Abstract
This project investigates the role of motivated memory in economic decision-making, focusing on how individuals selectively recall information about their own actions, others' behavior, feedback, and collective decisions. Standard economic models assume rational updating of beliefs, yet growing evidence suggests that memory distortions systematically shape decision-making. We extend this literature by experimentally analyzing three key domains. WP1 explores how framing the decision environment in the Dictator Game influences biased recall, affecting individuals' perceptions of their own and others' behavior. WP2 extends this to cooperative environments, investigating how individuals recall performance feedback, particularly when incentives exist to shift blame under negative evaluations. WP3 introduces a hierarchical structure, analyzing how leaders shape the recall and beliefs of their teams, potentially consolidating selective memories into a shared "collective memory." Taken together, these investigations will substantially advance our understanding of motivated memory, its malleability, and its broader implications, particularly in cooperative settings and organizational contexts.
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