In Relevance: Communication and Cognition (1986/1995), Deirdre Wilson and I developed an account of “ostensive communication” as an alternative to Grice’s theory of conversation. An ostensive communicator draws attention not only to the information she intends to convey but also to her intention to convey it. In doing so, she elicits an expectation of relevance in addressees that guides them in identifying the information communicated. This notion of ostensive communication has been adopted, reinterpreted, modified, and criticized in pragmatics, comparative psychology, and developmental psychology. In the light of these developments, we have been developing a revised account of ostensive communication (Sperber & Wilson. "Rethinking ostensive communication in an evolutionary, comparative, and developmental perspective." Psych. Review 2025). distinguishing two forms: in basic ostension, communicators give evidence of the information they intend to communicate; in mentalistic ostension, they give evidence of their intention to communicate that information. 

In this presentation, I will contrast our current account of ostension with Gricean approaches to communication.

Speaker: Dan Sperber - Department of Cognitive Science, CEU (Vienna) and Institut Jean Nicod, ENS (Paris)

Practical information

When? Thursday April 23rd, 4-6pm, we welcome you to the reception afterwards.

Where? UAntwerp City Campus, building B, room: B.002 (map)

Registration is not necessary.