My research focuses on the regulation of corporate governance, broadly defined, including shareholder activism, the role of controlling shareholders, executive compensation, loyalty voting rights, related party transactions ... A key focus of my research is how corporate governance can combat short-termist behavior by corporations. In my research, I rely on the methods of comparative law, the economic analysis of law, and empirical and econometric research.
Short-termism in corporate governance: a continental European perspective.
AbstractShort-termist behavior by corporations is considered a large societal problem. Many scholars have already argued that some investors are excessively focused on the short term, and that this short-termism is transmitted to corporate management through executive compensation and shareholder activists. However, most of the academic evidence has only studied the US and the UK, ignoring the specificities of corporate governance in continental Europe. Compared with the US and the UK, more corporations have a controlling shareholder in continental Europe, and shareholder activism and share-based executive compensation is rarer. So far, the academic evidence has not analyzed the implications of these differences in corporate governance. This has not stopped European jurisdictions from adopting measures to combat short-termism in corporate governance, for example by introducing loyalty voting rights. This research project analyzes the potential of corporate governance to discourage short-termism in two continental European jurisdictions, Belgium and France. It does so by reviewing the existing literature on short-termism in the US and the UK, comparing the US and the UK to Belgium and France, and providing new empirical evidence on Belgium and France. On the basis of this research, the proposals for corporate governance reform will be analyzed. This will help legislators and corporations take better informed decisions on combatting short-termism.
- Research Project