Research Thomas van Es

Abstract

The theoretical environment in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences is diffuse. In explaining conscious perceptual experience we uphold a wide variety of different theories. Two popular promising theories about experience are predictive processing (PP) and sensorimotor theory (SMT). It seems that the respective theories have what the other lacks. Where PP's cerebral focus feels too narrow, SMT's bodily focus can seem to play down the importance of the neural underpinnings of experience. Despite this promising fit, SMT rejects the representations at work in PP, making them incompatible. In this research I intend to fuse PP and SMT, forming a hybrid theory. The challenge is to make the theory internally coherent. The field however is shrouded in vague terminology, and the aforementioned incompatibility may be as well. The concept 'representation' is famous for being indeterminate, and the first stage will involve clarification of terminology, as to sharpen the exact points of conflict. In stage 2, I intend to resolve this conflict, and open up the path for hybridity. This will be done by explaining PP's representational functions in terms of non-representational sensorimotor activity. In stage 3, I will assess the extent to which this hybrid theory is internally coherent without loss of explanatory reach or power. Or, if this project fails, I will analyze where the conflict is insurmountable, as to give a clear idea of how to proceed in explaining consciousness.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: van Es Thomas

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project

Abstract

The theoretical environment in the philosophy of the cognitive sciences is diffuse. In explaining conscious perceptual experience we uphold a wide variety of different theories. Two popular promising theories about experience are predictive processing (PP) and sensorimotor theory (SMT). It seems that the respective theories have what the other lacks. Where PP's cerebral focus feels too narrow, SMT's bodily focus can seem to play down the importance of the neural underpinnings of experience. Despite this promising fit, SMT rejects the representations at work in PP, making them incompatible. In this research I intend to fuse PP and SMT, forming a hybrid theory. The challenge is to make the theory internally coherent. The field however is shrouded in vague terminology, and the aforementioned incompatibility may be as well. The concept 'representation' is famous for being indeterminate, and the first stage will involve clarification of terminology, as to sharpen the exact points of conflict. In stage 2, I intend to resolve this conflict, and open up the path for hybridity. This will be done by explaining PP's representational functions in terms of non-representational sensorimotor activity. In stage 3, I will assess the extent to which this hybrid theory is internally coherent without loss of explanatory reach or power. Or, if this project fails, I will analyze where the conflict is insurmountable, as to give a clear idea of how to proceed in explaining consciousness.

Researcher(s)

• Promoter: Myin Erik
• Fellow: van Es Thomas

Research team(s)

• Centre for Philosophical Psychology

Project type(s)

• Research Project