themselves
mêmes (.) des profs qui le font d’eux-mêmes des profs qui viennent me voir bon moi
( .) teachers who do it themselves teachers who come to see me well me

j’ai un truc à faire pour ( ) qu’est-ce que c’est le ( ) ou est-ce que je peux avoir de
I’ve something to do for ( ) what is the ( ) where can I get the

l’information peut-être un peu l’idée tu vois c’est peut-être un petit peu ça à réfléchir
information could be a little the idea you see it’s maybe a little bit that to think about

former=quand les gens ils ont un cours important ça avec quelqu’un très précis essayer
train=when people they have an important course that with somebody very specialized
de les aider à développer une compétence=[=com]prendre un peu mieux le métier pour
try to help them develop a skill=[un]derstand a bit better the job so that

N         [ça]
[that]

A après [“un peu mieux”]
afterwards [“a little bit better”]

N [ça serait intéressant] d’afficher un petit peu dans la salle des profs une
[it would be interesting] to put up a little bit in the teachers’ room
trombinoscope avec er : les noms dessus (0.2)
a chart with photos of the teachers with er: their names on it (0.2)

A des competen[c]es
the skill [s

In lines 51-82, Alice sets out her ideas and this acts as a third slot after Nigel, Beth and Liz have given their opinions. As Clifton (forthcoming) points out, the third slot can be used “for evaluating, formulating, and repairing which can be used for ‘gatekeeping’ (Yeung 2004a:122 and 2004b: passim) whereby deviations from, or misconceptions of, the management line are detected and are corrected in a subsequent turn”. As part of this extended turn in the third slot, Alice acknowledges the opinions of Nigel and Beth and labels them as ideas, which implies a lack of concreteness (line 61: the idea of the presentations from outside). However, she immediately qualifies this: but it’s also necessary that we have teachers who have a skill that is a little more specific in a field. She then continues her turn which builds on her idea of developing the teachers’ skills. The basic idea of her talk is not to bring in outside speakers, as Beth and Nigel have suggested, but to encourage the teachers themselves to becomes specialists in certain domains of practice. Towards the end of her turn she sums up and fixes the ‘meaning’ of her extended turn. She states that her ideas are for reflection (lines 71 ff.: me I wonder if
we shouldn’t think about a kind of field of skills that each person would develop er: well that’s for reflection (euh). However, it is her ideas that are presented ‘for reflection’ and the voice of the others is cancelled out. In other words, the team is not asked to reflect upon their idea but on Alice’s idea: Alice’s voice has become the voice for reflection. In this case there is no agreement and after the extended turn which has formulated Alice’s opinion, Nigel (line 82) self-selects to carry out a stepwise transition in topic to putting up a poster with people’s skills on it in the teacher’s room. However, as Barnes (2007: 291) points out, formulating utterances by the chairperson are taken to be harbingers of agreement and so they require no explicit response. This is because they are oriented to as conveying agreement and as being pre-closing formulations which allow a smooth transition to the next topic with a minimal break. Thus, Nigel orients to Alice’s summing up of the talk-so-far (lines 73 ff.) as doing a pre-closing formulation which fixes the meaning of the talk-so-far and having done this topic transition can be performed smoothly and in this case Nigel does a stepwise transition to the topic of putting up a poster in the teachers room and this transition is oriented to as being non-problematic by Alice, who confirms the change of topic in a subsequent turn (line 84).

In sum, even though Alice throws open the floor to the other participants so that they can give their ideas and she proclaims that she does not really have an idea about the issue of the creation of top quality courses, in fact after hearing the ideas of the others she takes the floor and, with only slight acknowledgment of the previous talk and the ideas of the others, she develops her ideas which cancels out the voice of the other participants. In fact, by getting the others to go first by a ‘facilitative’ use of language she puts them in a weaker position so that she can ‘deal’ with the views that are developed. However, in this instance, and contrary to the data of Hutchby (1996a: 47), which explicates how going second is used to attack the other person’s ideas, Alice, whilst acknowledging the ideas, basically ignores them and develops her own ideas of what should be done. In this way, she uses the apparently facilitative expression ‘what do you think?’ to maneuver the others into going first and then she gives her own opinion and uses the third turn to sum up the gist of the talk in a way that retains her idea of encouraging teachers to become specialized in a partial field and cancels out the voice of the other participants. In this
way, despite giving the floor to other speakers, she in fact still retains control of the talk and influences the sensemaking process.

7.3 What do you think? Part two.

Alice also uses the apparently ‘facilitative’ utterance ‘what do you think’ as a way of manipulating the participation framework so that decision can be made in a way that suits her. In line 1 of extract 7.4 below, she ‘facilitates’ the participation of others in the meeting by eliciting topic talk and asking if there is anything else. This elicits the topic of subscribing to *Time* magazine and using it for students and so opens up a ‘new’ topic for talk that comes from one of the team members. It can thus been seen as facilitative by allowing topic initiation by other members of the team. However, once she has given the floor to the others and Liz has made a suggestion that she does not like, Alice seeks to discredit the suggestion that the company subscribes to *Time* and to prevent the suggestion from becoming a decision.

Alice at first qualifies the idea of subscribing to *Time* as problematic but Liz persists with the idea. Alice is against this idea but in order to reject it, she uses the ‘facilitative’ expression ‘what do you think’ to change the participation framework and so involve Beth and Nigel in the talk and author a counter argument to the effect that it is not worth subscribing to *Time*. This counter argument finally takes the form of a decision not to subscribe. Thus, in the following extracts Alice also uses ‘what do you think’ to do unobtrusive control and so influence the sensemaking process. Again, whilst on the surface it appears as if she is eliciting contributions to the talk-in-progress, in fact she uses the utterance to continue topic talk and alter the participation framework so that an opinion that she labels problematic can be repaired in the following talk.

Extract 7.4

1. A autre chose
   *anything else*
2. L une fois on avait une fois on avait évoqué *erm* (gaze to A) l’idée de prendre
   *once we had once we had the erm*  
   *idea of taking*
3. A un magazine
   *a magazine*
4 B [ah oui ]

[ah yes]
5 A de s’abonner =

of subscribing =
6 L =de s’abonner à time maga[zine ]

=to subscribe to time maga[zine ]
7 A [time] c’est américain [c’est] ça le problème on va

[time] is american [ it’s ] that the problem that we’ll
8 L [uhu ]
9 A s’abonner a un truc américain et après on va avoir la moitié des stagiaires vont

subscribe to an american thing and then we’ll have half the students
10 A dire il faut de l’anglais ((smiles gazes to B))

saying english is needed
11 B (gaze to A smiles then gaze to N)
12 L mais: oui peut-être mais: j’utilise tellement peu d’américain que ça serait bien d’avoir

but: yes maybe but: I use american so little that it would be good to have
13 l’anglais américain

american english
14 B ( ) britannique c’est

( ) british it's
15 L newsweek ↑

newsweek
16 B non

no
17 L newsweek c’est britannique

newsweek it’s british
18 B il y a une version britannique (.3)[ enfin il y en a ] une autre il y a newsweek

there’s a British version (.3) [well there’s ] another there’s newsweek
19 A [°oui newsweek° ]

[°yes newsweek° ]
20 B time et il y en a une autre (.3) ((looks down, counts on fingers, then gazes at N))

time and there’s another (.3)
21 L [okay donc qu’est-ce que] ((gazing at A))

[okay so what ]
22 B [ il y avait un autre ] (( gazing at N))

[ there was another ]
23 N £horse and ↑ hounds£ town and ↑country ((gazing at B))

£horse and ↑ hounds£ town and ↑country ((gazing at B))
24 A town and country ((smiles gazing at N))
In line 1, Alice uses her right as chairperson to close down the previous topic talk and initiate the next topic through use of the topic initial elicitor, ‘anything else’. Liz then self-selects and initiates the topic of subscribing to *Time* magazine. In line 7, Alice immediately frames this as a problem because *Time* is American and the majority of the students want English. The turn is rhetorically designed so that she speaks with the voice of the students which blurs the distinction between the position of the original speaker and the actual speaker. In Goffman’s (1979) terms, Alice creates for herself the identity of animator who voices the words that have been authored by someone else. In this way, she distances herself from the action being done by the utterance and so can justify her criticism as something that the students think and not what she thinks. However, line 12, Liz challenges this versions of reality that Alice is putting forward, disaligns with Alice and begins a counter argument (*but: yes maybe but: I use american so little that it would be good to have american English*). This develops into a word search looking for a suitable magazine (lines: 14-25). At the end of this word search Liz then states *me my opinion is that we subscribe* which makes sense out of the current situation by suggesting a course for future action.

**Extract 7.5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Line</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tr>
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<td>29</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>32</td>
<td>A</td>
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</tbody>
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Liz’s assessment (line 27: *me my opinion is that we subscribe* [to *Time]*) normatively requires a second assessment (Pomerantz 1984b). In this instance there is no second assessment and this is, thus, hearable as a dispreferred response which prefaces disalignment. However, rather than performing the disalignment immediately herself Alice recycles the topic and selects Beth as the next speaker (line 29: *what do you think*). As seen previously, in a decontextualised way, this utterance could be seen as facilitative but it also has the effect of putting the assessment of the idea of subscribing to *Time* back to ‘square one’ by restarting talk on the topic by handing the floor to Beth without making an assessment. After a micro-pause, Beth does not take the floor so Alice self-selects to begin the turn. She again frames the issue as a problem (line 29) and then goes on to justify her idea by stating that the magazine will just ‘disappear’. She then closes her utterance with a disclaimer *well I don’t know what do you think?* In this way she makes her opinion but disclaims it. The disclaimer ‘I don’t know’ can be used to make a point but having made it protect oneself from the consequences by displaying a cognitive lack of commitment to the idea (Edwards 2005: 268). ‘I don’t know’ is not simply a way of displaying the cognitive state of being ignorant but implies not having a particularly strong opinion and is thus a way of toning down the speaker’s stake in the issue. In this case, by publicly displaying an apparent lack of commitment to her own ideas Alice encourages debate and she encourages the subordinates to present their own opinions. However, she has already made her opinion clear and by encouraging further topic talk she is creating a space in which alignment with her opinion and disalignment with Liz can occur.

Extract 7.6

35 L ou est-ce que er: on <le reçoit> une personne fait une photocopie de l’article or do er : we <receive> it one person takes a photocopy of the article that he
Il préfère et il met ça dans un classeur qui reste. [l’article] qu’il préfère
prefers and that he puts in a folder which stays [the article] which he prefers

et ça je sais pas deux articles par semaine et après le magazine sera là
and that I don’t know two articles per week and after the magazine will be there

(0.2) comme ça (0.2) ↑ non
(0.2) like that (0.2) ↑ no

[enfin dans un er : ] sens pédago[gique] éventuellement ça pourrait
[well in a er: ] pedagogic sense maybe that could

[ça marche ↑ pas ↓ non ]
[that doesn’t work ↑ no ]

être la même chose qu’on fait (dans) la gestion des huit heures
be the same thing that we do (in) the management of the eight hours

par semaine on peut sélectionner des sujets éventuellement mais je pense que
by week we can possibly select the subjects but I think that

c’est ( ) [je ne sais pas ]
it’s ( ) [I don’t know]

[ > le problème < ] c’est que les sujets sont très er :
[ > the problem < ] is that the subjects are very er:

éphémères
ephemeral

[très ] [périssables] en fin de compte parce que un mois plus tard
[very] [perishable] at the end of the day because one month later

[oui ] [( )]
[yes ] [( )]

[voilà] ((nods))
[there it is]

oui c’est pour ça que je pense qu’on a tous internet maintenant [ on ] peut
yes it’s for that that I think that we all have internet now [we ] can

[uhu ] ((nods))

[oui]
[yes]

subscribe to the economist [ there is ] ( ) it’s a resource

---

7 i.e., the photocopy of the article stays in the folder. In this way the teachers will have access to the photocopies but not to Time itself so that the magazine itself will not disappear.

8 Semi-intensive lessons which consist of eight hours teaching per week.
54 L     [ uhu ] ((nods))
55 A     [yes]
56 N     qui est formidable er: ça ne coûte rien du tout [ on ] a accès à beaucoup
57 L     [ uhu ] ((nods))
58 N     d’articles er: time [ vous] avez  the times ou telegraph vous avez toutes les revues qui
59 L     [ uhu ]
60 A     nous intéressent (.) vous avez au moins l’article le plus intéressant de la
61 N     [ semaine ] qui est gratuit [ et ] puis on varie [ > car si< ] on se contente
62 L     [ uhu ] [ uhu ] ((nods)) [ uhu ]

Liz takes the floor and continues to argue against Alice’s version of the problem and for the possibility of subscribing to a magazine (lines 35 ff.: or do er : we receive it one person takes a photocopy of the article that he prefers and that he puts in a folder which stays the article which he prefers and that I don’t know two articles per week and after the magazine will be there (0.2)). When she arrives at a TRP, she pauses but since there is no uptake she continues (like that) and then pauses again and then solicits a response by stating no with rising intonation. Beth then self-selects to provide a second assessment which takes the form of a dispreffered response that disaligns with Liz (Pomerantz 1984b). Firstly, the disalignment is marked by ‘well’ which is hearable as prefacing disagreement. Secondly, Beth continues her turn with weak agreement (in this case it is signaled by hedges: in a pedagogic sense, maybe, could be, possibly, which are also hearable as prefacing forthcoming disagreement). The disagreement is announced by the ‘but’. However, Beth never arrives at openly expressing her disagreement. This might be obscured by the untranscribable talk (line: 44) but regardless of what was or was not said and whether the untranscribable talk contained a disagreement, Alice overlaps (line 45) to take the floor to disagree with Liz’s suggestion of subscribing to Time. She prefaces the turn with the problem is, which frames the proposal to subscribe to a magazine as
problematic. However, as she continues her turn, she hesitates slightly (er:). Nigel interprets this as a word search and by predicting the word that Alice is looking for offers a candidate solution (line 46: *ephemeral*). In so doing he specifically aligns with Alice. Moreover, Alice ratifies this invocation of co-incumbent team identity by slightly reformulating Nigel’s candidate solution by the use of a synonym (*perishable*). As Alice continues the turn, explicit agreement tokens are backchanneled by Liz and Beth (*that’s right* and *yes*). Thus, they also add their voice and agreement to the co-construction of the turn-in-progress. Thus, a joint formulation of the state of affairs is authored that disaligns with Liz’s suggestion to subscribe to *Time*. Moreover, Liz is beginning to back down and reverse her opinion that they should subscribe to *Time*. This is evidenced by her backchanelling *‘there it is’* (line 49). Consequently, a team and intersubjective version of organisational reality is beginning to emerge and Liz is beginning to change her opinion and align with the team. Nigel then self-selects and suggests in an extended turn that it is much easier and cheaper to get the articles from the internet rather than paying for *Time* (lines, 49-62). He then shifts topic back to *Time* and a decision not to subscribe to *Time* is taken as explicated below in extracts 7.7 and 7.8.

Extract 7.7

63 N de time time c’est bon [ une ] fois er : toutes les cinq sem[aines ]
   *time* *time* is good [ one ] *time: every five* [ weeks ]
64 L [ oui ]
   [ uhu ]
65 N le reste du temps c’est mortellement
   *the rest of the time it’s mortally*
66 A moi oui j’ai [ l’impression ]
   *me yes I have* [ the impression ]
67 L [ c’est assez ] bore quoi
   [ it’s fairly ] *boring what*
68 B et puis enfin c’est quand même pour les niveaux assez avancés ( [XX] [XXX] )
   *and then well all the same it’s for fairly advanced levels* ( [XX] [XXX] )
69 L [ uhu ] ((nods))
70 N [ oui ]
   [ yes ]
When Nigel arrives at the end of his extend turn he makes an assessment of *Time* (line 63: *time time is good* [one ] *time er: every five* [ weeks ] *the rest of the time it’s mortally*). However, Alice self-selects to begin a turn before Nigel can complete his turn by giving an adjective to which the modifier *mortally* refers and then Liz overlaps Alice’s turn and self-selects to complete Nigel’s assessment [*it’s fairly*] *boring what*. This aligns with Nigel’s assessment. Despite the fact that Nigel has not completed his turn, Liz’s assessment, whilst it ‘does’ agreement, can be considered a downgrade because *mortally* is downgraded to ‘*fairly*’ (Pomerantz 1984b). Nevertheless, even though it is considered weak agreement, Liz’s position is shifting with the emergence of a team consensus which goes against her original assessment of *Time*. Furthermore, retrospectively, Liz’s ‘*fairly boring*’, turns out to be the first part of a co-authored three-part list (fairly boring, for fairly advanced levels and perishable). Beth then self-selects (line 7) to take the floor. She begins her turn ‘*and*’ which is hearable as a collaborative continuer (Vorreiter 2003: 2). In other words, it is the sequential continuation of a (possibly) syntactically complete turn by another speaker which adds on further material to the host turn and, by adding another reason not to subscribe to *Time*, it becomes a second part of a three-part list (*it’s for fairly advanced levels*). Beth’s collaborative continuer is accepted by both Liz’s ‘*uhuh*’ plus nod (line 69) and Nigel’s ‘*yes*’ (line 70). Alice (line 71) self-selects to overlap Beth’s continuing turn and by speaking more loudly (*yes and so*) she claims the floor. Alice’s utterance begins with ‘*and*’ which is a collaborative continuer which is ‘parasitic’ on the turn-in-progress and continues the turn syntactically and pragmatically. In this case, Alice uses her turn to provide a third part to the emergent list (*it’s perishable*).

In sum, Alice, as chairperson, closes one topic and then with a topic initial initiator opens up the floor to a possible self-starter who can introduce a new topic. Liz self-selects to introduce the topic of subscribing to *Time*. Alice immediately frames this as a problem,
yet Liz persists and gives her opinion that we should subscribe. This position is one that Alice has already rejected. As chairperson, and so turn-mediator, she maintains the topic of subscribing to *Time* by opening up the floor to others who have not yet expressed their views on the issue. This move can be seen as facilitative in that it invites participation from the ‘team’ but it has the effect of putting the discussion back to square one. At first there is no uptake so she authors her view, then Liz takes the floor again to defend her view but Beth takes the floor to disalign with Liz and so to support Alice. At this point Alice self-selects to take the floor and takes an extended turn, again framing the issue as a problem. This extended turn is co-authored by Nigel and Beth and significantly Liz also begins to change position to align with the emerging group consensus and modify her opinion. This is done through the use of back channels and co-authoring of a three part list (extract 7.7). Alice, thus, using access to turn mediation to solicit participation with the apparently facilitative utterance ‘what do you think?, can do not closing down a particular topic until group consensus has moved to support her opinion. In this instance ‘what do you think?’ invites Nigel and Beth to add their views to the talk and these views turn out to align with Alice. Significantly, as Liz sees the group consensus in emerging as going against the idea of subscribing to *Time*, she also begins to ‘go with the flow’ and she begins to back down from her original position. In this way, Alice creates space in which a team-authoring of an assessment of *Time* has developed in a way which supports her idea. Moreover, as this co-authoring is in progress, Liz has changed her position and now aligns with the team.

### 7.4 Post script: The decision

Finally, once Alice has used her discursive right to mediate turns to alter the participation framework and keep a topic ‘live’ until a group consensus which concurs with her version of the organisation emerges, she can then make a decision as to future organisational reality based on this. Thus, in the following extract, Alice builds on this team talk to formulate a future state of affairs which is ratified both as it emerges through backchannels which express tacit agreement and retrospectively by agreement tokens in subsequent turns. Consequently, the formulation becomes a decision. Significantly, this decision goes against the proposal which Liz has made earlier in the talk. Thus by
changing the participation framework and opening up the discussion Alice is able to ‘enlist’ the support of Nigel and Beth to her ideas. Liz ‘goes with the flow’ and over several turns reverses her position and then finally, based on this intersubjective consensus, Alice makes a decision as explicated below.

Extract 7.8

74 N  oui c’est ça ]
[yes that’s it]

75 L  [ uhu uhu uhu ]

76 A  ils nous demandent l’abonnement on arrête [car ] c’est la même chose [ erm ]
they ask us for the subscription we stop [because] it’s the same thing [erm]

77 L  [ uhu ]
[uhu]

78 A  maintenant on achètera les magazines ou les revues quand on a des stages très précis
now we will buy the magazines or journals when we have courses very precise

79 L  [ uhu ]
[uhu]

79 A  lesquels on a besoin [pour ]lesquels on souhaite que ça devienne la ressource
[for ] whom we have a need [for ]whom we want that it becomes a resource

80 L  [ uhu ] ((nod))

81 N  [ oui ] ((looks up, gazes at Alice, smiles ))
[ yes ]

82 B  [((nod))]

83 A  pédagogique EFAP ça a marché super bien je pense qu’on va aller plus là-dessus parce que
pedagogic EFAP that works very well so I think that we’ll go more in that direction because

84 l’abonnement aujourd’hui n’a pas beaucoup de sens
the subscription today doesn’t make a lot of sense

85 L  [ uhu uhu ]

86 N  [ oui ]
[yes]

87 B  par contre en espagnol on a un problème il y a pas beaucoup de stagiaires
on the other hand in spanish we have a problem because there aren’t many students

In line 78, Alice projects future action which is hearable as the first part of a decision-confirmation/disconfirmation pair (now we will buy the magazines or journals when we have a course very precise). As she reaches a first possible transition relevance place (precise), the other participants backchannel agreement: Liz and Beth nod, and Nigel backchannels ‘yes’, looks up at Alice, smiles and moves his hands palm down, slightly
raised across each other indicating understanding, agreement and the lack of need to pursue the topic further. Thus, the decision is ratified as it emerges. Alice, however, continues her ‘decision-turn’ and justifies her decision by citing the example of EFAP (a client of the company) which ‘worked well’. She then reiterates the decision (so I think that we’ll go more in that direction) and adds further justification (the subscription today doesn’t make a lot of sense). At the end of this turn, Liz backchannels ‘uhu’ plus a nod and Nigel gives an agreement token ‘yes’. A decision - an explicit formulation of future affairs and a projection of future action - is thus made by Alice and it is confirmed both as it is in progress and retrospectively at the end of Alice’s turn. Once the decision has been made, the topic of magazines is hearable as closed and Beth self-selects (line 84) to carry out a stepwise topic transition to the use of magazines for the Spanish classes.

In sum: by recycling discussion through the use of an apparently facilitative expression (what do you think?), Alice is able to draw other participants into the discussion. In this case they align with her idea not to subscribe to Time rather than Liz’s idea to subscribe. Once Alice has achieved this shift in participation and Liz begins to align with the emergent team opinion, Alice can then formulate this intersubjective opinion and, on the back of such a formulation, make a decision. Thus, by mediating talk Alice can also influence decision-making.

7.5 Conclusion

The identity chairperson has with it certain predicates that have to be displayed if the chairperson is seen to accountably fulfill the role of managing a meeting. As Jayyusi (1984: 40) points out, categories come with a corpus of expectable skills and abilities which are credentials of incumbency and which can be gradable and qualifiable. This gives rise to a notion of categories being qualified with adjectives so that we can have a good or bad teacher, a competent or incompetent police officer and so on. For Alice to be qualified as a ‘good’ chairperson she is expectably required to display predicates associated with chairmanship. Deviation from such moral imperatives might lead to the qualification ‘bad’ chairperson as opposed to ‘good’ chairperson. One of the predicates of a chairperson following a progressive view of management is that of being able to facilitate and consider the views of subordinates in a meeting. In a decontextualised way,
some previous research on facilitation has assumed that expressions such as ‘what do you think?’ are necessarily facilitative (e.g. Rixon et al. 2006). However, this chapter has demonstrated that the expression ‘what do you think?’ can be used to do unobtrusive control: i.e. it can be used to give a veneer of facilitation and to invite participants to take the floor but, as section 7.2 explicate, it can be deployed to solicit ideas but these ideas are then soundly ignored and section 7.3 explicates how ‘what do you think?’ can be used to change the participation framework. Changing the participation framework and giving the floor to other members of the team can lead to the emergence of a team consensus that goes against a suggestion made by one of the members of the team that the chairperson does not agree with. As demonstrated in section 7.4, as a team consensus emerges in favour of the chairperson, Liz’s original suggestion is dropped, she goes with the flow in the changed participation framework, reverses her original opinion and ends up agreeing with Alice. In this way, apparently facilitative expression can be used to ‘do’ unobtrusive influence, whereby expressions that are apparently facilitative are not used to ‘do’ facilitation but are used to ‘do’ influence.
8. Decision-making episodes

8.1 Introduction

Following Huisman (2001), this thesis uses the term decision-making episodes to convey the idea that decisions, conceived of as the building of commitment to future action, emerge incrementally over several turns at talk and, as Huisman (2001: 72) states:

“a decision evolves around the assessment of a future state of affairs. During a decision-making process, participants form what is tantamount to a ‘virtual’ future reality and shape the future of the organization. Commonly states of affairs from the past and present are also discussed in such decision-making episodes. Indeed, the starting point of a decision-making episode is the formulation of a state of affairs that is of current interest.”

Decision-making is, thus, inextricably linked with notions of retrospective and prospective organizational sensemaking (Weick 1995). This is because an essential part of decision-making is about retrospectively making sense of past organizational reality and creating an intersubjective version of these events in order to make them amenable for action. Consequently, decision-making is as much about making sense of past events that account for projected future action as about the future action itself (Alby and Zucchermaglio 2006). Furthermore, as Garfinkel (1967: 114) points out, in his seminal work on jury decisions, the common sense idea that decisions are about making rational choices between sets of alternative possible actions is not necessarily the case in actual instances of decision-making. Rather decision-making is more about justifying courses of action and making sense of what is (or was) going on in the organization so as to justify the decision that has been announced. In other words, since decisions are outcomes that participants’ are looking for, retrospective sensemaking ‘paves the way’ to the desired decision and accounts for it. Constructing a team (intersubjective) version of organizational reality to account for a decision is thus the key to decision-making. This can be seen, first, in the way in which sense is made out of a past/present situation by
labeling it as a problem and then prospective sensemaking provides the solution to this problem which becomes the decision when future action is projected by talk. Moreover, as will be explicated later, this chapter makes the distinction between decision-making and decision-announcing. Decision-making, or the sensemaking that permeates the talk around a decision, is an action in which all the team members are able to participate. On the other hand, orientating to the talk as decision-making talk by announcing it as a decision, by projecting future action, is category-bound to the chair. This is because decision-making episodes involve a complex division of labor and for talk to be accountably oriented to as decision-making talk (as opposed to, for example, reflecting on a problem), future action must be projected by somebody incumbent of the ‘correct’ identity. Otherwise it will not be treated as a decision and the work of the meeting will not be seen to be accountably done.

8.2 Decision-making and decision-announcing

8.2.1 Chairperson as decision-announcer

In the following extract, Alice asks the participants if the teacher training session went well. Beth points out that they need to ‘look at’ the language in which the in-house teacher training sessions are given because one of the sessions was given in English by a non-native speaker of English and some of teachers complained. Liz disputes the definition of the past event as being problematic but Alice intervenes in order to confirm Beth’s version of events, provide a solution to the problem and project future action which is oriented to as a decision.

Extract 8.1

1 A et ça ça a bien marché
   and that worked well
2 B ((nod))
3 A et vous avez fait ça toutes langues confondues ou vous avez fait ça séparément
   and you did that with a mix of languages or you did it separately
4 [en d’autres langues]
[in other languages]

5 L [moi je l’ai fait en] anglais=
[me I did it solely in] English

6 A =anglais uniquement ((shifts gaze to B))
=solely in English

7 B moi c’était mélangé9 [ >bon là < er : ][enfin ]((gaze to Liz)) il faudrait revoir ce genre de chose
me it was a mix [ >well there < er : ](anyway) it’s necessary to look at that kind of thing because

8 A [.hhh ] [ ( )]

9 B parce que er : par exemple l’atelier de Monique qui parle pas bien anglais [ils se plaignent]
er : for example in Monique’s workshop who doesn’t speak English well [they complained]

10 L [mais ça allait]
[ but it went okay]

11 L ça allait
it went okay

12 B un peu ils se plaignent un peu que c’était fait en anglais [ “je te” le dis comme ça °
a bit they complained a bit that it was done in English [“I’m] just saying°

13 A [bon ]
[good ]

14 A alors le problème [c’est] que alors si on fait des formations nouveaux profs et pour les
so the problem [is that] so if we do the training of the new teachers and for the

15 B [mais]
[but]

16 A formations dites pédagogiques on peu les faire tout langages confondus
so called pedagogic training we can do them with a mix of languages

17 B voilà
that’s it

18 A à ce moment là on les anime en français (0.2) c’est hors de question qu’on anime en
in that case we do them in French (0.2) it’s out of the question that we do them

19 anglais pour les profs non-Anglophones je pense que c’est pas trè:s respectueux
in English for non-Anglophone teachers I think that that is not very respectful

20 [du fait] qu’ils soient pas Anglophones et on n’est pas un centre uniquement
[since] they are not Anglophones and we are not a center solely

21 L [ ((nod))] [.] [hh]

22 d’enseignement d’anglais donc [là] dessus j’insiste
for English teaching so [on that] I insist

23 B [.hh]

9 i.e. some of the training sessions were in English and others in French.
In line one, Alice asks if ‘it’ (the training sessions) worked well. Alice then follows up with a second question (line 3: *and you did that with a mix of languages or you did it separately*). Liz replies that she did the training session in English and Beth replies that she did it using a mix of languages. However, Beth then shifts gaze to Liz, the other person responsible for teacher training, and thus selects her as principal recipient. Beth then adds to her turn using an impersonal agentless construction (lines 7 ff.): *anyway it’s necessary to look at that kind of thing because er : for example in Monique’s workshop who doesn’t speak English well they complained.* It is, thus, Beth who notices the potentially problematic nature of the language used for the training sessions. The seriousness of this problem is then negotiated in an attempt to make sense of what is happening. Liz tries to minimize this complaint by saying that it was okay (lines 10 ff.: *but it went okay it went okay*). Beth continues her turn and repeats: *they complained a bit that it was done in English.* At this transition relevant place Alice makes a bid for the floor (line 13: *good*) but Beth continues her turn to completion (line 12: °*I’m just saying°*). Alice then self-selects to take the floor and beginning her turn °*so”, which prefaches a formulation, she projects the upshot of the talk-so-far and makes explicit the links between the prior talk and the current turn (lines 14 ff.: °*so the problem is that so if we do the training of the new teachers and for the so called pedagogic training we can do them with a mix of languages°*). Alice fixes the meaning of the talk-so-far by deleting
Liz’s voice and making sense of the situation by defining the use of English by the teacher trainers as problematic and so aligns with Beth. As Heritage and Watson (1979: 141) point out, formulations come in adjacency pairs and a formulation makes agreement relevant as a next action. In this case, Beth provides agreement with Alice’s formulation in line 17 (that’s it). Sequentially, since the problem has now been fixed in talk, a solution becomes relevant as a next action and Alice provides this in her following turn which projects future action and so is hearable as a decision (line 18: in that case we do them in French (0.2) it’s out of the question that we do them in English for non-Anglophone teachers ). In so doing, Alice makes relevant her omni-relevant identity since the ability to retrospectively define talk as decision-making talk and to project future action is category-bound to the identity ‘chairperson’ (Barnes 2007: 292). Alice then accounts for this by saying: I think that is not very respectful since they are not Anglophones and we are not a centre solely for English teaching. She then reaffirms her identity as authorised decision-announcer by stating ‘I insist on that’ which is hearable as displaying ownership of the decision. Beth then aligns with Alice by paraphrasing the utterance and addressing it to Liz (line 24: it depends on the subjects [(0.1) if] we do them separately or not). This, in turn, solicits Liz’s agreement (line 25: yes okay). Beth’s collaborative expansion of the decision is then confirmed by Alice (line 25: that’s it).

Finally, formulations are also implicative of topic closure and now that the decision has been made and confirmed, Alice moves to close topic. This again invokes her category-bound right as chairperson to accountably close topic. In this case, she closes topic by means of a stepwise topic shift to pedagogic tools (line 27: Nigel good the tools are different for you) and so she confirms her decision and stops any more elements being brought to the sensemaking that might put the talk back to square one and jeopardize ‘her’ decisions.

In sum, Beth notices a situation and puts it on the agenda. However, it is the Alice who labels this as a problem and provides the solution which, through projecting future action, becomes a decision. This decision is then confirmed by Beth and Liz and so a commitment to future action is interactionally achieved. Alice then uses her category-bound rights to shift topic and so prevents further topic talk and thus preserves the decision as it is. Thus, it appears as if Alice, incumbent of the identity chairperson, has
the ability to influence decision-making through the ability to formulate and to close topic talk. However, decision-making episodes are often more nuanced than this and subordinates do have resources with which to resist the influence of the chair as will be explicated in the following sections.

8.2.2 Subordinates influencing decision-making episodes

If Alice, as chairperson, is the authorized decision-announcer and if for decisions to be publically and accountably done they must be announced by Alice, then the other participants can influence the decisions only through the sensemaking process. In what follows, a more extended extract of decision-making is explicated in which Nigel and Beth manage to influence the decision-making process by adding to a decision that has already been announced. Moreover, this can be seen in a series of smaller decision-making episodes embedded in a longer one, which goes on until topic change occurs. At the beginning of the decision-making episode, Alice announces that the pedagogic visits have to be restored. Having first given a solution, she then sets out the problem and as she does so, she achieves retrospective commitment to her projection of future action. However, as the decision-making episode continues, subordinates also influence the decision-making process by noticing and introducing mentionables to the talk which become decisions that add to and nuance Alice’s suggestion to restart the pedagogic visits.

8.2.3 Setting out the problem, providing the solution and accounting for it

Extract 8.2

1  A et les visites de soutien pédagogique il faut qu’on recommence ((shifts gaze to L and B))
   and the pedagogic support visits we need to start them again
2  L uhu ((nod))
3  B ((nod))
4  A parce que je pense qu’autrement er : malheureusement er certaines personnes vont
   because I think that otherwise er : unfortunately er some people won’t

---

10 Such visits would entail the senior teachers attending the lessons of other teachers to observe and advise on teaching practice.
pas faire de la qualité s’il n’y a pas=même s’il n y a aucun contrôle er : je pense que
do quality if there isn’t=even if there isn’t any control er : I think that
c’est évident (0.4) mais il y a d’autres personnes qui dès qu’il n’y a plus de contrôles vont
it’s obvious (0.4) but there are other people who once there aren’t any more controls
se dire eh beh maintenant je peux (     ) et c’est tout quoi [ il ] faut (0.2) je
will say to themselves eh beh now I can (   ) and that’s it [ we] need (0.2) I
It’s obvious (0.4) but there are other people who once there aren’t any more controls
will say to themselves eh beh now I can ( ) and that’s it [ we] need (0.2) I

pense que c’est pas la majorité [des] gens qui font ça mais il y a une petite minorité il
think that it’s not the majority [ of ] people who do that but there is a small minority

il faut il faut que les gens sentent que=qu’il y a quand même qu’il y a un con=qu’il
it’s necessary it’s necessary that people feel that=that there is still a con=that there’s
y a un suivi et qu’on est là pour les aider [0.3] qu’on est la pour donner des idées
a follow up and that we are there to help them [0.3] that we are there to give them ideas

[ mais ] qu’il y a quand même un suivi
[ but ] that there is still a follow up

[uhu] ((nod))
[uhu] ((nod))
[uhu]

[.hhh] oui c’est plus les inciter à avoir de l’imagination ou donner d’autres idées
[.hhh] yes it’s more to encourage them to have some imagination or give other ideas
[voilà]
[that’s it]

pour ce qu’ils ont pu ↑utiliser er : donc utiliser la même chose mais différemment
for things that they could have ↑used er: so use the same thing but differently

[voilà]
[that’s it]
[uhu] ((nod))
[uhu] ((nod))

c’est surtout ça que j’ai expliqué a Eva j’ai dit que quelqu’un va aller dans un de
it’s above all that which I explained to Eva I said that somebody would go into one of
tes cours (.) je sais pas qui encore mais j’ai dit que le but était de voir ce que tu peux
your lessons (.) I don’t know who yet but I said the goal was to see what you can
faire et voir si on peut donner des idées et la personne qui vient va prendre des idées
do and see if we can give some ideas and the person who comes will take some ideas
de toi c’est un <échange> mais il faut le faire et je pense que er :::::
from you it’s an <exchange> but it must be done and I think that er:::

In line one, Alice announces the need to (re)start pedagogic support visits (and the pedagogic support visits we need to start them again). This provides a solution to a
problem, which she then sets out in extended turn, but since there is no display of commitment to this by the other participants, it is not (yet) hearable as a decision. As Alice takes her turn in which she describes the problems that have led to the announced solution of re-introducing the pedagogic support visits, Liz’s backchannels (‘uhu’) and nods which is hearable as tacitly agreeing and aligning with the turn-in-progress (Heath 1992). In line 15, when Alice finishes her turn, Liz gives an explicit agreement token “yes” and then paraphrases Alice’s turn at talk. The paraphrase displays understanding of, and alignment with, Alice’s version of the problem and so commitment to her projected future action is being negotiated. Furthermore, in a third turn, Alice confirms Liz’ understanding (line 16: that’s it) and so an intersubjective view of the problem which accounts for the projected action and so achieves commitment to it is emergent in the talk (Schegloff 1992b). This is followed by a further display of understating in a second paraphrase (line 17: for things that they could have \textit{used} er: so use the same thing but \textit{differently}) which again receives confirmation in the third turn. In this way, Liz shows commitment to, and alignment with, Alice’s statement that the visit have to start again and, furthermore, Nigel also tacitly aligns with this by nodding (line 19). In lines 20 following, Alice then self-selects to provide an extended turn in which she recounts an anecdote concerning how the support visits are to be implemented.

In sum, Alice’s projects future action in the first line (\textit{and the pedagogic support visits we need to start them again}) but this is not at this stage a decision because there is no commitment. The commitment is negotiated as Alice sets out the problem and makes retrospective sense of what has been going on in the company. Agreement with this version of organisational reality and so commitment to her projected future action is negotiated in the talk (mainly through Liz’s paraphrases) and so Alice’s announcement to restart the visits is retrospectively oriented to as a decision because her discourse identity as decision-announcer, which is reflexively linked to her situated identity as boss/chairman, is oriented to.

8.2.4 Embedded decision one: ‘les anciens’

Despite the fact that the decision has been announced, the talk on the visits continues and this provides more opportunities for sensemaking which leads to a series of ‘smaller’
decisions that nuance and add to the principal decision to restart the pedagogic support visits. In this way, the subordinates are also able to influence the decision-making process even though they cannot announce decisions. In line 24, after an anecdote about how Alice dealt with a teacher, Beth raises the problem of ‘les anciens’ who are the more experienced teachers who traditionally have resisted management interference in their work as contrasted with ‘les nouveaux’ who are the more inexperienced teachers who are, generally speaking, happy to have support provided by the management team. Through bringing a new mentionable to the talk she is thus able to add more specific details to the decision to restart the visits.

Extract 8.3

24  B er : je pense que pour des visites de soutien pédagogique le seul problème que je vois  
   er : I think that for the pedagogic support visits the only problem that I see  
   (0.3) qui peut se poser c’est surtout les anciens (0.5) quelques anciens qui er : sais  
   (0.3) that could occur is above all the experienced teachers (0.5 ) some experienced ones  
   pas quoi=  
   who er : I don’t know=  
25  A =à ce moment là c’est moi c’est moi [ et Peter qui] [ ( ) ]  
   =in that case it’s me it’s me [and Peter who] [ ( )]  
26  B [.hhh °oui° ] [voilà ]  
   [ .hhh °yes° ] [that’s it ]  
27  L oui je pense que c’est mieux [ oui je pense] ((gazes to Alice))  
   yes I think that that’s best [ yes I think so]  
28  A [((nod))]  
29  B [ les nouveaux] les nouveaux  
   [ the inexperienced ones] the inexperienced ones  
30  L [>qui sont < là depuis un ou deux ans] il y aura aucune problème ils  
   [/who are< there since a year or two] there won’t be a problem they  
31  B peuvent venir nous rencontrer quand ils veulent [ et faire ] les échanges il n’y a aucun  
   can come and meet us when they want [ and have] an exchange there is no  
32  N [ °tout à fait°]  
   [ °exactly°]  
33  B problème
problem

37  L   mais ils vont pas faire le demande de venir
   but they won’t make the request to come

38  A   les plus anciens vous verrez [(ça sera pour moi]
   the more experienced ones you’ll see [( that’ll be for me]

39  B   [il y en a pas il y en a pas beaucoup il y en a de]
   [ there aren’t any there aren’t many there are ]

40  moins en moins heh huh ‘hh
   less and less heh huh ‘hh

41  A   ça sera pour moi hehh [£on les élimine (h) tous on (h) les élimine tous£
   that’ll be for me hehh [£we get rid (h) of them all (h) we get rid of them all£

42  B   [ mh hih huh “huh” ]

43  N   okay le frein majeur pour cette visite de soutien pédagogique c’était le=c’était
   okay the major brake on this pedagogic visit was the=it was

In line 24, Beth introduces the topic of ‘les anciens’ which she explicitly frames as a problem and which makes the search for a solution sequentially relevant. When Beth hesitates and states ‘I don’t know’, Alice orients to this as signaling the end of Beth’s turn and she takes the floor by latching a turn onto Beth’s turn. Alice’s turn gives the solution to the problem that Beth has raised (line 4: in that case it’s me it’s me and Peter who) and so orients to herself as having the right to author the decision in the form of a projection of future action. At this point agreement, and so commitment to this future action, emerges in which Beth (line 28: yes and that’s it) and Liz (line 29: yes I think that that’s best yes I think so) contribute. Beth then self-selects to start a turn and she carries out a stepwise transition of topic to ‘les nouveaux’ who she claims won’t be a problem and Nigel agrees with this (line 35: exactly). However, Liz objects that they (i.e. the new teachers) will not come of their own accord (line 37: but they won’t make the request to come). This sets up a potential for disagreement but rather than resolving this it is ‘let pass’ because Alice does not take up the stepwise transition of topic in her next turn. Instead, she skips connects to the previous topic of ‘les anciens’ and restates a solution to the problem by stating that (line 38): the more experienced ones you’ll see ( that’ll be for me. This projects future action and therefore is hearable as part of a decision but, in this instance, agreement is somewhat mitigated and commitment to the
projection of future action is not interactionally achieved. As Alice takes her turn which projects future action, Beth overlaps with an ‘in-joke’ (line 39): *there aren’t any there aren’t many there are less and less heh huh ‘hh*. She has to place the joke as near to the topic of ‘*les anciens*’ as possible since otherwise the topic might shift and she will lose the opportunity slot to place her joke as near to the relevant topic as possible. The joke refers to the fact that there is a ‘brain-drain’ from the school and the more experienced teachers are leaving to find jobs with better pay and conditions. When Beth completes her turn, Alice repeats her decision in the clear (line 41: *that’ll be for me*). She then aligns with Beth’s prior turn by laughing and then in a smiley voice, her utterance punctuated with in-breaths indicating that it has laughter bubbling within it, she adds to Beth’s joke (*£we get rid (h) of them all(h)*)) which displays understanding of, and alignment with, the joke. Thus, while there is no specific agreement with Alice’s projection of future action there is no disagreement either since Beth’s need to place her utterance directly next to a prior turn in order to ‘make the joke work’ has filled the slot required for agreement. The matter is ‘let drop’ and Nigel then carries out a stepwise transition which changes topic and so fixes the sense of the talk-so-far without explicit agreement i.e. Alice will deal with ‘*les anciens*’.

In short, in terms of decision-making, Beth is thus able to exert influence by modifying Alice’s initial suggestion so that it takes account of ‘*les anciens*’. She introduces this mentionable to the sensemaking as a problem. Alice, then, provides a solution to this problem which implicitly contains future action that she will deal with the issue. In this way, the original suggestion that Alice made which did not mention ‘*les anciens*’, is nuanced through the actions of a subordinate through access to the discursive resource of topic transition, which allows her to introduce a mentionable to the decision-making episode.

### 8.2.5 Embedded decision two: the reports

Nigel continues the sensemaking process by introducing a further problem (‘*frein majeur*’) i.e. the ‘heaviness’ of writing the report of the inspection. He also proposes a solution to the problem and achieves a co-constructed version of the problem and the solution. However, since he is not the authorized decision-announcer he orients to Alice’s
right to announce the solution (which he has suggested) as the decision by projecting future action.

Extract 8.4

44 N okay le frein majeur pour cette visite de soutien pédagogique c’était le c’était

45 extrêmement lourd er : (0.2) en temps il fallait assister à tout le cours et il fallait ensuite

46 écrire un rapport selon [( )]

47 A [alors]

48 N > est-ce qu’< on peut nettement assouplir ça [ je préférerais] voir vraiment un système

49 A [ voilà ]

50 N où on peut passer d’une façon relativement informelle mais plus [ fréquemment en] et de

51 L [ uhu ]

52 faire de cette visite une visite c’est la deuxième partie [c’est le le

53 L [ uhu ]

54 [feedback] c’est le : er : [( )]

55 L [ uhu uhu] tout de suite ] et tout de suite

56 N et tout de suite

57 L pas une semaine après

58 N non

59 A oui je suis d’accord et le rapport je n’en veux pas (0.2) je veux simplement un rapport

60 qu’il y a eu une visite pédagogique [à telle] date [et ]voilà c’est les points

61 L [ uhu ]
qui on été discutés parce que ce n’est pas une inspection on est d’accord

that were discussed cause it is not an inspection we’re agreed

it’s a pedagogic support visit in fact it is an exchange between a

it’s a pedagogic support visit in fact it is an exchange between a

a little more experienced pedagogue=a more experienced pedagogue or two

a little more experienced pedagogue=a more experienced pedagogue or two

la visite faite la personne ne revient pas dans la cours de l’autre le problème est

the visit is done the person doesn’t go into the lesson of the other the problem is

the visit is done the person doesn’t go into the lesson of the other the problem is

once again well people don’t like it because they have so many lessons that

once again well people don’t like it because they have so many lessons that

when they have a free hour they think about doing something else other than attending

when they have a free hour they think about doing something else other than attending

when they have a free hour they think about doing something else other than attending

the lesson of somebody else and the report and all that for me it doesn’t interest me at

the lesson of somebody else and the report and all that for me it doesn’t interest me at

cause if there is a pedagogic follow up and we do the pedagogic visits er:

cause if there is a pedagogic follow up and we do the pedagogic visits er:

de toute façon ça incite les gens à maintenir la qualité parce qu’on fait parti d’une équipe

in any case it encourages people to keep up the quality because we’re part of a team

in any case it encourages people to keep up the quality because we’re part of a team

il y a des visites pédagogiques et er on n’a pas besoin d’un rapport détaillé du genre il

there are pedagogic visits and er: we don’t need a detailed report of the type he

there are pedagogic visits and er: we don’t need a detailed report of the type he

n’a pas utilisé tel mot si le cahier pédagogique n’est pas bien rempli ça
didn’t use a certain word if the teaching log is not filled in correctly that

didn’t use a certain word if the teaching log is not filled in correctly that

is something else is something else

is something else

it’s not the job of the
In line 44, Nigel takes the floor and raises a problematic area of the visits and therefore nuances and seeks to add to the emerging decision. First, he frames his contribution as noticing a problem with the visits (okay the major brake on this pedagogic visit was the=it was extremely heavy er : (0.2)  in time it was necessary to attend all the lesson and then it was necessary to write a report according to (        )). Alice overlaps his turn in progress with a stand alone ‘so’ which challenges the relevance of the previous turn at talk, makes an articulation of the upshot of the prior talk conditionally relevant in the next turn and so forces the first speaker to take a next turn to defend themselves (Hutchby 1996a: 51). In line 48, Nigel indeed orients to the stand alone ‘so’ as a challenge and he takes the floor and gives a conditionally relevant response which gives the relevance of his prior talk. He suggests, “could we relax that”. In the interrogative design of the upshot Nigel therefore orients to Alice as the person who has the category-bound moral right to make the decisions and to project future action. At this point, Alice overlaps Nigel’s turn-in-progress with an explicit agreement token (line 49: that’s it). As Sneijder and te Molder (2006) demonstrate, an explicit agreement token makes a claim of epistemic primacy. Thus, Alice claims that Nigel’s solution is an ‘obvious’ response which she held prior to his suggestion. She thus fights to display her primacy concerning what is going on in the company and how to rectify the problems but, nevertheless, it is Nigel who suggests the solution to the problem and so influences the decision-making since whilst Alice maneuvers to maintain epistemic primacy she also does agreement. Consequently, an intersubjective version of what is going in the company and commitment to future action, based on Nigel’s sequential first, is beginning to emerge.
Having received alignment to the assertion that there is a problem, Nigel continues his
turn by proposing a concrete solution to the problem (lines 48 ff.: *I’d really prefer to see
a system where we could go in in a relatively informal way but more often*). As the
solution emerges, it is co-constructed by Liz and so a team/intersubjective version of, and
commitment to, future organizational reality emerges. Liz backchannels as the turn is in
progress, which is hearable as tacit agreement and when Nigel hesitates (line 54), she
overlaps with ‘straight away’, which adds an adverb to Nigel’s turn-in-progress. Nigel
confirms this and accepts this alignment by repeating it in the clear and then Liz upgrades
the utterance (*not a week later*), which indicates agreement (Pomerantz 1984b) and Nigel
then confirms this in the next turn. Liz and Nigel thus co-construct the solution.

Alice then takes an extended turn which is prefaced by an empathic agreement token and
then projects future action (lines 59 ff.: *yes I agree and the report I don’t want it* (0.2) *I
simply want a report that there was a pedagogic visit on such a date and here are the
points that were discussed*). As she authors the turn, she receives tacit backchannels of
agreement from Nigel and Liz. Significantly, when she projects future action, she shifts
to the pronoun ‘I’ which indexes and makes relevant her discourse identity as decision-
announcer and signals her ownership of the decision. She then goes on to account for this
decision and so defines organisational reality concerning the visits in an extended turn
(lines 63 following) during which she formulates the gist of the meaning of the talk about
the nature of the visits.

In sum: Nigel is able to influence the decision-making episode by raising a problem
which brings new mentionables to the sensemaking process and then by proposing a
solution (i.e. a version of future organizational reality) that will solve these problems. The
other members of the team align with this and so commitment to an intersubjective
version of future reality is constructed. However, by suggesting future action (*could we
relax that; we could go in in a relatively informal way*) rather than announcing it, he
orients to Alice’s identity as chairperson and the fact that she has the category-bound
right to announce the decisions. Thus, Alice announces a decision but it is based on the
sensemaking which Nigel has initiated and which has paved the way for the projection of
future action.
8.2.6 Embedded decision three: making appointments for the visits

A similar pattern emerges in the talk when Nigel introduces the other ‘brake’ and thus initiates a new sensemaking episode which retrospectively treats his utterance (line 44 extract 8.4) ‘the major brake’ as the first in a list.

Extract 8.5

85 N l’autre frein à ça c’était erm un petit peu la formalité on prenait rendez-vous (0.3)
the other brake to that was erm a little bit the formality we made the appointment (0.3)
86 er : où on disait=on annonçait er : er : au prof concerné une heure avant qu’on allait
er : where we said=we announced er : er : to the teacher one hour before that we were going
87 passer dans son cours er .hhhhh je ne sais pas si ça si on peut le généraliser [et ] passer
to go into their lesson er : .hhhhh I don’t know if we could generalize that [and] go in
88 L [ .hhh ]
89 de façon improvisée (0.2) mais si on annonce que dans un cadre d’échange dans un
in an improvised way (0.2) but if we say that in the framework of an exchange in the
cadre de soutien er: les portes seront er:
framework of support er : the doors will be er : [ajar]
90 [entr’ouvertes]
91 A [toujours ouvertes] toujours ouvertes
[always open ] always open
92 N plutôt que fermées et que n’importe qui peut assister=
rather than closed and anybody can attend =
93 A =peut assister à n’importe quel cours
=can attend any lesson
94 N est-ce qu’on peut se couvrir comme ça er :: [je me sentirais mieux ] moi=
 can we cover ourselves like that er :: [me I’d feel better ]
95 B [tu penses que ( )]
[you think that ( )]
96 A =mais oui parce que quand tu préviens un prof il va faire un cours spécial
=but yes because when you give notice a teacher he is going to do a special lesson
97 [on voit rien du tout ] on voit rien du tout
[you don’t see anything ] you don’t see anything
98 N [ça fausse tout ça fausse tout]
[it falsifies everything it falsifies everything]
99 L mais peut-être pour la première fois l’avertir
but perhaps give notice the first time

non c’est pas avertir [car] c’est pas du flicage [ce n’est pas] une inspection

no it’s not giving notice [because] it’s not policing it’s not an inspection

non d’ Informer qu’on va passer et après la deuxième fois ne pas les informer

no to inform them that we’re going to go in and after the second time don’t tell them

£aha ((gazes to Liz, smiles and waves finger at Liz))

non ((gaze to Nigel))

non je pense que je vais informer tout le monde qu’il va y avoir des visites

no I think that I will tell everybody that there will be pedagogic visits

In line 85, Nigel introduces another problematic element to Alice’s version of future organizational reality concerning the pedagogic visits. He points out that there is a problem with giving notice before attending the lessons. He then provides the solution to this problem (line 87): I don’t know if we could generalize that and go in in an improvised way (0.2) but if we say that in the framework of an exchange in the framework of support the doors will be ajar. The solution is authored using an epistemic downgrade (I don’t know if) which orients to Alice’s identity as decision-announcer who has the normative right to announce the decision. Therefore, Nigel has to present his utterance in a mitigated form and as a suggestion so as not to usurp Alice’s category-bound right to announce a solution to a problem as a decision. As Nigel’s turn is in progress, he hesitates (line 90: er:) and Alice, by applying knowledge of syntax to the talk-so-far, anticipates what the talk might become as it unfolds and, in order to display agreement with Nigel, completes the turn-in-progress by adding always open always open onto Nigel’s turn. This is produced in overlap with Nigel because he also simultaneously completes his turn (line 90: ajar). Nigel then continues the turn by adding an increment (line 92: rather than closed and anybody can attend). However, Alice stops his trajectory by latching her turn on to what retrospectively becomes the end of Nigel’s turn and she collaboratively completes it by recycling the end of Nigel’s turn (line 93: can attend). This explicitly ties her turn to Nigel’s and then she adds the increment any lesson onto the co-authored turn-in-progress. Such co-construction of a version of the
problems is, thus, hearable as an emergent commitment to future action (i.e., the solution proposed by Nigel).

Nigel then states (line 94): *can we cover ourselves like that er :: me I’d feel better.* He thus orients to Alice as decision-announcer because collaboratively they have just authored a solution to the problem but for this to become a decision an explicit projection of future action has to be made by the authorized decision-announcer (i.e. Alice) and Nigel’s question makes such a response relevant. Having co-authored the talk-so-far it would be difficult for Alice to now disagree and she carries out agreement with an explicit agreement token (line 96: *but yes*) and then follows this with an explanation which accounts for the emerging decision (lines 96 ff: *because when you give notice a teacher he is going to do a special lesson you don’t see anything you don’t see anything*).

As Alice’s turn is in progress, Nigel co-constructs the turn by adding an increment after ‘special’. Thus, the turn’s first TCU (*because when you give notice a teacher he is going to do a special lesson*) is completed by Nigel’s increment (*it falsifies everything it falsifies everything*). Simultaneously, Alice also continues her turn and so the collaborative increment that completes Alice’s first TCU is provided in overlap. Yet, despite this overlap, the sensemaking is being done as a co-construction and so an intersubjective version of organizational reality which accounts for, and builds commitment to, the decision is emerging.

Liz then self-selects to add to the sensemaking by suggesting (line 99: *but perhaps give notice the first time*). This is immediately repaired by Alice who begins her next turn with an emphatic ‘*no*’. Alice self-selects (line 100), disaligns with Liz and uses her turn to sum up the gist of the talk-so-far concerning the visits. She states that the visits are: ‘*no it’s not giving notice because it’s not policing it’s not an inspection*’. At first (line 101), Liz overlaps Alice’s turn-in-progress by saying ‘*no*’ with rising intonation which is hearable as questioning Alice’s summing up of the gist of the talk-so-far. Then, she downgrades her utterance by underlining the fact that it is only for the first time and the rather formal ‘*give notice*’ is downgraded to ‘*inform*’ and so she seeks alignment with Alice (line 102: ‘*no to inform them that we’re going to go in and after the second time don’t tell them*’).

In line 103, Nigel smiles, laughs and waves his finger in front of Liz. He thus orients to Liz’s turn as a laughable and invites further laughter (Jefferson 1979: 80). Liz disaligns
with the laughter and, just after the onset of Nigel’s laugh, she continues topic talk which displays her orientation to the laugh as laughing at (Glenn 1995) and moves to terminate the relevance of the laugh. As a result of Alice’s repair and Nigel’s laugh, Liz’s suggestion is not aligned with and so her voice is excluded from the intersubjective version of the solution to the problem that is being authored.

Alice then self-selects (line 105) and prefaces her turn with an emphatic ‘no’ which (again) disaligns with Liz. As explicated below, she then goes on to announce the decision by projecting future action by saying, in concrete terms, what will happen.

Extract 8.6

105 A non je pense que je vais informer tout le monde qu’il va y avoir des visites
no I think that I will tell everybody that there will be pedagogic visits

106 pédagogiques et que des gens iront dans les cours des uns des autres et je demanderai à
and that people will go into each others’ lessons and I will ask

107 certaines personnes d’assister au cours de quelqu’un [et ]que ça sera tien tu
some people to attend the lesson of somebody [and] it will be hey you

108 L [uhu ]

109 peux assister à un cours de ( ) tu es libre aujourd’hui est ce que tu peux assister à
can attend the lesson of ( ) you are free today can you attend a certain

110 un cours d’un tel et je pense que c’est le seul moyen d’avoir vraiment (0.2) [pour] moi
lesson of a certain person and I think that it’s the only way to have really (0.2) [for] me

111 L [oui]
[yes]

112 ça devient formel [ça ] devient une inspection [( )] c’est pas le but mais bon
it becomes formal [it ] it becomes an inspection [( )] it’s not the objective but well

113 L [oui]
[yes]

114 B [voilà]
[that’s it]

115 A des gens vont se sentir mal
people will feel bad

116 L moi oui je pense
me yes I think so

117 B est-ce que ça pourrait être lancé par toi ((gaze to Alice))
could that be initiated by you
In lines 105 following, Alice states what future organizational reality will be and sets out a plan for concrete action: *no I think that I will tell everybody that there will be pedagogic visits and that people will go into each other’s lessons and I will ask some people to attend the lesson of somebody (0.5) and it will be hey you can attend the lesson of (____) you are free today can you attend a certain lesson of a certain person.* Significantly, again, she uses the ‘I’ pronoun to which indexes her ownership of the decision and her discourse identity as decision-announcer. She defines how the visits will be done in the future which takes the form originally suggested by Nigel (i.e. no advanced warning). As she authors her decision, she receives backchannels of agreement from Liz (lines 111 and 113: *yes*), who now begins to align with the emerging group consensus and Beth (line 114: *that’s it*) and in the next full turn Liz specifically aligns with Alice (line 116: *me yes I think so*). In line 118, Beth carries out a stepwise transition in topic and shifts the talk to the topic of who is going to inform the teachers of the new system. By shifting topic, the sensemaking on the issue of the pedagogic visits is stopped and *de facto* it also fixes Alice’s decision since the decision itself is no longer the object of further sensemaking.

In sum: Nigel introduces a further mentionable (line 85, extract 8.5) but, deferring to Alice’s identity as decision-announcer, he cannot announce this talk as a decision and orients to Alice’s right to do this (e.g. line 87: *I don’t know if we could generalise that* and line 94: *can we cover ourselves like that*). In the following sensemaking talk, Alice, Beth and Liz align with the proposed solution and consequently (lines 105 following) Alice is able to retrospectively orient to this talk as decision-making talk by announcing a decision.

### 8.3 Non-decisions: *c’est pour réflexion*

As explicated in the previous sections, subordinates can, and do, influence the decision-making process by involving the other team members and, notably, the authorised decision-announcer in authoring a co-constructed version of organisational reality so that commitment to future action is achieved. Yet, significantly, it is the projection of future action that retrospectively orients to the prior talk as decision-making talk: in the absence of the projection of future action by the authorised decision-announcer, no decision is
publically and accountably made. In the following extract, despite the fact that a co-authored version of a problem and a solution to this problem have been authored, the authorized decision-announcer does not project of future action and retrospectively labels the prior talk as ‘for reflection’.

In the following extract, the team has been discussing the need to give teachers some background knowledge of specific fields of business such as banking or human resource management. Nigel suggests that it would be interesting to have a poster in the teachers’ room with the relevant expertise of the teachers marked on it so as to display who has what expertise in which field and in which companies they are working. He achieves commitment to this idea but Alice, as authorised decision-announcer, does not orient to it as decision-making talk and so no decision is made.

Extract 8.7

1  N  ça serait intéressant d’afficher un petit peu dans la salle des profs
   *it would be interesting to put up a little bit in the teachers’ room*
   
2  un trombinoscope avec er : les noms dessus (0.2)
   *a chart with photos of the teachers with er: their names on it (0.2)*
   
3  A  des compétences
   *the skills (0.2)*
   
4  N  [les] les entreprises er : où on a travaillé ou où on travaille encore (0.3)
   *the companies er: where we worked or where we are still working (0.3)*
   
5  A  oui
   *yes*
   
6  N  c’est invisible pour l’instant
   *it’s invisible for the moment*
   
7  A  ça c’est une bonne idée ça donnerait [la aussi] ((writes in note book))
   *that is a good idea it would give [there too]*
   
8  N  [ça donnerait] un impact un impact visuel parce
   *[it would give] an impact an impact visual because
   
9  que personne ne sait ce que nous faisons (0.2) et er : ils tapent sur la table la pédagogie
   *nobody knows what we’re doing (0.2) and er: they bang the table the pedagogy*
   
10  ne bouge pas et ça m’énerve je pense que
   *isn’t moving and that annoys me*
   
11  A  ça *tou:ge*
ça bouge mais les gens ils ont l’impression que ça bouge pas on a eu la réflexion
it moves but people have the impression that it doesn’t move we had the remark
dès ( ) maintenant maintenant moi je pense que j’ai pas entendu
from ( ) now now me I think that=I didn’t hear
personnellement ça m’était relié
personally it was told to me
à toi ((gaze to B))
to you
er : maintenant [ je pense que ]
er : now [ I think that]
c’était à moi ]
[ it was to me ]
c’était pas toi qui l’a fait
it wasn’t you who made it
non non
no no
non non elle a reçu Beth (0.5) ça m’a mis en colère quoi parce que nous on bouge
no no she received it Beth (0.5) it made me angry what because we move
notre premier trimestre était axé sur la formation maintenant il faut que ça soit
our first term was based on training now it has to be
transparent il faut que ça soit visible if faut que les gens rendent compte du travail
transparent it needs to be visible so that people are aware of the work

In line one, Nigel makes a suggestion to the effect that it would be interesting to have a poster with the photos of the teachers on it and their names. After ‘names on it’ there is a slight pause. Alice self-selects to add abilities to what retrospectively becomes a list of what will be on the poster (i.e. names of teachers, photos, and skills). As she arrives at the end of the word skills, Nigel continues his turn and adds to the list: “the the companies er : where we worked or where we are still working”. Through co-constructing the list they are, thus, interactionally creating an intersubjective version of organisational reality.
When the list is completed, there is a slight pause in which Alice backchannels agreement (line 5: ‘yes’). Then Nigel continues his turn to account for this suggestion (line 6: it’s invisible for the moment). As Pomerantz (1984b) points out, an assessment makes a second assessment conditionally relevant and Alice takes a turn which aligns with Nigel’s
assessment but significantly she orients to it as an idea (line 7: *that’s a good idea*). Alice then continues her assessment but before she completes it, Nigel overlaps Alice’s turn-in-progress and by speaking more loudly he ‘wins’ the turn and repeats the start of Alice’s turn (line 8: *it would give*). He uses the turn to add an increment to Alice’s turn which accounts for his suggestion (lines 8 ff.: *it would give* an impact an impact visual because nobody knows what we’re doing (0.2) and er : they bang the table the pedagogy isn’t moving and that annoys me). In short, Alice aligns with Nigel’s suggestion but as will be seen below this is not in itself enough for the suggestion to become a decision.

Extract 8.8

23  N  il faut des visuels=il faut qu’il y ait un aspect visuel (.) on a le website
    *it is necessary to have visuals*=it’s necessary to have a visual aspect (.)we have the
24  il faut maintenant des compétences de chacun et je pense que ça ça=et il
    website now it’s necessary to have the skills of everybody and I think that that=it’s
25  faut des supports qui sont bien classés dans la salle de : de : des profs
    *necessary to have materials that are well classified in the teachers’ room*
26  A  dans la salle de profs je sais pas parce que moi je voudrais la réduire (.) mais enfin ça
    *in the teachers’ room I don’t know because me I want to reduce (.) well anyway*
27  c’est un autre er : parce que je voulais [enlever toutes] ces armoires je voulais
    *that’s another er : because I wanted to [take out all ] those cupboards I wanted to*
28  L  ![(( )]]
29  A  mettre des postes d’ordinateurs je veux des postes d’ordinateur pour les profs donc
    *put in computer terminals I want computer terminals for the teachers so*
30  les armoires on peut-être en garder une mais er : pas trop
    *the cupboards we can maybe keep one but er: not too many*
31  (0.3)
32  ![[( )]]
33  N  [mais ( )]
    *[but ( )]*
34  A  [afficher quelque part]
    *[put up somewhere]*
35  L  ![([ l’armoire des ])] cassettes des cassettes ça peut partir
    *[the cupboard of ] the cassettes of the cassettes that can go*
36  A  oui mais ça ne prend pas les classeurs
    *yes but that won’t take the folders*
Il faut mettre une affiche quelque part de tout ce qu'on connaît we need to put up a poster somewhere of everything that we know

pour tout le monde for everybody

oui tout le monde j’ai marqué ça (points to note book in front of her) yes everybody I noted [that]

tous les profs (all) the teachers

bon ça c’est pour réflexion ça va pas être fait aujourd’hui c’est un grand travail donc er : good that’s for reflection it won’t be done today it’s a lot of work so er :

donc il y a les autres questions er : so are there any other questions er :

moi je voulais avoir des missions plus claires me I’d like to have clearer tasks

In line 23, Nigel reintroduces the topic of the visuals. He then carries out a stepwise transition in topic by saying that teachers’ room should also have a set of well-classified (teaching) materials. Alice immediately disaligns with this in a next turn. First, she begins her turn with weak disagreement (in the teacher’s room I don’t know) and then she accounts for this disagreement by saying that she wants to put computer terminals in the teachers’ room. However, she ends her turn by compromising and stating that, (line 30) we can maybe keep one but er: not too many. She then begins an increment with the conjunction ‘but’. However, both Liz and Nigel self-select: Liz continues the topic of the cupboards and Nigel attempts to return topic to the posters with the teachers’ names, their areas of expertise and where they work marked upon it. However, Liz fights off Nigel’s turn, retains the floor by speaking more loudly and thus maintains the topic of how to arrange the teachers’ room rather than the posters. Alice orients to the topic of the cupboards by taking a turn which addresses Liz’s turn at talk. In this way, Nigel fails to achieve alignment with his idea of putting up posters. After a micro-pause, Nigel
reintroduces the idea of putting up a poster (line 36: *we need to put up a poster somewhere of everything that we know*). This is followed by a one second pause in which there is no uptake. An unidentified participant then asks *for whom*. Nigel replies *for everybody*. Alice confirms this by prefacing her turn with an agreement token (*yes*) and a repetition (*everybody*) and pointing to her notebook she remarks that she has already noted this and so confirms her alignment with Nigel’s idea of putting up a poster.

Then (line 43), Alice stops any possible topic development on the poster, she self-selects with ‘good’, which, as Button (1991) points out, can be used as an assessment which moves towards topic closing. She then uses meta-comment to label the prior talk as reflection and that it will not be done today as it is a lot of work (line 43: *good that’s for reflection it won’t be done today it’s a lot of work so er :*). No statement of future action is made. Consequently, the suggestions of Nigel and subsequent talk are not oriented to as decision-making talk but are retrospectively labeled ‘reflection’. Significantly, then, the authorized decision-maker can also label the talk as non-decision talk rather than as decision-making talk. Furthermore, Alice then accesses her omni-relevant identity as chairperson and her category-bound right to shift and close topic, and she effects a topic shift with a topic initial initiator: *so are there any other questions*. Liz replies that, *me I’d like to have clearer tasks* and so a topic change is effected. The non-decision is maintained and so Nigel’s utterances are oriented to as ‘for reflection’ and do not lead to any projections for future action. Thus, even though a co-authored version of organizational reality and a solution are authored, this is no guarantee that the authorized-decision maker will necessarily orient to the talk as decision-making talk and, as in this case, by *not* projecting future action the talk is oriented to as for reflection rather than as decision-making.

### 8.4 Conclusion

Decisions are inextricably tied up with sensemaking: sense has to be made of the current/past situation as problematic in a way that justifies or accounts for future action (prospective sensemaking). In this way, a decision - an agreed upon version of future organizational reality formulated as a projection of future action - emerges from the negotiation of, and commitment to, an intersubjective version of the situation (i.e.
sensemaking). This sensemaking is available to all members of the team. However, announcing the decision and thus retrospectively labeling that talk as a decision-making episode is category-bound to the identity of the chairperson. Such a differential distribution of discursive rights is the stuff of influence since it allows the chairperson ‘the last word’ in a decision-making episode. First, they decide at what stage in the interaction the talk is labeled as a decision and indeed whether to label the previous talk as a decision-making episode or not. But access to category-bound turn-type allocation is not in itself enough to explicate the doing of influence in decision-making episodes. The other participants can, and do, participate in the sensemaking that builds commitment to future action and, in this way, subordinates can nuance emerging decisions. However, as explicated in the last section (8.3), even though a joint version of organizational reality and solution for this problem are negotiated it is not necessarily enough to assure a decision. This is because a projection of future action has to come from the authorized decision-maker and, as section 8.3 demonstrates, when Alice withholds a projection of future action and orients to the talk-so-far as for reflection, no decision is made.
9. Rubber-stamping: The rhetorical design of sensegiving or selling a decision

9.1 Introduction

As previously noted, decision-making episodes make the discursive identities decision-maker (an identity available to all the team members) and decision-announcer (identity available only to Alice) procedurally consequential to the interaction. The extracts discussed in the previous chapter have all had some degree of negotiation in the decision talk. In the following extract, the decision is announced by the authorized announcer (Alice) and is then defended. Thus, rather than decision-making what becomes visible is a case of decision selling (by the authorized decision-announcer) or rubber stamping. This refers to the practice of announcing decisions that have been made prior to the pedagogic meeting so as to achieve external credibility for the decision by showing that it has been approved by the ‘proper channels’. Yet, in fact, the meeting itself serves just to as a stamp to add authority and no serious discussion is entered into. The authorized decision-announcer’s role is, therefore, one of selling the decision and accounting for it rather than allowing other participants to negotiate the decision itself. Returning, then, to Garfinkel’s (1967) work on decision-making discussed in section 8.1, this has less to do with making rational choices than justifying courses of action that have already been decided upon. Consequently, the decision-maker who defines an aspect of future organizational reality can be seen less as a manager of meaning or sensemaker than that of a sensegiver. Sensegiving therefore implies that there is a limited negotiated aspect to the production of the decision and, as Rouleau (2005: 1415) says, sensegiving is a question of influencing outcomes and communicating thoughts about changes to others to gain support for the already made decision.
The following extract explicates this particular aspect of decision-making. The extract concerns the issue of increasing the length of a telephone lesson\(^\text{11}\) from 20 minutes to 30 minutes per lesson. When the recordings were made, teachers had 20 minute’s contact with the clients on the phone but were paid 30 minutes. The ‘other’ ten minutes were considered as time for preparation, arranging the next lesson with the client and so on. The new system would change the length of the lesson to 30 minutes contact with the client and the extra 10 minutes for administrative work would be retained. The decision, as Alice states herself, has in any case already been made. Thus, there is no question, in this extract at least, of making sense of ‘what is going on in the organization’ and then formulating this in order to ‘do’ a decision and of seeking a negotiated co-authored decision as seen in previous extracts in chapter 8. The decision has already been made, so Alice has to justify the decision in a way that is persuasive and obtains the agreement of the other participants so that the pre-supposition of a world known in common is maintained.

The world held in common is thus a practical matter and has to be constructed in talk. Not only does talk create and sustain a particular version of reality, but it is also designed to do this effectively through the use of rhetoric (Potter 1996). Therefore, from the social constructionist perspective, the rhetorical construction of the accounting for the decision is not simply a question of presenting the best possible case to justify a pre-discursive reality that is ‘out-there somewhere’. Rather “engaging in rhetoric [is] taking part in the process whereby realities about workplaces are socially constructed” (Watson 1995: 7).

Through justifying and accounting for her decision, Alice is thus authoring a particular version of organizational reality. However, to do leadership she has to influence the other participants to bring them ‘on-side’ so as to sell the decisions and create an intersubjective, team version of organizational reality.

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\(^{11}\) i.e. language lessons that are given to clients over the phone. This is a common way of giving lessons for clients who prefer not to leave their offices and it makes up one of the most profitable products in the school’s portfolio of courses.
9.2 The rhetorical design of decision-making

The following extract is discussed in terms of the rhetoric that Alice uses to ‘sell’ a decision as she takes an extended turn to justify a change in format of the telephone lessons.

Extract 9.1

1 A beaucoup de sociétés il y a beaucoup de sociétés qui veulent une demi-heure aujourd’hui
   many companies there are many companies who want half an hour today
2 (0.5) la concurrence fait une demi-heure déjà la concurrence = on est les seuls à faire vingt
   (0.5) the competition already does half an hour = we are the only ones to do twenty
3 minutes (0.2) on a créé un produit au départ on était les premiers sur le marché pour ce
   minutes (0.2) we originally created a product we were the first on the market for that
4 genre de produit on avait créé vingt minutes trois cours par heure à l’époque les profs
   kind of product we created twenty minutes three lessons an hour at that time the teachers
5 étaient payés vingt minutes (0.3) faut pas oublier donc ils faisaient trois cours en une
   were paid twenty minutes (0.3) so mustn’t forget they did three lessons in an
6 heure donc c’est pour ça que c’était ( ) en une heure on faisait trois cours ça n’a jamais
   hour so it’s for that that it was ( ) in one hour we did three lessons that was
7 été le cas on est passé à une demi-heure les cours étant vingt minutes aujourd’hui Cibex
   never the case we went to half an hour the lessons being twenty minutes today Cibex
8 nous demande de passer à une demi-heure parce que leur système informatique supporte
   asked us to go to half an hour because their computer system no longer
9 plus vingt minutes donc au premier janvier tous les cours de Cibex sont renouvelés à
   takes twenty minutes so on the first of january all the lessons at Cibex are renewed at
10 une demi-heure tous (0.2) il ya plus un cours de vingt minutes chez Cibex ( ) de plus en
   a half an hour all (0.2) there are no longer any twenty minute lessons at Cibex ( ) more
11 plus de sociétés =moi j’ai vendu un cours téléphone ce matin j’ai parlé avec le monsieur
   and more companies = me I sold a telephone lesson this morning I spoke with the man
12 et la société fait déjà des cours et j’ai dit écoutez une demi-heure j’ai parlé avec le
   and the company already do lessons and I said listen a half an hour I spoke with the
13 stagiaire j’ai dit vingt minutes pour faire la grammaire pour faire quelque chose
   student I said twenty minutes to do the grammar to do something
14 d’intéressant était court et il m’a dit qu’il préférait les cours d’une demi-heure car il faut
   interesting was short and he told me that he would prefer lessons of half an hour because

---

12 One of the major clients of the company
15 qu’il aille assez vite donc les cours d’une demi-heure >c’est vrai< ça fait quatorze
16 it’s necessary for him to go fairly quickly so half hour lessons >it’s true< that makes
17 semaines au lieu de vingt-et-une il gagne sept semaines et on renouvellera peut-être sept
18 fourteen weeks instead of twenty one he gains seven weeks and we’ll maybe renew seven
19 semaines plutôt donc nous on a tout à gagner par ce produit là donc on passera à des
weeks earlier so we have everything to gain by this product so we’ll move to
20 cours d’une demi-heure >de toute façon la décision est prise< (0.5) il y a des implications
half hour lessons >in any case the decision is taken< (0.5) there are budgetary
21 budgétaires il ya des implications de renouvellement des stages plus rapidement et des
implications there are implications for renewing courses more rapidly and
22 nous parce que nous une demi-heure ça fait quarante minutes c’est plus embêtant à gérer
us because us a half hour makes forty minutes it’s more difficult to manage
23 mais par rapport au client par rapport au suivi des stages une demi-heure ça fait une
but as regards the client as regards the follow-up of the courses half an hour makes
24 demi-heure ça fait un heure c’est beaucoup plus rapide pour eux (0.5) donc on passe à
half an hour that makes an hour that’s quicker for them (0.5) so we move to
25 une demi-heure au lieu de vingt minutes >et je pense que< les profs dans l’ensemble
half an hour instead of twenty minutes >and I think that< the teachers in the main
26 seront plus contents
will be happier

9.2.1 Category entitlement

The first rhetorical technique that Alice uses to ‘sell’ her decision is that of category entitlement. Category entitlement can be glossed as the way in which certain categories of people in certain contexts are treated as knowledgeable so that, for example, simply being a doctor is sufficient to account for having and displaying knowledge in the medical field (Potter 1996: 133). Moreover, as Jayyusi (1984: 39) points out, categories carry with them a corpus of expectable skills, abilities and knowledge which she calls the ‘credentials of incumbency’. Consequently, any display of identity carries with it expectable states of knowledge. Rhetorically, therefore, displays of category membership can be used to give credibility to the construction of a particular aspect of reality. For

13 i.e. the lessons last 30 minutes but the teacher is paid 40 minutes because 10 minutes are paid ‘extra’ to compensate for preparation time.
example, somebody who is ascribed the identity ‘doctor’ has an entitlement to display knowledge of medical conditions that is unavailable to lay people. In a similar way, Alice makes use of her category entitlement as director to construct the ‘facts’ of what is happening commercially. On the other hand, the senior teachers do not have the same entitlement to make truth claims about the commercial aspect of the business since they are one step removed from the commercial life of the company and do not have the category entitlement to display knowledge of the commercial aspects of the company.

Alice begins her turn: *there are many companies who want half an hour today.* She thus claims knowledge of the ‘commercial’ situation: what the companies want and what the competition is doing and reflexively, by displaying such knowledge, she makes her identity of director relevant. Moreover, she does this in a first position and without any hedging/downgrading. She, thus, claims epistemic primacy (Raymond and Heritage 2006). Moreover, since the teachers do not have knowledge of the commercial situation as a predicate of their identity they are in a weaker position should they want to present an alternative version of what is going on in the market.

### 9.2.2 The creation of ‘out-there-ness’

Potter (1996: 150 *ff.*) uses the term ‘out-there-ness’ to refer to the construction of descriptions as ‘factual’ representations of pre-discursive reality that represent the world ‘as it is’. In this case, Alice creates a sense of ‘out-there-ness’ by voicing the views of ‘many companies’. In Goffman’s (1979) terms, she creates for herself the identity of both animator (i.e. she voices the message) and author (i.e. since the talk is not in direct speech she also claims to author the words) but, significantly, the principal (i.e. the persons or body held responsible for the stance expressed in the words) is designated as the companies. In this way, she distances herself from the decision and makes it appear as if the decision is a ‘logical’ consequence of ‘out-there’ market forces and justified by the desires of the client. Therefore, her category entitlement as director, with a predicate of ‘knowing’ about the current state of the market, allows her to make this assertion that presents the market ‘as it is’ and state as ‘fact’ that companies want to have 30-minute lessons and not 20-minute lessons. The other participants being ‘teachers’ do not have such category entitlement to display knowledge about the market. As such Alice makes
use of her access to epistemic resources to present a version of the organizational environment as ‘fact’ and this ‘fact’ is difficult to challenge since the teachers do not have the category entitlement to ‘know about’ the market since they are one step removed from the commercial process.

This is also an instance of stake inoculation (Potter 1996: 125) which is used to defend against the imputation that Alice is acting out of self-interest or the interests of the organization rather than that of the teachers. Thus, as part of a defensive rhetoric designed to counter potential arguments against her position, Alice casts the increase in length of the telephone lesson from 20 to 30 minutes as an aspect of external ‘reality’ of market forces and thus the change itself has nothing to do with her own, or the Language Academy’s, interests. Moreover, by using the extreme quantifier (*many*) she makes use of an extreme case formulation to make her version of events more powerful. Pomerantz (1986) lists three reasons why extreme cases constitute powerful discursive resources. First, they defend against or counter potential challenges to formulations and are used by participants “when they anticipate or expect their co-interactants to undermine their claims and when they are in adversarial situations” (Pomerantz 1986: 222). Second, they are used to propose that a phenomenon is an objective ‘fact’ and not the product of circumstances and thus they take away the importance of actors and point to the unambiguous ‘out-there-ness’ of the phenomenon. Third, they propose that some behaviour or observation is not ‘wrong’ because it is frequently occurring and the normality and everydayness of the phenomena therefore make it substantially right.

### 9.2.3 Contrast

Furthermore, to underline the effect of the extreme case formulation Alice contrasts the Language Academy’s action with the actions of the competition (line 2: *we are the only ones to do twenty minutes*). This is a way of underlining the unusualness of the Language Academy’s position and so it supports the view of aligning with the consensus of the market. As Smith (1978) points out, comparisons can implicitly establish one course of action/behaviour as ‘normal’ and the contrastive behaviour as ‘abnormal’. Thus, when Alice points out that all the competitors do 30 minute-lessons, she effectively mobilises this consensus in support of her argument. Implicitly, then, consensus indicates being
‘right’ and normal and that therefore the change from 20 minutes to 30 minutes is justifiable.

Alice also contrasts across time. In the continuation of the turn, she favourably contrasts the new proposals for the 30-minute lesson with the historical evolution of the lessons (line 4 ff.: we originally created a product we were the first on the market for that kind of product we created twenty minutes three lessons an hour at that time the teachers were paid twenty minutes (0.3) so mustn’t forget they did three lessons in an hour so it’s for that that it was ( ) in one hour we did three three lessons that was never the case we went to half an hour the lessons being twenty minutes). Thus, Alice reminds the teachers that in the beginning telephone lessons were 20 minutes and preparation time and so on was not paid. By comparison with the ‘bad old days’ the teachers are still getting a good deal because they will be paid 30 minutes teaching-time and will have an extra 10 minutes paid for preparation.

9.2.4 Announcing the decision

In line seven, Alice shifts topic to the customer requirements of Cibex, which is one of the biggest clients of the school. She states (line 7 ff.), today Cibex asked us to go to half an hour because their computer system no longer takes twenty minutes. Thus, again, Alice presents the change in the length of the telephone lessons as an external, market-driven decision in which she and the Language Academy are simply following the market trends. Consequently, her own and the organization’s stake is obscured. Alice then presents the decision: so on the first of January all the lessons at Cibex are renewed at a half an hour all (0.2) there are no longer any twenty minute lessons at Cibex. How and when the decision was taken has not been discussed though it is probable that it was decided by the sales reps, Alice and the company concerned. Thus, any decision-making, in the sense of inviting the team-members to participate in this particular decision, is denied. What follows (and what has preceded the decision announcement) is more an attempt to justify and account for this ready-made decision which requires ‘rubber stamping’ so that it can be seen to have been publically and accountably achieved. Alice then continues with her turn and uses it to account for the decision with a personal anecdote.
9.2.5 Personal anecdote

Stories are not only told in conversation to make assessments about the world but, from a social constructionist perspective, they also create the reality which they seek to describe. Stories are thus an essential feature of participants’ attempts to influence an intersubjective version of organisational reality and working form a social constructionist and rhetorical perspective, stories are not (indeed cannot be) neutral reconstitutions of ‘facts’ or past events. They are always designed to do something and influence the sensemaking process by giving credibility to one version of events. Consequently, stories can be employed as prototypical representations of situations “where universality can be established without sacrificing the vital element of personal experience, which is central to the success of all stories” Richards (2006a: 146). Thus, in the following ‘story’ (embedded in extract 9.1 and reproduced below for ease of reading), Alice authors past events so as to render the decision to change the length of telephone lessons accountable.

Extract 9.2

10 demi-heure tous (0.2) il ya plus un cours de vingt minutes chez Cibex ( ) de plus en a half an hour all (0.2) there are no longer any twenty minute lessons at Cibex ( ) more
11 plus de sociétés =moi j’ai vendu un cours téléphone ce matin j’ai parlé avec le monsieur and more companies=me I sold a telephone lesson this morning I spoke with the man
12 et la société fait déjà des cours et j’ai dit écoutez une demi-heure j’ai parlé avec le and the company already do lessons and I said listen a half an hour I spoke with the
13 stagiaire j’ai dit vingt minutes pour faire la grammaire pour faire quelque chose student I said twenty minutes to do the grammar to do something
14 d’intéressant était court et il m’a dit qu’il préférait les cours d’une demi-heure car il faut interesting was short and he told me that he would prefer lesson of half an hour because
15 qu’il aille assez vite donc les cours d’une demi-heure >c’est vrai< ça fait quatorze it’s necessary for him to go fairly quickly so half hour lessons > it’s true< that makes
16 semaines au lieu de vingt-et-une il gagne sept semaines et on renouvellera peut être sept fourteen weeks instead of twenty one he gains seven weeks and we’ll maybe renew seven
17 semaines plutôt donc nous on a tout à gagner par ce produit là donc on passera à des weeks earlier so we have everything to gain by this product so we’ll move to
18 cours d’une demi-heure >de toute façon la décision est prise< (0.5) half hour lessons >in any case the decision is taken< (0.5)
In line 10, she begins *more and more companies* which repeats what she said at the beginning of her extended turn about many companies wanting the change. However, she does not finish the projected trajectory. Instead, she latches a personal anecdote onto this grammatically unfinished utterance and so shifts topic. The personal anecdote claims, as previously noted, rights to have and display ‘knowledge’ of what the companies want and so she claims to speak on behalf of the companies. Firstly, as Pomerantz (1984a) points out, this deployment of first-hand information can be used to bolster an account in an argument as a way of demonstrating that the ‘reality’ of the situation is known unproblematically and thus epistemic primacy is claimed. Furthermore, since nobody else has access to the event, the anecdote can be shaped as the speaker wants and nobody else can challenge what is said without directly challenging the author which is, of course, a precarious action to embark on without direct access to event. In this way, Alice establishes sole access to the event and her version of the event is unlikely to be challenged. She thus has free rein to shape the anecdote as she likes to support her own version of organisational reality. Secondly, the fact that Alice sold a course indexes her identity as director who also has a commercial function and has a right to ‘know’ about the market from first hand experience which the others participants do not. Consequently, Alice is able to display knowledge to which the others have no access. Significantly, this knowledge which she is able to display is mobilised to account for the decision that she has already made. Consequently, it becomes part of the resources with which she is able to author a persuasive rhetorical account of ‘organisational reality’.

Additionally (line 12 ff: *I said listen a half an hour I spoke with the student I said twenty twenty minutes to do the grammar to do something interesting was short and he told me that he would prefer lesson of half an hour because it’s necessary for him to go fairly quickly*), Alice uses what Wooffitt (1992) describes as ‘active voicing’ (i.e. the use of reported speech within accounts). Such active voicing blurs the distinction between the principal, the author and animator (Goffman 1979) and so can be used to present a claim (in this case Alice’s claim that 30-minute lesson are better) as an objective fact by claiming independent corroboration which points to the existence of a true and factual state of affairs that different players can see independently. Consequently, what is presented as a straightforward report of prior talk can be used as a shortened version of
the gist of what the other person said (Potter 1996) that characterizes the ‘fact’ clients want 30-minute lessons rather than 20-minute lessons.

The coda, which is used to give the upshot of the anecdote, comes in lines 15 ff.: *so half hour lessons* >it’s true< *that makes fourteen weeks instead of twenty one he gains seven weeks and we’ll maybe renew seven weeks earlier so we have everything to gain by this product so we’ll move to half hour lessons* >in any case the decision is taken< (0.5). Alice prefaces the coda with ‘so’ which gives the upshot of the anecdote but this appears to be a false start since she stops this utterance whilst it is grammatically incomplete and begins a next TCU (it’s true) which introduces the coda. *It’s true* points to the external ‘factness’ of the upshot. By increasing the lessons to 30 minutes, a course is completed in 14 weeks instead of 21 and the client gains seven weeks which is, according to the state of affairs presented in the anecdote, what the market wants. Alice then ‘does’ a second upshot: *so we have everything to gain by this product so we’ll move to half hour lessons* >in any case the decision is taken< (0.5). In this upshot, she uses an ambiguous ‘we’ pronoun (‘on’ in the original French text). The inclusive ‘we’ pronoun superficially includes the team but it could also be ‘we’ the company. Thus, as Hanak (1998) points out, the ambiguity of ‘we’ can be a strategy of persuasion since by making the referent ambiguous it is less easily challenged. In this case, the use of ‘on’ leaves open the referent: does it refer to the Language Academy, in which case it may exclude the senior teachers at the meeting and may refer to financial benefits for the company that are not the team members’ primary concern or does it refer to the senior teachers present who also teach the lessons?

**9.2.6 Three-part lists**

Following this anecdote, Alice (re)announces the decision (line 18: *in any case the decision is taken*) and then continues her talk to justify it. She now makes use of a three-part list which, as Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) state, is conventionally treated as strengthening or affirming a broader, overarching position or argument. Moreover, such lists can be used to summarize a general class of things so that their application ranges beyond the three items mentioned to become a general statement of ‘truth’ (Potter 1996: 196). Thus, in this instance, the three-part list takes the form of implications for, the
budget, the renewal of contracts and the clients’ computer systems which stand proxy for the general truth that everybody will benefit from the changes (line 18 ff.: there are budgetary implications there are implications for renewing courses more rapidly and implications for computer systems of management as regards the clients). First, then, Alice talks about the budgetary implications. As mentioned previously, this displays knowledge to which the other participants do not have access and so cannot be easily disputed by other members of the team. The second part of the list concerns renewing the contracts more rapidly which, again, displays knowledge of a commercial aspect of the organization of the school to which she, as manager, has category entitlements to display and to which the other team members, as senior teachers, do not have access. Third, she then continues the list by talking about the computer systems of the clients to which she as director has access since she also has a commercial role in the company and therefore knows what the clients want. Once more, by displaying knowledge to which the other participants are not entitled, she denies them access to discursive resources from which a counter-argument could be made. Furthermore, this last item on the three-part list is closed with an explicit attempt at stake inoculation (line 21: it’s more difficult to manage but as regards the client as regards the follow-up of the courses half an hour makes half an hour that makes an hour that’s quicker for them). Thus, by stating that the Language Academy has nothing to gain from the changes and that the changes are being driven by customer wishes, Alice avoids displaying any self-interest in the changes.

9.2.7 Claiming consensus

Finally, Alice renders her decision accountable in terms of what the teachers will think (lines 24 ff.: and I think that the teachers in the main will be happier). Thus, again using her category entitlement as director with the accountable predicate of knowing what her staff think, she is able to mobilise their voice to support her arguments. In other words, she is able to claim privileged access to what the teachers ‘as a whole’ think since she is in constant contact with them as a supervisor and so assumes the role of ‘spokesperson’ for them. Moreover, it creates an impression of consensus and therefore ‘factness’ around the argument: if, in the main, the teachers are going to be happy with
the changes then they also perceive the world as Alice does and this builds a consensus which is implicitly the correct and true perception of the world ‘as it is’ (Smith 1978).

9.3 Conclusion

Returning to the definition of leadership from a social constructionist perspective of leaders being managers of meaning, it would appear as if decisions are a key site in which leader as identity emerges. However, the distinction between sensegiving and sensemaking becomes relevant. Sensemaking implies a negotiated achievement of intersubjectivity whereas sensegiving implies an asymmetrical ‘giving’ of sense without opportunity to negotiate. Thus, in the extract discussed in this chapter, the decision has already been made and Alice tries to ‘sell’ it. In order to sell it, she has recourse to powerful rhetorical devices such as stake inoculation, extreme case formulations and category entitlements. In this way, she constructs a retrospective version of organisational reality that accounts for her decision. Yet, the extract discussed above comprises of one extended turn of talk. In itself, since it is monologic, it cannot lead to the creation of an intersubjective version of organisational reality: it needs agreement and alignment for this to happen. The focus of the next chapter will be on the achievement of alignment.
10. Achieving agreement: repair and alignment

10.1 Introduction

The achievement of intersubjectivity relies on achieving alignment and agreement concerning what is, has been or will be ‘going on’ in the organization. Such alignment is achieved via the next turn proof procedure whereby an understanding of the first turn is displayed in the next turn. In the case of disagreement the next turn can be used to repair the speaker in an attempt to arrive at an intersubjective version of events. Therefore, intersubjectivity, or the creation of a world held in common, is not a question of exchanging observations about reality as the telementational myth (discussed in chapter two) would have us believe. Rather it has to be negotiated in talk and is thus achieved through the locally managed sequences of talk which are subject to the participants’ orientations to what they consider to be allowable contributions to the talk. The creation of intersubjectivity is thus an in situ members’ practice and not “a matter of generalized intersection of beliefs or knowledge, or procedures for generating them” (Schegloff 1992b: 1299). Furthermore, Schegloff (ibid) goes on to suggest that repair is one of the key discursive resources for achieving such intersubjectivity. However, at other times, no explicit repair is needed to achieve agreement since, as Wasson (2000: 463) points out, subordinates recognise that it is in their best interests “to display alignment with corporate ideology and the interests of senior managers.” Consequently, they can seek to align with the emergent management line as it emerges in talk and in this way they ‘go with the flow’ so that repair is sometimes not required to ensure an intersubjective team version of organisational reality.

10.2 Repair

In the discursive construction of intersubjective reality, who repairs whom can be a vital way of ‘doing’ influence through building a particular version of intersubjective reality. In short, the repairer establishes their version of reality and the repaired gives up their
version of the world. Following Schegloff et al. (1977) repairs are not limited to
correction or errors, but include word searches, problems of hearing, or
disambiguation. As such, repair trajectories can be seen as a kind of self-righting
mechanism that allows conversation to continue. They are thus significant discursive
resources in influencing the negotiation of organizational reality. Repairs are essential to
this process because any utterance displays a particular view of ‘reality’ and thus
contributes to the incremental achievement of the turn-by-turn construction of a
discursively created intersubjective reality. Without the possibility of repair the
establishment of intersubjective version of (organisational) reality is at risk since
participants could leave the meeting with conflicting understandings. Repairs are thus a
resource for dealing with troubles in talk that might embody a breakdown of
intersubjectivity. From this perspective, the achievement of socially shared and
intersubjective understanding of organization is not primarily cognitive or individual but
is achieved, or lost, in the sequential properties of talk-in-interaction. Moreover, the
production of intersubjectivity that repair allows is party administered or, as Schegloff
(1992b: 1338) states:

[T]he adequacy of understanding and intersubjectivity is assessed not against some general
criterion of meaning or efficacy (such as convergent paraphrase), and not by an ‘external’ analyst,
but by the parties themselves, vis-à-vis the exigencies of the circumstances in which they find
themselves.

As Schegloff et al. (1977) point out, repair is not limited to correction of ‘errors’ but is
designed to catch wider ‘troubles’ in talk such as mishearings. In the context of
‘influence’, this thesis concentrates on repair which is hearable as ‘correcting’ what is
perceived to be a ‘false’ assertion of organisational reality (past, present or future) and
replacing it with a ‘true’ versions of organisational reality. Repairs thus become an issue
of whose account of organisational reality counts and thus are a means of dealing with
the breakdown of intersubjectivity. Following, Levinson’s (1992) notion of allowable
contributions, who repairs who thus becomes a crucial issue in the negotiation of
organisational reality and ‘rights’ to repair must be carefully oriented to through category
entitlements which have to be mobilised in order to ‘do’ repair.
10.2.1 Types of repair
Following, Schegloff et al. (1977) repair conventionally has four possible trajectories: self-initiated self-repair, other-initiated self-repair, other-initiated other-repair and self-initiated other-repair. Self-initiated self-repair, as can be seen in the extract below, occurs when the speaker notices the repairable and carries out repair themselves. In this case, self-initiated self-repair is carried out by the speaker who notices a trouble source and self-correction using ‘I mean’.

N:  She was givin me a ll the people that were go:ne this yea:rr I mean this quarter y’ ll know
J:  Yeah

Schegloff et al. (1977: 364)

Other-initiated self-repair occurs when a speaker says something that is considered a trouble source by another participant and the speaker is given the opportunity to repair the repairable. Thus, in the extract below, Roger (he is?) initiates a self-repair which is carried out by Dan (he was).

Ken:  Is Al here today?
Dan:  Yeah.
(2.0)
Roger:  He is? hh eh heh
Dan:  Well he was.

Schegloff et al. (1977: 364)

Other-initiated other-repair occurs when, someone other than the speaker initiates the repair and then speaker carries it out. This in the extract below, B repairs A’s ‘just playing around’ and replaces it with ‘fooling around’.

B:  Where didju play b:sk/baw.
A :  (The) gy:m.
B:  In the gym?
A: Yeah. Like group therapy. Yuh know=
B: Oh:::
A: half the group that we had last term was there en we jus' playing around.
B: Fooling around.
A: Eh- yeah ...

Schegloff et al. (1977: 365)

Finally, self-initiated other-repair occurs when the speaker requests that another participant carries out repair. This as can be seen in the extract below, where the utterance ‘I can’t think of his first name’, prompts repair by another participant.

B: He had dis uh Mistuh W- whatever k- I can't think of his first name, Watts on, the one that wrote // that piece,
A: Dan Watts.

Schegloff et al. (1977: 364)

Furthermore, Schegloff et al. (1977) pointed out that there is a preference for self-repair and self-initiated repair. However, their corpus consisted of ‘conversational data’. In institutional interaction, there is evidence to show that this preference is not oriented to (Kangasharju 2002; Kothoff 1993). As Kangasharju (2002: 1453) points out:

“The ‘errors’ hearable in a speaker’s talk may have a slightly different status in institutional interactions than in ordinary conversation. The members of an institutional committee may act unethically or counter productively if they do not correct errors that would give an inaccurate picture of the activities of the members or some matters in their experience and knowledge sphere. This also makes understandable both the collective opposition and the shape of the disagreeing turns as preferred (non-delayed and not noticeably mitigated) responses.”

(author’s italics)

Kangasharju and Kothoff’s findings concur with the data in this thesis: repair tends to be other-initiated other-repair and tends to be unmitigated. Repair also tends to be linked to claims of epistemic primacy (or knowing best) which can be, as will be discussed later,
category-bound. However, for the moment, suffice to say that if other-repair is carried out it assumes that the ‘repairer’s’ rights to knowledge and to display this knowledge outweigh the rights of the speaker. Repair is, thus, one way of enforcing one’s own version of organizational reality and denying the voice of the other. Moreover, if the other accepts the repair they have surrendered ‘their’ version of reality. Therefore, repair is an essential element in the negotiation and achievement of an intersubjective reality and those who have the discursive ability to repair have a powerful tool with which to influence talk-in-interaction.

10.2.2 A simple case of repair?
A simple case of repair can be seen in the following extract:

Extract 10.1

1  A ce que je vais faire je vais rappeler (.2) aux profs qu’en fait on a un problème de gestion what I’ll do I’m going to remind (0.2) the teachers that in fact we have a problem in the management

2  de ressources et je vais leur demander ( ) de mettre dans les nouvelles de la semaine= of the resources and I’ll ask ( ) to put it in the news of the week

3  L =on a eu on a eu

In line 1, Alice states, *in fact we have a problem in the management of the resources and I’ll ask ( ) to put it in the news of the week*. In the next turn (line 3), Liz challenges this and repairs Alice: *we had we had*. On the face of it, this is a case of other-initiated other-repair in an unmitigated form which is not unusual in business meetings. Liz has the responsibility for managing the resources centre and so she can mobilize claims to have a better knowledge of the situation than Alice, the director, who is one stage removed from the day-to-day running of the centre. Liz thus mobilizes superior claims to knowledge in order to repair Alice. Furthermore, the move could be hearable as defensive

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14 Weekly in-house newspaper.
because since Liz is responsible for the day-to-day running of the centre she has an interest in minimizing problems and therefore sustaining her identity as a competent manager of the resources centre. As Jayyusi (1984: 40) points out, categories often come in adjective + category combinations. Therefore, in order to render her actions morally accountable it is not sufficient just to be incumbent of the identity ‘manager of the resources centre’ but Liz has to present herself as competent manager of the resources centre. Thus Alice’s assessment that ‘in fact we have a problem in the management of the resources’ is potentially face threatening for Liz.

Liz, therefore, repairs this by challenging the temporal nature of Alice’s assessment by saying that ‘we had had [a problem]’ and therefore she implicitly asserts that there is no longer a problem and thus she retains identity as a competent manager of the resources centre. However, in this case, Alice does not accept the repair and so claims epistemic primacy to make an assessment that over-rides Liz’s repair. Thus, in the continuation of extract 10.1, Alice repairs Liz’s repair:

Extract 10.2

4 A non on a on a (.) je pense qu’il faut pas dire que on a eu quand on a et il faut que les gens no we have we have (.) I think that we shouldn’t say that we had when we have and people need

5 rapportent ce qu’ils empruntent [ ((gaze to B)) (1.0)] et que ca soit des cassettes audio to bring back what they borrow [ (1.0) ] and if it’s audio cassettes or video

6 L [((nod))] ou les cassettes vidéo s’ils en empruntent une en urgence ou des cds (0.2) c’est quand cassettes if they borrow them in an emergency ou cds (0.2) anyhow it’s

8 même pas trop difficile not too difficult

This can be seen as a case of third turn repair (Schegloff 1992b). Due to the second turn proof procedure, a speaker makes visible his/her understanding of a first turn in their next turn. If the second turn confirms the intersubjectivity that is being built up then the first speaker will (as usually happens) not treat the second turn as in need of repair. However, if the first speaker orients to the second turn as being a misunderstanding of the first turn,
and thus orients to an incipient breakdown of intersubjectivity, then the third turn can be used for repair. Schegloff (1992b: 1303) gives the following sequence as an example of third turn repair:

1 Alice: which one:s are closed, an’ which ones are open
2 Zebrach: most of ’em. This, this [ this, this, ((pointing))]
3 Alice: [I ‘on’t mean on the
shelters I mean on the roads

Zebrach’s second turn is oriented to as a misunderstanding of Alice’s first turn. Alice therefore repairs this in a third turn: ‘I don’t mean on the shelters I mean on the roads’. As Schegloff (1992b) points out third turn repair is the last structurally provided sequential place for the defence of intersubjectivity. This is because the next turn proof procedure reveals the participant’s understanding of the previous turn and thus the third turn is the opportunity space in which divergent understanding of the first turn can be dealt with and intersubjectivity can be maintained. If this opportunity slot is missed, then intersubjectivity could break down. Thus;

[T]hird position repair may be thought of as the last systematically provided opportunity to catch (among other troubles) such divergent understanding as embody breakdowns of intersubjectivity – that is, trouble in the socially shared grasp of the talk and the other conduct in the interaction.

Schegloff 1992b: 1301(italics in original)

Returning to the extracts previously discussed (now presented in full below):

Extract 10.3

1 A ce que je vais faire je vais rappeler (.2) aux profs qu’en fait on a un problème de gestion
what I’ll do I’m going to remind(0.2) the teachers that in fact we have a problem in the management
de ressources et je vais leur demander ( ) de mettre dans les nouvelles de la semaine=
of the resources and I’ll ask ( ) to put it is the news of the week
In turn one, Alice states that there is a problem with the management of the resources centre. In turn two, Liz orients to this assertion as being in need of repair and corrects it: we had a problem. However, Alice’s third turn repairs the repair and thus treats Liz’s understanding of the first turn as a trouble source or as being somehow ‘wrong’. Alice thus repairs the repair so that the intersubjective version of organizational reality that emerges is the one that she favours: her account of organizational reality counts. Alice’s third turn repair is prefaced by ‘non’, which initiates the repair, she then continues her turn with a component which openly rejects the understating projected in the previous turn (line 4: no we have we have (. I think that we shouldn’t say that we had when we have). In the following turn component (lines 4/5: and people need to bring back what they borrow), she states what should happen in her versions of prospective future organizational reality. As the turn is in progress, Alice pauses and shifts gaze to Liz. This elicits a response from Liz in the form of an agreement token (a nod). Alice then continues her turn.

In short, through the use of third turn repair, Alice ‘corrects’ Liz’s second turn misunderstanding of the first turn in the sequence. In this way, she ensures that her account of organizational reality is sustained: we have a problem rather than we had a problem. Liz makes no attempt to fight this repair and tacitly agrees to it by nodding so the version of reality that is retained is that of Alice. Acquiescing to Alice’s third turn repair indexes Liz’s orientation to Alice’s epistemic primacy in assessing what is going
on in the resources centre despite the fact that ‘on paper’ Liz is in charge of the day-to-
day running of the resources centre. This is because, the orientation of Liz and Alice
instantiates the hierarchy of the organization as a lived phenomenon and thus makes
procedurally relevant the SRP director/manager of resources centre with respective
rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other. In Jayyusi’s (1984: 122 ff.) terms these can be
seen as asymmetric categories sets in which category pairs have a contrastive
organization of rights, skills, duties and knowledge. Moreover, in the case of two
competing accounts, resolution of disjuncture is often made in favour of the oriented-to
asymmetric distribution of rights. As Jayyusi (1984: 123) notes:

“in the case of the asymmetric category sets, the asymmetric or contrastive assessment of differing
accounts are routinely accomplished through inspection of the account producers’ presumed
asymmetrical category relationship.”

Thus, in this case, the asymmetric category set director/manager of resources centre has
been set up and both Alice and Liz orient to an asymmetric relationship, which allows
Alice to do influence, regarding claims to knowledge and rights to define organisational
reality.

10.2.3 Negotiating repair: mobilizing sources of knowledge

So far, it would appear that Alice can mobilize her identity as director to carry out repair
and that her identity is enough to ensure that others acquiesce to her repair but this would
grossly underestimate the complexity of the situation. Grounds for repair can be
negotiated so that by mobilizing different sources of knowledge subordinates can repair
their hierarchic superiors. Repair is therefore not a unilaterally top down phenomenon in
which the hierarchic superior can repair his/her subordinates, the team members can also
mobilize resources with which they can carry out repair. In the following extract, the
participants are arguing over the amount of time it takes to convert the computer assisted
language learning exercises from old software (questor, magi-text, multi-magic etc.) to
the new software (CPLe-learning).
Extract 10.4

1 N [ça ça c’est un tavail] [that’s a lot of work]

2 B moi je le fais avec les anciens pour les cours téléphone ce que je faisais [c’est ça ] me I do it with the experienced teachers for telephone lessons what I do [it’s that]

3 A [mais attends] [but wait]

4 B il y a deux ans (.) à chaque fois tu dois refaire des exercices = two years ago (.) each time you had to redo the exercise=

5 A = non on a toujours eu questor qu’on pouvait utiliser moi er : j’ai utilisé questor [jusq]u’ = no we always had questor which we could use er: I used questor [until]

6 N [oui] [yes]

7 A en Septembre [deux] mille qua=deux mille trois j’ai utilisé questor sur multi= september [two] thousand fo=two thousand and three I used questor on multi=

8 N [oui .hh] [yes .hh]

9 N =oui ça ça se convertissait facilement multi-quest mais= = yes that that converted easily multi-quest but=

10 B =mais pas en e-learning = but not in e-learning

11 N mais pas en CPLE-learning [↑okay ] but not in CPLE-learning [↑okay]

12 B [parce-que] °les couleurs ° [because] °the colours°

13 A mais oui là on parle des scolaires but yes there we’re talking about the school kids

14 N oui yes

15 A oui mais les scolaires (.) les scolaires n’ont pas besoin de e-learning des scolaires= yes but the school kids (.) the school kids don’t need e-learning the school kids=

16 B =si si si non mais c’est le logiciel e-learning qui comprend tout donc à la limite multi- = yes yes no but it’s the software e-learning that includes everything so in any case
quest et questor sont maintenant dans le program e-learning c’est le truc qu’on fait multiquest and questor are now in the e-learning program it’s the thing we do
pour les ( ) etcetera donc ça comme ça n’a pas été transformé les pages etcetera
In line 1, Nigel states that ‘that is a lot of work’ (i.e. to transfer the old programs to the new software). Beth (lines 2 ff.) then takes the floor to give an example, which serves as a buttress to Nigel’s turn i.e., the utterance is designed to support and reinforce the utterance of a participant who has a co-incumbent identity (Francis 1986: 70). Moreover, the turn cites first hand knowledge as a source for this buttress to Nigel’s turn. As Pomerantz (1984a) points out, giving self as a source, can be used to index privileged access to events and thus to infer that the state of affairs is known unproblematically and with certainty and therefore it is one way of substantiating claims to knowledge in a dispute. At this point in the interaction, Beth and Nigel are therefore working as a team in opposition to Alice and thus instantiating the SRP ‘senior teacher’ with knowledge of what is going on at the chalk face and director who is one step removed from the classroom and so has less knowledge of hands-on pedagogic issues.

However, Alice interrupts the turn-in-progress (but wait) and then latches a turn onto the end of Beth’s turn to carry out a other-initiated other-repair (line 5: = no we always had questor which we could use er: I used questor [until] september [two] thousand fo=two thousand and three I used questor on multi=). First she uses a direct negation ‘no’ and then gives an account for this which relies on first hand evidence and thus mobilizes her knowledge based on her own experience as a former teacher and the ‘fact’ that in 2003/4 she was doing some teaching as well as being director. She thus attempts to shift her
identity form chairperson to former teacher who thus has access to ‘chalk face’ knowledge and can rival Beth’s assertion. The repair is, therefore, carried out with this shift in identity which gives her category-bound access to displays of knowledge with which to carry out repair.

However, Nigel and Beth co-construct a third turn repair. Nigel first states ‘yes’ as a bid to take the floor (lines: 6 and 8) and then he takes the floor (line 9), prefacing his turn with ‘yes’ followed by “that that converted easily multi-quest” which can be considered weak agreement. He then begins a second TCU which is prefaced by but. Beth orients to this as a harbinger of disagreement, predicts the dispreferred shape of the turn to come and latches a dispreferred TCU onto Nigel’s turn-in-progress (‘but not in CPLE-learning’), which collaboratively completes the turn-in-progress. Nigel confirms this increment in a third turn by repeating it and adding ↑okay to the turn with a rising intonation. This is hearable as an upgrade since it acts as a tag question and as Heritage and Raymond (2005: 28) state:

In second position, the [assessment + tag] format invites agreement to the position that is taken by the second speaker, thus preempting “first position” in the sequence. In this way it upgrades the second speaker’s claimed rights over the first with respect to the matter at hand.

Thus in this instance, Nigel’s ↑okay serves as a tag question and so he maneuvers himself into a position of epistemic primacy. This is because the okay with rising intonation makes a second assessment conditionally relevant and acts as a marker of epistemic primacy since it claims firstness and requires a second assessment in the next turn. As he takes his turn, Beth overlaps to add a further increment to the turn: ‘because the colours’. In this way, they collaboratively author an other-initiated other-repair of Alice’s claim that questor can be converted to the new software easily. At first, Alice does not respond to this normative demand for a second assessment, rather she seeks to re-establish intersubjectivity and explain the divergence of assessment through a problem of topic (line 13: but yes there we’re talking about the school kids) and therefore she ‘fights off’ the third turn repair. Nigel, line 14, confirms that they are talking about the same topic (i.e. the courses for school kids) and Alice, line 15, then repeats her assessment that: yes but the school kids (.) the school kids don’t need e-learning the school kids. This is
followed by an emphatic other-initiated other-repair carried out by Beth. In this turn, Beth makes relevant her identity as ‘teacher’ by stating, line 17, that ‘it’s the thing that we do’ which indexes the fact that she and the other teachers use this software which displays a source of first hand knowledge. Alice finally accepts the repair and she does a formulation which sums up the gist of the talk-so-far (lines 20 ff.: so, _multi-quest, =so it’s the _questor exercise for me it’s that which we want, we want qu[estors,=] and displays her (corrected) understanding of the situation that there is a problem with transferring the exercises to the new software and what we want is multi-quest and questor exercises. As she takes this turn, Beth backchannels agreement and at the end of the turn provides emphatic agreement (line 23: °yes° ) and at the end of the turn she repeats the agreement emphatically (line 25: YE:S). The explicit and emphatic agreement token is hearable as claiming superior knowledge and epistemic primacy since Beth claims to be in a position to judge the correctness of Alice’s assessment in the next turn (Sneijder & te Molder 2006).

In conclusion, then, repair is not only in the hands of Alice as director. The team members can carry out repair by making their identities as experienced teachers relevant and so claim a greater ‘hands-on’ knowledge of what is going on in the classroom. The right to display such knowledge and indexing the source of such knowledge as ‘first hand’ can thus give them the resources to repair Alice qua director. Alice is aware of this and so can use the category entitlement of ‘former teacher’ to support her assessments but this knowledge is old and so can be ‘trumped’ by Nigel and Beth’s more recent knowledge of what is going on in the classroom.

### 10.3 Going with the flow: predicting and aligning with group consensus

At times, the achievement of agreement does not have to be established via repair and agreement but can be achieved by ‘going with the flow’ i.e. by predicting and aligning with group consensus as it emerges in talk (Clifton 2006c). The following extracts are taken from a stretch of talk in which the topic is the relative merits of the ‘Business English Modules’ (BEMs). These teaching materials have been used with limited success
and their value is in doubt. Liz introduces the topic by asking ‘what is our opinion of BEMs’ but Alice reverses the question and asks ‘what is your opinion’ concerning the materials. Liz displays no opinion on the materials but this is an accountable matter since senior teachers are normatively required to have an opinion concerning teaching materials. In short Liz has committed a ‘faux pas’ by not displaying an opinion on BEMs. The rest of the sequence is hearable as an attempt to ‘go with the flow’ by aligning with the team consensus as it emerges and using sequential resources at her disposition to align with this emerging consensus in a way that displays that she does, after all, have an independent opinion on the issue.

Liz introduces the topic of Business English modules or BEMs in the following way:

Extract 10.5

1 L quelle est notre opinion sur les bems ((gaze to Alice))
   what is our opinion on bems
2 (.5)
3 le classeur plus photo [copies] ((gaze to Beth and Nigel))
   the folder and photo [copies]
4 A [£quelle] est votre opinion£
   [£what] is your opinion£
5 L oui uhu ((shrugs shoulders and grins))
   yes uhu

In beginning the topic this way, Liz sets up a question and answer adjacency pair so that Alice and later Nigel and Beth are obliged to set out their opinion on BEMs first. As Sacks (1992 vol. 2: 340) points out, going first is a very powerful discursive resource because the questioner, without having to express their views, is able to observe the actions of other participants. When Liz begins the turn she is looking at a sheet of paper in front of her but as she completes the first turn construction unit (what is our opinion on bems) she looks up at Alice. Thus, the initial question is addressed to Alice (Goodwin 1979: 99). Through asking for ‘our’ opinion Liz is in fact displaying that she has no opinion of her own or at least is not prepared to present her opinion at this stage and, as Bargiella-Chiappini and Harris (1997: 138) note, she uses the ‘our’ to shift the
responsibility and problem-ownership from herself to the group. However, as Liz gazes at Alice there is no uptake so after a micro-pause, Liz shifts her gaze to Nigel and Beth and pursues a response by means of adding an increment. Alice, however, overlaps the increment and asks Liz directly for her opinion (line 2: *what is your opinion*). Thus even though Alice has been given the possibility of assessing the pedagogical value of the BEMs, she returns the question to Liz. This is said with a smiley voice which indicates that Alice is teasing Liz and drawing attention to the categorical impropriety of her not having an opinion on a pedagogical issue.

Liz acknowledges Alice’s question by shrugging her shoulders slightly and grinning but she offers no substantive response. Liz is thus exposed as having no real opinion on a subject that falls within the team’s domain of practice. She has talked herself into the position of an unknowing participant which reflexively invokes the situated identity of a ‘poor’ member of the management team. Liz’s dilemma is now how to reverse or minimize a situation in which she has been ascribed the discourse identity of an ‘unknowing’ recipient which talks into being a situated identity of a poor member of the management team. As Day (1998) points out, the attribution of identity can be resisted and, in this case, Liz works to achieve this by establishing herself as a knowing participant by ‘going with the flow’ and by co-authoring where possible the emergent assessment of BEMs. Giving an opinion after the others have expressed their opinion would not necessarily claim epistemic independence and would therefore not display independent access to category relevant knowledge (Stivers 2005; Raymond and Heritage 2006; Heritage and Raymond 2005). One way that Liz can claim a prior epistemic stance that happens to align with the team’s consensus is to co-construct the assessments as they emerge, thus making it appear as if she has the same opinion as the team, that this is an independent opinion and that she is not merely ‘going along with’ what the other team members say. Therefore, as explicated below, Liz has to seize the opportunities to co-construct that are presented to her if she wishes to talk herself into being as a knowing participant and therefore accountably participate in the sensemaking activities of the team.
Extract 10.6

4 A  [£quelle] est votre opinion£
[£what] is your opinion£

5 L oui uhu ((shrugs shoulders and grins))
yes uhu

6 (1.0)

7 B la mienne c’est difficile à utiliser parce que c’est très (anonyme) (9) enfin
mine it’s difficult to use because it’s very (anonymous) (9) anyway

8 L visuellement =
visually =

9 B = c’est une liste de vocabulaire point (.) et des phrases donc ça peut donner= aider pour
= it’s a vocabulary list full stop (.) and expressions so that can give= help for a

10 une présentation d’un sujet mais ça s’arrête là (.3) ça c’est enfin voilà c’est que j’ai
presentation of a subject but it stops there (.3) that it’s anyway there you are that’s what

11 fait ce que j’ai vu et même par téléphone (.2) ((makes a ‘funny face’))
I’ve done what I’ve seen and even by telephone (.2)

12 N suis très mitigé moi je ne suis pas un grand fanatique des bems [ moi ]
I have mixed feelings myself I am not a great fan of BEMs [ myself ]

13 L [ uhu ]
[ uhu ]

In line 6, there is a one second pause in which nobody takes the floor. Beth then self-selects and provides an assessment of BEMs. She states that it’s difficult to use because it’s very (anonymous). There is then a micro-pause after which she adds anyway. Liz uses this pause and anyway which is hearable as an initiator of topic transition to add an increment onto the previous utterance before Beth can change topic. In line 8, Liz adds the modifier ‘visually’ onto the utterance of Beth and so collaboratively completes the utterance in progress. In terms of the category work that this achieves, through adding an increment to Beth’s turn-in-progress she is claiming co-incumbency of identity ‘good’ team member. However, at the same time the increment does not add any new information but rather develops the assessment already in progress. As such, Liz can claim the identity of a competent member of the management team by collaborating in the assessment of BEMs. But such an assessment confirms the emerging consensus of the
team and is not a pre-formulated epistemic stance since previously we saw that Liz gave no assessment when she was asked for one.

Beth then continues her assessment in an extended turn and when she finishes her turn, Nigel self-selects to make an assessment (line 12). However, in the next turn, Liz ignores Nigel’s assessment and skip connects to Beth’s prior turn and asks *but you’re speaking about lessons plus telephoning or your speaking of: for everything*. As explicated below, as the turn is in progress Liz makes strategic use of backchannels to display alignment.

Extract 10.7

14  L mais tu parles de cours plus telephoning ou alors tu parles de: pour tout

   *but you’re speaking about lessons plus telephoning or your speaking of: for everything*

15  B en général en général par exemple sais pas s’il y a un cours sur beh j’en utilise

   *in general in general for example I dunno if there’s a lesson on er : I use it*

16  par exemple ceux qui sont intéressants ceux qui concernent

   *for example those which are interesting those which are about*

17  writing [[(                         )]des lettres des expressions etcetera et en fait

   *writing [(                        )] letters and expression etcetera and in fact*

18  L [ uhu uhu ]

19  B tu passes une demi-heure à revoir des [ choses etcetera ] et après il faut qu’ils écrivent

   *you spend half a hour revising [ things etcetera ] and then they need to write*

20  L [ uhu uhu ]

21  pour la semaine semaine suivante ou tu recrées des exercices il y a .hhh c’est la présentation

   *for the following week week or you recreate exercises there’s a .hhh it’s the presentation*

22  de langage et c’est tout ça va pas plus loin donc des activités tout ça il faut

   *of language and that’s all it doesn’t go any further so the activities all that*

21  dynamiser le cours après avec ça on peut pas (.2) [ ça peut servir (        )]

   *need dynamising after with that one cannot (.2) [ that can be used (        )]*
In line 15, Beth continues authoring her opinion of BEMs. When she arrives at writing (line 17) Liz starts to backchannel verbally (uhu) and starts to nod (^-^). This takes the form of a series of small movements which then reaches a peak of a larger nod as she backchannels at the end of another possible TRP after Beth’s etcetera (line 17). As Heath (1992) points out, such nodding constitutes a non-verbal display of agreement with the emerging talk. Moreover, these nods are sometimes accompanied by backchannels (uhu) which, whilst not being strong agreement tokens in themselves, display the fact the recipient (Liz) understands the turn-in-progress and implicitly has no problems with it. Thus, through non-verbal displays of agreement and backchannels, Liz displays that she agrees with the emergent talk and is an “active participant in the delivery of the activity” (Heath 1992: 109). Moreover, by doing so as Beth’s turn is in progress, she is able to go with the flow but appear as if she has an independent opinion that happens to concur with Beth’s. Had she simply agreed with Beth in a following turn, such an effect would not be apparent.

When Beth comes to what is retrospectively the end of her turn, Alice overlaps and, gazing at Liz, asks (Line 23) what is your opinion. This leads to an extended turn in which Liz finally sets out her assessment/opinion of BEMs which aligns with the emerging assessments of Nigel and Beth and which also accounts for initial question (what is our opinion of BEMs) in terms not of her lack of knowledge but in terms of the teachers’ lack of knowledge.

Extract 10.8

22  A    ((gazing at Liz))        [quelle est ton opinion ]
  [ what is your opinion ]

23  B        [ (                           )]

24  L       [ >je suis pas très chaude< mais Françoise m’avait dit oui mais ] les professeurs
            [>I am not very warm< but Françoise said yes but ] the teachers
            >I don’t know that it exists it needs ordering that in place of I wanted to know=

25  L       =commander ça comme ressource pédagogique ↑
            =order that as a resource pedagogic ↑

27  A       =comme frais pédagogiques
            as pedagogic expenses
In line 24, Liz sets out her pinion of BEMs (*I am not very warm*) which aligns with the emerging team consensus. She then seeks to account for her original question (*what is our opinion on BEMs*). Liz now has the group’s opinion on which to base her answer and she uses a distancing device (Potter 1996) to make it appear as if the initial ‘*what is our opinion on BEMs*’ was not authored by her but came from Françoise, one of the sales reps, who is not present at the meeting (line 24: *but Françoise said yes but the teachers don’t know that it exists it needs ordering that in place of I wanted to know*). As Holt (2000) points out, indirect reported speech blurs the distinction between the position of the original speaker and the actual speaker and (*ibid*: 427) it “purports to be the straightforward rendition of prior thought or utterance, but on the other hand, it can be used by the author to fulfill a range of tasks in the current interaction”. In this instance, Liz is using it as a distancing device to avoid being held accountable for having asked a question about the group’s opinion on BEMs in the first place. She therefore tries to make it appear as if Françoise (the sales rep who is not present at the meeting) had brought up the issue and had suggested that the BEMs should be used by the teachers. She, thus, retrospectively re-authors this question to make it appear as if her real intention, as opposed to Françoise’s, was not to find out the group’s opinion on BEMs but to get direction on a purely administrative point to which she is entitled to be unsure of i.e., can BEMs be part of pedagogic expenses (line 25 ff.). Thus she tries to recast the initial question which did the damage as not being truly her question and her real interest being something less harmful to her claimed identity as a competent member of the team.

There then follows a sequence in which whether BEMs can be used for pedagogic expenses or not (lines 30 to 40) is discussed.

Extract 10.9

29 A non
   *no*

30 L c'est-à-dire [okay] donc on fait pas ça
   *in other words [okay] so we don't do that*

32 B [ ah non ]
   *[ ah no ]*
Following line 40, the topic shifts back to an assessment of BEMs as teaching material.

Extract 10.10

40  A    et on s’en sert pour certain cours
        and we use it for certain lessons
41  L    [ okay ]
        [ okay ]
42  N    [ très ] spécialisés [ certains cas ] les présentations par exemple c’est pas mal
        [ very ] specialised [ certain cases ] presentations for example is not bad
43  A    [ certains cours ]
        [ certain lessons ]
44  L    oui uhu
        yes uhu
45  B    oui voilà il y a des choses qui sont pas mal
        yes that’s right there are things that are not bad
46  N    (       ) c’est pas mal [ la négociation c’est pas mal ]
        (       ) is not bad [ negotiation’s not bad ]
47  A    [ ils sont repris aussi ] ils sont repris pour les cours
        [ they are used as well ] they are used for the telephone
In line 40, Alice states that *we use it for certain lessons*. In line 41, Beth agrees with this and Nigel self-selects simultaneously to complete Alice’s turn in progress with an increment by adding the adjective *very specialized* to Alice’s noun phrase (*certain lessons*). By collaboratively completing the turn in progress Nigel is displaying alignment with Alice and a team consensus on the pedagogic value of BEMs is reinforced. As Sacks (1992 vol. 1: 322) states, “there probably isn’t any better way of representing the fact that ‘we are a group’ than by building a new sentence together, one that’s coherent, grammatical, etc, and unplanned.” Nigel then assesses certain parts of BEMs as ‘*not bad*’ (line 42). In line 44 Liz aligns with this consensus (*yes uhu*) and in line 45 Beth also adds to this emerging consensus (*yes that’s right there are things that are not bad*). In the next turn, line 46, Nigel supports Beth’s assessment by giving examples: (*negotiation’s not bad*). In line 47, Alice overlaps Nigel’s turn-in-progress and also gives an example of the use of BEMs (*they are used as well*).
for the telephone lessons the bems. This receives agreement from both Nigel and Beth (lines 49 and 50) and after Beth’s agreement token she continue her turn but, as her turn is in progress, Liz overlaps with an upgrade ([that’s] good because there) which displays agreement with the emerging consensus. Liz’s that’s good thus upgrades the ‘not bads’ in line 42, 45 and 46. Significantly, the upgrade is produced in overlap because if she waits to make her assessment, she might lose the assessment slot and thus might not be able to display alignment with the emerging consensus. And if she waits until the end of Beth’s turn, it will be regarded as an assessment in a second position and could be seen to index a lack of an independent epistemic that was held prior to the talk and which is essential to fulfilling the credentials of incumbency of the identity good senior teacher. After this, line 53, Alice carries out a further assessment to which Liz agrees. There is then a brief repair sequence (lines 58 and 59) and then Beth continues an assessment (lines 60-66).

Extract 10.11

58   A   enfin de de [ fourniture ][pédagogique ]
      anyway as [ material ][ pedagogic ]
59   L   [ des frais oui ][de fourniture ]
      [ the expenses yes ][ of material ]
60   B   [ ( ) ] didactique etcetera c’est difficile à utiliser
       [ ( ) ] didactic etcetera it’s difficult to use
61   sauf présenter ou il faudrait tout refaire donc c’est plus de travail tu prends un autre livre
     unless to present or it all needs redoing so it’s more work you take another book
62   N ((whispers to Beth)) (“hide this”)
       (“hide this”) 
63   B   ahh ha ::ha ::
64   B   parce que même le writing je dis c’est pas mal par exemple tu as beaucoup de livres il y a
      because even the writing I say it’s not bad for example you have a lot of books there’s
65   international express il y a er:: business er: objectifs etcetera qui ont des unités sur
      international express there’s er:: business er: objectives etcetera which have units on
66   [ letter writing et ( ) ]
      [ letter writing and ( ) ]
67   L   [ uhu uhu c’est suffisant ] oui
       [ uhu uhu it’s enough ] yes
In lines 60 following, Beth continues her assessment of BEMs. However, as Goodwin and Goodwin (1992: 155) note, such a public display also provides resources for Liz to author and to modify her own action in terms of the emerging assessment. Whilst Liz does not co-author as the assessment is in progress, she performs a collaborative completion as the turn is in progress (line 67) and completes what is retrospectively the end of Beth’s turn (letter writing and) with an assessment ‘it’s enough’. In so doing she claims co-authorship of the assessment-in-progress and does not assess in a second position which may be hearable as not having an independent opinion on the issue. Beth then continues her assessment (lines 68 following).

Extract 10.12

68 B il y a il y a plein des choses qui sont bien faites alors que les bems c’est pa : pa : pa : there are there are loads of things that are well done whereas bems is pa : pa : pa :

69 la liste des [ phrases ]

the list of [ expressions ]

70 L [ uhu uhu ] mais c’est plus comme référence [ que je con]sidère ça [ uhu uhu ] but it’s more as a reference [ that I con]sider it

71 B [ oui ( ) ]

[ yes ][ ( ) ]

72 L pour qu’ils puissent le garder après so that they can keep it afterwards

In line 68, Beth continues her assessment and gives an assessment of BEMs in comparison to other materials. Liz then takes the floor (line 70) with ‘but’. The ‘but’ is hearable as introducing an alternative/contradictory opinion or formulation which characterizes the discussion of BEMs so far. But, despite the fact that the upshot is introduced with ‘but’, it does not present a radically new aspect to the authoring of the opinion since Beth has already indicated that (line 68) whereas bems is pa : pa : pa : the list of [ expressions ] and previously (line 9 ff.) = it’s a vocabulary list full stop and expressions so that can give=help for a presentation of a subject but it stops there and (lines 60/61) she has stated it’s difficult to use unless to present. From this Liz can easily judge the displayed meaning of Beth (i.e. for teaching they are not very useful but as list
of phrases they are reasonable) and make the safe deduction that the material is good as a reference source. Thus, whilst appearing to add a new unexplicated version of the gist of the talk-so-far with the ‘but’ being used to signal a contrast, she can appear to be adding her ‘new’ opinion on BEMs but in fact it is a very safe formulation of the talk-so-far which goes with the flow rather than offering a new upshot. The safeness of this upshot pays off since (line 71) Beth agrees with this assessment in a third slot.

In short, then, through orientation to the structural possibilities of the talk-so-far, Liz seeks to co-author turns and so she is able to use this interactional device to bring off a display of being a knowing recipient because by co-authoring turns together Liz is demonstrating that she is of the same opinion of the group as the talk emerges and thus she makes claims to being a knowing participant in the talk. Thus through the sequential properties of talk she is displaying an identity that has the morally accountable characteristics of a competent team member. Consequently, the way in which Liz seeks to co-author emergent talk obscures the fact that claims to having an already formed opinion in line with the group’s consensus are dubious since at the beginning of extract 10.5 she was unable to display an opinion on BEMs.

10.4 Conclusion

Repair is thus essential to the achievement of intersubjectivity and is a way of resolving disagreement. Failure to resolve such disagreement would mean that participants could leave the meeting with divergent understanding. However, the resolution of such dispute through repair is not an unmotivated event that relies simply on the strength of argument to get to the ‘truth’. As the extracts in this chapter illustrate, members have to access category entitlement in a way which allows them access to greater ‘rights’ to repair. However, these ‘rights’ are not necessarily all in the hands of the hierarchic superior, team members can also carry out repair by a making relevant greater grounds for ‘knowing’ that the hierarchic superior. As seen in section 10.2.3 by making relevant identities such as senior teacher with hands-on knowledge of what is going on in the company, the subordinates can also do influence and can repair the director (Alice) and so achieve an intersubjective version of organizational reality that the manager acquiesces to rather than vice versa.
However, at other times the subordinates do not dispute claims and do not seek to repair. Rather, as explicated in section 10.3, they go with the flow and align with the emerging consensus. As such, rather than influencing they are allowing themselves to be influenced by the emerging group consensus. In this sense, it could be seen as an instance of followership rather than leadership and in this respect it could go someway to redressing the historical imbalance in leadership research which has tended to fail to consider in the role of the follower in enough detail (Collinson 2006: 179). However, the assumed duality of leader/follower identities that could be perceived in this data cannot be seen as an example of Parsonian rule following according to *a priori* and socially sanctioned identities and though Liz does seek to align with the group consensus, this does not make leadership into a kind of zero sum game in which some parties have it and others don’t. Rather, it is dispersed within the group as a set of discourse potentials which can be negotiated. In this case (section 10.3), without being explicitly repaired, Liz goes with the flow and allows herself to be influenced but in other instances such as in the case of negotiated repair (section 10.2.3) the doing of influence can be challenged. In conclusion, then, there is no zero-sum game influence and leadership that is based on an *a priori* organisational hierarchy that equates the leader with hierarchic superior rather influence exist as a constantly changing process that is negotiated, acquiesced to or challenged, on a turn by turn basis according to the discursive resources made available to the participants.
11. Doing influence: making assessments

11.1 Introduction
Since any assessments purports to present a situation ‘as it is’, they have a key role to play in the defining of organisational reality. As Goodwin & Goodwin (1992: 155) note, assessments “constitute one of the key places where participants negotiate and display to each other a congruent view of the events that they encounter in their phenomenal world. It is thus a central locus for the study of the shared understandings”. Assessments are thus essential building blocks in the social construction of (organisational) reality. However, the making of assessments is carefully policed in interaction and is not dependent on actual epistemic states alone but is also dependent on rights to display knowledge (Drew 1991). Furthermore, through displays of access to knowledge, sequential placement of assessments, and the category work that such assessments reflexively ‘do’, participants orient to their epistemic rights in relation to others. This gives rise to the notion of epistemic primacy, whereby participants claim to have ‘superior’ rights to assess which index claims to be more influential in the negotiation of an intersubjective reality. In short, by claiming epistemic primacy a participant is claiming a stronger right to author a version of organisational reality.

11.2 Displaying epistemic primacy
Firstly, one way of making assessments count concerns the relationship between the epistemic state of the speaker and the assessment. In order to produce an assessment, a speaker needs access to the referent that is being evaluated. For obvious reasons, not all forms of access have the same value: first-hand evidence is rated higher than access based on hearsay. In formulating their access, speakers are thus forced to make a bid in the ongoing negotiation of epistemic status. According to Pomerantz (1984a) giving the source of knowledge can be used to perform a variety of actions, such as defending a point of view (this is how I know), backing down in an argument by asserting the limits of
what one knows (at least this much I know for sure) or criticizing someone in an ostensibly ‘sensitive’ way. For example, Pomerantz (1984a: 622) gives the example of a mother doing criticism of her son’s long hair by citing source as being reports on the TV that have said that long hair is now old-fashioned. Accounting for how something is known by giving a source is therefore one way of substantiating one’s right to produce an assertion in a dispute over entitlements to knowledge and can therefore be invoked as a way of making one’s assessment count.

Secondly, the sequential position of an assessment is also important. Note, first of all, that assessments rarely come alone. They are always subject to confirmation by the other participants to the interaction. Assessments come packaged in adjacency pairs: every assessment of a state of affairs by one speaker makes relevant a corresponding second assessment of that state of affairs by the hearer, to the extent that failing to produce such a second constitutes a noticeable phenomenon and constitutes the basis for further inferential work. The relationship between these subsequent assessments is tightly organized: ‘firsts’ and ‘seconds’ are not chosen in a random fashion but are delicately tailored to one another. Pomerantz (1984b) showed that the relationship between the two is characterized by a preference for agreement: if the second speaker does not agree with the first speaker’s assessment, his disaffiliative second assessment will be formally marked by means of hesitations, hedges, exonerative accounts, and so on. In a recent series of research reports, Heritage, Raymond and a number of other researchers (Heritage & Raymond 2005, Raymond & Heritage 2006, Heritage 2002, Stivers 2005, Sneijder & te Molder 2006) have argued that a strong connection exists between the relative position of the assessment and particular epistemic entitlements: ‘going first’ entails a claim to epistemic primacy, while corresponding seconds are routinely interpreted as accepting such a claim. There is ample indirect evidence for the existence of such routinised inferences, in particular the fact that participants seem to have a range of resources with which they can contest the underlying associations of sequential positioning with particular epistemic rights. By upgrading and downgrading these epistemic claims, the implicit claims associated with the sequential position of an assertion can, thus, be modified in view of one’s relationship with the other participants (Heritage & Raymond 2005, Raymond & Heritage 2006).
Thus, sequentially positioned first assessments can either be unmarked, upgraded or downgraded. In their unmarked form, they claim direct and unmediated access to the assessable. However, they can also be upgraded by means of an item such as a negative interrogative, which strongly invites a preferred response of agreement. They can also be downgraded by means of an evidential such as ‘looks’, ‘seems’ or ‘appears’ (which downgrade the speaker’s superior access to the assessable), or by means of a tag question inviting agreement (which reaffirms the other participant’s primary rights to assess the referent).

In the same way, second assessments also come in an unmarked, upgraded or downgraded form. Unmarked seconds do not challenge the first speaker’s claim to epistemic primacy. In their upgraded form, however, they are hearable as a bid to upstage the implied epistemic primacy of going first. Raymond and Heritage (Heritage & Raymond 2005, Raymond & Heritage 2006) distinguish four different techniques for upgrading a second assessment:

(1) a second assessment of the ‘inverted’ format ‘confirmation plus agreement token’ assigns a lower priority to the activity of agreeing with the prior assessment and thereby construct it as relatively unimportant vis-à-vis the second
(2) oh-prefacing the second assessment (cf. Heritage 1984b, 2002) is another resource available to second speakers for indexing their superior and/or an independent epistemic stance
(3) adding a tag question to the second assessment places the second speaker in a first position relative to a projected third turn
(4) the use of a negative interrogatives strongly indexes agreement as the preferred next action.

Sneijder and te Molder (2006) add two more procedures to this list:

(5) the use of an ‘objective’ format (‘Mars bars are lovely’ instead of ‘I love Mars bars’) presents the second assessment as a fact, thereby undercutting inherent claims to primacy indexed by the first assessment
the explicit marking of agreement by means of formulas like ‘of course or ‘I totally agree’ “marks the action of agreeing as a conscious deed rather than a spontaneous one that depends on interactional contingencies” (Sneijder & te Molder 2006: 113).

11.3 Assessments and ‘doing’ influence

In exchanging assessments – and that, to a large extent, is what a management team meeting consists of – participants not only negotiate an organizational reality but every assessment inevitably positions the speaker relative to the other participants in terms of their rights to display knowledge. This delicate game of negotiating rights to make assessment and to display knowledge is played through the exchange of ‘downgraded firsts’, ‘upgraded seconds’ and so on, each of which constitutes a bid in the locally negotiated hierarchy of entitlements. It is here that ‘influence’ is made analytically tangible ‘in’ the talk, as an intersubjectively negotiated hierarchy of entitlements to assess and define organizational life. Influence is thus not something ‘beyond’ the talk. It is not a matter of changing the other participants’ mental states or, in a more cynical vein, with brutally substituting one’s own ‘version’ of organizational reality for that of the others regardless what the others think – two views that treat talk as a derivative of formal or informal ‘power’ that is somehow ‘more fundamental’ than talk itself.

11.3.1 Displays of epistemic primacy

In some instances, as a result of the procedural consequentiality of the MCD management team and relevance of the asymmetric SRP manager-senior teacher, the ‘doing’ of assessments is performed as clear cut orientation to Alice’s epistemic primacy. This is achieved by the team members directly orienting to Alice’s right to assess events in the organisation. Thus, when team members ask Alice for an assessment they are orienting to her right as director to the sequential first which thus indexes her epistemic primacy. This can be seen in the following extract:
Extract 11.1

1  L  et que penses-tu des fréquences des séances (.) [et ]
   and what do you think about the frequency of the sessions (.) [and]
2  A  [alors] là je pense que ça dépend uniquement
   [so] there I think that it depends solely
   [so]  there I think that it depends solely
3  de la rentrée de :s des vacataires (.) pour l’instant=tous les vacataires qu’on a eus sont plus ou
   on the start of term th:e the part-timers (.) for moment=all the part-timers that we’ve had are
   on the start of term th:e the part-timers (.) for moment=all the part-timers that we’ve had are
4  moins formés donc moi je peux les prendre d’un façon ponctuelle [si je vois] que ça suit
   more or less trained so me I can take them from time to time        [if you see]  that it
   more or less trained so me I can take them from time to time        [if you see]  that it
5  L  [d’accord]
   [  okay  ]
6  A  pas derrière er donc (0.3) on arrête
   doesn’t follow er : (0.3) we stop

In line 1 (and what do you think about the frequency of the sessions), Liz orients to Alice
as having the right to assess the state of affairs in the resources centre. She does this by
addressing a request for Alice’s opinion (what do you think) which is a de facto request
for an assessment. Alice, therefore, is accorded sequential firstness and so epistemic
primacy. She replies with a conditionally relevant second pair-part which replies to Liz’s
question and provides an assessment of the frequency of the training sessions which can
be glossed as saying that it depends on the level of training of the part-time teachers (line
2 ff.: [so]  there I think that it depends solely on the start of term th:e the part-timers (.)
for moment=all the part-timers that we’ve had are more or less trained so me I can take
them from time to time [if you see]  that it doesn’t follow er : (0.3) we stop). This
receives agreement from Liz (line 5: okay) who accepts the assessment and so does not
dispute Alice’s epistemic primacy in being able to assess what is going on in the
company and so define organizational reality.

However, orientation to epistemic primacy is dependent to some extent on topic. In the
following extract, the topic of telephone lessons is introduced. Nigel is in charge of the
lessons and so Alice, despite being the hierarchic superior, orients to Nigel’s epistemic
primacy in this field.
In line 1, Alice shifts topic to the contents of the telephone lessons by asking Nigel if he has something to say on the subject. More specifically she also calls for an assessment on the subject (line 1: ↑it’s okay (0.2) that’s okay). This invokes, and thus makes procedurally consequential to the interaction, Nigel’s identity as ‘senior teacher in charge of telephone lesson’ and knowing what is going on in this area of the school’s work is a predicate of his identity and he is accountable for knowing this. Furthermore, the request for an assessment gives the sequential first slot, and thus primacy, to Nigel. Nigel then takes the turn which has been offered to him but this turn begins with the topic of a document that he has used for the training of teachers for the telephone lessons and it does not include an assessment of the state of the telephone lessons. In line 4, then, Alice
repeats her request for an assessment: *at present* ↑*it’s okay*. She then continues the turn with a request for a specific assessment concerning the number of teachers Nigel has: *you have enough teachers for the telephone lessons or you areːː* [euuh]. As she hesitates at the what is retrospectively the end of her turn, Nigel takes the floor and provides the requested assessment (line 5: ↑*[it’s okay] it works*). Alice then asks for further details (line 6 ff.: ↑*it works (0.8) and the teachers are not overworked for the telephone lessons*). Nigel then provides an assessment of whether the teachers are overworked or not in the following turn: ∷ *er: some yes=no it depends (0.3) it’s=there is somebody on a contract it doesn’t work it never takes off but people generally tell me regularly Liz for example will tell me okay next week I’ll have a some time*. Significantly, within the assessment Nigel cites personal experience to reinforce his primacy (Pomerantz 1984a). At the end of his turn there is a slight pause (line 10) and Alice then takes the floor with okay which accepts the assessment and does not seek to dispute Nigel’s primacy in this domain and then she carries out a stepwise transition to the number of telephone lessons that were given in February.

Thus, topic to some extent can decide who has epistemic primacy and primacy is not solely in the hand of the hierarchic superior. However, topic in itself is no guarantee that epistemic primacy will be in the hands of the person who is ‘supposed’ to know most about the topic according to the organisational chart of the company. In the case of Liz simply being in charge of the resources centre is not enough to ensure her epistemic primacy in this domain. In the following extract, in which the team is discussing the stock of text books (*Market Leader, Business Basics, Business Objectives, and In Company*), she allows herself to cede her moral right to know what is going on in a field for which she has specific responsibility.

**Extract 11.3**

1 A donc là je parle pour les cours intra [ en ] entreprise les gens ne peuvent pas avoir
so there I’m speaking in-house lessons [ in ] company people can’t have

2 L [ okay ]
[ okay ]
so what needs to be known is how to manage the resource

des ressources combien de livres il y a [combien ] de livres il faut donner aux 

centre how many books are there [how many] books have to be given to

A [alors bon]  

[ so good ]

professeurs ((gazes to A)) je sais qu’il y a pas de limite [mais si] quelque fois il y 

the teachers (gazes to A)) I know that there is no limit  [ but if ] sometimes there

A [non alors] ((gaze to L))  

[ no so ]

a pas de livres là donc il faut que j’attende deux semaines avant que je fournisse 

are no books there so it’s necessary that I wait two weeks before I provide the 

des choses qui sont à jour aux professeurs 

things that are up-to-date to the teachers

A pourquoi 

why

parce que si par exemple il y a pas suffisamment de market leader ou des chose qui sont 

because if for example there aren’t enough market leader or the things that are 

vraiment à jour des livres qui qui sont sortis récemment in company c’est quelque 

really up-to-date the books which which have come out recently in company that’s 

chose de récent peut-être qu’il y en a trop de business objectives business basics 

something recent maybe there are too many business objectives business basics

A voilà 

that’s it

>donc je donne< ça je donnais ça pour l’instant mais est-ce qu’on changera pas vers  

> so I give < that I was giving for the moment but won’t we change to

quelque chose de plus moderne 

something more modern

mais SI et c’est justement ça c’est à vous de dire je suis (       ) à dire mais écoute et 

but YES and it’s exactly there it’s up to you to say I am (   ) to say but listen and

viens me voir fais un petit mot [en disant] je pense qu’au lieu de commander =de

come to see me send a little word saying I think that instead of ordering=giving

15 Headway is a popular course book for so-called general English classes and not for ‘business’ English.
In lines 1-5, Alice comes to what is retrospectively regarded as the end of topic talk on *Headway* and, in line 6, Liz carries out a stepwise transition of topic to the resources centre and makes a request for an assessment concerning how to manage the situation (*so what needs to be known is how to manage the resource centre*). This turn is not addressed to any one particular participant. Firstly, this is because when she speaks, she is looking down and so does not select anybody by gaze and as Goodwin (1979: 99) claims “the gaze of a speaker should locate the party being gazed at as an addressee of his utterance” and secondly, she does not address any recipient by name. Thus, despite not specifically being oriented to as the speaker to whom the request for an assessment is addressed, Alice, by responding to the turn (line 8: *so good*), treats it as addressed to her. As Lerner (2003: 190) states, “when the requirements for responding to sequence initiating action limit eligible responders to a single participant, then that speaker has been tacitly selected as next speaker”. Consequently, Alice, through orienting to Liz’s turn as addressed to her is displaying that she has the right to give an assessment in a sequentially first position and, therefore, she claims epistemic primacy. As Liz continues her turn, Alice is also looking down but she treats ‘*how many books are there*’ as a TCU and self-selects to make a bid for the floor. Her turn begins *so good* which projects further talk but Liz continues her turn and at the end of the next TCU (line 4: *how many books have to be given to the teachers*) she gazes to Alice, thus selecting her as recipient of the turn and thus having epidemic primacy as regards knowing how to manage the resource centre. She continues her turn with another TCU ‘*I know there is no limit*’ and at this point Alice begins to gaze at Liz and, as Goodwin (1981: 58) notes, this is a means by which the recipient can display whether or not they are acting as hearer. In this case, therefore, Alice now signals that she is a hearer, acknowledges that the turn is addressed to her,
orients to her right to assess the state of affairs in the resources centre and she begins a reply (line 10: *no so*). However, Liz still keeps the floor and continues outlining the problem (line 11: *but if sometimes there are no books there so it’s necessary that I wait two weeks before I provide the things that are up-to-date to the teachers*). In line 13, Alice holds Liz, incumbent of the identity senior teacher in charge of the resources centre, accountable for this and ask *why?* In the following turn, Liz provides an account for this and then she provides a solution (line 16: *maybe there are too many business objectives business basics* [i.e. the older less up-to-date course books]). In this way, Liz authors an assessment of how to manage the resources centre in response to her own question, though significantly it is downgraded by the use of *maybe* and thus she defers epistemic primacy to Alice. This receives confirmation a third slot by Alice (line 17: *that’s it*) which, as Sneijder and te Molder (2006) point out, is an explicit agreement token and so claims a right to assess the truth of a prior assessment and thus indexes superior knowledge on the issue.

In line 18, Liz takes the floor to give the upshot of the talk-so-far (> *so I give* < that *I was giving that for the moment but won’t we change to something more modern*), which presupposes some unexplicated version of the gist of the prior talk (Heritage and Watson 1979: 134). Significantly, this upshot is performed in the form of a question which orients to Alice’s primacy. Alice responds (line 20) with an emphatic agreement token *but YES* which, once again, indexes her epistemic primacy (Sneijder and te Molder 2006) and she goes on to author a version of how to manage the resources centre: *it’s up to you to say I am ( ) to say but listen and come to see me send a little word saying I think that instead of ordering=giving business basics [now] we have to give market leader [ so ] they have a pre-intermediary book.* Furthermore, as Alice delivers this version of how to deal with the resources centre, Liz backchannels agreement: line 22 *uhu* and a nod and line 24 *okay* and nod.

In sum: despite being in charge of the resources centre on paper, Liz orients to Alice as having epistemic authority in this domain. Thus epistemic primacy is not commensurate with *a priori* organizational charts but is negotiated in talk and, in this case, Liz abdicates her hierarchical right to knowledge in this domain to Alice, who is, therefore, able to author her version of organizational reality. At other times, as explicated in the next
section, orientation to epistemic primacy is less clear cut: it is negotiated, policed and fought over as participants attempt to make their own assessment count as the intersubjective version of organizational reality adopted by the team.

11.3.2 Disputing epistemic primacy

The team is discussing the problems concerning the company’s in-house computer assisted language learning (CALL) software packages (i.e. multi-quest, multi-magic and questor). These ‘older’ programs were integrated into a newer version (CPLE-learning) which is used for e-learning and as such should not be used in the classroom. The ‘problem’ lies in the fact that when transferring the ‘old’ programs to the new software they somehow ‘disappeared.’ This has caused problems for the lessons and, furthermore, it is argued that the software has become so complicated that teachers can no longer create their own CALL exercises as they had done in the past.

In line 1, Alice formulates and sums up the gist of the talk-so-far, which has been focused on the software problems. This assessment initiates a dispute over epistemic primacy since all the participants agree with the assessment but the terms of agreement are in dispute and who has epistemic primacy and therefore most influence in the sensemaking process is also in dispute.

Extract 11.4

1  A  >ça j’en parle à Peter.(.) [donc, multi-quest, =donc c’est=
  >that I’ll discuss with Peter.(.) [so, multi-quest, =so it’s=
2  B  
3  A  =des exercices questor\r,<=
  =the questor exercise,<=
4  B  =°ou[i°
  =°yef:s°
5  A  [>pour moi c’est ça qu’on veut, on veut des qu’[estors,=
  [>for me it’s that which we want, we want questors,=
6  B  [OU:I.
  /YE:S.
= quand on a un cours [particulier, on veut mettre un stagiaire,=
= when we have a [lesson, we want to put a student,=

[(trucs de grammaire.)
((grammar things.)

= sur un (tr-) un exercice de grammaire, pendant un quart d' heure,=
= on a (th-) a grammar exercise, for a quarter of an hour,=

[†oui.
[†yes.

=[pour revoir un truc de grammaire (xxx)], et on a (.) toute une banque<=
=[to revise a grammar thing (xxx)], and we have a (.) a whole exercise<=

[(
]

[de donne< (.) ques<
=ba<nk< (.) ques<

[uhum

=oui.
=yes.

=yes. exact ly..°

[et on peut plus l’utiliser aujourd’hui [(
=and we can’t use it any longer today [(

[par ailleurs eh-]
[what’s more eh-]

=°oui.° par ailleurs Florence Dupont, avait un stage eh:
=°yes.° what’s more Florence Dupont, had a course eh:

> son stage de français eh la semaine dernière,<
> her French course eh last week,<

elle a toute une:: floppée des exercices sur disquette,
she has a:: whole floppy with exercises on a disk,

que j’ai essayé [e::h

which I tried [e::h

[>oh non, ça [ne marche plus ça, ça fait longtemps.< ]
[>oh no, that [no longer works, for a long time.< ]

[en vain de convertir ces]
[in vain to convert these]

exercices. ((staccato)) C’ÉTAIT (0.2) c’était techniquement possible,
exercises. (staccato) IT WAS (0.2) it was technically possible,

A =>oui. (...) ça prend des heures.<
=>yes. (...) that takes hours.<

N [mais ça prend <énormément> de temps.
but it takes an <awful> lot of time.

B moi les anciennes ça fait cinq ans je les transforme [(   )]
me the old ones I’ve been transforming for five years [(   )]

In the first part of line 1 (that I’ll discuss with Peter.), Alice formulates a future action by herself in response to the problems raised by her interlocutors, thus treating the foregoing problem talk as completed. The remainder of her contribution consists of an extended formulation (lines 1 to 18) of the gist of the preceding segment of talk (Heritage & Watson 1979). In so doing, she treats the foregoing talk as somehow in need of an assessment (to which the other interlocutors are then obliged to respond, i.e., they must accept or reject the formulation). She also considers herself the right person to assess the foregoing talk and to produce that formulation and in formulating the talk, she is thus claiming epistemic primacy.

It is, however, the responses of Nigel that are of particular interest as he disputes Alice’s claim to epistemic primacy. In line 15, he produces an emphatic expression of agreement (=yes.) immediately after the possible completion point at the end of line 14. And in line 17, he produces an even more emphatic expression of agreement, consisting of the agreement token =yes. and the adverb “exactly”. At this point it becomes obvious that Nigel is making a bid in the game of negotiating epistemic primacy and that he is actively trying to undercut Alice’s entitlement to assess the situation which is implicit in the formulation she is delivering. As Sneijder and te Molder (2006: 111) note, “by suggesting that the previous speaker is ‘right’, speakers index their knowledge of the referent and suggest being in a position to judge whether other participants’ assessments are in line with reality or not. In other words, participants construct superior expertise.” When Alice’s formulation moves towards another possible completion in line 18, Nigel produces yet another expression of agreement (what’s more), which projects further talk containing additional information underscoring the alleged correctness of Alice’s point of view. For a short while the two continue talking in overlap, after which Nigel does a
restart (in line 20), this time prefacing his *what’s more* with an agreement token (=°yes.°) that explicitly ratifies the correctness of Alice’s formulation. By flagging the correctness of the previous speaker’s remarks, Nigel is again upgrading his own epistemic position vis-à-vis Alice. Nigel subsequently discloses the source of his knowledge, so as to buttress his epistemic status: he tried to help a colleague to convert some exercises so that they would be compatible with the new programme, which did not go smoothly. In this way, Nigel demonstrates possession of first-hand knowledge. His utterance (lines 20 ff.) is therefore hearable as upstaging Alice’s claim to knowledge, because it is prefaced by an explicit agreement token and because it formulates his first-hand source of knowledge in order to bolster his claim (Pomerantz 1984a). In line 24, as soon as Alice has obtained sufficient information to infer that Nigel’s attempts to assist his colleague were unsuccessful, she undercuts Nigel’s claim with an oh-prefaced turn which is produced partially in overlap. The oh-preface of Alice’s interruption indexes epistemic independence (Heritage 2002, Raymond and Heritage 2006; Heritage and Raymond 2005). It conveys superior knowledge (or rights to display knowledge) and as such it competes with Nigel’s epistemically upgraded prior assessment. Alice’s *for a long time* (line 24) furthermore suggests that she is the one who can boast more extensive expertise, as she has been aware for a long time of the information that Nigel has just presented as ‘new’. In so doing, Alice thus undercuts the newsworthiness of Nigel’s experience and so his epistemic primacy. In lines 25 and 26, however, Nigel staunchly continues, refusing to give in to Alice and he takes a turn which stresses his own personal knowledge of the situation and therefore displays primacy. His assessment is followed by an agreement token (line 27: *yes*) and a claim to that it *takes hours* which indexes Alice’s first hand knowledge of the situation and is therefore used to display her knowledge of the situation and contest primacy in this issue. In the next turn, Nigel upgrades this assessment (line 28: *but it takes an <awful> lot of time*) which stresses his knowledge of the situation and sustains his claim to primacy. Beth then begins a turn in which she starts to give her experience but as the turn is in progress, it is overlapped by Alice who changes topic by seeking to find out how the problem occurred as explicated below.
moi les anciennes ça fait cinq ans je les transforme [ ( ) ]
me the old ones I’ve been transforming for five years [ ( ) ]

[ je comprends pas pour quoi ] moi
[ I don’t understand why ] me

je comprends qu’on a e-learning mais pour quoi est-ce Peter n a pas laissée ne laisse pas
I understand that we have e-learning but why didn’t Peter leave doesn’t leave
questor comme c’était ↑ avant ((gaze to L)) que tout le monde peut se servir de son
questor like it was ↑ before ((gaze to L)) so that everybody can use their

((L shrugs shoulders))

diskette qu’on a fait au cours des années
disk that we’ve done over the years

je pense qu’il y avait un projet de transformer présenter les pages parce que c’est pas
I think that there was a project to transform present the pages because it’s not
beau [etcetera] et que comme il y a plein des trucs à faire il n a pas fait
pretty[etcetera] and that as there are many things to do he didn’t do it

(l’ancienne format°
the old style°

l’ancienne questor doit être la [pour] les gens qui ont un diskette [qui ] ont prépare
the old questor must be there [for] the people who have a disk [who] have prepared
des exercices [er ::] si moi un jour je fais un cours j’amène mon diskette questor si
exercises [er ::] if me one day I do a lesson I bring my disk questor if

je ne peux pas la mettre ça va [er :: ] je vais pas être content
I cannot put it in it will [ er :: ] I’m not going to be happy

°oui°
°yes°
48 B non avec ta diskette tu peux le problème c’est les nouveaux [professeurs]  

no with your disk you can the problem is the new [ teachers ]

49 A [j’ai donné à] Véronique et  

[ I gave] Véronique and

50 ça passait pas=  

that didn’t work=

51 B =non mais moi enfin sais pas jusqu’au maintenant j’arrivais j’ai pas essayé dernièrement  

=no but me anyway don’t know until now I managed I haven’t tried recently

52 mais j’arrive à les transformer >mais< il faut savoir comment [c’est compliqué ]  

but I manage to transform them >but< you have to know how [it’s complicated ]

53 A [oh moi je transforme] bien  

[ oh me I transform] well

54 c’est récente ça parce qu’en septembre j’ai travaillé encore avec [ ( ) ]  

it’s recent that because in september I still worked with [ ( ) ]

In line 29, Beth self selects to begin a turn which gives her experience. However, she is overlapped by Alice who takes an extended turn (lines 30-38) in which she looks for an explanation of the problems concerning the in-house software. Alice ends her turn with a projection of future action which will solve the problem (lines 38 ff: so beh [ me I’m ] going to=I’m going to ask him to put questor back and that’s it the old questor must be there [for] the people who have a disk [who] have prepared exercise [0.3] if me one day I do a lesson I bring my disk questor if I cannot put it in it will [er ::: ] I’m not going to be happy). As she produces her utterance, Nigel backchannels agreement (lines 42 and 46) and when Alice comes to what retrospectively is the end of her turn, he self selects with °yes°. Even though the backchannels and the freestanding °yes° (line 47) are uttered in a soft voice, they still index Nigel’s claim to epistemic primacy since, as Sneijder and te Molder (2006: 111) point out, by hearably judging the correctness of the other speaker’s assessment a speaker is constructing a display of superior expertise and thus epistemic primacy.

Beth then carries out a repair (line 48: no with your disk you can the problem is the new[ teachers ]) which disputes Alice’s source of knowledge on which she has built up her assessment. In line 49, Alice overlaps what is retrospectively the end of Beth’s turn and challenges the repair: [ I gave] Véronique and that didn’t work. Véronique is one of the
new teachers and so this first hand knowledge directly contradicts Beth’s previous turn. In the face of this, line 51, Beth seeks to account for this difference in knowledge yet still retain a sense of the world held in common by explaining away the difference in knowledge by accounting for it by stating that she has not tried recently. This leaves open the possibility that differing times may explain the disagreement (cf. Pollner 1974: 50 ff.). In the continuation of her turn, Beth maintains her position in an unmitigated form (line 52): *but I manage to transform them* >but< you have to know how [it’s complicated]. In this way, she still maintains her display of the truth of her knowledge in the face of Alice’s putative repair (line 49). Alice’s response to this is to make a bid for epistemic primacy by the use of an ‘oh’ prefaced turn which claims primacy and epistemic independence (Heritage 1984b and 2002). The ‘game’ of upgraded and downgraded assessment as the participants ‘jockey’ for epistemic primacy continues in the next turn as Nigel explicitly aligns with Alice’s’ assessment but by use of an explicit agreement marker (line 55: of course) he upgrades his assessment and so also claims epistemic primacy. After this explicit agreement, he goes on to formulate the talk-so-far.

Extract 11.6

55 N [bien sûr] ça marchait
[ of course ] it worked

56 nous avons un problème dites de mise à disposition des exercices d’e-Learning [( ]
we have a problem of let’s say availability of e-Learning exercises [( ]

57 A [oh oui ]
[ oh yes ]

58 A mais ça c’est différent ça c’est [e-Learning] (0.5) ça c’est du e-Learning mais il faut du
but that’s different that’s [e-learning] (0.5) that’s e-learning but we need

59 N [( )]

60 A questor on a du magi-text on a du questor ça n’a rien à voir avec e-Learning on garde
questor we have magi-text we have questor that’s nothing to do with e-learning we keep

cet produit (.) [donc] si moi je vais revoir Peter on remet ce produit c’est un très
this product (.) [ so ] if me I’m going to see Peter we put that product back it’s a very

61 B [( )]

62 A bon produit pour les cours sur place il y a un tas des gens qui ont de telles bonnes idées
good product for the in-house lessons there are loads of people who have really good ideas
As Nigel (line 56: *we have a problem of let’s say availability of e-Learning exercises*) makes his formulation he is also claiming the right to assess the prior talk. As Heritage and Watson (1979: 150) point out, normatively doing formulations is category-bound to the identity chairperson and Alice’s response to Nigel’s formulation displays that she orients to Nigel as not having the right to make a formulation at this point. She orients to Nigel’s assessment by: overlapping at a TRP, seizing the floor and by giving a second assessment which upgrades (oh preface + explicit agreement) and therefore claims superior rights to assess (line 57: *oh yes*). She then carries out a dispreferred second assessment by disagreeing with Nigel and then carries out a stepwise transition away from Nigel’s topic of e-learning to questor and magi-text and she provides her formulation of the talk-so-far which takes the form of a decision because it projects future action (lines 60 ff.). In lines 68 and 69, both Beth and Nigel say something but both turns are untranscribable due to the *sotto voce* delivery. In line 70, Alice carries out a further assessment and then closes topic and so fixes her meaning of the talk-so-far as *the* intersubjectively achieved meaning of organizational reality as negotiated by the team. Through the use of an assessment in the form of a formulation and the projection of future organizational reality through the decision, the version of organizational reality that has become the ‘legitimized’ team version is hers and despite various attempts to jockey for primacy she has managed to have the last word.
11.4 Conclusion

Displaying epistemic primacy is thus one way of ‘doing’ influence in the negotiation of an intersubjective team version of organisational reality. The person, or persons, who can display epistemic primacy also display superior rights to assess and so define organisational reality. The right to display knowledge and claims of epistemic primacy are not generated by actual states of knowledge but rather they are generated in the interaction through occasioning the interactional relevance of identities with which participants can negotiate epistemic rights vis-à-vis each other (cf. Drew 1991). This can sometimes be quite straightforward and at other times this can involve a whole series of upgraded and downgraded assessment in which the participants negotiate respective rights. Thus, as demonstrated in extract 11.1, the SRP manager-senior teacher is being oriented to and Liz clearly orients to Alice (qua manager) as having the right to assess. When the default identities in the team are altered and, as explicated in transcript 11.2, a change of topic makes Nigel’s identity as senior teacher in charge of the telephone lessons relevant, this also brings with it an orientation to Nigel’s epistemic primacy in this field. However, responsibility for a certain aspect of the running of the school is not in itself enough to ensure displays of epistemic primacy and in extract 11.3, Liz is oriented to as not having epistemic primacy in a field that she has responsibility for. Finally, in extracts 11.4, 11.5 and 11.6 it is demonstrated how participants can ‘fight’ for such primacy.

In sum, the analyses of these extracts point to a ‘dispersed’ form of influence which is not the ‘possession’ of any one person or group of person in the interaction but which is always present and is constantly being negotiated, contested, policed and struggled over by participants in the interaction. Influence is thus conceived of as a potential that has to be instantiated through talk-in-interaction and the relational possibilities that this presents.
12. Conclusions

12.1 Introduction

As Grant and Iedema (2005) point out, despite the linguistic turn in organizational research there is, in fact, little cross-disciplinary work between organizational research and linguistics. Consequently, as they claim, publications in journals such as *Discourse and Society* or *The Journal of Pragmatics* offer little for the practitioner or organizational researcher and publications in *Organization* or *Organization Studies* have little of a linguistic base. Grant and Iedema (2005: 39) conclude that there is a potential for a synergy between the two research traditions and that this should “generate productive and innovative insights into organization.” In taking a discursive approach to leadership, this thesis has attempted to bridge the gap between the two research traditions and thus add insights from discursive psychology to organizational research. The main conclusions to this thesis are summed up in four sections.

First, as explicated in section 12.2, drawing on the social constructionist notion of leaders being the managers of meaning, this thesis has attempted to show how leadership is achieved as a lived and *in situ* phenomenon and thus complements mainstream leadership research that has tended to overlook this aspect of leadership. Second, as discussed in section 12.3, by combining leadership, influence and the social construction of organization, this thesis is able to offer an insight into the doing of power in organization. Third, section 12.4 discusses the wider implications that the conclusion of this thesis has for organisational research more generally. Finally, section 12.5 argues that a greater understanding of how discourse constructs the organization can provide a ‘practical theory’ for practitioners so that they can reflect on their practice, become more aware of the role of language in shaping their realities and so increase their leadership skills. In this way, the findings of this thesis can have a practical pay-off.
12.2 Contribution to leadership research

The search for a grand all-encompassing theory of leadership, which mainstream leadership research characterizes, has led to theoretically driven research in which abstraction often stands proxy for the phenomena that it is supposed to represent. A more qualitative approach with less ambitious objectives, which aims to say something about some aspects of leadership, is perhaps one way out of this impasse since it can enable us to see leadership as a lived, *in situ* phenomenon which is based on *emic orientations* to workplace practice rather than researchers’ theoretically driven agendas. A qualitative approach to leadership based on a fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction using DP as a research methodology can thus complement the findings of more mainstream research in several ways. First, it can ‘push’ the linguistic turn in leadership research further and provide a fine-grained sequential and categorical analysis that explicates how leadership is talked into being. A number of authors have advocated a ‘linguistic turn’ in organizational research (e.g. Alvesson and Kärreman 2000) which assumes a performative view of language and insists that language use in organizations does not simply passively ‘reflect’ the organization (naively conceptualized as a kind of exogenous pre-discursive entity): such an approach posits that organisations are incrementally constructed as the interaction unfolds and that organizations are made discursively available *in* and *by* the talk of its members. Importantly, these sense-making practices produce the organization *and* they reflexively define the roles of the players within that organization and the process of sensemaking involves a complex division of labour which instantiates and (re)confirms the allocation of rights, duties and obligations within the organization and through which the leader, as manager of meaning, is said to emerge. As, for example, Smircich and Morgan (1982: 258) note:

[L]eadership is realised in the process whereby one or more individuals succeed in attempting to frame and define the reality of others. Indeed leadership situations may be conceived as those in which there exists an obligation or a perceived right on the part of certain individuals to define the reality of others.

(italics in original)
Leadership is thus conceptualised as a social and thus dialogic achievement in which the leader, as the manager of meaning, emerges from the process of negotiating organizational reality as members of the organization jointly work their way through the flow of events surrounding the organization that await interpretation. This thesis has sought to give a radically endogenous aspect to social constructionist orientated leadership research which, despite its purportedly endogenous respecification of organization still retains a great deal of exogenous elements. Returning to Smircich and Morgan’s (1982) definition of leadership, it is clear that leadership is treated as an emergent quality that cannot be separated from actual discursive performance. However, this definition of a leader as the participant who is the most influential in defining the institutional reality of the organization is not grounded in the participants’ demonstrable relevancies as they emerge over the course of the talk (and is thus not necessarily shared by the participants themselves). In this sense, social constructionist definitions of leaders and leadership still retain a strong exogenous flavour. Furthermore, Smircich and Morgan appear undecided as to how exactly the emergence of leadership thus conceived is to be assessed analytically. At one point they seem to suggest the issue ought to be tackled in terms of perceived rights and obligations, but their initial focus on ‘success’ in the defining of organizational realities implies a vantage point for evaluating the quality of talk that is (again) external to talk itself. It is correct to say, therefore, that DP has on offer a far more radically endogenous perspective on the allocation of rights and obligations since it relies on a fine-grained analysis of naturally-occurring talk as the only resource available to researchers for unravelling leadership from a truly emic perspective. This thesis has attempted to provide an account of how activities such as ‘managing meaning’ and ‘defining reality’ are interactionally organized and how participants make use of sequential, categorical and rhetorical resources available to them to influence this process and so ‘do’ leadership. Thus, for example, in chapter 6 it was seen how orientation to the identity ‘chairperson’ allows Alice access to more powerful discursive resources such as turn mediation with which she is able to ‘do’ leadership.
12.2.1 Leadership as process

The findings of this research thus support a process approach to leadership (Hosking 2006) which minimizes, and even calls into question, the presence of and procedural consequentiality of the identity ‘leader’ as an in situ oriented-to phenomenon. Leadership is not then a question of one person or a group of people having more influence than others in the process of defining organisational reality: it is a collective, complex, unlocalizable, and continuous relational process of influence which is embedded within the wider process of organizing. A process approach to organisation and leadership thus takes the focus away from the existence of ‘leader’, as a discrete entity, and places it on the process through which leading is achieved. Such an approach to leadership concurs the notion of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness whereby “the reality of something existing ‘concretely in itself without transition’ is a matter of abstractive thinking and not a property of the underlying thing itself” (Wood 2005: 1104). Through casting leadership in terms of process, the entative approach which places emphasis on leaders is replaced by an approach which emphasizes the ‘doing’ of leadership. The entative approach is consistent with the Cartesian dogma which assumes a clear separation between mind and body and thus between individuals and which, therefore, underlies a telementalist approach to language and communication. Leadership, as defined by social constructionists as the management of meaning, is thus to be found in the group process of sensemaking and the role of influence in creating an intersubjective form of organizational reality. This is commensurate with a relational approach to ‘doing’ leadership (Uhl-Bien 2006) where the focus of research moves beyond unidirectional or even reciprocal leader/follower relations to one that recognises leadership wherever it occurs. Leadership is not restricted to a single or even a small set of formal or informal leaders; rather it functions as a dynamic system of sensemaking in which leadership is embedded. Consequently, such a shift requires a move away from the concept of leaders as being managers of meaning that is still based upon the ‘heroic’ (i.e., individualist) conception of leadership derived from social psychology.

Commensurate with the process approach to leadership, this thesis indicates that the relevance of the identity ‘leader’ is not warranted by the data. Rather than orienting to any one person in the team as leader, the participants orient to identities that are made
relevant by the duplicatively organized MCD: the management team. Thus chapter 5 explicates how this category device is made relevant at the start of the meeting and that this becomes the default category device until there is a change of footing. Identities within this MCD are negotiable, shifting and variable and this is one of the tools with which the participants do leadership but leader as a relevant and thus oriented-to identity is not one of the resources. Thus, in various places in the thesis (notably chapter 6) it is explicated how the oriented-to procedural consequentality of the identity ‘chairperson’ allows Alice access to the discursive rights by which she is able to influence the sensemaking process so that her version of organizational reality counts. Such category-bound resources include, for example, the ability to set the agenda, to change topic and to announce decisions. This allows her to ‘do’ influence and so ‘do’ leadership but the identity work that is performed is category-bound to her identity as chairperson, not leader. Similarly, other participants who are not incumbent of chairperson identity can mobilize discursive resources available to them to ‘do’ influence. For example, as explicated in chapter 12, Nigel invokes his identity ‘experienced teacher’ to use first hand knowledge to challenge Alice’s epistemic primacy and so present a more influential version of what is going on.

Therefore, as regards the notion of the management of meaning and the emergence of the leader through interaction, the outcome of this analysis suggests that all people continually influence one another and that the doing influence is therefore a pretty mundane activity in a meeting and that it is constructed as extraordinary by (wrongly) attributing to one person or group of people the ability to influence the others, whereas in fact it is a mutual and fluid process that cannot be attributed to any one person. Analysts failing to take note of this and who retain a heroic approach to leadership thus run the risk of using the reified concepts of leadership to analyse the phenomena and thus explain leadership through the use concepts that stand proxy for the phenomena that they seek to investigate. On the other hand, lay uses of heroic concepts of leadership may be seen as reifications of the mundane process of influence and their interest to the researcher is not in their underlying capacity to reflect leadership ‘as it is’ but rather their interest to the researcher lies in the actions that heroic concepts of leadership perform in interaction.
In sum, the identity leader appears to be a post hoc reification rather than an identity that is oriented to in talk by the participants themselves. Why the identity leader should become a post hoc reification, under what circumstances such reification is carried out and why leaders are the object of speculation within organizational research and popular discourses is not the focus of the thesis but the idea that leaders do not in fact exist as concrete identities is not new. Gemmill and Oakley (1992), for example, suggest that leadership is a myth that reinforces existing social beliefs and structures about the necessity of hierarchy and leaders in organizations. Meindl *et al.* (1985) argue that the notion of leadership is used to make sense of complex organizational events. And Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003b: 985) argue that: “leadership may mean very little apart from having an impact on the self-esteem of its subjects, and providing an ideology promoting subordination of employees to managers supposed not only to exercise control but also to exhibit leadership”. Consequently, it can be argued that ‘theories of leadership’ often offer little more than a shoring up of the myth of heroic leadership that is used to sustain the hegemony of the current organizational status quo. For example, Alvesson’s and Sveningsson’s (2003b) voice concerns to the effect that leadership amounts to little more than hype and a ‘mythologization’ (in their terms) of mundane activities. In a further study in the same year (Alvesson and Sveningsson 2003a), they demonstrate how managers are capable of articulating discourses about leadership but their accounts of leadership break down when asked to expand on what they actually do in concrete terms that is leadership. As Alvesson and Sveningsson state:

> In virtually all these examples the interviewed managers put forward a notion, that is, several versions of leadership in accordance with contemporary fashionable scripts concerning how one should conduct leadership. In this respect, all managers appear fairly informed and progressive. However, when explaining the topics, the view of their leadership becomes vague or even self-contradictory, the initial positioning almost melts away. At the end of the interview accounts, there is not much leadership left intact.

Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003a: 374)

Consequently, the leadership myth is sustained by managers attributing ‘leadership status’ to mundane activities. Thus, mundane acts carried out by managers become labeled as ‘leadership’ and through this process they are transformed into something
allegedly significant because it is done by a ‘manager’. As Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003c: 1455) note, such mundane activities as listening, informal talk or being cheerful are elevated to the extra-ordinary when done by ‘leaders’; they sum up their research in the formula: “(1) mundane acts carried out by (2) a manager and (3) labeled leadership means (4) an expectation of something significant, even ‘magical’ being accomplished”. However, by reinventing such mundane activities as leadership when done by managers, the hegemony of concepts of managerialism is (re)created and sustained. This is because the extra-ordinarization of mundane workplace interaction through a discourse of leadership reflects, and creates, an exaggerated dependency on managers and reconfirms the hierarchical structure and vested interest of an organization. As Alvesson and Sveningsson (2003b: 983) state, “what is considered visionary or strategic leadership might very well be interpreted as esteem-enhancing identity work for those vulnerable to – or attracted by – the modern leadership discourse”. Leadership theories thus can be seen a sustaining a myth which is used to justify imbalances of power within the broader social system.

12.2.2 Leadership and influence

Previous research on influence in business environments has been mainly based on taxonomies drawn from self-report and questionnaires of managerial behavior. Such taxonomies classify influence in broad terms such as assertiveness, ingratiation and so on yet they fail to offer a fine-grained analysis of how practitioners ‘do’ assertiveness or ‘do’ ingratiation as an in situ accomplishment. For example, Lamude and Scudder (1995) offer this definition, taken from Yukl and Falbe (1990), of upward appeals as a form of influence.

Upward appeals: the manager seeks to establish the legitimacy of a request by claiming the authority or right to make it or by verifying that it is consistent with organizational policies, rules, practices, or traditions.

Lamude and Scudder (1995: 166)

However, exactly how this is achieved is not explicated. Yet the ‘stuff’ of influence is the ‘how’ of influence and not abstracted taxonomies that rely on the readers’ intuition to ‘fill
in the gaps’. Furthermore, such taxonomies are often decontextualised and ignore the fact that resources that ‘do’ influence are differentially available to participants according to their identities. Consequently, such taxonomies do not give a completely nuanced account of how influence is achieved and they leave the practitioner to intuitively fill in how to ‘do’ influence as a context sensitive, interactional accomplishment.

Considering influence to be an essential part of leadership, this thesis has gone beyond the taxonomies of influence outlined in the literature review (cf. chapter 2). Such taxonomies are exogenous to the concerns of the participants and do not explicate how influence is achieved on a turn-by-turn basis during talk-in-interaction. The ‘how’ can be explicated through a fine-grained, sequential, categorical and rhetorical analysis of members’ practices in achieving an intersubjective version of organizational reality. Thus, for example, in section 9.2, it was seen how active voicing is used to invoke the identity of a hierarchic superior with a commercial role in the company and so make relevant outside agencies (the clients of the company) to which the director (Alice) has access but to which the other team members do not. Thus, a fine-grained linguistic analysis can provide ‘flesh’ to the taxonomies of influence that are alleged to occur in research such as Lamude and Scudder’s that relies on second-hand accounts of doing influence rather than direct observation of influence in action.

Whilst it is true that some taxonomies of managerial influence and leadership consider influence as a two-way process (e.g. Yukl and Falbe 1990; Kipnis and Schmidt 1988), most taxonomies of influence in organizations consider it to be only a ‘downward’ phenomena which assumes that ‘subordinates’ do not influence ‘managers’. Yet, this thesis demonstrates how influence is both downward and upward and from this perspective, the focus of leadership research should shift from individual entities who have pre-discursive rights ‘to influence’ by virtue of their hierarchical position in the organization to the process of influencing as a multi-party phenomenon. Influence is not a zero-sum game or commodity that some have and others do not, rather it is located in the relational sensemaking process of the group and individuals are always in the process of simultaneously influencing and being influenced. However, access to these discursive resources with which influence is achieved is not symmetrical but is skewed according identity. To some extent this can be seen in turn type pre-allocation, yet influence is
more easily conceived of as a set of potentials which, while always present, can be
variably negotiated by participants in the meeting. It is not something that is possessed by
one or more of the participants and which is made available and oriented to in strictly
pre-allocated and category-bound discursive resources. Furthermore, not only do
participants have to know the rules of interaction (in the ethnomethodological sense of
exploiting rules to account for what they are doing) and thus orient to what they consider
as allowable contributions to the meeting but in order to ‘do’ influence these
contributions must be skilfully and rhetorically designed.

Rhetoric has often been glossed as the art of persuasion but Edwards (1997: 8) goes
further to link it with an explicitly social constructionist agenda whereby rhetoric
assumes an active and omnipresent role in the construction of reality:

“Descriptions are selected and assembled with regard to actual alternatives, and sometimes
specific counter-descriptions. They are not merely different from otherwise possible descriptions,
but have a rhetorical, argumentative quality with regard to what somebody else might say (Billig,
1987). This is a feature not only of overt disagreements between people, but of discourse in
general. We can always inspect a piece of discourse, even the most straightforwardly
uncontroversial and descriptive (perhaps especially those!), and ask: what is being denied by that
assertion? Or, what otherwise plausible world, or version of the world, is at issue?”

Rhetoric, as in the DP tradition, is thus seen as being constitutive of social reality and
therefore the persuasive (rhetorical) design of this talk is a part of doing influence.
Therefore, an integral part of ‘doing’ leadership is also embedded in the rhetorical design
of contributions to the meeting as well as categorical access to the more ‘powerful’
sequential resources of talk. Rhetoric, in the data presented in this thesis, is effected
through the use of numerous techniques, such as active voicing, narratives, extreme case
formulations and so on but the use of rhetoric is not the sole preserve of the hierarchical
superior and the language of all the participants is couched in rhetoric so as to influence
the sensemaking process. In conclusion, a discursive approach to leadership inspired by
DP can make visible the amorphous concept of influence and its role in the ‘doing’ of
leadership.
12.3 Leadership and power

Furthermore, by combining leadership, influence and the social construction of organization, this thesis is able to offer an insight into the doing of power in organization (cf. Pye 2005: 47). As Grisoni and Beeby (2007: 194) note: “in relation to the power dynamic of leadership, the ability to influence others is central. We understand power as the ability to define situations with and for others. If leadership is fundamentally about power and power is the ability to define situations with and for others then the exercise of power becomes the exercise of sensemaking”. Thus, they draw together the main themes of this thesis into a power/influence/sensemaking nexus. The ability to ‘manage meaning’ is powerful for two reasons. As Molotch and Boden (1985: 285) note, through talk, “the hierarchical nature of the relation among participants is sustained, and the substantive version of reality achieved in common talk is the version offered by the more powerful interactant”. Moreover, as Molotch and Boden (ibid) also point out, this is achieved through a struggle for discursive resources which concurs with some conversation analysts’ definition of power (e.g. Clark and Pinch 1988; Hutchby 1996a, 1996b, 1999; Hutchby and Wooffitt 1998, 1999; Kitzinger 2000, Wooffitt 2005, Schneider 2005).

These analysts argue that a fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction that focuses on the asymmetrical distribution of discursive resources in interaction “can succeed in making visible what for conventional sociologist is the awkwardly invisible concept of power” (Hutchby 1999: 92). Therefore, doing a fine-grained analysis of talk-in-interaction can make visible the asymmetrical distribution of resources by which influence is achieved in the process of sensemaking and so it can also make tangible the enactment of power in organizational environments.

First, then, orientation to allowable contributions during the process of sensemaking instantiates the hierarchy of the organization as power. As Hutchby (1996b: 482) states,

“the ways in which participants design their interaction can have the effect of placing them in a relationship where discursive strategies of greater or lesser power are differentially available to each of them. In this sense, power can be viewed as an ‘emergent feature’ of oriented-to discourse practices in given settings”
Thus, access to more or less powerful discourse resources allows participants to be more or less influential in the defining of organizational reality and so it reflexively (re)enacts the hierarchy of the company as a lived and oriented to phenomenon. The hierarchy that is enacted is not necessarily that of the organizational charts since power from this perspective is not seen as a pre-existing phenomenon that is held by certain participants by virtue of their hierarchical position (i.e. formal power). Rather power is seen, in an ethnomethodological sense, as a practical achievement which is realized through the reflexive link between the categorical and sequential properties of talk and participants’ orientations to what, for them, count as allowable contributions to the interaction. The ethnomethodological approach to power thus also encompasses the notion of informal power (i.e. power that is not enacted through socially sanctioned hierarchies).

The play of power at a sequential level was pointed out by Sacks (1992 vol. 1: 256 ff.) who shows how such power relations can be operative through participants’ orientation to access to discursive structures when he notes that children begin turns with something like “you know what daddy?” In so doing, children are orienting to their limited rights to initiate talk and their restricted access to participate in the adult social world. However, the power that Sacks explicates is not a zero-sum game: it is open to challenge and negotiation and so flows throughout the interaction. So, for example, the utterance “you know what daddy?” is also a way of challenging limited rights to talk. This is because, it obliges the father to reply “what?” which legitimizes the child’s next turn at talk because the child has to provide a next turn to the question “what?” Kitzinger (2000) explicitly links this observation of Sacks with the ‘doing’ of power through orientation to discursive rights and obligations. Moreover, she also argues that, despite the fact that Sacks is claiming to explicate the emic orientation of the participants rather than give a researcher’s abstract view of power, the participants do not have to specifically articulate issues of power for power to be present in their emic orientations. She argues that it is precisely because power is routinely incorporated into interaction without being explicitly noticed that is of interest to the researcher.

More recently, Hutchby (1999) discusses the way in which callers to British talk radio shows are able to manipulate to their advantage the unequal interactional possibilities that are intrinsic to the radio talk show format. After outlining the interactional disadvantages
of ‘going first’ in a debate (the other party can take issue with whatever it chooses to
consider as problematic in what the previous speaker just said), Hutchby notes that in
radio talk the first position is systematically allotted to the caller, while the talk show host
has the more advantageous position of going second. In the course of the call, however,
clever callers regularly succeed in manoeuvring the host into a position where the host
has to ‘go first’ and in securing the interactional advantage of going second for
themselves. The relationships between subsequent turns thus constitute a resource that
can be ‘tapped’ by all parties to the debate and that can be exploited to manoeuvre the
other party into a disadvantageous position. Hutchby likens this ‘dispersed’ form of
power that he came across in the talk radio shows he investigated to a notion of power
embraced by Foucault:

Like Foucault, a CA approach seeks to view power not as a zero-sum game but as a set of
potentials which, while always present, can be variably exercised, resisted, shifted around and
struggled over by social agents. Foucault argued that power is not something that is possessed by
one agent or collectivity and lacked by another, but a potential that has to be instantiated within a
network equally including those who exercise power and those who accept or resist it. The
network itself is viewed as a structure of possibilities and not as a concrete relationship between
determinate social entities.

(Hutchby 1999: 586)

In sum, this research may also be able to offer a perspective of the issue of power in
organization that takes account of Hardy and Clegg’s (1996: 636) observation that, “the
door marked ‘general theory of power’, whether fashioned critically or conventionally
seems to lead us back into a reduced version of the circle with a perspective that renders
many organizational phenomena invisible or unimportant, particularly the concerns of
people whose lives frame the circle”. Thus, a fine-grained take on power and influence
combined with sensemaking practices might prove to be one way in which participants’
emic orientations to power and the construction of organizational reality can be made
visible to researchers.
12.4 Contribution to research into organizations

Despite the fact that Weick et al. (2005) claim that sensemaking is grounded in communication, few fine-grained analyses of talk-in-interaction have been offered to substantiate how this may be done (though see, for example, Boden 1994). Though the emphasis of this thesis is on leadership and influence in the sensemaking process, it also has wider implications for organizational research that takes the linguistic turn seriously and it can contribute to an understanding of how organizations are constructed in talk.

From this social constructionist perspective, the organization must be understood in terms of its emergence through talk. As Weick (2004: 408) states, “organization does not precede communication nor is communication produced by organization. Instead, organization emerges through communication”. Thus, the organization is not a stable exogenous phenomenon but is a constituted feature of the setting of which it is part. Such an approach essentially dissolves the traditional micro-macro dichotomy which, after all, is a researchers’ dichotomy and not a member’s distinction (Francis and Hester 2004: 18 and Hilbert 1990). Significantly, then, as Schegloff (1987) claims talk-in-interaction becomes the primordial site of sociality. As he says:

Both our casual and our studied examination of interaction and talk-in-interaction provide a lively sense of the occasions on which who the parties are relative to one another seems to matter, and matter to them. And these include senses of “who they are” that connect directly to what is ordinarily meant by “social structure” – their relative status, the power they differentially can command, the group affiliations they display or can readily have attributed to them such as their racial or ethnic membership, their gender and age-grade status, their occupational status and its general standing and immediate interactional significance, and other categories of membership in the society which matter to the participants and which fall under the traditional sociological rubric “social structure”.
(Schegloff 1991: 47/8)

In short, social order (including organization) is a local product of interaction: interaction constructs social relationships which enact social institutions. Such ‘socially constructed’ organizational realities are produced and oriented to as ‘externally’ constraining social facts through a process of reification. This process of ‘social construction’ is realized through talk-in-interaction and more specifically it is achieved through a process of
sensemaking: “when we say that meanings materialize, we mean that sensemaking is, importantly, an issue of language, talk and communication. Situations, organizations, and environments must be talked into existence” (Weick et al. 2005: 409). Understanding organization, thus, becomes a question of understanding how it is constructed in talk on a turn-by-turn basis. However, what is missing from most accounts of sensemaking is a fine-grained analysis of how this is achieved and, consequently, how the organization comes into being. Yet, if organizations are considered to be the product of sensemaking and the performative nature of language, then empirical research should be carried out to study just how the emergence of organization and identities within the organization actually occurs (Watson 1997) and despite a few notable exceptions (e.g., Boden 1994; Taylor and Cooren 1997) little work has been carried out into the fine-grained emergence of organization through talk.

The ethnomethodologically inspired research paradigm that this paper puts forward thus attempts to bridge this gap and to provide a fine-grained analysis of the emergence of organization and more specifically the identity of leader. Bittner (1965) for example, in his seminal article *The Concept of Organization*, claims that traditional sociology has led to “an informed vagueness” about organization since organization has been accounted for by using second order researchers’ concepts that are ‘one step’ removed from organization as a lived experience. Conversely, an ethnomethodologically inspired research agenda offers a chance to explicate the organization as a living, temporally unfolding, complex entity as it emerges through talk-in-interaction. As Bittner (1965: 247) states: “the meaning of a concept, and all the terms and determinations that are subsumed under it, must be discovered by studying their use in real scenes of actions by persons whose competence to use them is socially sanctioned.” In short, the methodological use of the concept of organization and the identities of players within that emerging organization must be studied by observing competent users and their mundane commonsense reasoning. In sum, through using discursive psychology as a methodology to explicate the doing of influence in this sensemaking process, this thesis is able to offer insights, which are currently missing from social constructionist accounts of organization, into the way in which organizations are constructed on a turn-by-turn basis.
12.5 Where do we go from here?

As Watson (1994: 86) states, “a piece of management research is useful in so far as it is capable of informing the practices of those involved in management activities” and following this line of argument, this thesis is closed with a tentative suggestion for the practical application of a discursive theory of leadership. If one accepts the social constructionist premises of this research and that the organization and the identities of ‘players’ within the organization are not a pre-discursive fait accompli that are determined by the exogenous structure of the organization, then the inherent fluidity of organization has also to be accepted. The organization and the identities of players within it are constantly being carved out of the undifferentiated flux and chaos that surrounds the organization. Consequently, it is always open to change. However, such change does not take place in a social and historical vacuum. Participants are accountably aware of the constraints and resources that are available to them and that if they pass certain limits they will face sanction, but they are perhaps less aware of the reified and socially constructed nature of the organization.

Organizational researchers such as Chia (1995) and Shotter (1993) take the post-modern social constructionist stance that organization is, in fact, created through talk-in-interaction and is a discursive construction. Making practitioners aware of this can be empowering because encouraging practitioners to consider that there is no invisible ‘they’ who put constraining situations in front of the organization and that the ‘they’ is the people who are more active and influential when it comes to defining organizational reality coaxes practitioners to ‘take up arms’ against the ‘situation’ and be more active in challenging the status quo. By challenging the accepted nature of organization as an exogenous, fixed entity that determines practitioner roles and which casts practitioners as judgmental dopes, a social constructionist approach to leadership, which suggests that since organization is a discursive creation it can always be constructed differently, could have emancipating effects on people within organization. Yet, for a social constructionist notion of organization to be used in this emancipatory way, it would first be necessary to challenge lay conceptions concerning the importance of language in organization. From a lay perspective, as Weick (2004) points out, talk and action are considered to be two separate activities that are consecutive rather than concurrent. Furthermore, talk is
considered to be less important than action and this is reflected in common sayings such as; ‘actions speaks louder than words’, ‘all talk and no action’ and so on. These lay assumptions are so ingrained that, as Weick (2004: 405) notes, “given the context created by these assumptions, advocates of discourse analysis face an uphill battle for legitimacy. But they have the means to change this. What they need to do is make explicit several assumptions that they take for granted which would help a wider audience appreciate that conversation is the action of organizing”. If practitioners are enabled to consider language as action then they will be able to realize the possibilities for action within language. After all, in the field of linguistics, since Searle and Wittgenstein, such a notion of language as action is hardly challenged. More specifically, from a social constructionist perspective, practitioners will be able to see the crucial role of (power of?) language in the construction of their and others’ identities and the organization itself. Consequently, rather than perhaps accepting identities and organization as being imposed, a social constructionist perspective allows practitioners to envisage things differently and to challenge existing ways of being. From a practical perspective, if one does not want to passively accept an identity in somebody else’s organizational landscape, then it is essential that the centrality of language and its ability to construct an alternative landscape is impressed upon practitioners. If practitioners are not encouraged to become part of the language games that surround them and if they are not helped to have an awareness of how language games are played and the stakes that are involved in such ‘games’, then they are left on the side lines to complain without seeking to partake actively in the creation of their own identities and their organizational landscape. As Shotter (1997: 11) says:

“It is a situation in which 'I' feel I have made 'my' contribution, and in which 'you' can feel that you have made yours. Unless this is the case, I might feel that I am having to live in your reality, or you feel that you are having to live in mine, or, that both of us are having to live in a reality not our own. These opportunities to contribute to the construction, or not, of one's social realities, is what there is in such situations to struggle over: if social realities are socially constructed, then it is important that we can all have a voice in the process of their construction, and have our voice taken seriously, i.e., responded to practically.”
In order to prevent this kind of exclusion that Shotter implies, practitioners should be made aware of the constructionist nature of talk. Moreover, and more specifically in terms of leadership, if practitioners want a leadership role in the creation of organizational reality, it is therefore a question not of giving them more theories of leadership but of giving them skills with which they can achieve influence in the construction of organizational reality and identities. Moreover, it also encourages practitioners not to conflate leadership with hierarchy by accepting the status quo and the ‘right’ of others to define organizational reality. Leadership, as with any other social construction, is ‘up for grabs’. This approach to leadership is compatible with current trends in leadership research which place an emphasis on the distributed and relational nature of leadership (e.g. Day et al. 2004; Gronn 2002; Bennett et al. 2003) and which is in opposition to the more traditional image of leader as the ‘heroic’ individual. Consequently, leadership is an issue for everybody in an organization and not only those who have supervisory roles.

If this is the case, instead of grand theories of leadership practitioners need to be more aware of their own skills as wordsmiths and the reflexive possibilities that they have to shape the organizational landscape and their own and others’ identities within this landscape. Yet, most theories of leadership are too abstract to be of use to practitioners because they reveal little about concrete action in real world situations; they rely on the a priori identification of leaders from the hierarchy of the company and findings are generally too ill-defined to provide concrete guidance for leader development (Cohen 2004). Furthermore, Byrne’s (1992: 62) research which consisted of interview data with deans of business schools gives some choice quotes concerning the merits of management research:

“it’s crap [business academics] say nothing in these articles and say it in a pretentious way”

“as much as 80% of management research may be irrelevant….. I wonder if the majority of it is of any significant value to executives in terms of influencing their daily actions, behaviors or business practices”
Mintzberg’s (1982) accounts for this gap between theory and practice by arguing that leadership researchers and practitioners basically come from two different discourse communities and this, therefore, explains why research often bears little relevance to the daily lives of practitioners. As Mintzberg (1982: 249) says, “my point is that if leadership researchers can talk only to each other, then they ultimately serve nobody”. Somewhat ironically, he calls for leadership to pass a usefulness-to-practitioner test. He basically calls for a less theoretical approach to leadership research in which there should be fewer instruments for quantifying and measuring leadership and a greater (atheoretical) concern for what is actually done. In this way, he calls for leadership research which reveals the practices of leaders to become more relevant to leaders. The core ability of a leader is not thus finding and applying a current and fashionable leadership theory; it is rather the capacity of being able to formulate a persuasive version of organizational reality. The objective of research that is of help to the practitioner is not therefore to discover new ‘facts’ about leadership: it is rather to facilitate an understanding of something that is ‘seen but unnoticed’. Consequently, what research should offer is a ‘practical theory’ (Shotter and Cunliffe 2003) that foregrounds the seen but unnoticed nature of the construction of social reality and identities. Practitioners, from this broadly social constructionist perspective, are empowered by an account of leadership which gives them a central role in noticing and labeling and so bringing into being phenomena within the chaos that surrounds and permeates organizations. Leadership is, therefore, to do with authoring and making sense of the past, present and future of the organization and identities within the organization. Such an approach casts leaders as practical authors:

as practical authors, managers, in the course of their everyday conversation with other organizational participants, author the shape of their organization’s operational space or social landscape. And, in so doing, they also author a sense of their own identities and the identities of those around them, the different parts all involved must play in relation to each other upon that landscape. In this way, managers are more like artists and novelists than scientists or engineers. Such authorship is a dialogical practice in which features of experience and surroundings are articulated and brought into prominence. What makes managers ‘good’ authors, is that they are able to draw on a variety of linguistic resources to help those around them, who experience themselves as occupying indeterminate, ill-defined realms of activity, make intelligible sense of their surroundings. In so
doing, they help them create new possibilities for action, as well as new ways of being and relating, while recognizing also, the ethical responsibilities associated with these new ways.

Shotter and Cunliffe (2003)

What allows practitioners to ‘do’ leadership is their ability to draw on a repertoire of linguistic resources to help other organizational players make sense of the undifferentiated flow of activity that surrounds them.

From this perspective, leadership is not a question of character traits or role playing (as in traditional social psychology), rather it is a way of being or relating which is framed by the discursive possibilities inherent in the sensemaking process and the creation of an intersubjective sense of organizational reality. Such an approach to leadership, thus, casts practitioners in the role of rhetoricians. Significantly, drawing from its classical roots, rhetoric is regarded as a ‘teachable’ skill and, as in classical times, this thesis claims that the study of rhetoric should become a basic management tool. Practitioners require descriptive or instructive accounts of leadership in action with which they can further define and improve their own practice. Practitioners who aspire to leadership should thus be encouraged to reflexively look at their own and others’ practices (as lived action) and consider how within the framework of practical authorship this can be improved. In short, improving leadership is a question of improving rhetorical skills based on the assumption of the performative role of language in organization. Consequently, what practitioners notice can be expressed in such a way that others take it seriously and are influenced/persuaded to accept it and so it becomes an intersubjective version of organizational reality (defensive rhetoric). Moreover, not only can it help practitioners build their own persuasive versions of reality but it can also help them deconstruct the arguments of others (offensive rhetoric).

However, a word of warning is in order. As Potter (1996: 230 ff.) points out, such an approach to the practical application of a discursive approach to leadership could be seen a misempowering because it could be argued that the ‘power’ of rhetoric will be left in the hands of the existing elites who have access to training and education. As regards leadership training, such criticisms are perhaps even more pertinent since selection for leadership training is often conflated with company hierarchy. However, this thesis argues for a dispersed version of leadership whereby everybody in the organization is a
potential leader and has their role to play in the joint construction of an intersubjective organizational reality. It therefore argues for an inclusive form of leadership training that is not restricted to hierarchic superiors. Secondly, Potter (ibid) also argues that teaching practitioners how to ‘talk’ might be patronizing because practitioner interaction is already very subtle and skilled. However, training need not necessarily be patronizing. The practitioner need not be cast in a passive role where he/she has to learn something from the researcher, who stands outside events and interprets ‘what is going on’ for the practitioner. Facilitative approaches to training based on the concept of the reflective practitioner (Schön 1983), for example, seek to empower the practitioner by encouraging them to become more aware of their practices and so develop their own agenda for improving such practice in collaboration with the trainer. Housley and Fitzgerald (2000) outline how conversation analysis could be a useful tool in the development of reflective practice and practitioner based research. They argue (ibid: 15) that “the analysis of members’ communicative and interactive activities within meetings (and potentially other contexts) could provide a way through which practitioners could reflect upon and analyze aspects of their practice.” This synergy between CA and reflective practice would be created because CA transcription is used as an estrangement device so that the seen but unnoticed machinery of talk in (workplace) interaction becomes available for analysis and reflection. Moreover, talk is not regarded as existing in a vacuum but it is also considered to be the means by which the activities under investigation (such as leadership) are achieved. More importantly, one of the advantages of this is that it is a first order analysis of members’ practices and any practitioner based research is therefore also data driven rather than being generated by second order theories that may be so abstracted that, as Mintzberg (1982) argues, they have little relation to what actually goes on in practice. Whilst linking reflective practice and CA inspired research such as presented in this thesis is relatively rare, Roberts and Sarangi (2003) and Jones and Stubbe (2004), for example, have already documented their attempts to make practitioners more aware of their talk through the study of recordings of their own workplace interaction. They argue for a move away from the researcher as outsider and expert feeding back findings into practice. As they note, the ‘traditional’ relationship between researchers and practitioners or theory and practice harbors an inherent superior
position for the scientist compared to the practitioner and this can lead to resistance and rejection of external advice. They, thus, propose an action research approach based on reflective practice.

Action research can be defined as a “systemic inquiry that is collective, collaborative, self-reflective, critical and undertaken by participants in the inquiry” (McCutcheon and Jurg 1990: 148). It is generally considered to have been first identified by Lewin, an American social psychologist, in the 1940s. Lewin (1946) argued that research into social practice requires that the research act is embedded in a form of self-development that focuses on individuals undertaking research into their own practice, in their own context, and for their own benefit. The overall aim of such research is therefore to develop effective professional practice. Moreover, Masters (1995) points out that action research has a strong emancipatory element which promotes critical consciousness and that such critical awareness can manifest itself in political (as well as practical) action in order to promote change. The framework of such research, as outlined by Jones and Stubbe (2004: 199) would be as follows:

a) articulating an issue to be addressed
b) reflecting on and analyzing the issue
c) formulating and testing a practical-theory
d) action (i.e. implementing the practical theory and in turn reflecting on it)

The effect of such an approach to working with practitioners is thus not to impose outside theories but to encourage a participatory approach whereby practitioners become engaged in data collection, identifying what they see as issues and devising action plans to deal with these issues using the tools (in this case a discursive approach to leadership and sensemaking) in order to improve their practice. In short, rather than being treated as consumers of theories that may appear remote from actual practice, practitioners become critical observers of their own practice. Therefore, the role of researcher is to facilitate the practitioner’s ability to respond to unique situations in an appropriate way. In short, it becomes a way of improving their skill in playing the language game. Moreover, this leads to the empowerment of practitioners who are involved in researching and reflecting
on their own practice in a dialogical relationship with the researcher whereby the distinction between theory and practice and knowing and doing are minimalised. Jones and Stubbe (2004) report successful implementation of such reflective practice as they say:

“we received a great deal of positive feedback from informants about the benefits to them, both personally and professionally, of their involvement in the data collection and feedback processes. For instance, people often reported that they had gained useful insights simply by monitoring their actual interaction patterns as compared to their perceptions or by listening to their own recordings”

Jones and Stubbe (2004: 190)

Thus, to conclude, this research could be returned to workplace in order to improve workplace communication and more specifically the leadership skills of practitioners and to empower them in their everyday workplace lives. In short, there is a potential for this work to have real pay-off and to improve the level of workplace interaction.
13. References


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14. Appendix one: transcription key

(2.5) approximate length of pause in seconds
(.) micro-pause of one-tenth of a second
[word] overlapping utterances
↑ rising intonation
↓ falling intonation
→ part of extract discussed in the text
: sound stretching
= latched utterances
word stressed word
CAPITALS speech notably louder than surrounding speech
( ) inaudible
(X X) unclear speech rendered as approximation to the number of syllables
(guess) transcriber’s guess at unclear utterance or word
((makes notes)) description of an activity
--^-- nod
>word< spoken faster than surrounding talk
<word> spoken more slowly than surrounding speech
°word° spoken more softly than surrounding talk
hh out-breath
.hh in-breath
wor(h)d ‘laughter’ within words
£word£ words spoken with a smiley voice

J Jon : researcher
N Nigel
B Beth
L Liz
A Alice