The international character of the academic world offers many benefits. Science as a whole thrives on co-operation across borders. But internationalization also brings with it the possibility of certain risks and some prudence is advised. Apart from leading to many valuable co-operations there is also a risk for involuntary interference such as the unlawful obtaining of information, the unwanted influencing of research, cyberattacks and the violation of human rights.
Knowledge security also features prominently on the political agenda due to shifts in the geopolitical landscape. The European Commission has already published a Staff Working Document on Tackling R&I Foreign Interference, and the Flemish government is likewise developing a knowledge security policy.
FWO has also implemented a knowledge security policy and introduced a Security Appraisal Tab in its application procedure. This tab serves an awareness-raising purpose and expects researchers to reflect on and consider the potential increased risks associated with their research projects and partnerships.
In 2022, the Flemish Interuniversity Council (VLIR) published a knowledge security vision statement (in Dutch) outlining a values-based framework with a strong focus on self-regulation and co-creation with the government. In 2025, it also published the Guidelines on Knowledge Security, Dual Use, and Research Misuse.
Within the University of Antwerp, you can always contact the department of Research, Innovation & Valorisation Antwerp’s knowledge security officer for any questions or advice.
Guidelines on Research and Collaborations
Research security risks arise from an interplay of various factors that may carry heightened sensitivity, such as the combination of your research topic and the partner with whom you collaborate. When an increased risk is identified, the Ethical Committee for Misuse, Human Rights & Security (MiHRS) is responsible for screening and providing advice on the project or collaboration.
1. Institutional Collaborations
Due to constantly evolving geopolitical dynamics, a number of restrictions and guidelines concerning collaborations with foreign entities have been introduced at both a national and European level. In this context, certain institutional collaborations with international partners may be subject to screening by the Research Security Contact Point due to a potentially increased risk.
Risks that may arise in the area of research security, are for example foreign interference, unwanted data transfer, misuse of research results, or the involvement of a partner in human rights violations.
Institutional collaborations are collaborations that are formalised through a document that is signed by the university as an institution, either by a central service or by one of its faculties or departments.
These include, for example:
- Research collaborations, with or without external funding;
- Joint PhDs;
- Exchange agreements for students and/or staff;
- Contractual agreements such as Material Transfer Agreements (MTA), Data Transfer Agreements (DTA), and Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDA).
a. EU Sanctions Map
Extra caution is required when collaborating with countries listed on the EU sanctions map. Certain sanctions or restrictions apply to these countries, for example due to armed conflict, human rights violations, etc. For these reasons, such countries may be categorised as a potential higher risk. Researchers are expected to critically reflect on collaborations with partners in these countries.
b. Flemish Export Control Policy
In addition to the European list of countries subject to sanctions, the Flemish government also implements its own export control policy targeting a number of additional countries: Department of Chancellery and Foreign Affairs – Strategic Goods Control Service. Researchers are expected to critically reflect on collaborations with partners in these countries.
2. Country Policy
a. Russia & Belarus
Following the invasion of Ukraine, a wide range of European sanctions have been imposed on Russia and Belarus, including specific restrictions related to Horizon projects. In addition, the Flemish Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs has introduced restrictions, specifically regarding the export and transit of dual-use technologies. Furthermore, the FWO and VLIR have decided to implement limitations on collaborations with partners in Russia and Belarus. Institutional collaboration with partners in these countries is currently not possible.
b. Iran
Iran is also subject to a number of European sanctions. Additionally, in 2018, VLIR issued a statement following the death sentence imposed after an unfair trial on a VUB guest professor. VLIR reiterated its position in 2020. Institutional collaboration with partners in Iran is currently not possible.
c. Israel
On 28 May 2024, a university-wide moratorium (in Dutch) regarding collaborations with Israeli partners was published. All new institutional collaborations must be reported to the MiHRS Committee.
d. China
Year after year, China has been featured in the annual reports of the Belgian State Security Service (2021–2022, 2023, 2024, 2025) due to espionage and interference. When conducting research that is potentially sensitive or involves critical information, a high level of vigilance is required.
As stated in the 2025 annual report:
“Belgium, and by extension all Western countries, maintain a complex relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Cooperation with China is an economic necessity, but we cannot ignore the fact that the country is increasingly acting assertively in its ambition to become a global player politically and economically.”
For the university as well, collaboration with China is in many cases highly valuable, but awareness of certain risks is essential.
i. Seven Sons of National Defence
The Seven Sons of National Defence are seven Chinese universities that cooperate very closely with the Chinese government and military [1] . These institutions were identified as high-risk partners during a Flemish parliamentary session on research security risks in December 2023 [2] . The FWO decided to no longer fund collaborations with any of these institutions. The University of Antwerp follows this decision.
The universities concerned are:
- Beihang University, also known as Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- Beijing Institute of Technology
- Harbin Engineering University
- Harbin Institute of Technology
- Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics
- Nanjing University of Science and Technology
- Northwestern Polytechnical University
ii. CSC Scholarships
As an institution, we also experience substantial mobility to and from China. A well-known funding channel for Chinese researchers going abroad is the China Scholarship Council (CSC). However, CSC scholarships include a number of provisions—such as mandatory return to China, extensive data sharing, and explicit support for the president and the Communist Party—which are considered to pose an increased knowledge security risk.
[1] Policy Brief: The China Defence Universities Tracker. P.6
[2] Schriftelijke vraag 103 (2023-2024) | Vlaams Parlement (in Dutch)
3. Critical Technology
In addition to sensitive partners, research topics themselves may be sensitive and therefore pose a potential risk. Certain research domains have an inherently higher risk profile because they are more susceptible to misuse.
The European Commission has identified ten critical technology domains in which the risks associated with international collaboration are greatest. Each of these domains carries an increased risk
- of civil–military fusion, whereby defence companies and military authorities work closely with universities and research institutions so that innovations rapidly flow into the military sector;
- of misuse, where technology may later be used to violate or restrict human rights (e.g. surveillance, internal repression);
- of the transformative nature of the technology, meaning that it may significantly enhance performance and efficiency and/or cause radical change in certain sectors (VLIR Knowledge Security Guidelines, 2025, p. 11).
4. FWO Research Security Policy
The FWO has implemented its own research security policy, reflected among other things in the Security Appraisal Tab. This tab is part of funding applications and must be completed by researchers for new project proposals.
Projects classified as “potentially increased risk” projects must obtain research security approval from the institution’s internal competent committee before they can commence.