Cedric Jenart holds a Bachelor of Laws (University of Antwerp, summa cum laude), a Master of Laws (University of Antwerp and on exchange Freie Universität Berlin, summa cum laude) and an LL.M (Harvard Law School) as a Fulbright Boas and B.A.E.F. scholar. He interned at the Belgian Constitutional Court and at various international law firms.
His current Ph.D. research is being funded by the FWO Flanders and has been partially performed as a visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public and International Law in Heidelberg (Germany), the University of Lille (France) and the University of Oxford (United Kingdom). It is summarized hereunder.
Constitutional principles on outsourcing rulemaking powers to non-politically-accountable actors in European states
Who else but legislatures should make statutory laws? Nevertheless, all legislatures in Europe pass on some of their power to make statutes to other actors. Traditionally, rulemaking power has been conferred to the executive. More recently, independent agencies and private actors are receiving outsourced, rulemaking powers. Whereas the executive was still controlled by voters or by parliamentary representatives of the voters, these 'non-politically-accountable actors' (NPAAs) are not, or to a lesser extent
Which powers can be outsourced to such NPAAs and to which degree? What mechanisms exist to intervene when the transfer of rulemaking power goes 'too far'? Western European constitutions remain mostly silent on these fundamental questions. Therefore, policy makers, politicians and legal practitioners remain in the dark on the legal sustainability and (possible) outer limits of outsourcing rulemaking powers to non-politically-accountable actors.
My research first aims to derive, from existing treaties, constitutions and statutes, constitutional principles that determine the limits for legislatures to confer their rulemaking powers. Second, the research establishes minimum legal safeguards that the rules, made by non-politically-accountable actors must meet. Ultimately, comparative conclusions for Belgium, France, Germany and the UK will enable us to better understand this crucial practice of modern rulemaking.