Research team
Expertise
Study of primary and secundary sources of the phenomenological movement, especially Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Contibution to the development of contemporary phenomenology, more precisely concerning the status of embodiment and consciousness. Critique of naturalism.
The Philosophy of Gesture: an investigation of bodily expression inspired by Mead, Vygotsky and Merleau-Ponty.
Abstract
The project will result in a publication co-authored by David McNeill (University of Chicago) and Liesbet Quaeghebeur about some theoretical aspects of multimodal language use, i.e. the human capacity for expression viewed as an embodied process rather than as a purely linguistic one.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Reynaert Peter
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
The body-subject as transcendental condition for language use. Merleau-Ponty and the embodiment debate in linguistic pragmatics.
Abstract
Because of the recent introduction of 'embodiment' in linguistic pragmatics, the obvious comparison with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of embodied language should be made. This way, two scientific domains which both deal with language use, but which in practice know little about each other's work, can come to a fertile mutual influence.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Reynaert Peter
- Co-promoter: De Mulder Walter
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Congres : "8th Annual Congress of the Association for the Scientific Study fo Consciousness"
Theories of phenomenal consciousness:a search for an adequate non-reductionistic framework.
Abstract
The main objective of the project is to give a systematic overview of contemporary naturalistic theories of phenomenal consciousness (qualia). The focus is on the following problem: all contemporary reductionist theories of phenomenal consciousness are based on the assumption that cognition can be studied without the mention of consciousness. Consciousness is then characterized in causal-functional terms, independent of a phenomenal characterization. Our diagnosis is that reductionism is an untenable position, because it renders phenomenal consciousness into an epiphenomenon: there emerges an unsolvable mind-bodyproblem then, because of the unbridgeable explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness and the causal/functional notions that are associated with consciousness. The bridging of the gap requires a reframing of the problem.Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Leilich Joachim
- Co-promoter: Reynaert Peter
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project
Materialism and phenomenal consciousness.
Abstract
Researcher(s)
- Promoter: Leilich Joachim
- Co-promoter: Reynaert Peter
Research team(s)
Project type(s)
- Research Project