Abstract
Virtues such as courage and honesty have long been central to ethical thought, guiding moral actions. People believe that by following these virtues, they can act rightly, an idea also supported by many virtue ethicists. However, when examined through the lens of thick concepts, this conventional understanding of virtues may be called into question. Thick concepts—terms like courage and honesty—not only describe actions but also carry inherent evaluations. Regarding whether thick concepts consistently convey the same evaluation, particularists challenge this view. According to particularists, all thick concepts, whether moral (virtues) or non-moral, have variable valence or are subject to changing evaluations. For example, honesty may be right (positive valence), wrong (negative valence), or even morally neutral. While this view of thick concepts has gained prominence in philosophy, it conflicts with both our intuitive understanding of virtues and the arguments of virtue ethicists. Drawing on the philosophical insights of Iris Murdoch, this project seeks to uncover and reconcile this tension. Specifically, it aims to answer the question: Are virtues an exception of thick concepts that are regarded to convey flexible evaluation and bear variable valence? This research proposes that virtues constitute a distinct category of thick concepts, one aspect of which bears variable valence, while another aspect—namely, virtues—possesses invariant valence.
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